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Abstract
This thesis examines how ideals of trusteeship influenced British administration of the
Palestine mandate. The Covenant of the League of Nations described the mandate system as a
'sacred trust of civilisation'; because of this, the powers who held mandates were obligated to
govern the territories they occupied during the First World War with the long-term aim of
establishing them as independent members of the international community. British fulfilment
of that trust drew on wider influences that had informed its rule elsewhere in the colonial
empire; notions of liberalism, utilitarianism, and rationalism, core elements in a British
philosophy of colonial rule, profoundly shaped British governance in Palestine. In utilising a
model of trusteeship to explore the Palestine mandate, this study also explores how colonial
policy-making was shaped by Orientalist representations. Cultural preconceptions enabled the
basic premise of trusteeship by providing a binary image of 'backward', inferior subject
populations in need of assistance and of progressive, superior Western powers capable of
delivering the required 'tutelage'. The influence of trusteeship and Orientalism in Palestine is
examined in five key administrative areas: self-government, immigration, land, education,
and law and order. Under trusteeship, various forms of local and communal self-government
were advanced to provide administrative experience and create a foundation for eventual
participation in national self-government; reform ofland tenure and the facilitation of Jewish
immigration were intended to promote economic growth and increase prosperity amongst all
sections of the population; the government school system was expanded to encourage basic
levels of mass literacy and develop vocational knowledge of modern agricultural techniques;
and the mandatory administration sought to create local, self-sufficient civilian forces to
uphold public security. Such policies allowed British officials to justify their presence in
Palestine through discourses of 'progress' and 'improvement', which were required
irrespective of any British commitments made to support Zionism.
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Under Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the mandates that were
established to govern territories conquered during the First World War were described as 'a
sacred trust of civilisation', given to 'advanced nations' who could 'best undertake' the
responsibility of promoting the welfare and development of 'peoples not yet able to stand by
themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modem world'. The underlying premise of
the mandate system was that a general obligation existed to promote policies that would put
these occupied territories on the path to independence. IWilliam Rappard, an influential
Swiss diplomat and academic who sat on the League of Nations Permanent Mandates
Commission between 1925 and 1939, explained in 1946 that 'the primary task of the
administering authority is one of disinterested guardianship and of progressive development
towards self-government of backward peoples'r' The three different categories of mandate -
'A', 'B', and 'C' - were each designed to reflect the stage of 'development' reached by the
local population. The 'C' mandates, deemed the most 'backward', were located in the South
Pacific and were to be governed as integral parts of the mandatory power; the 'B' mandates,
made up from the German colonies in West and Central Africa, were intended to guarantee
'freedom of conscience and religion' and prevent abuses of power, such as the slave trade;
and the 'A' Mandates, which encompassed the former territories of the Ottoman empire, were
'subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such
time as they are able to stand alone'. 3
In British ideologies of empire, doctrines of 'trusteeship' had a long history that pre-
dated the existence of the mandate system." In 1783, when discussing the East India Bill in
the House of Commons, Edmund Burke had explained that
All political power which is set over men, being wholly artificial, and for so much a
derogation from the natural equality of mankind at large, ought to be some way or
1 Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
2 William E. Rappard, 'Mandates and Trusteeships with Particular Reference to Palestine', The Journal of
Politics, Vol. 8, No.4, (November 1946), p.522.
3 Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
4 Bernard Porter, The Lion's Share: A Short History of British Imperialism, 1850-1995, (Harlow, Pearson
Education, 1996), pp.l8-27.
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other exercised ultimately for their benefit ... such rights ... are all in the strictest sense
a trust; and it is in the very essence of every trust to be rendered accountable. S
These sentiments were echoed by another liberal thinker, John Stuart Mill, when he
suggested that self-government should be the long-term outcome of such a responsibility and
that, unless some effort was made to achieve this objective, imperial powers were 'guilty of a
dereliction of the highest moral trust which can devolve upon a nation'i'' These statements
reflected an important preoccupation with the morality of British imperialism and the vast
power that colonial administrators often wielded. During the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, trusteeship was primarily defensive, aimed at preventing British subjects
from abusing the power they exercised in the colonies in order to check any despotic
influences from spreading back to metropolitan institutions. Yet such ideas soon coalesced
into a liberal model of imperialism that linked 'a theory of imperial legitimacy with the
project of improvement' and produced a 'set of justifications and governing strategies centred
on the duty of liberal reform as the primary purpose of imperial rule' .7
In the colonies of white settlement - Canada, South Africa, Australia, and New
Zealand -liberal moves towards self-government were relatively straightforward, but in other
colonies, where native societies were predominant, trusteeship was an uneven and more
complicated process. Of course, these difficulties, based on derogatory views of local subject
populations, served the imperial order by ensuring the longevity of its rule, which usually
allowed Britain to reap various material benefits on the path to self-government. However,
that is not to say that the moral obligations imposed by trusteeship were redundant. The
ambivalence about extending representative institutions in non-white colonies was usually
grounded in an authentic concern over subject peoples' 'readiness' for such bodies. In fact,
many of the central aspects of trusteeship were developed in response to the problems that
ruling non-white India posed. From the mid-1830s, a sustained attempt was made at
reforming Indian land and tax systems, civil laws, administrative practices, and higher
education along British lines." Through the contributions of various intellectuals like Edmund
Burke, Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, John Stuart Mill, and Thomas Babington Macaulay, and
5 Edmund Burke, quoted in Ronald Hyam, 'Bureaucracy and 'Trusteeship' in the Colonial Empire', in Judith
Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume IV: The Twentieth
Century, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), p.265.
6 John Stuart Mill, quoted in Ibid.
7 Karuna Mantena, Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism, (Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 2010), p.2l. .
8 Porter, The Lion's Share, p.21; D.A. Washbrook, 'India, 1818-60: The Two Faces of Colonialism', in A.
Porter (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume III: The Nineteenth Century, (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2009), pp.395-421.
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colonial administrators such as Lord Cornwallis, Lord Bentinck and Sir Charles Trevelyan, it
is possible to speak of a philosophy of British colonial rule, refined in India, which contained
inherent liberalising, rationalising and utilitarian tendencies.'
The predisposition towards preventing abuses of power within the imperial system
connected trusteeship to currents of humanitarian concern. The anti-slavery movement, for
example, was seen as a key expression of early trusteeship.l" Humanitarianism is beginning
to receive a broader conceptual scope of its own in the history of empire. IIRob Skinner and
Alan Lester, in a special edition of the Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, have
recently sought to persuade historians that they could 'usefully consider the history of
humanitarianism as a fundamental component of imperial relations and a way of bridging
trans-imperial, international and transnational approaches'. 12 They have identified two
founding concepts of humanitarian action: firstly, a 'progressive' or 'developmental' strand
that focused on removing the causes of suffering; and secondly, an obligation to provide
relief in times of a particular crisis, which has tended to shape modem definitions of
humanitarianism.V The former was broader and focused on addressing the ills of
'underdeveloped' societies, whilst the latter was aimed at alleviating individual distress. A
commitment to improve the welfare of subject populations was also present in the ideology of
trusteeship. The idea that colonialism could benefit a subject people as well as the colonial
power and wider international community through development was a powerful justification
for empire. In 1895, for example, the colonial secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, explained to
the House of Commons that 'estates which belong to the British Crown may be developed for
the benefit of their population and for the benefit of the greater population which is
outside' .14 The argument gained its most resonant application in Frederick Lugard's 'dual
9 See, for example, the classic work of Eric Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India, (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1959). For a more recent illustration, see Uday Mehta, Liberalism and Empire: A Study in
Nineteenth Century British Liberal Thought, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1999).
10 Andrew Porter, 'Trusteeship, Anti-Slavery, and Humanitarianism', in Porter, The Oxford History of the
British Empire, Volume III, p.199.
11 See Michael Barnett, Empires of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism, (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University
Press, 2011).
12 Rob Skinner and Alan Lester, 'Humanitarianism and Empire: New Research Agendas', Journal of Imperial
and Commonwealth History, Vol. 40, No.5, (December 2012), p.731.
13 Ibid, p730.
14 Hansard He Deb, 22 August 1895, Vol. 36, c642.
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mandate' that provided both a method and rationale for British imperialism in Africa in the
inter-war years of the twentieth century.P
The ideology of trusteeship could, however, only function within the limits prescribed
by the political, economic, and social realities of the empire. Moreover, it could not run
counter to imperial interests." In a recent study on the intellectual works of Sir Henry Maine,
Karuna Mantena argued that in the wake of events like the Indian Mutiny of 1857 and the
Morant Bay Rebellion in 1865, reformist models of liberal imperialism that espoused
universalism were undermined by a culturalist stance dedicated to protecting the 'traditional'
nature of native societies from the negative effects of modernisation as part of an attempt to
stabilise imperial rule." Mantena argues that the geographic expansion of the British empire
between 1857 and 1914 coincided with 'a phase ofliberal retrenchment and the repudiation
of central assumptions and imperatives underlying the "civilising mission" .18 She continued:
The disruptive, structural impact of colonial/modern institutions upon native society
vividly demonstrated the urgent need for protection. The call for the protection or
rehabilitation of society was committed not only to the idea that native society
contained within itself the resources for its maintenance and reproduction, but also
that this unity was threatened by and yet in need of imperial rule. For itwas the
portrayal of native society as simultaneously intact and vulnerable that underpinned
the paternalistic impulse of late imperial rule."
Mantena's work is particularly useful for exploring some of the ideological origins of indirect
rule. The paternal impulses that she describes became a key element of trusteeship in the
inter-war years, but it is possible that she has overstated the case regarding the demise of
liberal justifications of imperialism. As Peter Cain suggested in response to Alibis of Empire,
the assumption that the liberal model of imperialism disappeared completely in the late
nineteenth century needs qualifying: despite the fact that the indirect approach to colonial
administration became prominent in many parts of the empire, it was not practiced
everywhere, and Britain 'always saw the imperial project as morally charged, as an
endeavour to bring 'civilisation' to the benighted'r"
IS See Frederick Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, (Edinburgh, William Blackwood &
Sons, 1923).
16 Porter, The Lion's Share, p.22.
17 See Mantena, Alibis of Empire.
18 Ibid, p.2.
19 Ibid, p.6.
20 Peter J. Cain, 'Character, 'Ordered Liberty', and the Mission to Civilise: British Moral Justification of
Empire, 1870-1914', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 40, No.4, (November 2012), p.SS8.
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The form of trusteeship that Britain exercised in the inter-war years was a blend of
both the 'developmental' and 'protective' doctrines, which served to rehabilitate a more
liberal, interventionist imperial agenda for the administration of the new mandated territories.
InJuly 1919, Leo Amery, who became colonial secretary in 1924, explained to the House of
Commons that he did not think the mandates would
Impose upon us any conditions ... we have not been in the habit of imposing upon
ourselves whenever we dealt with subject peoples. We have always in very large
measures treated native territories under our rule as a mandate to us in the interests of
the inhabitants and of the world at large, and we have justified our authority not
merely in our own interests, but by the general consent of other nations with regard to
our rule. It is our task now to do this work more successfully than ever, and to
establish beyond doubt in the judgment of mankind that we are worthy of the trust
reposed in us.21
The mandates therefore provided a new form oflegitimacy to trusteeship, but the system
itself was primarily structured around providing a fresh justification for European
imperialism in an age of Wilsonian national self-determination and anti-colonlalism.P They
were also designed to forge a stable consensus amongst the victorious powers on the use of
conquered territories to prevent future rivalries." Of course, the 'tutelage' that the mandatory
powers were to exercise would allow them to maintain strategic priorities and, it was
assumed, ensure subservience to Western political institutions when mandated territories
reached 'independence' - whatever form that would take." Yet it has perhaps been too easy
to make the assumption that this rhetoric was only a superficial justification. Trusteeship
allowed colonial officials to justify their presence in Palestine through discourses of
'improvement' and 'progress' but, as will be demonstrated in this thesis, it also profoundly
influenced the mandatory administration by emphasising the importance of various ideals
such as constitutional legitimacy through advancing forms of self-government; liberal
economic development through 'rational' reform of land tenure; the maintenance of public
security by civilian bodies; and access to basic forms of elementary and 'technical' education.
21 Hansard HC Deb, 30 July 1919, Vol. 118, c2175.
22 Michael Adas, 'Contested Hegemony: The Great War and the Afro-Asian Assault on the Civilising Mission
Ideology', Journal of World History, Vol. IS, No.1, (2004), ppAI-2; Susan Pedersen, 'The Meaning of the
Mandates System: An Argument', Geschichte und Gesellschaft, Vol. 32, No.4, (October-December 2006),
ff.560-582. '
William Roger Louis, 'The United Kingdom and the Beginning of the Mandates System, 1919-1922,
International Organisation, Vol. 23, No.1, (Winter 1969), pp.73-96.
24 Scott Atran, 'The Surrogate Colonisation of Palestine, 1917-39', American Ethnologist, Vol. 16, No.4,
(November 1989), pp.no.
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The Historiography of British Rule in Palestine
Doctrines of trusteeship have rarely been used to analyse the Palestine mandate. Instead,
historians have, understandably, tended to focus on the development of Arab-Jewish tensions
in Palestine as their primary concern. As the formative period of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the
mandate has generated a substantial body of work that seems incongruous with the fact that it
was actually a 'relative blip in the history of empire', lasting from just 1922 to 1948.25 The
reason for this is that, after declaring its intention to hand the mandate back to the United
Nations in May 1947, the British withdrawal from Palestine a year later, amidst escalating
violence, was one of the greatest failures in British imperial history.26 Not only did Britain
evacuate without designating a successor government (a unique state of affairs in the long
history of empire) but the fate of Palestine was left to be decided by a civil war that quickly
escalated into a destabilising regional confrontation. The legacy of that war remains unsolved
and continues to define the political situation in the Middle East, but it has also had a
profound effect on the historiography of the mandate period. The subsequent development of
the conflict has formed the overarching theme of much of the literature on British rule in
Palestine, which has reflected political and cultural debates from 1948 to the present. The
influence of such debates has led to periodic re-examination of the history of the mandate as
new frameworks of interpretation are established which mirror contemporary concerns.
Many historians have come to acknowledge that much of the early historiography on
mandatory rule was written from perspectives that had been distorted by either ideological
bias or methodological failings." For Kenneth Stein, the importance of advocating a political
viewpoint had undermined 'nuances of terminology, the causation of events, [and] the
identification of mechanisms of change in the conflict's evolution' .18Arguably, however, the
problem was more fundamental as scholars tended to operate out of national historical
narratives that placed discursive limits upon their categories of analysis and the conclusions
2' Nicholas E. Roberts, 'Re-Remembering the Mandate: Historiographical Debates and Revisionist History in
the Study of British Palestine', History Compass, Vol. 9, No.3, (March 2011), p.216.
26 D.K. Fieldhouse, Western Imperialism in the Middle East, 1914-1958, (Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2009), p.l51.
27 See Roberts, 'Re-Remembering the Mandate', p.215-30; Rachel Maissy-Noy, 'Palestinian Historiography in
Relation to the Territory of Palestine' , Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 42, No.6, (November 2006), pp.889-905;
Martin Bunton, 'Mandate Daze: Stories of British Rule in Palestine, 1917-48', International Journal of Middle
Eastern Studies, Vol. 35, No.3, (August 2003), pp.485-92; Zachary Lockman, 'Railway Workers and Relational
History: Arabs and Jews in British-Ruled Palestine', Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 35, No.
3, (July 1993), pp.601-27; Kenneth Stein, 'A Historiographic Review of Literature on the Origins of the Arab-
Israeli Conflict', American Historical Review, Vol. 96, No.5, (December 1991), pp.l450-65.
28 Stein, 'A Historiographic Review of Literature on the Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict', p.1564.
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they could reach.29 Such narratives gave significant attention to 'elites' and the diplomatic,
political, and military aspects of history, to the disadvantage of 'other' groups and the social,
economic, and cultural dimensions of the mandate in Palestine. This theory - called the 'dual
society' model- assumed that the Arab and Jewish communities had fundamentally
disconnected historical trajectories that, because of their divergent national aims, could only
interact in certain ways, the chief of which was conflict, violent or otherwise.i'' The
conceptual paradigm on which these narratives rested was a fixed representation of the Arab
and Jewish communities as self-contained, monolithic entities that developed along distinct
and independent paths in accordance with their unique internal dynamics.
Much of the early historiography was influenced by the dual society model. A key
premise of this hypothesis was that the ideological and political pressures exerted within the
Arab and Jewish communities produced a form of economic stratification that resulted in
divergent levels of modernisation and restricted mutual relations." If the main interaction this
model allowed for was conflict, then it is unsurprising that it formed a dominant theme in the
historiography. Before the release of archival materials, the earliest studies attempted to
understand the major turning points under the mandate and how politics had shaped aspects
of the conflict's origin.32 Such studies emphasised the inevitable nature of the conflict and
categorised Britain's role as one of conciliation between the two communities. The de-
classification of official documents, particularly those of the Colonial and Foreign Offices,
during the 1970s and 1980s enabled a core body ofliterature that focused on 'elite'
diplomatic, political, and military history." An important theme that these works displayed
was the tendency to regard Zionism as the key factor driving the history of the mandate,
presenting a trajectory of Jewish development against Arab backwardness.
29 Roberts, 'Re-Remembering the Mandate', p.21S.
30 Lockman, 'Railway Workers and Relational History', pp.601-2.
31 Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, Origins of the Israeli Polity: Palestine under the Mandate, (Chicago,
University of Chicago Press, 1978), p.13.
32 See Jacob Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, (New York, Norton, 1950); Christopher Sykes, Crossroads to
Israel, (London, Collins, 1965). , .
33 See Michael Cohen, Palestine. Retreatfrom the Mandate: The Making of British Policy. 1936-45, (London,
Elek, 1978); G. Sheffer, 'British Colonial Policy-Making Towards Palestine, 1929-39', Middle Eastern Studies,
Vol. 14, No.3, (1978); Bernard Wasserstein, The British in Palestine: The Mandatory Government and the
Arab-Jewish Conflict, 1917-1929, (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1991); Nicholas Bethell, The Palestine Triangle:
The Struggle between the British. the Jews. and the Arabs. 1935-48, (London, Deutsch, 1979); Wm. Roger
Louis and Robert W. Stookey (ed.), The End of the Palestine Mandate, (London, Tauris, 1986); Michael Cohen,
Palestine to Israel: from Mandate to Independence, (London, Frank Cass, 1988); Ritchie Ovendale, Britain, the
United States, and the End of the Palestine Mandate, 1942-48, (Woodbridge, Royal Historical Society, 1989).
See also Kenneth Stein's historiographic essay for a comprehensive overview of this 'traditional' literature.
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The field has, however, become more nuanced as the value of the dual society
explanation for analysing Arab-Jewish relations was undermined during the late 1980s and
early 1990s through the work of revisionist historians who questioned some of the key
assumptions that underpinned it. Among the revisionists, the 'new Israeli' historians were
particularly prominent in challenging the conventional narratives of early Zionist
historiography, especially regarding the events of 1948 and the. 'myths' surrounding the
establishment of the Israeli state." This project of critique allowed a re-conceptualisation of
the Arab-Jewish problem to create a framework that involved an exploration of the social,
economic, and cultural dimensions of each society in what has been called a 'relational'
approach." The main concern of this new approach was to emphasise that an understanding
of the Arab and Jewish communities could only be adequately reached by studying the ways
inwhich both were constituted and shaped by a complex matrix of economic, political,
social, and cultural interactions." If the dual society model was characterised by a 'realist'
approach to Arab-Jewish interests and interactions, the social and cultural aspects of the
relational paradigm signalled a move towards more 'discursive' frames of analysis and
emphasised the importance of cultural understandings in shaping relationships under the
mandate. The utility of this concept has allowed it to deliver more sophisticated conclusions
about Arab-Jewish relations.f
In terms of the British role under the mandate, both frameworks have presented some
difficulties as the predominant focus has been on the Arab and Jewish communities in
Palestine or the policy of the British government in London, which tends to neglect the
importance of how Britain administered the mandate in a quotidian context. The function of
the mandatory administration has typically been portrayed as that of a neutral 'umpire'
attempting to 'hold the ring' between the two communities until tensions escalated to such a
34 See Simha Flapan, The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities, (New York, Pantheon, 1987); Benny Morris, The
Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-49, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989); Avi
Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine,
(Cambridge, Columbia University Press, 1988); l1an Pappe, Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-51,
(Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1988); Gershon Shafir, Land, Labor, and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian
Conflict, 1882-1914, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989).
35 Lockman, 'Railway Workers and Relational History', p.604.
36 See Zachary Lockman, Comrades and Enemies: Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine, 1906-48, (Berkeley,
University of California Press, 1996); Ronen Shamir, Colonies of Law: Colonialism, Zionism, and Law in Early
Mandate Palestine, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000); Mark Levine, Overthrowing Geography:
Jaffa, Tel Aviv, and the Strugglefor Palestine, 1880-1948, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2005);
Hillel Cohen, Army of Shadows: Palestinian Collaboration with Zionism, 1917-48, (Berkeley, University of
California Press, 2009); l1an Pappe, A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples, (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2012).
37 Lockman, 'Railway Workers and Relational History', p.605.
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point that Britain had no choice but to withdraw. The contentious issue of land, a
fundamental prerequisite for nation-building, was deemed to embody a laissez-faire British
position that enabled the Zionists to exploit their influence under the mandate and the
inherent weakness of Arab society to build the nucleus of a state whilst Britain did little to
intercede except to uphold law and order. Such an approach, it was argued, allowed Britain to
tolerate a systemic process of land transfers from Arabs to Jews.38 The focus on 'high' policy,
white papers, and the decision-making process in London led historians to question whether
Britain was 'pro-Arab', 'pro-Zionist', or even just 'pro-British' in its attitude towards
Palestine, yet this can often create a reductive framework of analysis. So, too, can the
tendency to present the years between 1920 and 1936 as recurring cycles that Britain was
unable to control. This cycle went as follows: the Zionist movement in London would
pressure the British government to establish a favourable situation in Palestine, which would
result in a reaction - diplomatic or violent - from the Arab community; a commission of
inquiry would then produce conclusions sympathetic to the Arabs; after which a diplomatic
struggle in London would allow the Zionists to use their influence and restore the status quo
to begin a new cycle.39 Whilst this pattern of events clearly happened, the cycle does not go
far enough in incorporating the role of the mandatory administration, its capacity for
influencing events, and the changes that were actually occurring in Palestine under the
mandate.
In the late 1990s, historians began to explore the more routine aspects of the
mandatory government." These studies were a welcome development in the historiography,
but some conceptual restraints that had characterised the study of the British rule in Palestine
remained: namely, a tendency to concentrate on Zionism as the major driving force behind
developments during the mandate period. Naomi Shepherd concluded that colonial officials,
however well-meaning, were ultimately 'ploughing sand' in their attempt to develop an
administrative apparatus that nurtured Arab-Jewish relations as the foundation for a polity
because Zionism inevitably exacerbated nationalist tensions on both sides." AJ. Sherman
38 See Kenneth Stein, The Land Question in Palestine. 1917-39, (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina
Press, 1984); Pappe, A History of Modern Palestine, pp.97-102.
39 W.F. Abboushi, 'The Road to Rebellion: Arab Palestine in the 1930s', Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 6,
No.3, (Spring 1977), p.23.
40 See Andrew Shennan, Mandate Days: British Lives in Palestine. 1918-48, (London, Thames and Hudson,
1997); Naomi Shepherd, Ploughing Sand: British Rule in Palestine. 1917-48, (London, John Murray, 1999);
Segev, One Palestine. Complete; Roza El-Eini, Mandated Landscape: British Imperial Rule in Palestine. 1929-
48, (London, Routledge, 2006).
41 Shepherd, Ploughing Sand, p.247.
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suggested that British administrators favoured the Arabs in Palestine because they resembled
a traditional 'subject' population that needed protection and guidance against Zionism.f Tom
Segev, coming from the 'new Israeli' perspective, argued that Jewish nation-building took
place under British protection and that British actions 'considerably favoured the Zionist
enterprise', in an attempt to revise a prevailing theme in Zionist historiography that treated
Britain as an imperialist oppressor from whom independence was won.43
Despite divergent views on the British attitude to Zionism, the prevailing themes
within the historiography are the failure and futility of the mandatory administration. The
desert provided the metaphorical imagery; not only was Britain 'ploughing sand' but 'from
the outset, the British edifice had been built on [it]' .44 A common verdict was that the
creation of a bi-national state in Palestine was impossible, that Arab-Jewish conflict under
mandate was inevitable, and that the consequent civil war was unavoidable. As Martin
Bunton has suggested, a major problem with such views is that they can display a
'conspicuous act of retroactive determinism'i'" The issue of context also manifests itself in
the failure of these works to situate the Palestine mandate within the wider current of ideas on
British imperialism and colonialism in the inter-war years, which is unfortunate because in
turning away from 'high' policy some of these works actually sought to address the question
of what motivated colonial officials and a connection such as this could have allowed a
broader conceptual scope."
Bunton has adopted a wider frame of reference in his study on the land system in
Palestine by focusing on the way in which the mandate was part of a broader system of
British imperial administration.V He suggests that Palestine was a quasi-colonial territory
with fundamental cultural and religious divisions that were not particularly unusual within the
British empire. As many officials who served in Palestine had also been stationed elsewhere
in the colonial empire, they brought their habits of mind and preconceptions with them. His
book, Colonial Land Policies in Palestine, is a detailed examination of how these officials
attempted to apply prior assumptions and experiences to the problems of land ownership and
use in Palestine. In these issues, Arab-Jewish tensions were relatively insignificant as the
main difficulty for the mandatory administration was an archaic system of land tenure.
42 Sherman, Mandate Days, p.l6
43 Segev, One Palestine. Complete, p.S.
44 Ibid, p.S1S.
45 Bunton, 'Mandate Daze', p.48S.
46 Sherman, Mandate Days, pp.11-54.
47 Bunton, Colonial Land Policies in Palestine, pp.1-29.
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Bunton argues that the British instinct to reform the land system, with the aim of creating a
society of freeholders and tenants with clearly defined rights in a market economy, was
derived from their own experiences of the empire, which were far more influential than the
commitment to build a Jewish national home. The core of his study examines the attempt to
create a free market economy and the problems that caused it to fail, but the historiographical
reorientation that it embarks upon is one that needs to be applied across all aspects of the
mandate, not just the land regime.
Orientalism, Empire, and Trusteeship
The cultural preconceptions held by colonial officials are a crucial yet relatively under-
explored aspect of British rule in Palestine. A recent historiographic review of the literature
on the mandate has described British rule 'as ripe for the kind of post-colonial and subaltern
analyses that the history of Zionist settlement and Palestinian nationalism has gone
through,.48 Post-colonial theory has significant potential to enrich historical investigation of
the British imperial and colonial experience, yet traditional historians have been reluctant to
engage with these analytical tools. Inmany areas of British academic history, the reception of
post-colonial thought has been ambivalent, with historians remaining staunchly committed to
empiricism." This has especially been the case with conservative historians of the empire,
where there have been few 'big ideas' and relatively little 'theory-building'; it is perhaps
telling that debate still revolves around the century old theories of J.A. Hobson or the half-
century old ones of Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher.i'' Overall, historians have been
sceptical of explanations that obscure the variety of the British imperial experience.I' At
times, this general hesitancy is understandable as some post-colonial theorists treat
imperialism as an abstract that can be removed from the context of its 'history' altogether
through a predisposition to treat imperial power as an all-embracing, trans-historical force
that controls and transforms every aspect of colonised societies. 52
These tendencies have formed a divide between political and cultural historians that
has become difficult to cross. Stephen Howe has suggested that 'imperial history and colonial
48 Roberts, 'Re-Remembering the Mandate', p.223.
49 See Patrick Joyce, 'The Return of History: Postmodemism and the Politics of Academic History in Britain',
Past & Present, Vol. 151, No.1, (February 1998), pp.207-35.
so See JA Hobson, Imperialism: A Study, (London, James Nisbet & Co, 1902); and Ronald Robinson and John
Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians: The "Official Mind" of Imperia/ism, (London, Macmillan, 1961).
SI See, for example, David Cannadine, 'The Empire Strikes Back', Past & Present, Vol. 147, No.1, (May
1995), p.182.
S2 See, for example, Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture, (London, Routledge, 2004).
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discourse analysis, the traditional chroniclers and the cultural theorists, apparently speak
mutually incomprehensible - worse, reciprocally despised -languages,.53 The polemical
context of the debate that surrounds post-colonial critique has frequently resulted in
'overdetermined' caricatures of the positions of both its practitioners and their critics that
have impeded opportunities for positive exchanges, despite a variety of calls for this to
happen. 54 A constructive engagement with post-colonial theory can provide a greater
understanding of the cultural preconceptions that British officials carried with them in
Palestine. The most recent and detailed attempt to utilise post-colonial theory in a study on
the mandate has not provided a particularly stable platform for historical investigation as it
homogenises all of the preceding historiography as an integral part of the colonial discourse
and proceeds to dismiss or 'unwrite' it all.ss Nevertheless, it remains the case that
understanding cultural assumptions offers an important mode of generating new perspectives
on British actions under the mandate; in using post-colonial theory, this thesis will seek to
expand on conventional narratives of trusteeship by suggesting that cultural images played a
significant role in shaping the implementation of policies on the ground.
To understand those images, this thesis will argue that Edward Said's path-breaking
study Orientalism can be used to provide a framework of analysis for historical
investigation. 56In looking beyond the conception of colonial power as a material
phenomenon and presenting it instead as an epistemological system, Orienta/ism served as a
foundational text for the discipline of post-colonial studies and is one of the most important
books of the late twentieth century. It is now relatively old, published over 30 years ago, yet
it retains significant potential: as Edmund Burke III and David Prochaska have recently
suggested, 'rumours of its demise have been greatly exaggerated' .57A key part of its capacity
to enrich historical investigation lies in its ability to develop a perspective that can scrutinise
S3 Quoted in John Mackenzie, 'Edward Said and the Historians', Nineteenth Century Contexts, Vol. 18, No. I,
(1994), p.23.
S4 Mrinalini Sinha, 'Historia Nervosa or Who's Afraid of Colonial-Discourse Analysis?', Journal of Victorian
Culture, Vol. 2, No.1, (Spring 1997), p.l15; Dane Kennedy, 'Imperial History and Post-Colonial Theory',
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth Studies, Vol. 24, No.3, (September 1996); Bart Moore-Gilbert,
'Postcolonial Cultural Studies and Imperial Historiography: Problems of Interdisciplinarity', Interventions, Vol.
1, No.3, (1999); Edmund Burke III and David Prochaska (ed.), Genealogies ofOrientalism: History, Politics,
Theory, (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 2008); Spencer Mawby, 'Orientalism and the Failure of British
Policy in the Middle East: The Case of Aden', Journal of the Historical Association, Vol. 95, No. 319, (July
2010), pp.332-353.
ss Zeina Ghandour,A Discourse on Domination in Mandate Palestine: Imperialism, Property, Insurgency,
(London, Routledge, 2009).
S6 Edward W. Said, Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient, (London, Penguin, 2003).
57 Burke and Prochaska, 'Introduction: Oriental ism from Postcolonial Theory to World History', in Burke and .
Prochaska (ed.), Genealogies of Orientalism, p l ,
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'elitist' sources whilst not necessarily privileging an elitist viewpoint. Said's ideas can enable
analysts to 'identify' the pattern of cultural references that are present in the archival record
on the mandate. It is therefore particularly useful for analysing the views of colonial
administrators, which has become somewhat lost as cultural theorists have tended to
concentrate on cultural production rather than policy-making. Said is also more attentive to
'history' than most theorists from the post-colonial canon as he paid considerable attention to
what went on 'outside' the text. As Burke and Prochaska explain, Said sought to place
'individual authors in a historical tradition' and in doing so gave different treatment and
attached varying levels of importance to those writers, which is demonstrative of the fact that
Orientalism is more historically nuanced than Said is often given credit for. 58 Nevertheless,
the book has drawn sustained criticism on the grounds that it is ahistorical or theoretically
inconsistent" This thesis is not the place to recount or resolve these long-running debates-
if that were even possible - but some general points can be made by way of explaining how
Orientalism supports trusteeship and the analytical framework of this thesis.
In its broadest sense, Said explained that Orientalism was a way for Europe to come
to terms with the Orient based on its special place in Western experience. This experience
included a cultural enterprise that was 'almost a European invention, and had been since
antiquity a place of romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes, remarkable
experiences'i'" Said therefore suggests that Orientalism is the sum of Western representations
of 'the East'. In a more specific manner, Said delivered three separate, yet inter-dependent
meanings for Orientalism that give shape to a general understanding of it. Firstly, Said gives
an academic meaning:
Anyone who teaches about, writes about, or researches the Orient - and this applies
whether the person is an anthropologist, sociologist, historian, or philologist - either
S8 Ibid, p.8.
S9 Generally, critiques of Orientalism fall into two categories: critical engagements and hostile dismissals. The
more important critical engagements are James Clifford, 'On Orientalism' The Predicament of Culture:
twentieth century ethnography. literature. and art, (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1988); Dennis
Porter, 'Orientalism and Its Problems' in Francis Barker (ed.), The Politics of Theory: Proceedings from the
Essex Conference on the Sociology of Literature, (Colchester, University of Essex, 1982); Sadik Jalal al-' Azm,
'Orientalism and Orientalism in Reverse', Khamsin, No.8, (1981); and Homi Bhabha, 'The Other Question:
Stereotype, Discrimination, and the Discourse of Colonialism', The Location of Culture. For the latter, see
Bernard Lewis, 'The Question of Oriental ism', Islam and the West, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993);
John Mackenzie, Orientalism: History. Theory. and the Arts, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1995);
Robert Irwin, For Lust of Knowing: The Orientalists and their Enemies, (London, Penguin, 2007); and Ibn
Warraq, Defending the West: A Critique of Edward Said's Orientalism, (Amherst, Prometheus Books, 2007).
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in its specific or its general aspects, is an Orientalist, and what he or she does is
Orientalism.i'
This suggests an extremely broad area of inter-disciplinary academic knowledge. Until
Orientalism was published, this was the conventional conception of an orientalist; a scholar
working in a field of (somewhat arcane) academic knowledge concerned with applying
impartial scientific methods and value-free techniques to studying the peoples, cultures,
religions, and languages of the Orient. But Said went on to suggest that these 'value-free'
techniques were actually based on an imaginary and binary division between the Orient and'
the Occident, giving Orientalism a metaphysical character:
Orientalism is a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological
distinction made between 'the Orient' and (most of the time) 'the Occident.' Thus a
very large mass of writers ... have accepted the basic distinction between the East and
West as the starting point for elaborate theories, epics, novels, social descriptions, and
political accounts concerning the Orient, its people, customs, 'mind,' destiny, and so
on. This Orientalism can accommodate Aeschylus, say, and Victor Hugo, Dante and
Karl Marx.62 .
This dichotomy between the East and the West is created through what Said calls
'imaginative geography', where the practice of designating in one's mind a familiar space
which is 'ours' and an unfamiliar space beyond that as 'theirs' is a way of making
geographical distinctions that can be arbitrary, but also become replete with suppositions,
assumptions, and fictions that crowd the unfamiliar space and give it meaning.f" It is in the
traffic between the academic and imaginative meanings of Orientalism that Said comes to the
third meaning of Orientalism, which is more historically and materially defined than the other
two:
Taking the late eighteenth century as a very roughly defined starting point Orientalism
can be discussed and analysed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient
- dealing with it by making statements about it, authorising views of it, describing it,
by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for
dominating, restructuring and having authority over the Orient."
It is this meaning of Orientalism that helps to produce and sustain a rationalisation for the
foundation of commercial, economic, or strategic interests in the Orient. This institutional







The key point to be taken forward from this reading of Orientalism is to acknowledge
the importance of representation without abandoning the idea that an underlying reality is
being represented. From the suggestion that the Orient and the Occident as both geographical
and cultural entities are constructed around a series of man-made binary divisions imposed by
the Orientalist, it should be clear that Said's argument revolves around the idea that Western
representations of the Orient are not based on what is actually 'there' but on observations that
result from subjective fantasies and assumptions on what this radically different place should
contain. In suggesting that Orientalists 'constructed' the Orient, what Said insists is that
Orientalism actually reveals little about the so-called Orient, but far more about the culture
and values of the Orientalists who have constructed it.65
Crucially, however, Orientalism functioned as an institution. Itwould be wrong to
conclude that the Orient 'was essentially an idea, or a creation with no corresponding
reality,.66 The imaginative assumptions of Oriental ism, supplied by academic Orientalists, are
disseminated through an institutional structure whose opinions and views on the Orient
circulate as objective truths; Orientalism is
Not an airy European fantasy about the Orient, but a created body of theory and
practice in which, for many generations, there has been a considerable material
investment. Continued investment made Orientalism, as a system of knowledge about
the Orient, an accepted grid for filtering through the Orient into Western
consciousness, just as that same investment multiplied - indeed, made truly
productive - the statements proliferating out from Orientalism into the general
culture."
So whilst acknowledging the man-made and arbitrary nature of the structures of Orientalism,
Said is suggesting that it is not simply the case that it is 'a structure oflies and or of myths
which, were the truth about them to be told, would simply blow away'. Said's contention is
that 'ideas, cultures, and histories cannot seriously be understood or studied without their
force, or more precisely their configurations of power, also being studied' .68The relationship
between the Orient and Occident was one of power and of domination. The Orient was
'Orientalised' not only because it was discovered to be 'Oriental', but also because the
Orientalist could speak for and represent the Orient as a consequence of the disparity in
strength between the East and the West.
65 John McLeod, Beginning Postcolonialism, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2000), p.4l.




The focus on power is reflective of the diverse theoretical underpinnings of
Orientalism and the flexibility of Said's method. This is where he has opened himself to
various charges of inconsistency, but it is also why Orientalism is so productive and enabling.
One of the most apparent influences in the book is from Michel Foucault. For Foucault,
power was an anonymous network of relations which is strategic only in the way that it seeks
to maximise itself by all means. For example, governments are the agents of power, not its
author, and individuals are only ever 'functions' of the systems within which they operate.
Said, on the other hand, stressed that Western domination of the non-Western world was not
an arbitrary or anonymous phenomenon but a conscious process governed by the intention of
individuals as well as by institutional imperatives: 'unlike Michel Foucault, to whose work I
am greatly indebted, I do believe in the determining imprint of individual writers upon the
otherwise anonymous collective body of texts constituting a discursive formation like
Orientalism'J" Said inscribes a model of agency and intention in Oriental ism that allows him
to analyse various Orientalists who have contributed to the construction of the discourse.
This deviation is largely the result of Said's attempts to synthesize the concepts of
power and discourse from Foucault with that of hegemony from Antonio Gramsci. One of the
key influences is Gramsci's notion that cultural reproduction operates alongside the more
tangible and public mediations of power, such as government and legal systems, to position
groups into hierarchical relations. Gramsci's main concern was with the way that consent was
solicited from 'subaltern' sectors of civil society through channels like cultural practices; he
argued that 'one should not count only on the material force which power gives in order to
exercise an effective leadership'. 70 Said's notion of Orientalism owes much to Gramsci' s
conceptualisation of the dynamics of domination, stating that
Culture, of course, is to be found operating within civil society, where the influence of
ideas, of institutions, and of other persons works not through domination but by what
Gramsci calls consent. In any society not totalitarian, then, certain cultural forms
predominate over others, just as certain ideas are more influential than others; the
form of this cultural leadership is what Gramsci has identified as hegemony, an
indispensable concept for any understanding of the cultural life in the industrial West.
It is hegemony, or rather the result of cultural hegemony at work, that gives
Orientalism the durability and strength I have been speaking about so far.71
69 Said, Orientalism, p.23.
70 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, (London, Lawrence and
Wishart, 1971), p.S9.
71 Said, Orientalism, p.7.
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The hegemonic qualities of Orientalism are responsible for giving it such institutional
strength in that Orientalist representations were accepted by both coloniser and colonised
alike.
One of the major aspects of the modern manifestation of Orientalism is its close
relationship with imperialism and colonialism. In this respect, the assumption of an essential
difference between Orient and Occident provides a crucial enabling element. Said suggests
that 'to say simply that Oriental ism was a rationalisation of colonial rule is to ignore the
extent to which colonial rule was justified in advance by Orientalism'. 72 Inproducing that
justification, Orientalism connects to prevailing trends in Western culture - for example,
liberalism, utilitarianism, and rationalism - to create the sense that the Orient required forms
of European tutelage and trusteeship to progress and take up its place in the 'modern' world.
In such terms, the Gramscian influence on Orientalism is perhaps most pertinent for this
thesis. It is worth recalling Said's description of the institutional nature ofOrientalism 'as a
Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient'. 73
Orientalist representations were instrumental in providing meaning to areas marked for
colonial rule because they provided a powerful binary image of superior Occidentals and
inferior Orientals.
The essential feature of this binary was that the relationship between the East and the
West, on political, cultural, and even religious grounds, was seen - in the West - to be one
between a strong and a weak partner. As Said explained,
Many terms were used to express the relation ... The Oriental is irrational, depraved
(fallen), childlike, "different"; thus the European is rational, virtuous, mature,
"normal". But the way of enlivening the relationship was everywhere to stress the fact
that the Oriental lived in a different but thoroughly organised world of his own, a
world with its own national, cultural, and epistemological boundaries and principles
of internal coherence.i"
The main point is that the Oriental is both contained and represented by this dominating
framework, which was like a library or archive of information commonly held and bound
together by a family of ideas and a unifying set of values." With the development of modern
Orientalist discourse, there was
The distillation of essential ideas about the Orient - its sensuality, its tendency to






separate and unchallenged coherence; thus for a writer to use the world Oriental was a
reference for the reader sufficient to identify a specific body of information about the
Orient."
These 'distilled' ideas explained the behaviour of Orientals. For the colonial administrator,
who, as Said explained, 'could draw upon the empirical and spiritual reserves of a long
tradition of executive responsibility towards the colored races', Orientalism supplied
Orientals with a mentality, a genealogy, and an environment but, most importantly, it allowed
Europeans to deal with and attribute to Orientals a set of general characteristics that justified
the necessity of colonial rule.77 Orientalism thus facilitated the core precepts of trusteeship by
providing the images of an inferior, backward population in need of assistance and an
advanced, superior one capable of delivering the required guidance.
It is important to note how strongly the general character ascribed to the Oriental
could withstand the rhetorical and existential force of obvious exceptions. Said explained that
'the general category in advance offers the specific instance a limited terrain in which to
operate: no matter how deep the specific exception, no matter how much a single Oriental can
escape the fences placed around him, he is first an Oriental, second a human being, and last
again an Oriental' .78 This general category, which was able to override individual exception,
not only displays the hegemonic strength of Orientalist discourse but also explains how
colonial administrators could knowingly deal with and make such sweeping judgments about
large subject-populations that permeate the archival record. The importance of this cannot be
overstated because it sustained the various negative stereotypes about the Palestinian Arabs
that provided a stable base for the exercise of trusteeship. This is why Orientalism has a
significant degree of utility in analysing colonial officials' understanding and decisions in the
policy-making process. To analyse that process, this thesis focuses predominantly on the link
between the Colonial Office in London and the office of the high commissioner in Jerusalem.
If the binary image of superior Occidentals and inferior Orientals provided a fairly
straightforward approach to the Arab community through paternal applications of trusteeship,
it was more complicated for the Jewish community. British officials in Palestine have often
been accused of 'unfavourable' attitudes towards Jews in Palestine that expressed latent anti-
76 Ibid, p.20S.
77 Ibid, p.226; p.42.
78 Ibid, p.l 02.
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Zionism and anti-Semitism." In truth, British-Jewish relations in Palestine were primarily
marked by a fundamental sense of ambivalence. In one respect, this stemmed from the
ambiguity of the Balfour Declaration. The declaration - and British wartime diplomacy as a
whole - has been subject to significant historical interpretation.i" James Renton has recently
suggested that it was issued as a piece of wartime propaganda through misguided notions of
international Jewish power.81 The ambivalence in British-Jewish relations, however, ran
much deeper than political difficulties over the precise interpretation of the Balfour
Declaration.
Despite Zionist historiography presenting the establishment of the national home as
an anti-colonial movement, it is more useful to see Jewish settlement in Palestine as part of a
process of 'dual' colonisation.V If Britain was responsible for providing an 'umbrella' in the
form of political and economic infrastructure, the Zionist movement supplied immigrants,
purchased land, and developed its own national institutions. This meant that British officials
were unsure whether to treat Jews as 'natives' or as Europeans. In this respect, Zionism was,
in the British mind, a strange competitor. It vied for the status of coloniser whilst remaining
subject to British colonial rule, which upset the traditional binary image on which colonialism
rested." As Ronen Shamir suggested, relations 'fluctuated between cooperation and
animosity, were marred by suspicion and hostility, and were, in general, ambivalent and
conflictive' .84However, the international sanction given to Zionism during and after the First
World War confirmed that European statesmen believed that the Jewish people had acquired
'modem' dispositions through their European origins. Zionism was founded on a unique
blend of European ideology that married ancient Jewish tradition to nineteenth-century
humanistic and liberal thought and twentieth-century nationalism and socialist-revolutionary
79 See Evyatar Friesel, 'British Officials and Palestine, 1923', Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 23, No.2, (April
1987), pp.194-21 0; and 'Through a Peculiar Lens: Zionism and Palestine in British Diaries, 1927 -31', Middle
Eastern Studies, Vol. 29, No.3, (July 1993), pp.419-44; Atran, 'The Surrogate Colonisation of Palestine', p.23.
80 See Leonard Stein, The Balfour Declaration, (London, Vallentine Mitchell, 1961); Mayir Verete, 'The
Balfour Declaration and Its Makers', Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 6, (1970), pp.48-76; Elie Kedourie, In the
Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence and its Interpretations, (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1976); Isaiah Friedman, Palestine: A Twice Promised Land?, (New Brunswick, Transaction
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(London, Bloomsbury, 2011). .
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ideology." The Zionist movement itself was premised on a cultural alliance with Europe,
imagining it to be a part of the West; it was not simply the return of the Jews to their ancient
heritage but an extension of Western civilisation into the Orient/" The result of this
ambivalence in British-Jewish relations was that the Palestine government gave the Zionist
movement significant autonomy within the mandatory system.
British Trusteeship in Palestine
Utilising some of Said's ideas, the primary aim of this thesis is to provide a wider approach to
British rule inPalestine by exploring how trusteeship influenced the administration of the
mandate in five key areas: self-government, immigration, land, education, and law and order.
It is clear that within the mandate system, Palestine stood out from other territories because of
the adoption of the Balfour Declaration and its eventual inclusion in the preamble of the
Palestine mandate. William Rappard suggested it was an 'adventure unique in international
politics', yet British support for this 'adventure' did not signal the abrogation of the trust held
towards the local population that underpinned the mandate system as a whole. Rappard stated
that 'as Mandatory Powers in all other mandated areas, Great Britain in Palestine was to
improve the lot of the inhabitants by protecting them against abuses and by assuring them of
certain material and moral benefits'. 87 In utilising a model of trusteeship, this thesis seeks to
move away from interpretations that rely on mutually exclusive pro-Zionist and pro-Arab
perspectives to explain British actions. Instead, it suggests that the tasks of 'disinterested
guardianship', where mandatory powers were to look after the interests of the local
population, and 'progressive development' towards self-government created a set of
obligations that significantly influenced British officials in Palestine.
Those officials have often been criticised for lacking a consistent or coherent policy
towards implementing the mandate." In this context, it is important that trusteeship is
regarded as constituting an approach to colonial rule rather than a distinct policy. Even then,
it has to be realised that trusteeship offered a significant degree of ambiguity. As Kenneth
Robinson claimed in his Reid Lectures on the 'dilemmas of trusteeship' during the inter-war
years, 'in the political sphere, as in the economic and social spheres, the principle of
trusteeship ... did not provide any unambiguous answer to the actual problems of colonial
8S Anita Shapira, Land and Power: The Zionist Resort to Force, 1881-1948, (Stanford, Stanford University
Press, 1999), pp.354-5.
86 Atran, 'The Surrogate Colonisation of Palestine', p.723.
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govemment'r" In Palestine, this problem was exacerbated by the fact that the term 'national
home' had no established meaning or precedent in international law. Instead of a carefully
defined strategy, trusteeship and British rule in Palestine relied on a set of general
assumptions that became increasingly flawed as the mandate progressed. That these
assumptions were necessary reflects James Renton's assertion that the Balfour Declaration
and the mandate represented 'flawed foundations' for British rule in Palestine." Despite, as
will be seen, some difficulties in implementing them, these assumptions allowed trusteeship
to reconcile the conflicting obligations that the mandatory administration held towards the
various communities in Palestine.
The first was the Orientalist assumption that the Arabs of Palestine did not constitute
a national body that deserved political rights or self-determination." This caused British
officials to repeatedly spurn Arab delegations that travelled to London to lobby the
government and obviated the need to engage with the Arab community in the political
domain. The issue of nationalism was a particularly controversial issue across the Middle
Eastern mandates. Despite repeated calls for self-determination from the local populations,
Britain and France were especially reluctant to concede to these requests or even consider
them as legitimate. As Arthur Balfour, the foreign secretary between 1916 and 1919,
suggested
The language of the Covenant assumes or asserts that in the regions we are
discussing, as in other portions of the Turkish Empire, there are in the advanced
chrysalis state "independent nations" sufficiently "developed" to demand "provisional
recognition", each of which is to be supplied by the Powers with a mandatory till it is
able to stand alone. Where and what are these "independent nations"? Are they by
chance identical with Syria, Mesopotamia, and Palestine? If so, the coincidence with
the Sykes-Picot arrangement is truly amazing, for no such idea was present to the
minds of those who framed it. 92
This statement demonstrates some of the ambivalence that British policymakers held towards
Wilsonian ideals of self-determination in a colonial context, although it is in itself debatable
whether President Wilson envisaged the full extension of self-determination to the non-
89 Kenneth Robinson, TheDilemmas of Trusteeship: Aspects of Colonial Policy between the Wars, (Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 1965), pp.71-3.
90James Renton, 'Flawed Foundations: The Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate', in Rory Miller
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2009), p.33.
92M
emorandum by Arthur Balfour, 11 August 1919, FO 406/41.
21
Turkish peoples of the Ottoman empire." The result was that when the Palestine mandate
was finally ratified in 1923, it contained a general commitment to advance self-government
and local forms of autonomy but specifically only went as far as protecting the 'civil' and
'religious' rights of existing 'non-Jewish' communities. There was no mention of any
political rights for a Palestinian Arab - or even simply Arab - national movement. Instead of
a national community, the Arabs of Palestine were regarded as a collection of communal
groups that were defined by religion, principally Muslim and Christian." Chapter Two
investigates this subject and examines British efforts at developing self-government by
looking at both the attempt to secure constitutional development through representative
institutions and the expansion of local forms of communal autonomy. It explores how the
tensions between advancing self-government under ideas of trusteeship and the imperatives
of ensuring 'good' colonial governance hindered the development of representative
institutions and shifted the focus of British efforts to the comparatively less controversial
sphere oflocal autonomy.
The second assumption that underpinned trusteeship was that quasi-European
economic development, aided by Zionist colonisation, would significantly benefit the local
population by increasing prosperity. This, in tum, would supposedly mitigate tensions that
might arise from a larger Jewish presence in Palestine." The effort to establish the Jewish
national home was therefore subsumed by the wider application of trusteeship and British
support for Zionism became a condition for Arab progress. This presupposition, combined
with the belief that the Arabs did not constitute a national body, allowed British officials to
encourage the presence of an expanding Jewish national home that ostensibly ran counter to
the interests and wishes of the indigenous Arab population. Economic development and the
establishment of 'basic' public services were seen as the best methods of establishing a stable
foundation for a polity that the various communal groups in Palestine could participate in
and, therefore, as the most expedient way of putting Palestine on the road to self-government
and discharging the obligations of trusteeship. For example, Eric Mills, a district official in
Palestine, wrote that a 'federalised legislature', based on communal representation of
Muslims, Christians, and Jews, would only be possible when 'harmony' had been achieved
93 Pankaj Mishra, From the Ruins of Empire: The Revolt against the West and the Remaking of Asia, (London,
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between the various elements of the population through greater prosperity," The emphasis
that trusteeship placed on administrative and infrastructural development as a precondition
for the establishment of representative institutions meant that the encouragement of
communal co-operation remained a secondary, and substantially unfulfilled, aim under
British rule.
The third and fourth chapters of this thesis - concerning immigration and land - take
up this economic theme and examine how British attempts to promote growth formed the
underlying rationale for changes made to both immigration and land policy. Chapter Three
analyses the system that the mandatory administration used to regulate immigration and
explores how that system was governed by the notion of economic capacity, which required
British administrators to ensure that Jewish immigration did not vitiate the economic position
of the local population. Chapter Four looks at how the mandatory administration initiated a
wide-ranging process of reform using liberal, rational, and utilitarian values designed to
increase the productivity of the land. The central aspect of these reforms was the achievement
of secure tenure in order to stimulate a liberal, unobstructed market that would ensure the
efficient distribution of agricultural land and allow property owners to raise capital to
improve their remaining holdings.
A third assumption that sustained trusteeship related to the longevity of British rule in
Palestine. The mandate for Palestine did not specify how or when British obligations would
be fulfilled and was vague enough to be implemented in different ways. Ultimately, this gave
the mandatory power significant latitude in its approach to fulfilling its obligations and
allowed it maintain its own interests. In theory, the Permanent Mandates Commission at
Geneva exercised a supervisory role, but the system was loosely organised and oversight had
little impact on policymaking." Colonial officials envisaged a long and unhindered British
presence in Palestine: for example, Winston Churchill, when colonial secretary, remarked to
an Arab delegation who requested full self-government in Palestine that 'our children's
children will have passed away by the time that is completed' .98 This view allowed British
policymakers to postpone difficult decisions about the final stage of the mandate during its
early years.
96 Minute by Eric Mills, 23 May 1925, Israel State Archives (ISA), 2/0/1/273.
97 Susan Pederson, 'The Impact of League Oversight on British Policy in Palestine', in Miller (ed.), Britain,
Palestine, and Empire.
98 Churchill to Arab Delegation, 28 March 1921, Colonial Office (CO) 733/2.
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In hindsight, these assumptions were fundamentally flawed and slowly unravelled in
the face of developing Arab-Jewish tensions, yet this thesis will argue that they sustained a
belief in trusteeship in Palestine between the establishment of a civil government in July 1920
and the outbreak of the Arab rebellion in Apri11936. The Western Wall riots that broke out in
August 1929 are sometimes described as a fundamental turning point after which British
policymakers realised that the position in Palestine was untenable." This thesis will contend
that the 1929 riots and the various policy statements made in their aftermath presented less of
a challenge to established British policy than is commonly assumed. Itwas only with the
outbreak of the Arab rebellion in Apri11936, which significantly disrupted the power of the
colonial state, and the publication of the White Paper of 1939, which attempted to address
Arab grievances, that the priorities of British rule shifted away from trusteeship.l'" The
restrictions on Jewish immigration through the 1939 White Paper policy, the large-scale
presence of military forces in the Middle East after 1939, the eventual recognition that the
Palestinian Arabs had legitimate national aspirations of their own, and the involvement of
other Arab states in the Palestine 'question' all created a new dynamic for the colonial
administration of Palestine in the late 1930s.
British colonial rule was typically marked by a 'firm' commitment to uphold law and
order through rigorous policing. Ensuring stability, however, also meant preventing social
dislocation. Economic development and changes within key administrative areas were
regarded as having serious potential to undermine the structure and cultural integrity of the
'traditional' nature of Arab society in Palestine. Concerns over social stability form an
important theme for Chapter Five which deals with education. The British priority was to
provide basic levels of education on a mass scale: secondary or 'literary' education was
discouraged on the grounds that it would exacerbate a dangerous trend of migration from the
countryside to the town and, as in other parts of the empire, create a class of disaffected,
unemployable clerks likely to engage in anti-colonial politics. Yet British officials also
believed in Orientalist tropes that the Arab 'mind' was unsuited to higher forms of education ,
which demonstrated that such priorities were connected to the 'protective' forms of
paternalism that Mantena discusses in Alibis of Empire. Where it was possible, colonial
99 Ilan Pappe, A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples, (Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 2012), p.90; Penny Sinanoglou, 'British Plans for the Partition of Palestine, 1929-1938', The Historical
Journal, Vol. 52, No. I, (March 2009), pp.131-152.
100 See, for example, Martin Kolinsky, 'The Collapse and Restoration of Public Security', in M. Kolinsky and
M. Cohen, Britain and the Middle East in the 1930s: Security Problems, (London, Macmillan, 1992); or
Michael Cohen, 'Appeasement in the Middle East: The British White Paper on Palestine, May 1939', The
Historical Journal, Vol. 16, No.3, (1973), pp.571-596.
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officials sought to intervene in native society only when necessary. However, that did not
stop Britain from introducing sweeping changes that were deemed necessary but as a 'trustee'
there was an underlying principle to respect the indigenous population and endeavour to rule
through established, familiar systems.i'" The need for social cohesion often produced tension
between the developmental and protective aspects of trusteeship; colonial officials were often
faced with policy decisions that had the potential to advance their conception of development
in Palestine but could also produce short-term consequences that would destabilise Arab
society.
Another significant constraint on British rule was economic and financial limitations
applied across all aspects of the mandatory administration. Like other colonies, mandated
territories were expected to 'pay their own way' .102 Ironically, though, as Kenneth Robinson
explained, 'the trustee was not to use his own money to make the ward's estate more
productive' .103 The most that the Treasury in London would assent to was the guarantee of an
imperial loan of £4.5 million but it was only issued in November 1927, seven years after the
idea had first been mooted. By then, most of it was already spent: £1 million was owed to the
British exchequer for the railways and assets that the mandatory administration took over
from the military administration, £2 million was owed to the Crown Agents, and the rest was
earmarked for the development of a deepwater port at Haifa, which was as much an imperial
need as a Palestinian one.'?' The passing of the Colonial Development Act in 1929, which
was intended mainly for colonies in the tropics, had little effect on trusteeship in the Palestine
mandate. lOS
The overarching attitude of the Colonial Office towards the finances of Palestine was
outlined by an official in December 1921:
Expenditure must be worked out as a whole and be brought down to the lowest
possible figure compatible with decent Government. Revenue must be collected to the
greatest possible amount, in other words, the country must be taxed to the hilt and if
there is anything left over beyond essential expenditure it must be decided on general
101 Martin Bunton, 'Inventing the Status Quo: Ottoman Land-Law during the Palestine Mandate, 1917-36', The
International History Review, Vol. 21, No.1, (March 1999), pp.31-2.
102 Bunton, Colonial Land Policies in Palestine, p25. See also Sarah Graham-Brown, 'The Political Economy of
the Jabal Nablus, 1920-48', in Roger Owen (ed.), Studies in the Economic and Social History of Palestine,
(London, Macmillan, 1982), pp.92-4.
103 Robinson, The Dilemmas of Trusteeship, p.26.
104 Barbara Smith, The Roots of Separatism in Palestine: British Economy Policy, 1920-29, (London, I.B.
Tauris, 1993), pp.34-6.
lOS See Michael Havinden and David Meredith, Colonialism and Development: Britain and Its Tropical
Colonies, 1850-1960, (London, Routledge 1993), pp.l60-187.
25
principles whether the burden of taxation is to be lightened, or expenditure which is
not essential, but which is desirable, should be incurred.l'"
The general inclination of colonial administration was towards the reduction of expenditure,
rather than ambitious development projects. Taxation was set as high as was possible without
unduly agitating the local population, but the priority of maintaining public security meant
that an increasing proportion of that revenue was devoted to law and order.107 The mandatory
administration was under continuous pressure from the government in London to reduce the
British taxpayer's liability in Palestine, as the exchequer covered the costs of maintaining a
garrison there. This pressure formed a major theme in the development of security forces to
uphold law and order. Chapter Six examines how the dual imperatives of retrenchment and
the creation of local, self-sufficient forces to maintain public order under ideas of trusteeship
shaped the evolution of Palestine's security forces. The increasing cost of policing Palestine,
as responsibility for public order was handed over to local units and communal tensions
intensified, ultimately came at the expense of other aspects of development and took priority
over other aspects of mandatory policy, such as education and health.
These constraints were not only detrimental to the goals of trusteeship. They also
hindered the aims and aspirations of the Palestinian Arabs because of the way inwhich the
mandatory administration exercised its power in Palestine. Under a communal paradigm,
Britain dealt with Muslims and Christians through forms of direct rule although Christians,
who made up a small minority of the Arab population, were less dependent on the mandatory
administration because of their affiliation to various churches and foreign powers. The
yishuv, as the Jewish community in Palestine was known, was subject to a novel form of
indirect rule. Through institutions like the World Zionist Organisation, the Palestine Zionist
Executive, and, later, the Jewish Agency, the yishuv was given significant autonomy to
pursue the aims of the Zionist movement. The different approaches to each community were
fundamentally rooted in cultural preconceptions, but, as will be demonstrated throughout this
thesis, these direct and indirect methods of rule had significant ramifications for the
development of national bodies that could harness state power.
By the end of the mandate, the yishuv had developed a government bureaucracy,
representative institutions, and the core of a modern, European-style regular army - as Rashid
Khalidi suggested, the autonomy granted to the Zionist movement allowed it to establish a
106 Quoted in Bunton, Colonial Land Policies in Palestine, p.25.
107 Ibid.
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'para-state' in Palestine. lOS The result of trying to insulate Arab society from the changes that
were happening under mandatory rule in a bid to preserve social stability was that the
Palestinian Arabs were less able to adapt to or match the development of the Jewish national
home. The British inclination for retrenchment also produced uneven effects. The yishuv
clearly benefited from the mandatory administration's spending, but it also had its own local
and international bodies that could generate finance for the development of public services
and state institutions. This meant that British parsimony was felt more acutely by the
impoverished Arab community, who had no external sources of revenue. For the Palestinian
Arabs, the constraints on trusteeship and the impact of a direct form of colonial rule
prevented the establishment of unified national bodies, which was demonstrated to disastrous
effect during the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948.




The establishment of a civil government for Palestine in July 1920 signalled a departure from
the underlying principle of maintaining the status quo that had guided the military
administration. This allowed Britain to begin building an effective government and
bureaucracy that could both discharge its obligations as mandatory power and safeguard
imperial interests. The evolution of this system drew on experiences from across the empire
which, in a fundamental manner, were built on an inherent belief in the enabling capacity of
British rule that had been developed through long imperial and colonial traditions that
incorporated self-styled 'universal' values, such as liberalism, rationalism, and utilitarianism
,
and applied them to the colonial context. In that context, which was shaped by Orientalism,
they were instrumental in forming the official view that 'good' government was predicated
on the creation of satisfactory conditions for economic productivity, the firm maintenance of
law and order, and the development of 'basic' public services.' The promotion of these
objectives formed a fundamental part of trusteeship. They constituted an administrative
standard from which the Palestine government could look to build participation in self-
government.
A commitment to advance self-government was a core aspect of trusteeship and was
reflected in the mandate document. Article Two called for Britain to place the country under
such 'political, administrative and, economic conditions as will secure ... the development of
self-governing institutions', whilst Article Three stated that 'the Mandatory shall, so far as
circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy'. 2 These specific obligations, however, were
weighed up against the general requirement to safeguard the interests of the local population
as a trustee; initiatives to delegate authority had to be framed so that they could not threaten
the maintenance of 'good' government. Moreover, as there were no specific criteria against
which to judge the development of self-government, mandatory powers were given sufficient
latitude to protect their own interests. Any moves towards effective self-government would
therefore only be made within a framework that also accommodated wider imperial interests
,
IYlana Miller, Government and Society in Rural Palestine, 1920-48, (Austin, University of Texas Press, 1985),
f·31.
A full copy of the Mandate can be found in 'Palestine. Royal Commission Report', July 1937, Cmd. 5479,
(London, HMSO, 1937), pp.34-7 and pp.398-401.
28
or at the very least were not in a position to challenge them. In Palestine, this typically meant
acceptance of the mandate as a precondition for any measure of constitutional engagement,
which, as Rashid Khalidi has suggested, constituted an 'iron cage' from which the Palestinian
Arab national movement could not escape.'
The primary aim of this chapter is to trace the development of self-government under
the mandate by exploring how trusteeship and the imperatives of colonial rule, which at times
held a dissonant and oppositional relationship, informed British thinking on the subject. The
balance between these two features is often overlooked in favour of a focus on Arab-Jewish
tensions, which are frequently highlighted as responsible for Britain's general failure to
develop any form of national or representative self-government that included both
communities. However, significant debates and developments took place at the national and
local level that have yet to be explored in a wider context of self-government. Inorder to give
sufficient weight to these, this chapter will be divided into four sections: firstly, the initial
attempt at 'high' level constitutional development under Sir Herbert Samuel, Palestine's first
high commissioner, between 1920-3 will be examined; secondly, the focus will shift to local
forms of autonomy during the 1920s by examining district administration and local councils;
the third section will maintain the local perspective by exploring the development of
communal institutions; and finally, this chapter will examine the concerted approach to self-
government attempted by Palestine's fourth high commissioner, Sir Arthur Wauchope, during
the 1930s.
An underlying theme in the development of structures for colonial governance is
collaboration. The question of self-government was not only considered through the
imperatives of trusteeship, and the use of limited forms of self-government was an important
method of building and sustaining collaboration. In many post-colonial contexts, addressing
the issue is controversial and difficult, but it remains the case that the foundations of the
colonial state ultimately relied not only on its strength of arms, which it tended to use only in
an emergency, but on the degree of co-operation it could elicit from members of the local
population, For the yishuv, initial co-operation with Britain posed little. problem and was
encouraged as the primary method of advancing Zionist interests, although as the mandate
progressed and with the White Paper of 1939 that curtailed Jewish immigration, Britain came
to be seen as hindering those interests. For the Palestinian Arabs, the subject is especially
3 Khalidi, The Iron Cage, pp.31-64.
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poignant as the collaboration of elite 'notables' with the mandatory power impeded attempts
at building national or state institutions that could resist colonial control and Zionist
settlement." The dilemmas of co-operating with the mandatory power were readily apparent
whilst Britain promoted the development of the Jewish national home, yet a key priority for
the administration was to build ties of collaboration and bring opponents into the power
structures of the colonial state to mitigate potential hostility and secure a form of legitimacy
for it.s To do this, Britain applied tried and tested strategies of divide and rule to sustain, and
even create, rivalries amongst local factions of Arab notables, and develop communal
institutions, based on religion, to fracture national unity. In this context, establishing limited
forms of self-government was held to be a valuable strategy that could constrain political
tensions and maintain order, which typically meant that efforts at promoting self-government
were usually at their strongest following an occurrence of disorder.
Itwould, however, be disingenuous to see the establishment of self-government as a
simple mechanism for forging collaboration with the local population. Indeed, such a stance
would have undermined its justificatory value for British officials. Norman Bentwich, for
example, who served as attorney-general from 1918 to 1931, explained that the mandatory
administration exercised a 'benevolent autocracy' over Palestine." This is not only illustrative
of Bentwich's belief that the British authorities could exercise authoritarian powers in a
'benevolent' fashion, but also indicates the paternal role that colonial officials envisaged for
themselves under the mandate. It is here that trusteeship becomes especially prominent with
the understanding that participation and guidance in British methods of administration could
provide valuable 'experience' for the Arab population. This notion connected to the
representations provided by Orientalism, which suggested that the Arab 'mind' was unsuited
to positions of responsibility or the exercise of self-government and would require substantial
British guidance before it was in a position to do SO.7 Such ideas could block constitutional
development that might undermine British imperial interests in Palestine, but their
pervasiveness as a justification for a direct form of colonial rule should not be
underestimated. Sir Stewart Symes, who served as a district commissioner and chief secretary
between 1920 and 1928, epitomised the rationale behind this belief when he explained in his
memoir that the' Arabs often and obviously couldn't, the Jews for the most part wanted to,
4 Khalidi, The Iron Cage, pp.48-64.
5 Miller, Government and Society in Rural Palestine, p.47.
6 Norman Bentwich, England in Palestine, (London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1932), p.239.
7 Said, Orientalism, pp.34-9.
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could, and did, manage their own affairs satisfactorily'. 8 This essential idea formed the major
context for the British approach towards developing self-government in Palestine.
Sir Herbert Samuel and the Search for a Constitution, 1920-23
During his inaugural speech as high commissioner on 7 July 1920, Sir Herbert Samuel
delivered a message from King George V that emphasised the 'absolute impartiality with
which the duties of the mandatory Power will be carried out'. Samuel elaborated on this
message by explaining the 'sound principles of government' that served as 'the foundation of
the greatness of the British Empire': freedom and equality of religion and justice; the
maintenance of order 'with a firm hand'; the suppression of corruption; an equitable taxation
system; and economic development to increase the prosperity of the population." These
values served as general guidelines to direct the administration of Palestine. However, this
list is also significant for its omissions and there was no reference to self-government
amongst these 'sound principles of government'. In Samuel's view, the commitment to self-
government under trusteeship could be detached from general tenets of colonial governance;
the promotion of' good' administration did not always signify the decentralisation of power.
For the high commissioner, a belief in these 'sound principles' created a platform for
development and would enable conditions in which self-government could, eventually, be
advanced.
Despite an overarching tendency to centralise power in British hands, a significant
amount of latitude was given to the Zionist Commission, which came to serve a distinct role
under the mandate as the official' Jewish Agency' (to which it was renamed when it
expanded in 1929). Headed by the Zionist diplomat par excellence, Chaim Weizmann, it
arrived in Palestine in early 1918 to form a vital link between the British authorities and the
yishuv, and to lay the foundations for the national home.'" The ommission was a sign of the
influence of Zionism amongst British politicians in London, as the mandate had not yet been
granted and the commission faced opposition from the military administration that was
committed to maintaining the status quo. I I The commission was endorsed on the grounds that
it would serve only as an advisory body, although this disappointed the Zionist movement,
which had hoped for a measure of executive power, particularly the appointment of a Jewish
8 G.S. Symes, Tour of Duty, (London, Collins, 1946), p.44 (emphasis in original).
9 Sir Herbert Samuel to Earl Curzon, 12 July 1920, FO 406/44.
10 William Ormsby-Gore to Sir Mark Sykes, 12 April 1918, ISA 2/0/1/61.
II Major-General Sir Louis Bols to the Chaim Weizmann, 19 May 1920, ISA 2/0/1/71.
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nasi of Jerusalem.l'' However, as Tom Segev has noted, this did not stop the commission
from quickly evolving into a quasi-government for the Zionist movement in Palestine."
The lack of a comparable institution was a natural complaint for Arab leaders and the
impact of the Zionist Commission was an underlying cause in the outbreak of the May Day
riots in 1921. The proximate trigger of this 'disturbance' was a series of Jewish
demonstrations in Jaffa, but the situation quickly escalated into general attacks on Jews in the
town by Arabs. That unrest intensified into riots that swept across Palestine for several days
and culminated on 7 May in a large-scale Arab raid on the Jewish agricultural colony of
Khedera that was only dispersed after British air power had been deployed.l" Official
estimates concluded that 95 people were killed - 48 Arabs and 47 Jews - and 219 wounded ,
of whom 73 were Arabs and 146 Jews, making it the most serious outbreak of disorder since
the beginning of the British occupation. IS The consequences of the Jaffa riots will be
addressed in more detail during the next chapter, but it is important to note here that some of
the major grievances held by the Arab population were the presence of the Zionist
Commission, and, crucially, its position as an official advisory body to the British authorities.
The Haycraft Commission, headed by the chief justice of Palestine, Sir Thomas Haycraft,
investigated the cause of the disturbances and heard evidence from Arabs who alleged that
the Zionist Commission had created distrust among the Arab population by privileging
Jewish interests over their own and by turning itself into an 'imperium in imperio' that
carried undue influence with the mandatory administration." Haycraft concluded that without
such an atmosphere of general distrust 'the Jaffa outrages would probably not have taken
place' ,17
The high commissioner broadly agreed with these conclusions, explaining that the
riots had indicated that 'there are deep-seated causes at work, and these are to be found in the
political questions that have been disturbing the minds of large sections of the people' ,18
During the violence, political tensions sharpened and racial divisions became accentuated ,
which considerably enhanced the risk of further outbreaks, or even a general uprising.
12 This can be translated as either prince or president.
J3 Segev, One Palestine, Complete, pp.64-S.
14 For a detailed account, see ibid, pp.l73-201.
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Samuel explained that 'before the Jaffa disturbances the masses could be regarded as little
likely to be responsive to the call of the agitator, but the events that then took place make it
impossible to feel any such assurance now' .19 The violence dispelled Samuel's hopes for the
peaceful establishment of the Jewish national home. Racial divisions introduced an unstable
element into questions of agitation and connected to Orientalist images of a subject
population that was usually docile in the face of firmly exercised colonial authority but
volatile and unpredictable when it came to racial or religious issues.
The Jaffa riots emphasised the need to maintain links with Arab notables. During the
rioting, district governors had been able to use their 'personal influence' with Arab leaders
and compel them to calm tensions among their communities, which had been instrumental in
limiting the scope of the violence.i" The disturbances highlighted the importance of
strengthening those links, and the riots served as a catalyst for the first major attempt at
constitutional development under British rule. Samuel's aim was to arrive at an
'understanding' with the opponents of Zionism, even at the cost of 'considerable sacrifices'
because the only alternative was an overt policy of force and coercion, which he regarded as
wrong inprinciple and unlikely to prove successful in practice, as it would continually erode
the platform for relations between the mandatory administration and Arab notables."
Samuel's response was to re-examine two key issues: Jewish immigration, which will be
examined in the next chapter, and representative institutions. He wrote to Churchill, who was
then colonial secretary, suggesting that it would be desirable for the 'very early establishment
of representative institutions' by developing the nominated advisory council into an elected
body.22 In this context, the use of the words 'very early' demonstrate the importance of such
institutions as a basis for collaboration, but also recognition that the Arab population was not
yet ready for the establishment of such an institution, however constituted, and that it was
being proposed out of necessity. In proposing such a conciliatory measure, Samuel came up
against reticence in the Colonial Office: it was minuted that 'to make such a concession under
pressure is to rob it of half its value. We must firmly maintain law and order and make
concessions on their merits and not under duress' .23For them, the question of concessions
was linked to the image of British prestige.
19 Samuel to Churchill, 13 June 1921, CO 733/3.
20 Samuel to Churchill, 8 May 1921, CO 733/3.
21 Samuel to Churchill, 18 June 1921, CO 733/3.
22 Samuel to Churchill, 8 May 1921, CO 733/3.
23 Minute by Sir John Shuckburgh, 20 May 1921, CO 733/3.
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In the end, Samuel's insistence on the need to satisfy public opinion proved stronger
than Colonial Office opposition and during his speech on the king's birthday in June 1921 he
informed an assembly of Arab notables that 'the question of ensuring a free and authoritative
expression of popular opinion' was being considered by the British government in London.
At the same time, he also rewarded Arab notables for their actions during the riots, including
a CBE to Ragheb Bey El-Nashashibi, the mayor of Jerusalem, and OBEs for Hajj Abdel
Rahman Ismail Ibrahim, mayor of Tulkarm, and Asim Bey Said, mayor of Jaffa.24 These
honours have to be seen in a context of collaboration, where symbols of British honour were
used to bolster the standing of local elites and strengthen their bonds to the colonial state. On
instructions from the Colonial Office to avoid using the words 'elected' or 'representative',
the high commissioner's statement was suitably vague and non-committal in order to give
colonial officials in London sufficient latitude to protect British interests in any scheme
proposed." Following the riots, a delegation from the Arab Executive was sent to London to
lobby the British government against the establishment of the Jewish national home.26 As the
chief organ of the Arab national movement, the Executive was elected from the Palestinian
Arab Congress which, like the Muslim-Christian Associations that had sprung up in major
towns, attempted to present a unified opposition to the British tendency to divide the Arab
population on communal grounds.I' That tendency was deeply rooted in colonial practices
and when the delegation arrived in London the Colonial Office refused to recognise it.
Instead, it entered into unofficial talks based on a continuing commitment to the Balfour
Declaration, but with a willingness to establish some form of representative assembly with
limited powers along the lines of legislative councils established elsewhere in the empire.28
The mandatory administration hoped, at this point, to secure Arab approval for the
proposed Palestine constitution. This meant that the question of a legislative council became
tied to acceptance of the constitution, but the delegation in London repeatedly pressed for the
immediate establishment of a national, representative government based, inter alia, on the
McMahon-Hussein correspondence and the Anglo-French Declaration of November 1918.29
24 Samuel to Churchill, 6 June 1921, CO 733/3.
25 Churchill to Samuel, 25 May 1921, CO 733/3.
26 There are a variety of accounts on the diplomacy between the Colonial Office and the Arab delegation. See,
for examples, Y. Porath, The Emergence of the Palestinian Arab National Movement, /9/8-29, (London, Frank
Cass, 1974), pp.l37-47; or Wasserstein, The British in Palestine, pp.113-9.
27 Khalidi, The Iron Cage, p.42; p.55.
28 Colonial Office Minutes, 12-13 August 1921, CO 733/14.
29 See, for examples, 'A Brief Statement of the Demands of the Arab People of Palestine', 12 August 1921, CO
733/14; Palestine Arab Delegation to Churchill, 21 February 1922, CO 733/36. The McMahon-Hussein
correspondence promised a form of Arab independence in return for the Sharif of Mecca revolting against the
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This was reflective of the legalistic approach that Arab notables adopted in their dealings
with Britain, which characterised 'a plaintive, almost piteous' stance predicated on the
assumption that Britain would eventually come to its senses about the promises it made of
Arab independence.i" The Colonial Office put forward a variety of proposals for an elected
assembly in Palestine. Crucially, however, they were based on colonial models that included
sufficient safeguards to maintain British power under the mandate. The proposals, which
included a fully representative assembly that held only advisory powers or a legislative
assembly that was controlled by a majority of non-elected, official members, fell far short of
the Arab delegation's demands and were quickly reiected."
Despite this setback a draft constitution for Palestine was submitted by the attorney-
general in August 1921. The desire to gain some form of constitutional agreement was
symptomatic of the British preoccupation to govern by consent and reflected the liberalism
present in the British philosophy of rule. The draft formalised the executive powers of the
high commissioner, but also set out plans for the transfer of some of his legislative powers to
an elected council. This was to consist of 22 members, as well as the high commissioner,
with 10 nominated official members and 12 elected unofficial members. The high
commissioner would hold powers to prorogue or dissolve the council and the constitution
forbade any ordinance to be passed that was 'in any way repugnant to or inconsistent with the
provisions of the Mandate'. 32 In addition to these constitutional safeguards, the elections
would be carried out in such a way as to produce at least two Christian and two Jewish
unofficial members so that the official bloc and the Jewish members of the council, who it
was assumed would vote with the government, would always form a majority" Effectively,
this meant that the key subjects that Arab notables wanted powers over, particularly Jewish
immigration, would be out of reach. These safeguards indicate that the Colonial Office and
Palestine government did not envisage the legislative council as a body primarily for the
development of self-government. Instead, it was a conciliatory gesture made to placate
opposition to British rule and strengthen the hand of collaborators.
Ottoman empire. The Anglo-French Declaration sought to allay Arab concerns that Britain and France would
renege on their wartime promises by stating that local governments would be chosen by the local people and not
imposed by the victorious powers.
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The Arab delegation rejected the proposed constitution out of hand. Their main
reasons were the inclusion of the Balfour Declaration and the power that the high
commissioner would be able to exercise over the legislative council." This rejection formed
the background for the Arab boycott of all constitutional initiatives in 1923. Samuel pressed
the Colonial Office to make a public announcement on policy to allay Arab fears and clarify
British intentions towards Palestine. InMay 1922, the high commissioner arrived in London
to help draft a white paper, which signalled the government's resolution to press on without
having reached any form of accommodation with the delegation and get the mandate
approved by the League of Nations. After the publication of the Churchill White Paper in
June, this was fmally done on 24 July 1922.35
The Churchill White Paper stated that it was the intention of Britain to 'foster the
establishment of a full measure of self-government in Palestine' but qualified this by
suggesting that it must be achieved 'by gradual stages and not suddenly' .36 This can be seen
as an expression of trusteeship, but it does require some elaboration. The statement was
underpinned by the Orientalist conviction that the Arabs of Palestine were not ready for self-
government and this was demonstrated by the emphasis on the 'gradual' nature required of
such a process." In this context, the incremental achievement of self-government, despite
Arab calls for a representative parliament, was justified through trusteeship as being in the
best interest of the population of Palestine. This concern was grounded in the emphasis
placed on the maintenance of law and order and on the efficiency of administration; so, whilst
the mandate obligated the development of self-government, trusteeship also imposed on
British officials a duty to ensure that a 'minimum' standard of governance was upheld by the
mandatory administration. ~iven the negative cultural preconceptions surrounding Arab
capacity for self-rule, it is not surprising that tension existed between these strands of
thought. For Britain, the collaborative element involved in the grant of a limited form of self-
government was key: it would draw elements of the native population into the colonial state
,
provide legitimacy, and help to maintain law and order by providing a constitutional outlet
for moderate opposition.
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Following the confirmation of the mandate, the Palestine constitution was eventually
enacted as an order-in-council on 10 August 1922. It was formally accepted by the Zionist
movement with informal reservations, but was rejected in full by the fifth Palestine Arab
Congress that same month." The Arab Executive had organised strikes whilst the mandate
was being ratified in Geneva to demonstrate opposition to the re-affirmation of the Balfour
Declaration. Within the executive, further civil disobedience was mooted but most members
were opposed to action that would lead to rioting and further conflicts with the mandatory
administration.i" Their main dilemma was that in accepting a legislative council that had
some elements of representative self-government, they would legitimate the mandate and the
Jewish national home. It has been suggested that if the mandatory government had made
further concessions at this time - such as stating that participation did not necessarily mean
acceptance of the Balfour Declaration - then divisions within the Arab Executive may have
led some of its members to accept the legislative council. 40 However, by the time the high
commissioner issued a proclamation to direct the elections in February 1923, the Arab
Executive had decided on an outright boycott to demonstrate its opposition to the mandate."
Samuel reported that the boycott combined with a general feeling of apathy amongst
the electorate that voting would be manipulated by Arab notables to maintain their own
interests and that a restricted legislative council would not improve on the current state of
administration. At the final count, the proportion of votes cast to voters registered was 18 per
cent of Arabs, 5.5 per cent of Christians, and 50 per cent of Jews, and only 213 secondary
electors out of a projected 809 were elected, which led to the result being declared void.42
The boycott reinforced the view that Arabs were not ready to exercise elective or
representative power within the mandatory state." However, Samuel still sought to establish
some sort of national foundation for collaborative politics and set about re-establishing a
nominated advisory council, on the same lines as the legislative council, i.e. eight Arabs, two
Christians, and two Jews, with 10 official members and the high commissioner.t' The Arab
Executive saw this move as a trap and extended their boycott campaign by placing pressure
38 Wasserstein, TheBritish in Palestine, p.122.
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40 Ibid, p.150.
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on the nominated members to withdraw from the scheme. During the summer of 1923, seven
of the ten Arab nominees pulled out.
The election of a Conservative government in late 1922 caused fresh scrutiny to be
directed towards British policy for Palestine." The new colonial secretary, the Duke of
Devonshire, chaired a cabinet sub-committee on the topic, but the dominant figure on it was
Lord Curzon who, as foreign secretary, held sceptical views about British support for
Zionism in Palestine." The report of the committee was drafted by Curzon and concluded
that Britain could not renege on its commitment to Zionism without a significant loss of
imperial prestige, which was a sacrifice that could not be risked. Curzon recommended that
an organisation should be created to mirror the special position accorded to a Jewish agency
under Article Four of the mandate, which had continued as a general source of Arab
complaint." The proposals for an Arab Agency outlined the establishment of a publicly
recognised body to advise the mandatory administration on economic and social matters
affecting the 'non-Jewish' population and, subject to the control of the administration, 'of
assisting and taking part in the development of the country' .48
The idea was to place both communities on an equal footing, but it is particularly
revealing that the Arab Agency was to be nominated by the high commissioner, whilstthe
Jewish Agency was not." It could be regarded as a positive step forward for the Arab
community, but it is likely that such advice would have been sought in the nominated
advisory council anyway and the proposed agency would have possessed none of the powers
of the legislative council, meaning that overall it was probably the least satisfactory of all
options to the Palestinian Arab national movement. The scheme was immediately rejected by
the assembly of Arab notables that the high commissioner had gathered to announce the
proposal. Samuel was informed that the offer of an Arab Agency would not fulfil the
aspirations of the Arab people in their own land, and that, as they did not recognise the status
of the Jewish Agency, there was no desire for an Arab equivalent, which would effectively
45 See Sahar Huneidi, 'Was Balfour Policy Reversible? The Colonial Office and Palestine, 1921-23', Journal of
Palestine Studies, Vol. 27, No.2, (Winter 1998), pp.23-41 and Michael J. Cohen, 'Was the Balfour Declaration
at Risk in 1923? Zionism and British Imperialism', Journal of Israeli History, Vol. 29, No.1, (2010), pp.79-9S.
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Studies, Vol. 25, No.3, (Spring 1996), pp.60-S.
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represent the Arabs as a minority in their own land.50 After three failed attempts at reaching a
constitutional agreement, officials in London decided that continuing with such gestures
would be futile. The 1922 order-in-council was then amended, with the effect that executive
and legislative powers became concentrated in the high commissioner's office for the
duration of the mandate.
Local Autonomy Part 1: District Administration and Local Councils
The rejection of the Arab Agency marked the final attempt at substantial constitutional
development for over a decade. A popular view has been that the failure to bring Jewish and
Arab communities together in 1923 under the banner of a legislative council established the
pattern through which the history of the mandate would be repeated. In his synthesis of the
, ..
historiography, D.K. Fieldhouse has even gone as far to suggest that 'in retrospect, it is
obvious that 1923 marked the final failure of the Palestine mandate'r'' Developments at the
local level have received relatively little treatment in the overall context of self-government,
and have been obscured by the attention devoted to the debates and policymaking process
that failed to achieve success at a 'high' level. Yet, ultimately, it is difficult to gain a full
understanding of British thinking about self-government without consideration of both levels.
In offering an analysis of the evolution of local administration, this section is aimed at
showing that the failure of the legislative council was not necessarily a watershed moment
and that local initiatives had an important impact on the nature of Palestinian structures and
institutions.
After the collapse of constitutional proposals in 1923, the British focus shifted
towards cultivating structures of local responsibility in an effort to increase self-government
whilst avoiding wider political questions that had reached a clear impasse. The growth of
local autonomy was encouraged in Article Three of the mandate 'so far as circumstances
permit', but it can also be seen as a more natural expression of trusteeship than the early
attempt at creating a legislative council as it was regarded as a more realistic method of
increasing Arab experience in administrative matters. 52 This view was expressed by Lord
Plumer, Palestine's second high commissioner, when he informed the Colonial Office "that 'it
would be prejudicial to the interests of the people of Palestine as a whole to introduce any
SO 'Palestine. Proposed Formation of an Arab Agency', p.l O.
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form of Representative Government at the present time or for some little time to come,.53 In
speaking for the interests of the people, the high commissioner not only demonstrated
recourse to the guiding ethos of trusteeship, but also provided an example of the hegemonic
position of the colonial state that allowed him to define the interests of the local population.
InAugust 1926, Plumer gave an important demonstration of his thinking about local
autonomy. He described it as one of the main 'stepping stones' towards 'responsible'
participation in fuller self-government, but he also suggested that education in local
administration was not the only pre-cursor for wider self-government: public security,
financial stability, and steady economic growth would also need to be in place before he
could envisage re-opening the question of a legislative council. 54He believed the growth of
local government would be valuable in 'educating' the population in the 'the duties and
responsibilities of Administration':
I am confident that it is following on these lines that some fonn of elected Central
Government can in the future be best established; but only after experience has been
gained in the practical management of public affairs by local representatives of the
people, and when the people themselves have learnt discrimination in selecting the
men to whom they can entrust those affairs with confidence. 55
In terms of trusteeship, the aim of this strategy was an increase in self-governance, but it was
constrained by the assumption that Arabs possessed little capacity for running their own
affairs and also needed to 'learn' the responsibilities of being an electorate. Trusteeship
imposed a duty to improve this situation, but it also obliged colonial officials to deliver
'good' administration for Palestine. Focusing on the local level was an effective way of
combining these often conflicting obligations, although the overriding tendency was to ensure
that real power was retained in British hands through supervisory influence. The approach
taken to local self-government was, however, fragmented and was not subject to any form of
timetable.
The focus on local forms of autonomy was ultimately made possible by the
willingness of the Arab leadership to participate in such structures despite their general
opposition to the mandate. The boycott in 1923 was not followed up by a common policy of
non-cooperation with the colonial power. Yehoshua Porath has suggested that 'the
Palestinians' mistake was to believe that participation in the legislative council meant
S3 Plumer to Amery, 17 July 1928, CO 733/155/8.
S4 Plumer to Amery, 24 August 1926, CO 733/116.
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acquiescence to the mandate and the Balfour Declaration, while everyday co-operation with
the Government and acceptance of jobs in it were considered axiomatically permissible'. 56
Whether Arab notables were motivated by self-interest or a belief that opposition to the
mandate could only be legitimately voiced from within the framework of the colonial state, it
did not change the fact that a key British concern was to engage opponents of the mandate
within its machinery to mitigate resistance and that these links were purposefully cultivated
through the district administrations and local and municipal councils. These positions offered
prestige and limited amounts of power, but ultimately served to hinder the development of
Arab national institutions that could operate independently of the colonial state." The
willingness of the Arab elite to engage with the mandatory at this level ensured the continued
absence of constitutional proposals under Lord Plumer's tenure, as he sought to reinforce
progress made in the local sphere of governance. S8
The administrative efficiency of the mandatory government was dependent on the
relationship that it could sustain with the local population. Through the district
administrations, it was possible to have a visible 'native' presence in the routine functions of
government that conferred legitimacy upon it. Such interactions were based on an
amalgamation of Ottoman inheritance and British colonial precedence. There were several
distinct links in the district hierarchy: the district commissioner (or governor), a British
innovation; the district officer, who occupied the Ottoman position of qaimakam but with
reduced powers; and the mukhtar, or village headman. Inutilising existing patterns of
government to expedite colonial rule, it is possible to detect residual influences of indirect
rule. The territorial organisation of the districts was entirely novel as mandatory Palestine had
not previously existed as a separate administrative entity within the Ottoman empire and had
been divided between the vi/ayet of Beirut and the independent sanjaq of Jerusalem, despite a
nascent sense of 'Palestinian' identity. S9 Under the civil administration, the broad pattern was
to divide Palestine into three districts: a Northern district, based on Haifa; a Southern district,
centred in Jaffa; and an enlarged district of Jerusalem.
The functions of the district commissioner, district governor, and mukhtar are
particularly important for understanding the shape of local self-government. The district
56 Porath, The Emergence of the Palestinian Arab National Movement, p.IS7.
57 Khalidi, The Iron Cage, p.S8.
58 Plumer to Amery, 19 February 1926, CO 733/112.
59 See Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness, (New York,
Columbia University Press, 2010), pp.9-34.
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commissioner held four main responsibilities: maintain order, collect taxes, supervise
municipal and local councils, and represent local interests to central government. 60 According
to Bentwich, these general tasks were unified by a general duty 'to exercise the paternal
functions of government'; he explained that
The District Commissioner and his staff play the part of the intermediary between the
agents of progress and efficiency [the central government departments] and the
townspeople and the villagers, of whom the Arab part cling to their customs and
traditions, and the Jews clamour for the most advanced social reforms."
This statement highlights how a district commissioner had to balance conflicting priorities
within the overall framework of trusteeship, but it also demonstrates Orientalist thinking that
the Arabs represented a 'backward' people who could benefit from the presence of a socially
advanced and European derived Jewish settler community, which was one of the main
assumptions of trusteeship and support for Zionism.62
The principal function of the district and assistant district officer was to collect taxes
through supervising the village mukhtars, but they were also important as the visible presence
of the mandatory administration in rural areas and were required to go touring, improve
village sanitation, and act as a magistrate to arbitrate disputes in Arab villages. The Arab
proclivity for 'feuding' formed a particularly visible trope of Orienta list discourse. The issue
of magisterial powers revealed the asymmetry between a British and non-British officer
holding the same position. A British officer was typically granted a class A warrant, which
enabled him to deal with much more serious cases than a non-British officer, who could
expect only a class C warrant/" In urban areas the district officer was directed to use his
'personal influence' with the mayor and councillors to exercise 'a useful supervision over
their affairs', which demonstrated some of the mechanics of collaboration/"
The mukhtars were a 'native' layer of administration devoid of British
representatives. The position was established under Ottoman rule as a consequence of the
drive towards more bureaucratic government that took power out of the hands of tribal
sheikhs." As a 'natural vehicle of authority in a simple community', the mukhtar was,
alongside the district officer, crucial for the success of mandatory rule in areas that lacked
60 O'Donnell Commission Report on District Administration, p21-2, CO 733/209/15.
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local or municipal councils.t'' His main duties revolved around the village: to keep the peace,
inform the police of any offences, assist in the collection of taxes, issue certificates of
inheritance or property, publish public notices, and register births, marriages, and deaths. As
payment for these functions the mukhtar was entitled to keep a percentage of the tithe and
was able to charge fees for the issue of various certificates, which created a vested interest in
the collection of taxes. 67
One of the main issues for trusteeship and the development of self-government was
the dynamic of participation between British and non-British officers and the relative
distribution of positions within the hierarchy. A central theme here was an attempt to
incorporate more 'native' Palestinians in this hierarchy. After his constitutional plans
foundered, Samuel wrote to the Colonial Office to suggest the appointment of officials from
influential Muslim families as part of a collaborative strategy 'to establish other points of
contact with the people' .68 The nature of the military administration meant that the initial
positions of responsibility within the districts were held by British army officers. As the
military government transitioned to the civil, many of those officers remained in place or
moved to different parts of the mandatory administration." By Apri11923, it had been
possible to reduce the number of British officials, but Samuel was keen to accelerate this
trend:
The further extension of this principle would be an earnest of the intention which I
have frequently expressed, both in public and private, to associate Palestinians
directly with the administration of their country when this is possible; it would be
evidence of the confidence reposed by the Administration in these Officers, and of the
desire to educate them in the art of government, with a view gradually to a more
complete substitution of British Officers by Palestinians in the local administration.l"
The link to trusteeship was made through the suggestion of educating Palestinians in the 'art
of government', yet the drive for greater inclusiveness was constrained by the need to ensure
that standards of administration were maintained. The collaborative context of Samuel's plan
was not missed either. InMay 1924, for example, Samuel recommended that the mayor of
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Gaza, who had 'large influence' and had shown himself particularly 'willing to co-operate
with the government', be appointed as a district officer."
By the end of Sir Herbert Samuel's tenure in 1925, it had been possible to reduce the
number of senior British officials in the district administration to 19 (from 29 in 1920).72 In
1929, further reductions had been made to just 15 senior British officials.P However, these
numbers alone, which might suggest greater Palestinian participation, do not reveal the
polarisation that had taken place between senior and junior officials. The upper echelons of
the district administrations remained a British domain with very few Palestinians making it to
the rank of district officer. Instead, Palestinians occupied positions that would have brought
them i~to regular contact with their own community but were effectively supervised by
British officials. In 1925, when Samuel had informed the Colonial Office of the reduction of
British officials to 19, there were only three Palestinians in corresponding roles and, by 1929,
this had diminished to one.74 Despite a greater number of Palestinians generally involved in
district administration, they were confined to lower positions of responsibility and power was
centralised in British hands. In 1923, Sir John Shuckburgh, assistant under-secretary of state
and head of the Middle East department in the Colonial Office, provided the underlying
rationale for this outlook when he minuted that
Strong emphasis is laid in the foregoing minutes on the administrative objections to
introducing Palestinian officials into responsible positions. I do not wish in the least to
minimise these objections. There is great force in them. They are the kind of
objections that have been raised over and over again to proposals for giving natives,
in India and elsewhere, a greater share in the administration of their country ... They
will not do the work so well as British officers, but that cannot be helped. We must
put up with it being less well done."
This attitude meant that senior appointments, such as district commissioner, assistant district
commissioner, and head of a government department, were only open to experienced
members of the British colonial service, in line with the thinking that, whilst Palestinians
needed experience in administration, overall control had to be placed in 'safe hands' for the
benefit of Palestine.
Alongside the attempt to increase Palestinian participation in district administration
was an attempt to increase the stature of municipal and local councils. In 1921, a Local
71 Samuel to Thomas, 6 May 1924, CO 733/68; Thomas to Samuel, 15 May 1924, CO 733/68.
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Councils Ordinance was promulgated to establish local bodies and promote rural autonomy.
Under the ordinance, the high commissioner was granted powers that allowed him to decree
which areas of Palestine would be administered by a local council and specify the powers and
functions it would hold. He would also be able to prescribe its composition, which allowed
him to decide on the system of representation, the proportion of elected and unelected
members, and who the unelected members would be.76 The legislation was intentionally
latitudinarian so that the regulations governing each council could be tailored to individual
circumstances and allow the mandatory administration to create 'institutions appropriate to
the primitive and archaic organisation of villages, and to organisations adapted to the most
modem conceptions of social unities such as are current in certain Jewish colonies." This
distinction demonstrated how Orientalistjudgments about 'primitive and archaic' Arab
villages clashed dramatically with the 'modem conceptions of social unities' that marked the
Jewish colonisation of Palestine in the mind of British colonial officials. The difference was
significant because, in the minds of those it influenced, it dictated the level of political
aspirations they expected each community to hold, which in tum set the pace for the
development of self-government.
Despite the varied nature of the communities which these councils were intended to
serve, they often held some common functions and powers. The most important was the
ability to act as a corporate body which allowed them to levy taxes and raise loans for the
development of public services, but such powers were strictly controlled and required the
approval of the district commissioner.P The success of each local council was dependent on
the extent to which the local population decided to participate. Arab councils were found to
be unsuccessful as villagers were reluctant to pay the taxes for public services that were slow
to develop." As an attempt to develop local self-government, the controls exercised by the
district administration over the local councils highlighted the underlying tension between
ensuring efficient administration and delegating authority to encourage 'education' in
administration. The Local Government Commission (which will be examined in more detail
in the chapter on education) encapsulated this tension when it suggested in June 1924 that
whilst
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Any measure of local self-government probably results in a loss of efficiency, all that
is essential is that the measure oflocal self-government conferred should be subject
only to such safeguards of financial and technical supervision as will ensure the
interests of the persons contributing to such services are protected; but that, with these
limitations, local self-government should be conferred in such a way that the Local
Government bodies have the substance and not the shadow not only of authority but
also of responsibility. 80
It is clear that the 'technical' and 'financial' supervision exercised did much to undermine the
independence of local councils. In 1937, the Peel Commission, which was sent to Palestine to
report on the outbreak of the Arab rebellion, remarked that, as local councils were viewed
more as an organ of the central British administration than of local self-government, it was
not surprising that villagers took little interest in them. The Jewish community had also
proved reluctant to participate in them, but this was because most rural areas had already
established themselves into self-governing groups with democratic control emanating from a
'general meeting' of the village community. They feared that acquiring local council status
would mean their policy and budgets would be subject to government intervention, so they
preferred to consolidate their autonomy by using institutions that they were granted under
indirect British control."
As an institution, municipal councils had existed under Ottoman rule. They ranked
above local councils in importance, which meant that more effort was directed towards them
as a vehicle for promoting local self-government. 82 Following the British occupation of
Palestine in 1917, two major changes occurred to the position of municipal councils. Firstly,
their elected nature was suspended in favour of nomination by the military administration
because of the lack of a suitable register of voters. This allowed the mandatory government to
re-constitute councils that had fallen into abeyance during the war whilst avoiding the
complicated question of elections. The nomination of members to these councils was an
important device in the early attempt to build links of collaboration with the Arab elite. The
second change was that, after the partition of Arab territories into British and French
mandates, the provincial administrative councils that had exercised a supervisory influence
over the municipalities were withdrawn. This allowed the military administration to establish
its own layer of control over the municipalities through the management of their budgets and
the issue of a grant-in-aid for services.f The grant-in-aid was a particularly useful control
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measure that allowed the mandatory government to insist on the development and
maintenance of public services in a municipality. In a report on municipal government, Eric
Mills stated that 'the judicious use of the grant-in-aid introduces a very intimate relation
between the central and the local authorities and can result in a remarkable combination of
local liberty and efficiency never falling below the standard required by central
government' .84
The two changes were perpetuated by the civil administration and served to
undermine the independent scope of local government that these councils had enjoyed under
the Ottoman empire. In theory, they were responsible for governing the most important towns
in Palestine, for providing public services to their communities, and acting as a 'collective
mouthpiece' to the district commissioner. It was acknowledged at an early stage that
municipalities should be able to carry out those functions 'as independently as possible', but
at the same time the mandatory administration decided it was 'essential that their activities
should be carefully correlated with those of the district administration'. As a consequence,
district commissioners were made responsible for the work of municipal authorities within
their areas.85 This constraint reflected the duality of British thinking and meant that several
important functions, such as town planning and education, were removed from the remit of
the municipalities and moved to central government departments. Bentwich, for example,
explained that the 'historical' nature of Palestine's towns required that planning and
development be entrusted to 'competent' persons, who he identified as the handful of British
officials that liaised with the district administrations.f
As with other attempts at developing self-government, British thinking was caught
between the impulse to develop local autonomy whilst ensuring that standards of
administration were maintained. This called for an explicit recognition of the nature of local
self-government that was being contemplated: Mills' report stated that 'properly understood,
local autonomy or local self-government in the sense of the Mandate is not identical with
complete self-government in local areas within the territory of the autonomous State,.87 The
existence of the mandate itself was taken as 'an admission that the people themselves are not
yet able to guarantee the efficiency and effectiveness of their governmental acts without
84 Ibid, p.44.
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assistance' from the mandatory power.ss Orientalist notions formed the underlying context
from which the necessity of British control emanated. A Colonial Office official stated that
On the general question oflocal government... the truth is that no Eastern country has
ever really had an efficient local government, partly because the idea of doing things
for themselves is foreign to the Eastern mind, the daily round of routine duties is
onerous to the Eastern, and partly because there is no public opinion of any sort to
keep the local government uPsto scratch. Any local government tradition, therefore,
which exists is actually bad. 9
Such ideas were not simply negative and used as a justification for establishing British
control, as they also imposed a positive duty on colonial officials to lead the 'Oriental' out of
this 'backward' state of affairs. The minute continued:
The fact that ideas of local self-government are foreign to the Eastern mind should
not, however, I think, be used as an argument in favour of abandoning such a project.
Nothing has greater educative value, and nothing in the long run, helps to the same
extent in winning the sympathies of the inhabitants of the country for the central
government, as having to struggle with the difficulty of their own local affairs.90
The 'difficulty' spoken of here provides more context for British supervisory influence over
local administration, demonstrating that, whilst it was imposed against the setting of Arab
'backwardness', it was also seen as in the interests of the population until they had become
'educated' in such matters.
The main step in this 'educative' process was to restore municipal councils to an
elected footing. This would help 'instruct' the local population in the responsibilities of being
an electorate in preparation for wider participation in national self-government later on.
However, as colonial officials also saw the responsibility of being an electorate as a privilege,
particularly after the Arab boycott of the legislative council, the process of re-instating
elections was a lengthy one. The situation was made even more complex because the
municipalities often contained mixed populations and so establishing an acceptable level of
representation between the Muslim, Christian, and Jewish communities was problematic,
especially because the system of proportional representation was deemed too sophisticated
for the Muslims, who were generally regarded as 'illiterate' and 'little trained to the method
of self-government' .91 In 1923, there were brief discussions about holding elections for the
municipalities after the legislative council had failed, but the political climate was deemed
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inopportune and likely to result in another boycott.92 During these deliberations, the issue of
safeguards was raised and it was suggested that if the municipalities were to be restored to an
elected basis the district commissioners would need to keep powers that could allow them to
maintain a supervisory role over the councils. The chief secretary suggested that the district
commissioners should retain powers to approve municipal councils' budget and the ability to
nominate the president of the council, which became two of the main preoccupations in
British thinking on restoring elected councils."
With the arrival of Lord Plumer as high commissioner matters began to advance. In
March 1926, he submitted an ordinance for a municipal franchise and elections were finally
held for 22 municipalities in the autumn of that year. Plumer carried forward the safeguards
that had emerged on the subject in 1923, but suggested that the earlier proposal would have
led 'too early to the enfranchisement of a number of persons who possess little sense of civic
responsibility' .94 To restrict the franchise, he raised the taxation threshold and imposed a
qualifying element through ownership of property." This move can be seen in terms of
educating a small number of the population to become a 'responsible' electorate, whilst
making achievement of the franchise an aspiration for the rest of the population. It can also
be seen that restricting the franchise to relatively wealthy persons ensured that elections
would not disrupt the social fabric of towns and the links that the mandatory administration
had cultivated with their elites.
The election of municipal councils marked a watershed on the road to self-
government as divisions within the Arab national movement meant the pressure that had been
applied on the mandatory administration by successfully rejecting the constitutional overtures
of 1921-3 weakened as the Arab leadership began to compete for positions as councillors and
town mayors. Such competition gave the mandatory administration an important mechanism
to intervene in local politics and secure its own influence through a system of collaborative
patronage." The use of such powers formed an important part of the strategy to maintain
equilibrium between the Husseini and Nashashibi families, who had emerged as the two main
contending factions within the Arab elite.97 A common theme in the historiography of the
mandate has suggested that rivalry between these two factions splintered the Arab national
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movement and hindered it from developing national institutions, which in turn rendered
opposition toward Britain and the mandate ineffective, yet the connections between this
competition and the divide and rule strategy of the mandatory government are not often
made." The British preoccupation with maintaining a balance between the major families by
ensuring a 'fair' distribution of official posts to ensure some semblance of representative
opinion can be seen as exacerbating such rivalry.99 For example, after Musa Kazem Pasha
Husseini had been stripped of the Jerusalem mayoralty after the May Day riots and replaced
with Ragheb Bey Nashashibi, it was necessary to balance this by making sure a Husseini
remained the mufti of Jerusalem.P" Decisions like this took place across the mandate and
prevented the Arab national movement from organising effective political opposition to the
British rule.
Local Autonomy Part 2: Communal Institutions
The evolution of communal institutions was, as with district administration and local
councils, predicated on the cultural preconceptions of colonial officials but it was
underwritten by a far greater degree of collaborative rationale. As elsewhere in the empire,
the imperatives of divide and rule facilitated a communal approach to dealing with the subject
population. This process was usually derived from existing distinctions within society, but
relied on promoting, refining, and even creating new differences. As Khalidi has suggested,
'the net result was often a highly developed and systematised communitarian structure,
within which the British could play their favoured role of arbiter, and ideally be seen as
above or outside a "local" conflict, rather than as part of it, or even the creator of it, as they
were in many cases' .101 The long-developed tradition of divide and rule was based on a
perspective that viewed colonised societies in communal rather than national terms, and as
fundamentally divided instead of potentially unified, which served to provide a key
justification of the need for colonial rule. Another form of control utilised by the colonial
state relied on indigenous elites or middle classes to participate in structures of rule to which
98 Khalidi, The Iron Cage, pp.65-75.
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the mandatory authorities could offload the duties it did not wish to carry out whilst
conferring limited amounts of power, and prestige, to those who co-operated.l'f
In Palestine, these approaches combined in the development of communal institutions
for local autonomy. The extant system that was modified for British purposes was the
Ottoman millet system, which had been established to prevent European powers from
intervening in domestic affairs.I'" It had been designed to give minority religious groups in
the empire, mainly Jews and Christians, powers of local autonomy in return for the payment
of certain taxes. Britain adopted the communal basis at the heart of this structure but,
crucially, decided that the Muslim community, which hitherto had been the 'ruling' group,
held the same status as the Jewish and Christian communities. The essence of this modified
communal structure in Palestine required that each group have their own religious
institutions. For the Arab community as a whole, the consequence of this approach was the
prevention of unified national institutions. This section will focus on the bodies established
for the Muslim and Jewish communities because the Christians in Palestine already had an
established system whereby different churches were linked to various European or foreign
powers, which the mandatory authorities did little to modify.
The Supreme Muslim Council (SMC) emerged as a unique institution in mandated or
colonial territories. Uri Kupferschmidt has suggested that this uniqueness stemmed from the
political situation in Palestine, yet his account of the council does not explore it in the wider
contexts of self-government, collaboration, or colonial rule.104 The British desire to create a
Muslim council was derived from its reluctance as a Christian power to be seen intervening
in Islamic affairs. 1OS The official approach the mandatory government adopted towards
religious affairs was generally one of non-interference, but this did not stop it from
structuring the environment in which those interactions took place or intervening to protect
its own interests when necessary.i'" The concern for non-intervention in Islamic affairs took
on added significance in a territory that contained some ofIslam's holiest sites at a time when
officials were particularly anxious to avoid provoking religious sensibilities across the
empire, particularly in British India.107 These concerns were made more acute after the
t02 Ibid, pp.51-3.
t03 Eugene Rogan, The Arabs: A History, (London, Penguin, 2011), pp.111-3.
104 Uri M. Kupferschmidt, The Supreme Muslim Council: Islam under the British Mandate for Palestine, (E.J.
Brill, Leiden, 1987), p.1.
tos Samuel to Churchill, 19 February 1922, CO 733/112.
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outbreak of rioting during the Nebi Musa festival in Apri11920.108 Thereafter, the British
concern was that the 'raising of the religious cry' was a prelude to an episode of colonial
disorder, which was demonstrative of the belief that religious fervour rather than political
grievances would incite Muslim Arabs to disorder.
In the initial deliberations over creating the SMC, the mandatory administration was
wary of conceding too much power but at the same time it was reluctant to assume the
religious functions of the Ottoman state. Those duties included management of the sharia
court system, appointment of qadis (judges), and control of waqf endowments. The
mandatory administration had wanted to retain final sanction on these issues, but Muslim
protests combined with the principle of non-interference and the aftermath of the May Day
riots to make the high commissioner yield to Muslim leaders' demands to give the council
full control in these matters. I 09 In fact, the administration was so concerned about divesting
itself of these functions that it accepted their draft constitution without reservation: the chief
secretary explained that he was 'anxious not to allow any further questions to be raised' on
the subject.IIO The vague drafting of many elements of this document would later hinder
British attempts at curbing the power of the SMC.111 The management of the sharia courts
and waqf endowments gave the SMC significant social as well as religious functions, but it
also gave it an independent financial position - an average annual income of around £50,000
or £60,000 through the 1920s - and a considerable body of staff - in 1924 over 1,100 - which
were instrumental in the council's transformation into a significant platform within Arab
politics.
In this context the question of who would lead the council was of major importance,
particularly as the unclear drafting of the constitution seemed to confer life presidency upon
its leader. The British choice in transforming the office of mufti (scholar or cleric) of
Jerusalem represented another example of taking an existing institution and modifying it for
colonial purposes. Previously, the mufti of Jerusalem had been responsible for the Hanafi rite ,
which conferred greater prestige but no direct power over other muftis. Britain renamed the
title 'grand' mufti and, in making him president of the SMC, significantly expanded the scope
and authority of the role. This restructuring undermined the balance that had existed under
Ottoman rule where qadis had pre-eminence over muftis. The qadis were appointed centrally
108 See Segev, One Palestine. Complete, pp.127-44.
109 Deedes to Churchill, Political Report for August 1921, CO 733/6.
110 Deedes to Churchill, 29 December 1921, CO 733/8.
III See draft 'Supreme Moslem Sharia Council' order, undated, CO 733/8.
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and were not from local areas in order to prevent favouritism and conflicts of interest,
whereas muftis usually did have local origins. The creation of the SMC led to a unique
situation in Islamic jurisprudence where a mufti appointed the qadis. The power to appoint all
qadis, muftis, and sharia and waqf officials gave the council and its leader powers of
patronage that enabled it to build substantial ties ofloyalty amongst Muslim notables.112
Members of the al-Husseini family, one of the richest and most powerful groups of
notables in Jerusalem, had held the position for over two centuries when Kalim al-Husseini
died in 1921. The high commissioner chose his brother, Hajj Amin al-Husseini to succeed
him but, as Zeina Ghandour has suggested, he was an 'ambiguous ally' due to his earlier
involvement in the Palestinian Arab Congress and the Nebi Musa riotS.I13 The appointment of
Hajj Amin was made in a context of divide and rule. Not only had the Jerusalem mayoralty
recently been given to a member of the Nashashibi family, but Musa Kazim al-Husseini, who
came from a different branch of the family, had been elected president of the Arab
Executive. 114 The grand mufti proved extremely willing to use the council to further his own
interests and undermine those of his rivals, which helped to ensure that those rivalries, which
also played out in the local and municipal spheres of government, prevented Arab notables
from forming cohesive national bodies. There was an implicit agreement that in taking the
quasi-official positions offered by the mandatory government that those who accepted them
should not openly oppose the mandate and British rule. liS
In terms of collaboration, the SMC was seen by the Colonial Office as a particular
success: in 1926 an official noted that 'the institution has, on the whole, been one of our most
successful moves in Palestine ... The arrangement has worked smoothly, and has no doubt
done much to reconcile Mohammedans to the mandatory regime' .116 As Khalidi has
suggested, the restructuring of various elements of the politico-religious Ottoman system
constituted 'a peculiarly brazen form of "invented tradition" that conferred significant
legitimacy for these collaborative vehicles.l" However, there was also an important element
of trusteeship involved with the SMC. Mandatory officials felt that in giving Muslims control
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of their religious affairs they were discharging their obligations under trusteeship. In their
mind, the communal functions carried out through this form of self-government were not
viewed in political or national terms, which was a significant contrast with Jewish communal
institutions and demonstrated how Orientalist thinking helped to shape administrative
policy. I IS
Through the late 1920s, the SMC submitted various proposals to the mandatory
administration to expand its power. It proposed creating a 'General Moslem Assembly' that
would hold legislative powers, the ability to levy taxes on the Muslim population, and elect
the SMC as a form of executive. This went far beyond the conception of what Britain thought
was appropriate for Muslim communal affairs. By the end of the 1920s, the prevailing
opinion was that the SMC had been granted too much power through its control of the sharia
court system, but the mandatory administration was reluctant to undermine the advantages
the SMC had provided.v'" The chief secretary, Harry Luke, explained that
It must be recognised that the bringing into existence of this powerful Moslem Body
has in some directions had distinctly beneficial results. The grant of responsibility and
extensive powers to this Body have given the Moslems of Palestine a new sense of
confidence and of pride and interest in their past, one of the results of which has been
the impressive work of restoration in the Haram al-Sharif.12o
Luke continued by describing that a 'remarkable psychological change' had taken place: the
Muslims were no longer 'apathetic' and 'this revival, both spiritual and material, is a
phenomenon worthy of note in that it indicates the stirring of a new feeling in the Moslems of
this country' .121These statements were reliant on the Orientalist stereotype of a 'static' East
to begin with, but it is particularly interesting that within his memorandum Luke suggested
that it was the British creation of the Supreme Muslim Council that was ultimately
responsible for this renewal, which can be taken as recognition of the necessity of British rule
to 'stimulate' the Orient out of its backwardness.
The communal institutions of the Jewish population were markedly different from the
Arab population as they came to reflect not only the international dimension of the Zionist
movement but also the disparity in British thinking about the cultural qualities of the two
peoples. The major difference was the political nature of the yishuv and the implicit sanction
118 Clayton to Hajj Amin al-Husseini, 14 Apri11926, CO 733/161/9.




it received as a national body from the mandatory authorities. The Zionist Commission,
which was appointed by the World Zionist Organisation (WZO), arrived in Palestine with the
political objective of establishing the Jewish national home. As the commission grew it
became the main collaborative institution between the yishuv and the Palestine government,
which gave the WZO the crucial ability to lobby both the mandatory administration in
Jerusalem and the British government in London. In 1921, the Zionist Commission was
renamed the Palestine Zionist Executive after the establishment of the civil administration
and it soon gained recognition as the official 'Jewish Agency' named under Article Four of
the mandate. This formalised its role and the legitimacy of its operations, yet its development
was essentially ad hoc, reliant on international support, especially for funding, and was not
governed by any statutory instruments that regulated its functions. However, no comparable
Arab institution was established under the mandate, and in time the Executive came to
possess its own bank, school system, and health service, and was able to organise Jewish
immigration and direct settlement.122 In 1929, the Zionist Executive transformed itself into an
enlarged Jewish Agency, which incorporated an equal number of non-Zionists into its
governing mechanisms in a bid to expand its funding base, particularly in the United
States.123 The growth of this institution meant that the Zionist Executive became a significant
instrument of British indirect rule over the Jewish people of Palestine, which allowed for the
emergence of various Zionist quasi-state structures, such as the Histadrut, for labour
organisation, and the Haganah, for defence.
For the British, however, the major debate during the 1920s did not involve the
evolution of the Zionist Executive, or even the Histadrut or the Haganah, but the creation of
a statute that regulated the authority of the other major Jewish communal body in Palestine. A
representative assembly for Jews in Palestine, the Assefat Hanivharim, had been established
as early as October 1920 and the mandatory administration held regular meetings with its
executive body, the Va 'ad Leumi.124 In July 1922, the high commissioner submitted a draft
ordinance to give the Jewish community in Palestine a 'judiciary character' and provide
statutory powers of autonomy, including the right to levy taxation. 125 This move was a
consequence of the effect of utilising the millet style of Ottoman representation to divide the
communities in Palestine. The Colonial Office rejected Samuel's initiative, but the issue was
122 Wasserstein, The British in Palestine, pp.136-7.
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raised again in August 1923 when the secretary of state instructed the high commissioner to
submit proposals to create a Jewish body parallel to the Supreme Muslim Council. Samuel
went further than the colonial secretary's instructions and again recommended the creation of
statutory powers for the Jewish community that included political devices such as the right to
levy taxes.
Sahar Huneidi has suggested that Samuel was motivated by his underlying
commitment towards Zionism; a view that would contradict his professed impartiality in
administering the mandate.126 It is, however, perhaps more useful to view his support for
enlarging Jewish communal powers as based on the idea of creating an equivalent to the
SMC but that cultural preconceptions about Jewish capacity for self-government meant this
idea took on a different meaning. Samuel explained that the constitution through which the
SMC was created 'did not afford an altogether suitable model for the Regulation of the
Jewish Community', as the yishuv also needed to be organised for a 'variety of lay
purposes' .127This contrasted the view that religion formed the highest expression of 'natural'
identity for Muslim Arabs against the belief that the Jewish community lived 'a highly
developed communal life' alongside its religious practices that made it necessary for local
Jewish bodies to be endowed with powers of autonomy. This, of course, reflected the secular
nature of political Zionism. For Samuel, though, the matter was linked to the democratic
proclivities of the Jewish and Arab peoples, which opened it up to Orientalist stereotypes
about the 'backward' and 'despotic' East and the 'progressive' West. Whereas Jewish society
in Palestine was capable of developing democratic institutions from the ground up, Samuel
believed the Arab population was incapable of doing so and preferred to have authority
imposed upon them.128
When discussing Samuel's proposals, the Colonial Office did not dissent from this
general perspective, which demonstrated how pervasive these cultural preconceptions were.
Instead, it was hesitant to sanction the creation of an official body to represent every Jewish
person in Palestine when some, such as orthodox or non-Zionist Jews, might be unwilling to
recognise its authority.129 To reconcile this anomaly, Samuel advocated the creation of two
separate bodies: a religious authority that would deal with rabbinical affairs and a lay
authority, which would have powers to levy taxes and run public services. In an unofficial
126 See Huneidi, A Broken Trust, pp.184-9.
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capacity, the Va 'ad Leumi was already engaging in these functions, but creating statutory
powers for the lay authority would give it political functions and legitimacy that had no
parallel with the Supreme Muslim Council. The Colonial Office's reluctance was exacerbated
by the divisive effect that putting communal boundaries on a legal footing would have on the
overall objective of pursuing self-government. The impact of Samuel's proposal was clearly
considered in general terms of British trusteeship over Palestine: the question was not
whether colonial officials believed the Jewish population was capable of exercising such
power, but whether it could be justified as having a beneficial effect on Palestine as a
whole.!"
The ensuing debate on this subject was described by staff in the Colonial Office as
one of the most difficult they had yet had to deal with in connection with Palestine.l'" This
was because the outcome of these proposals would playa key role in the future development
of the yishuv, and therefore raised wider questions about the nature of integration in the
colonial context. The problem was that no alternative to the millet style of communal
organisation could be suggested and that colonial precedent of divide and rule formed an
underlying part of the debate about representation in the 'East' generally. One member of the
Colonial Office minuted that
The truth of this is of course up to a point indisputable, that is to say that throughout
the East you have within the State communities so different from, or even antagonistic
to, each other that no other basis is possible, and from the Colonial Office point of
view a communal basis has great advantages.Pi
Leo Amery, the colonial secretary, further remarked that 'generally speaking I doubt ifit is
possible to ignore the communal basis as the natural one in an Eastern country especially the
moment you talk in terms of elections and self-government' .133 These comments ascribe the
fractured nature of society as the normative mode of the 'East' and reflected the view that
colonised societies were inherently divided rather than potentially unified. This was in spite
of the fact that ostensibly Britain had tried to homogenise citizenship in Palestine. Amery
suggested that
We stand clearly by the view that we recognise no other nationality and citizenship in
Palestine than that of a Palestinian. [But] on the other hand there is what one might
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call cultural autonomy and a measure of that seems to me a natural consequence of
d .. .. h th 134our etermination to 10SIston teo er.
Despite creating a 'Palestinian' citizenry, for colonial officials, a communal basis
underpinned the colonial state and was the only way of providing coherence to the population
of Palestine. Given that communal organisation formed a 'natural' grouping from which it
was difficult to deviate, the role of Zionism here was a key issue in relation to trusteeship.
Officials were insistent that they were not sponsoring Zionism to create 'something in the
nature of another Balkan State with an aggressive nationalist policy [from] a dissentient
minority,.135 Instead, and in line with the general ethos of trusteeship, it was minuted that 'my
idea of the Zionist experiment is the gradual awakening of the backward Arab peoples by the
infusion of Jewish culture and enterprise' .136 This is a useful example of how Zionism
featured in the ethos of British trusteeship and it is in this context that the debate over the
organisation of the Jewish community took place. Delegating such responsibility was
conceived in terms of giving the Jewish population the requisite tools to carry out this
function whilst at the same time developing the national home.
In the end, Samuel travelled to London and persuaded the secretary of state, then J.H.
Thomas, to accept his proposals during a discussion, of which no records were kept, at the
Colonial Office in late 1924.137 The matter was eventually approved by the new colonial
secretary, Leo Amery, when he visited Palestine in May 1925138 and within two years the
Va 'ad Leumi had transitioned into an elected and representative lay authority with powers to
levy taxation and maintain public services. The delay in promulgating the ordinance occurred
because the Local Government Commission asked the high commissioner to delay whilst it
carried out its own task.139 In 1937, the Peel Commission echoed the Haycraft Commission's
earlier verdict that the organisation of the Jewish community along these lines constituted an
'imperium in imperio' .140 In contrast to the Arab community, this delegation of powers gave
the Jewish population a significant opportunity to develop national institutions. Through the
indirect approach that Britain adopted towards the yishuv, its communal institutions became
endowed with powers that allowed it to develop independently. Arab communal institutions,
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on the other hand, were constrained by a direct approach from the mandatory government
that sought to keep the Arab population divided in order to expedite colonial rule.
A Concerted Approach: Sir Arthur Wauchope and the 1930s
Following the August riots of 1929, which will be examined in later chapters, the Pass field
White Paper of October 1930 emphasised the necessity of introducing new forms of self-
government and the question of establishing a legislative council was one that colonial
officials carefully considered throughout the 1930s. The White Paper stated that 'the
important question of the establishment of a measure of self-government in Palestine must, in
the interests of the community as a whole, be taken in hand without further delay' .141 This
assertion reflected the tendency to encourage constitutional development after outbreaks of
colonial disorder. However, there had already been growing recognition that the wider
question of self-government needed to be addressed. Shortly before the outbreak of violence,
Palestine's third high commissioner, Sir John Chancellor, had tentatively revived discussions
about a legislative council with the Colonial Office. Whilst suggesting that he appreciated
that 'the obligations devolving upon the Mandatory power are incompatible with the
establishment of a democratic form of Government', Chancellor prophetically explained that
'unless some steps are taken before long to associate the people more closely with the
government of the country there is reason to think that political agitation against the
Government may assume an objectionable and even a dangerous character'. 142 His
recommendation of using the 1922 legislative council model was cut short by the outbreak of
violence in August 1929, which led to Chancellor suspending all discussions about
constitutional development whilst questions of restoring and maintaining public security took
greater priority.l'"
Despite the White Paper's assertion that the question of self-government needed to be
'taken in hand without further delay', the situation was not that simple. The complexities that
existed during 1921-3 remained and had, arguably, been amplified during the 1929 riots and
the succession of policy announcements that followed. The attempt at expanding local
autonomy had been informed by a general tension between advancing self-government and
ensuring 'good' administration. That duality was carried forward into deliberations on
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constitutional development and widened in scope. Any proposals would have to be
acceptable to all sections of the population, whilst containing adequate safeguards to ensure
that mandatory obligations could be discharged. This was a fundamental problem that
influenced all discussions on constitutional structures during the 1930s. The experience of
Samuel's failure to establish a legislative council in the face of Arab obduracy was a further
concern for colonial officials. The White Paper stated that 'the sooner all sections of the
population show a desire to co-operate with His Majesty's Government in this respect, the
sooner will it be possible for such constitutional development to take place as His Majesty's
Government hope to see in Palestine' .144 To address the question of self-government and gain
that co-operation, Sir Arthur Wauchope, who had taken over as high commissioner in
November 1931, adopted a concerted approach that linked local autonomy to national self-
government.
The first major discussions on the subject under Wauchope began in early 1932. From
the high commissioner's perspective, the establishment of constitutional institutions could be
justified on numerous fronts: fulfilling an 'honourable pledge' made by various white papers
that influenced British prestige; for the 'good of the people' in advancing self-government
and trusteeship; and the political effect that it would have in Palestine.l" The commitment to
developing self-government for the' good of the people' was a clear reference to trusteeship,
but the connections between the three aspects reflected how self-government was also related
to collaboration and provided a justification for the presence of the mandatory administration.
Wauchope's position was influenced by underlying assumptions about the lack of Arab
capacity for self-government and by the need to avoid the deadlock that had led to the
rejection of constitutional proposals under Samuel. The legislative council model that had
been proposed in 1922 offered a starting point, but it was clear that this model would need to
be substantially adapted to gain approval from both communities after the Arab boycott of
1923. This, in tum, would require consultation with Arab and Jewish leaders to avoid another
failure. In the interim, Wauchope opted to continue the strategy of expanding local autonomy
but, unlike previous efforts, this was regarded as a short-term move to prepare a framework
for discussions in Palestine about a legislative council, as well as increasing Arab familiarity
with administration.l'"
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An important change since the legislative council was discussed in 1923 was the
standing of the yishuv, which during the 1930s considerably increased in size and strength
through increased levels of immigration. This transformation led to a different opinion
amongst Zionist leaders on the desirability of a legislature: they would only support its
establishment if it was created on the basis of 'parity', with equal representation given to
Jews and Arabs. The demand was indicative ofthe ambivalence in British-Zionist relations
that became more profound as the Jewish community grew and its dependence on the
colonial state waned. Wauchope considered parity as 'wrong in principle', whilst the Colonial
Office thought it 'obviously unreasonable' and 'impossible to defend in Parliament or
elsewhere' .147 It was acknowledged that accepting the principle would lead to severe
repercussions with Muslim and Christian Arabs, who would almost certainly reject any
proposals based on it. 148 The high commissioner believed that if opposition from the minority
Jewish community was seen to be responsible for blocking the scheme, it would threaten the
'feeling of trust' he had established with Arab notables and undermine his collaborative mode
of politics with them, particularly the grand mufti.149 For his part, Hajj Amin al-Husseini
pushed for the proposed legislative council to be fully representative and have the widest
powers possible as part of an overall strategy to use a legislature to 'safeguard' Arab
interests, which in effect meant blocking the growth of the Jewish national home through
limiting immigration.F" Whether the demand for parity was a tactic by the Zionists to prevent
the establishment of the legislative council outright is debatable, but it is certain that they
feared an Arab majority would use the council to restrict the development of the national
home and were anxious that mandatory officials would be unable to devise a means where an
Arab majority could not do so either directly or indirectly.P! This was a concern that
mandatory officials felt, but was part of a wider apprehension that a legislative council
without adequate safeguards would quickly pass out of British control.
The possibility of Jewish opposition formed a major part of the decision to focus on
improving participation in local affairs and to use the interim period for consultation with
both communities to secure their co-operation, instead of re-opening the question in public.
The decision was justified by Wauchope as in the interest of the country:
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I see no dishonesty in postponing its fulfilment for another 1 Y2 years when it is in the
interests of the country to do so: Isubmit it is wiser from every reason to take such
action now ... provided we adhere to our determination to grant one as soon as we can
with benefit to the country as a whole, and provided we take small but immediate
measures to increase the share of the people in the administration and government of
the country.IS2
These 'immediate measures' were designed to create space for discussions about the
legislative council and involved appointing more Palestinians to government advisory boards,
admitting three unofficial members to the high commissioner's advisory council to increase
the local population's access to the machinery of government, and enacting a new ordinance
to extend the powers oflocal bodies.ls3 These initiatives were designed to create time for
discussion about the legislative council. They were part of a positive move based on the
assumption that local autonomy offered a more suitable environment for Arabs to gain
experience in administration.
By November 1932, unofficial Jewish and Arab members had been appointed by the
high commissioner to the Agricultural Council, the Labour Board, the Standing Committee
on Commerce and Industry, the Railway Board, and the Road Board.P" A new ordinance for
local government was not enacted until January 1934. Its size and complexity meant that the
administration consulted with the Colonial Office and various bodies in Palestine, including
mayors, the Arab Executive, and the Jewish Agency, who all made objections to the initial
draft put forward in September 1932 on the grounds that the Palestine government exercised
too much control over municipalities.F' The Municipal Corporation Ordinance set out in
some detail the duties of municipal business by enumerating the powers and obligations of
the council, the maximum taxes it could levy, the services it could undertake, and the officials
that it could employ. The legislation represented a significant expansion of municipal
functions, particularly as the councils were now able to start creating their own municipal
civil services by appointing local officials, such as a town clerk, town engineer, and medical
officer.ls6 However, the mandatory administration retained extensive supervisory powers: the
financial activities of the municipalities were subject to the approval of the district
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commissioner and the high commissioner reserved the power to create local authorities,
appoint mayors, direct elections, and disband ineffective councils.ls7
The effects of the new ordinance were slow to take hold. In 1937, the Peel
Commission found that the average municipality was 'not yet a corporate body expressing in
its services the social sense of the community'. It implied that the municipalities were
inadequately developed to deliver effective local self-government: there was 'little sense of
municipal responsibility for the public welfare in the sense in which this would be understood
in Europe'. 158 Of course, this tended to refer to the Arab population. It concluded that many
Arab towns were too small and without adequate means to create a municipal civil service.
Most could only afford a single officer and five had no permanent civil staff at all. Following
on from that it was established that most towns could only offer limited public services;
beyond such 'fundamental amenities' as drainage, sewerage, and roads, there had been little
expansion into services like electricity or public transport, whilst control of education and
public health remained centralised in government departments. Although financial constraints
and lack of initiative were partly responsible for this, the Peel Commission also concluded
that the growth of municipal councils had 'been checked in some degree by the strict
subordination of the Municipalities to the District Administration' .159 The practice of
approving municipal budgets was deemed excessively laborious and had the consequence of
alienating the municipal councils by undermining their independence. It also had the practical
effect of holding up public works: 'the more progressive Municipalities resort in exasperation
to a variety of semi-legal devices to circumvent the delay and so press on with important
works' .160 In the overall context of developing self-government, British preoccupation with
ensuring that it maintained sufficient control to ensure a minimum standard of administration
actually acted as a barrier to development. This control was justified through the paternal
form that trusteeship often assumed which, in promoting the overall interests of Palestine,
warned colonial officials about a reckless delegation of authority to bodies that were not
ready or capable of managing such responsibilities.
By 1934, the focus ofWauchope's concerted approach had shifted back towards the
question of a legislative council. There were three main aspects to be considered before
official talks could begin in Palestine: the form of the council; the nature of representation
1S7 Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 1 July 1933, CO 733/243/3.




amongst its members; and the powers it would hold. The three elements would need to be
carefully aligned to address the issues of general Zionist opposition and the call for parity,
Arab demands for a fully representative parliament with wide powers, and British concerns
over adequate safeguards to ensure the operation of the mandate.l'" Because of the Arab
boycott in 1923 there was sustained debate about the new proposals. The main discussions
came in two phases during 1932 and 1934. In the end, a legislative council was not
established, but the debates are important because they demonstrate the shape of British
thinking on the general nature of self-government.
The 1922 White paper had established a clear precedent for the form of the council
that was in line with the wider practice of colonial legislative councils with a semi-elected
single chamber that was subject to controlling British influence. However, there was still
scope for deliberation. InAugust 1934, the district commissioner for Jerusalem, J.F.
Campbell, submitted a memorandum that emphasised the benefits of a wholly nominated
bicameral system. He believed that this system, with an officially controlled upper house,
would provide the most effective safeguards for British interests. For Campbell, being able to
appoint the lower house would prevent infiltration by 'extremists' and provide a more
compliant body for the mandatory administration to work with.162 Despite these suggestions,
there was a general consensus between the high commissioner and the Colonial Office that a
unicameral system offered a more straightforward option based on existing colonial patterns,
and so bicameralism was not seriously considered.
Campbell's suggestions, however, did help to structure some of the discussions that
were held. In speaking of the problems of 'extremists' gaining seats on the council, he raised
a major British concern about ensuring the legislature remained 'moderate'. The high
commissioner explained that a perfectly free election 'would almost certainly lead to the
election of a number of irresponsible extremists [and] men of this type would not represent
the real interests of Palestine, which are primarily agricultural and industrial' .163 Presumably,
these 'extremists' would have been mainly concerned with restricting Zionist development
which in tum would harm those agricultural and industrial interests. This is a good example
of British officials defining what local interests in Palestine were through their own
161 See, for example, 'Note of conversation between Colonial Secretary and Mr. Sokolow and Dr. Brodetsky' 3
November 1932, CO 733/219/4; and Summary of conversation between High Commissioner and Grand Mufti
20 August 1934, CO 733/265/1. '
162 J.F. Campbell to Hathorn-Hall, 24 August 1934, CO 733126511.
163 Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 25 August 1934, CO 733/265/1.
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perspectives and demonstrates one of the key assumptions of trusteeship that agricultural and
industrial development, leading to economic prosperity within a framework of liberal,
utilitarian, and rational governing institutions, would mitigate political tension between the
Jewish and Arab communities. To ensure that such interests were adequately represented,
Wauchope believed it was 'essential' that a certain proportion of the council be nominated by
the high commissioner.
The system of representation for the council- and its overall size - provoked debate
in two main directions: the nature of the official element and the distribution of seats between
the different communities. In considering the size of the council and its official contingent,
Wauchope was willing to depart from colonial precedent and the blueprint established by the
1922 White Paper. In order to give more scope to balancing the representation of the various
communities, he departed from the practice of an official majority and instead proposed a
much larger council of between 30 and 40 members. His preference for a smaller official
element was also part of an attempt to make the Arab population engage with the council, as
one of the major complaints about the 1922 model was that the number of official members
would severely limit Arab influence within it. The Colonial Office, however, was wary of
this proposal. It argued that a larger council would be difficult to manage as the official and
nominated members would be 'swamped' by the elected members. The colonial secretary
proposed limiting unofficial elected members to 14, with five official and six nominated
members.164 In the end a form of compromise was reached after meetings at the Colonial
Office in October 1934. The 1922 proposal of 12 elected unofficial members was retained,
but the official element was reduced in favour of nominating unofficial members to ensure
adequate representation of all interests and to guarantee some form of moderacy. The
accepted formula was 12 elected and 16 nominated members, including five official positions
amongst the nominees.l'f
The balance of official and unofficial members was a cause for debate, but the major
point of discussion was the distribution of seats between the different communities in
Palestine. This was always going to be a contentious issue as the allocation of seats would
ultimately determine the prevailing attitude of the council, especially with a reduced official
element. The leaders of the yishuv called for parity, whilst the Arab population demanded a
fully proportional system. These calls reflected contemporary demographic realities: Arab
164 Colonial Office Note on Palestine Legislative Council, 2 October 1934, CO 733/265/1.
16' Wauchope to Colonial Office, 29 October 1934, CO 733/265/2.
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notables felt that proportional representation would deliver the legislature into their hands so
they could block the growth of the Jewish national home, whilst Zionist leaders called for
parity as the most effective way of circumventing Arab demands for restrictions.l'"
The British position was that neither mode was an adequate system of
representation.l'" Wauchope had mooted the possibility of adopting a territorial basis for the
division of seats, rather than communal, to make the issue of representation appear less
contentious. However, the constituencies were to be arranged so that the desired number of
candidates from each communal denomination was elected, which demonstrated that the
communal paradigm derived from the millet system continued to underpin British thinking on
the subject. The use of a territorial division was also thought to be less divisive in terms of
Arab-Jewish relations, although the encouragement of Arab-Jewish co-operation was not
necessarily a high priority in terms of trusteeship. The mandatory administration preferred to
focus on developing limited forms of self-government and maintaining an efficient
administration within a British framework. This predilection complemented the colonial
secretary's view that the communal basis would be more prudent and would allow each
community to adopt its own system of voting. For example, the Jewish community would
have been able to extend a female franchise.168
In the end, the overall shape of the council allowed the mandatory administration to
settle on a hybrid of the two: the elected element would be configured on a population basis,
whilst the high commissioner could appoint the nominated members to ensure that there was
no dominant majority. In practical terms, this meant that the total number of Christian and
Muslim seats would be 14, the Jewish community would have nine, and the official
complement would be five seats. The distribution of seats also mirrored cultur~l
preconceptions. It was obvious that a proportional system offered the most equitable system
of representation but, despite rejecting Jewish calls for parity, it was almost taken for granted
by colonial officials that they would be given representation beyond their relative proportion
of the population and that they would exercise this power more responsibly. These
preconceptions were no doubt reinforced by the development of democratically elected
communal institutions within the yishuv itself.169 Malcolm MacDonald, who became colonial
secretary in June 1935, explained that Zionist leaders 'are really capable of being
166 Colonial Office Note on Palestine Legislative Council, undated, CO 733/265/1.
167 Note of discussion in Colonial Office, 19 October 1934, CO 733/275/1.
168 Ibid.
169 Cunliffe-Lister to Wauchope, 2 December 1932, CO 733/219/4.
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statesmanlike, and are by far the most likely ... to make constructive contributions to a
problem the solution of which requires concessions from both sides' .170 There was an element
of pragmatism though, as the official and Jewish members could vote together and provide a
counter-weight to an Arab bloc and defeat potentially dangerous legislation, but the increased
representation of Jewish interests must also be seen in terms of cultural preconceptions about
capability for self-rule.
Because there would not be an official majority on the council and because Jewish co-
operation could not necessarily be guaranteed on every subject, the powers that the legislative
council would be given, or the restrictions placed on it, were of paramount importance in
providing safeguards to sustain British rule. For the Arab community, these safeguards had to
allow the council to exercise some degree of legislative power to make it worthwhile for the
local population to engage with it, because they would once again be presented with the
dilemma of providing legitimacy to the mandate if they decided to support its establishment.
However, Wauchope viewed the delegation of legislative power through the prism of
trusteeship. He felt obligated to create a meaningful legislature as a way of developing self-
government in the interests of the population. But in trying to grant real power, Wauchope
acknowledged the need for rigorous safeguards to ensure that the requirements of 'good'
government could be adequately met, which again demonstrated hesitancy about the political
inexperience of Arabs and the general reluctance of British officials to grant representative
power in a colonial context.l" This need was also increased because after the experience of
the Arab boycott in 1923, it was decided to not only abandon the official majority but also the
clause in the council's constitution that prevented it from passing laws that contravened the
mandate. Wauchope regarded the clause as a 'sweeping restriction', but also an unworkable
one, given that the terms of the mandate were 'general and elastic ... [and] lend themselves to
a variety of interpretations between wide limits', which could quickly lead council
deliberations into an impasse.l72
This left two other forms of safeguard to consider. The first was to reserve certain
subjects from the jurisdiction of the legislature, such as land and immigration, which were
obviously divisive issues. Yet reserving subjects was nearly as objectionable as inserting a
clause that did not allow bills to disregard the mandate as it restricted free speech and closed
170 MacDonald to Wauchope, 22 June 1935, CO 733/275/1.
171 Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 25 August 1934, CO 733/265/1.
172 Wauchope, 'Observations on the methods for providing safeguards for the proposed Legislative Council',
undated, CO 733/265/1.
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off the possibility for constructive suggestions to be made on the barred subject. The other
idea was to give the high commissioner a power of veto over the council and the ability to
certificate legislation without reference to the council when it was 'urgently required in the
public interest'. This proposal had the advantage of allowing the council to at least debate
freely on any subject, which Wauchope described as 'an important psychological
consideration' in garnering support for the policy.173At the same time, however, it was the
widest safeguard possible in that it potentially applied to every bill the legislative council
might want to enact. In ruling out the official majority and obeisance to the mandate,
Wauchope had no real choice but to adopt powers of veto and certification if the mandatory
administration was to retain what it felt was an effective safeguard. To make this more
palatable it was suggested that the use of such powers would be restricted to bills that were
inconsistent with the mandate, prejudicial to public security or the external defence of
Palestine, or that concerned taxation and expenditure of public funds.174
This framework on the form of the council, its system of representation, and its
powers received approval from the Cabinet in November 1934. Throughout the discussions
with the Colonial Office, Wauchope had also been conducting unofficial talks with leaders in
Palestine to gauge their opinion on the proposals and he continued these in a bid to begin
official talks in June 1935. After meeting with the grand mufti, Wauchope ascertained that the
broad Arab perspective was that it would support the proposals but at the same time
endeavour to gain as wide powers as possible during official talks about its formation.
Wauchope warned Hajj Amin that if the Arab community refused to participate in a
legislative council with 'moderate' powers, then it would reinforce the underlying British
belief that 'that the Arabs were not yet fit for a Council, nor for any constitutional change' .175
However, Wauchope's discussions with David Ben-Gurion, who had by now emerged as the
dominant leader of the yishuv, took on a very different complexion and MacDonald's
comments about the 'statesmanlike' leaders of the yishuv being more likely to compromise
when concessions were required proved significantly misplaced.
The indirect approach that Britain adopted towards the Zionist movement, which had
allowed for the emergence of quasi-state institutions under the banner of communal
organisation, gave enough scope for the achievement of Zionist aims and meant a legislative
173 Ibid.
174 Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 25 August 1934, CO 733/265/1.
17S 'Summary of Conversation between the High Commissioner and the Grand Mufti', 20 August 1934, CO
733/265/1.
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council was largely unnecessary. Since the mandatory administration could not agree to
parity, it was clear that the yishuv would be unable to control the council and so it actually
represented more of a threat to its interests than an opportunity for advancing them.
Wauchope identified three positions that Zionist leaders would adopt during official
discussions: firstly, to attempt to postpone the question indefinitely; secondly, to insist on the
principle of parity; and finally, to attempt to limit the powers of the council to such an extent
that the Arab community would refuse to participate. Inprivate, Ben-Gurion went as far as
demanding that when working out the representative balance between the communities, every
Jew in the Diaspora should potentially be included in the yishuv, which Wauchope regarded
as 'quite unfair,.176 This position, derived from the international nature of the Zionist
movement, was again re-iterated at a meeting between Weizmann and Wauchope in May
1935.177 This general stance was another indication of the growing ambivalence in British-
Zionist relations.
The force of Jewish opposition, and the fact that Malcolm MacDonald had only
recently been appointed as colonial secretary, meant that any formal declaration or
conversation on the subject was postponed until the autumn of 1935, whilst Wauchope
attempted to reconcile with Zionist leaders. Despite 'friendly' talks that continued throughout
the year, the high commissioner was warned that he must not take deliberation on the subject
as an implication that they would participate in the legislative council. 17SIndeed, by now
Ben-Gurion suggested that he would not support a legislative council even if the principle of
parity was accepted.!" Wauchope's own position was informed by his earlier belief that
'enforcing the establishment of a Legislative Council now against strenuous Jewish
opposition ... would create a most difficult situation both in Palestine and elsewhere, and
would be bad for the country' .ISOThe proximate difficulty resulting from a Jewish boycott
would be the empty seats on the council, and the implications that would have on the
direction of it under uncontested Arab leadership. lSIOn these grounds, Jewish opposition was
actually a key factor in Arab support for the council.IS2 But, whilst accepting the need to gain
Zionist support, the high commissioner hinted that he was willing to press on with his
proposal even if they threatened abstention. He was clearly addressing the deteriorating
176 Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 16 August 1934, CO 733/265/1.
177 Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 7 May 1935, CO 733/275/1
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political situation in Palestine through the mid-1930s when he explained that 'the evil results,
were we to give way now in deference to Jewish protests and threats of non-cooperation in
the election, would be as deplorable as they undoubtedly would be lasting'.183 Wauchope
feared this situation would be followed 'by riots or grave acts of civil disobedience in
Palestine' .184However, the desire to gain Jewish co-operation proved stronger and resulted in
inertia on the subject, which meant the proposals remained at the stage of unofficial talks.
Wauchope continued to view the establishment of a legislative council in terms of
trusteeship but, by the end of 1935, his concerted approach to self-government became part of
a wider picture of changes that the mandatory administration needed to introduce to sustain
trusteeship amidst a changing political climate. The high commissioner suggested that, in
addition to the creation of a legislature, a reduction of immigration from the 'excess' level of
1934 was needed, and that a measure to give protection to small land owners from
dispossession was required (which will be examined in chapters three and four). He explained
that 'I need hardly add that I do not urge these measures on account of Arab ill-feeling or
resentment: I do so because I consider that to carry out our double duty under the Mandate,
these measures ... are called for to enable Government to maintain the principles underlying
its policy.18SThose principles were the fundamental expressions of trusteeship that Zionist
settlement would promote economic development whilst not disadvantaging the position of
the Arabs.
In March 1936, there was a significant growth of opposition within the British
parliament to the establishment of a legislative council, to the point that the government had
'practically no support' on the issue. After a prolonged House of Commons debate on 24
March 1936, during which MacDonald detected 'extensive Jewish propaganda', the general
opinion was that the British government was not obliged to set up a legislative council within
a certain time frame, that Palestine required more 'training' in local and municipal
government before the creation of a legislature, and that its establishment was more likely to
exacerbate tensions between Jews and Arabs than improve them. 186Furthermore, MacDonald
reported 'it was feared that, despite any safeguards, [a] Legislative Council would become an
instrument for defeating the intention of the Mandate and for checking the development of
183 Wauchope to MacDonald, 5 August 1935, CO 733/275/1.
184 Wauchope to MacDonald, 11 February 1936, CO 733/320/5.
185 Wauchope to MacDonald, 7 December 1935, CO 733/320/5.
186 Hansard HC Deb, 11 March 1936, Vol. 309, c2110-2; Hansard HC Deb 24 March 1936, Vol. 310, cl079-
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the national home'. Parliament suggested that either a commission of enquiry be despatched
to Palestine to determine whether it would be 'desirable to give effect to the proposals' or that
a round table conference be held in London to discuss a potential constitution with both
sides.187Wauchope protested that these courses of action would have 'the worst possible
effect on Arabs in Palestine' as they would be seen as reneging on previous commitments.l'"
Proposals to invite an Arab delegation to London to consult with the colonial secretary were
discussed, but before they could be agreed the Arab rebellion broke out and the project of a
legislative council was dropped entirely.189 The convergence of Jewish opposition in
Palestine and political reticence in London were responsible for the failure ofWauchope's
concerted approach to establish a national legislature.
Conclusion
After the collapse of constitutional proposals under Samuel in 1923, sustained dialogue on
various aspects of a legislative council between 1932 and 1936 represented a comparatively
flexible approach by the mandatory administration and the Colonial Office to try and align
Arab, Jewish, and British interests within an acceptable format. The primacy of British
interests within that matrix meant that the mandatory authorities would not establish a
legislative council that it was not able to control. In the end, this principle underlined much
British thinking on the development of Arab self-government in Palestine, as it was clear that
an unsupervised delegation of significant authority could quickly undermine the foundations
of the colonial state. Nevertheless, the failure to advance authentic self-government was a
political grievance that Arab notables held from the beginning of the mandate. The
prevarication over establishing a legislature under Wauchope, amidst Zionist opposition to
the proposal, was an exacerbating factor on the already radicalised political opinion of'the
Arab community in the 1930s, which had begun to see armed resistance as the only effective
method of realising its national aims.
The lack of a national forum in which Jews and Arabs could engage in political
discourse can be seen as a factor in the developing conflict between the two communities,
although it is clearly difficult to gauge the effect that creating a legislative council would
have had whether it was created in the early 1920s or the mid-1930s. In the end, the evolution
of communal organisations provides more explanation for the growing separation and
187 MacDonald to Wauchope, 25 March 1936, CO 733/320/5.
188 Wauchope to MacDonald, 28 March 1936, CO 733/320/5.
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deepening tensions. The indirect approach taken by the mandatory administration towards the
yishuv gave it sufficient latitude for its communal institutions to develop independently and
become quasi-state institutions, which could unite the Zionist movement in times of crisis.
On the other hand, the communal division of Arabs into Muslim and Christians, and more
importantly the use of the SMC and local positions of autonomy to divide Arab notables
along factional lines, prevented the emergence of unified, self-governing institutions that
could effectively challenge the mandatory power or fend off Zionist colonisation.
These issues indicate that British thinking about self-government in Palestine was
influenced by the question of collaboration. Granting limited autonomy to encourage the
local population to acquiesce in mandatory rule was a key tactic to ensure stability for the
colonial state. However, even when self-government was contemplated in terms of
collaboration, trusteeship played a very significant role. The creation of self-governing
institutions represented an important factor in the overall development of Palestine and was
therefore a central element of British trusteeship. This ethos sought to promote the
development of self-government, but at the same time concern about the 'interests' of the
local population served to constrain the delegation of authority when it might have threatened
the basic tenets of colonial governance - the firm maintenance oflaw and order, the creation
of satisfactory conditions for economic productivity, and the development of public services.
As has been demonstrated, these considerations were profoundly informed by cultural
preconceptions about the capacity of Arabs and Jews for controlling their own affairs.
It was often the case that when British officials contemplated delegating power to the
Arab community, they believed that it would also undermine the administrative standards to
which they aspired under their obligations as trustees for Palestine. This meant that the major
focus of British efforts at promoting self-government amongst the Arab community was at
the level of local government, so that they could gain experience in district administration or
of running local or municipal councils before participating in more responsible and
representative structures of national self-government. Colonial officials were willing to
tolerate some losses of efficiency at the local level, provided that a supervisory influence was
in place to ensure that administration did not drop below a certain standard. To make this
delegation at the local level more acceptable, many important areas that could have been
administered locally, such as education, were concentrated in government departments run by
British officials. The centralisation of real power and the overarching presence of British
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supervision had the ultimate effect of deterring the majority of Arabs from substantially




From the beginning of British rule in Palestine, Arab calls for an immediate grant of
representative self-government were based on a desire to repudiate the Balfour Declaration
and prevent Zionist settlement in Palestine. After the declaration had been issued in
November 1917, it was clear that Jewish immigration into Palestine would be a cornerstone
of the Zionist Organisation's ambitions for the establishment ofa national home in Palestine.
Wyndham Deedes, who served as Sir Herbert Samuel's first chief secretary, went as far as
saying that immigration was 'the essence of Zionism' .I Itwas held in such high regard by
Zionists that it was designated' aliyah', meaning to ascend, which gave a spiritual tone of
revivalism to secular Zionism. The first two waves of Jewish migration to Palestine, known
as the first and second aliyah (1882-1903 and 1904-14), lacked the scale and political
intensity that accompanied the third, fourth, and fifth (1919-23, 1924-29, and 1932-38). The
first and second aliyah were marked by Arab-Jewish tensions of their own, including violent
clashes in Jaffa in 1908, but British support for Zionist ambitions and its supplanting of the
Ottoman empire during the First World War meant that the Zionist aspiration of a Jewish
majority in Palestine became a feasible, if distant possibility.i
The ramifications of this aspiration, including the frustration of pan-Arab aims in the
region, meant that immigration was a fundamental cause of hostility between the yishuv and
the indigenous Arab population. British immigration policy attracted sustained criticism from
both Zionist and Arab leaders: the former aimed to maximise autonomy over the immigration
process to settle as many immigrants as possible, whilst the latter continuously called for the
suspension of Jewish immigration.' Tensions were not only driven by political grievances,
but also by the economic impact of Jewish immigration." In fact, British attempts to regulate
immigration between 1920 and 1936 were ultimately administered by a series of different
economic categories and not through a politically driven system of quotas, which reflected
IDeedes to Churchill, 10 March 1922, CO 733/19.
2 Shapira, Land and Power, p.83-S.
3 See Zionist Organisation to Churchill, 10 May 1921, FO 37116382; and 'A Brief Statement of the Demands of
the Arab People of Palestine (Moslems and Christians) by the Palestine Arab Delegation in London', 12 August
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4 Barbara Smith, The Roots of Separatism in Palestine: British Economic Policy, 1920-29, (London, Tauris,
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the importance that colonial officials attached to the economic dimension of Jewish
immigration.
A number of approaches can be taken to studying the economy of Palestine in the
mandatory period. One is of a 'typical European colony', complete with a European settler
minority. Despite the nature of the mandate system, which prevented mandatory powers from
establishing special trade privileges for themselves, Palestine had an archetypal system of
colonial finance: its currency was linked directly to the metropolitan power; significant
portions of revenue were raised from indirect taxes; and a high proportion of expenditure
went on security and defence. S A second perspective is that of a 'dual economy' with separate
Arab and Jewish sectors. The Jewish sector, initially a set of fragmented enclaves, was
transformed by the influx of immigrants and capital into a 'definable economic
organisation'i'' Whilst potentially useful, such an approach needs to be careful about denying
the important contacts that took place between Arab and Jewish workers across the period," A
third frame of analysis is of a capitalist sector interacting with a pre-capitalist one in a
paradigm that moves away from national labels by focusing upon the Palestinian economy as
a whole. Yet there are problems here as well; for example, to identify Jewish settlement with
a capitalist dynamic can ignore the fact that the success of the Zionist movement was actually
predicated on subordinating considerations of profit and loss to maintaining as many Jews in
Palestine as possible at a standard of living fit to encourage more to settle there permanently.t
All of these approaches have a degree of utility to them. Jacob Metzer has put forward
a more nuanced dual economy model that draws on the last two by suggesting that a dualist
outlook is appropriate provided that it is recognised that there were 'substantial' economic
relations between Jews and Arabs.9 This chapter will utilise Metzer's notion of a dual
economy whilst recognising that that economy was profoundly framed by both the colonial
context of Palestine and the capitalist/pre-capitalist interactions that took place within it. The
Zionist movement hoped that, within the dual economy, a division along ethnic lines would
advance the development of the Jewish national home; so it was generally the case that Arab
land sold to Jews passed permanently into Jewish hands through a process of
'nationalisation'; that Jewish flows of capital were almost exclusively invested in Jewish
S Roger Owen, 'Introduction', in Owen, Studies in the Economic and Social History of Palestine, pA.
6 Ibid, p.5.
7 See, for example, Lockman, Comrades and Enemies.
8 Owen, 'Introduction', pp.6-7.
9 Jacob Metzer, TheDivided Economy 0/Mandatory Palestine, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1998), p.9.
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enterprises; and that non-Jews were actively discouraged from working in them. These trends
generated tension between the communities, but political conflict was exacerbated by
heightened levels of immigration, particularly when it combined with other volatile issues
like contested land claims and disputes over the control of sacred urban spaces." This was
especially the case during the 1930s when Palestine became one of the only viable refuges for
European Jewry after the rise of Nazism in Germany. During the fifth aliyah, the short period
of 1933-36 witnessed more than half of the total number of immigrants settle in Palestine
since the beginning of British rule. In 1935, immigration peaked at 61,854, which at that rate
would have seen a Jewish majority in around a decade. I I The dramatic rise in immigration in
the 1930s and a change in the dynamic of rural land sales intensified popular images of Jews
dispossessing Arabs and provided a key impetus for the outbreak of the Arab rebellion during
1936.12
The importance attached to immigration in this context means that the British role and
motivation for facilitating it has been explored inconsistently. It is often analysed indirectly as
a cause in the outbreak of violence, such as in the riots of the early 1920s, the Arab rebellion
of 1936-39, or with the 1939 White Paper and consequent Jewish revolt after the Second
World War.13 A major exception to this is a relatively old study by Moshe Mossek on
immigration policy under the tenure of Sir Herbert Samuel." The danger of an indirect
approach is of a reductive frame of analysis; the correlation between levels of immigration
and the outbreak of disorder was not a simple one. Moreover, there is a risk of obscuring the
wider rationale that British officials used in justifying support for immigration, which
remained fairly consistent between 1920 and 1936. The aim of this chapter is to examine the
development of the immigration system between those years and explore how ideas of
trusteeship informed immigration policy in Palestine. The British commitment to facilitate
10 Martin Thomas, Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914, (London,
University of Cali fomi a Press, 2008), p.226 and Charles Townshend, 'Going to the Wall: The Failure of British
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Routledge, 1977), pp.81-90.
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Jewish immigration has been explained in terms of strategic national interest, where
sponsorship of a Jewish national home would safeguard British interests in the Middle East
by establishing a loyal settler population and simultaneously foster favourable sentiments
toward Britain throughout world Jewry. IS Whilst this may have been the initial case for
policymaking in the highest echelons of the British government, it is unlikely that this reason
alone could have sustained British support for Zionism in the face of Arab protests
throughout the mandatory period. Under Article Six of the mandate, Britain was obligated to
facilitate Jewish immigration as long as 'the rights and position of other sections of the
population are not prejudiced'. The fulfilment of this obligation connected to the assumptions
that sustained trusteeship: that carefully managed Zionist settlement in Palestine would drive
economic development and that this, in tum, would mitigate opposition to the establishment
of the national home.
Both Britain and the Zionist Organisation emphasised that Jewish immigration would
be synonymous with progress. Itwas believed that the growth oftheyishuv's economy
through immigration and the capital that followed it would have a positive effect on
transforming the subsistence agriculture on which the Arab element of the dual economy was
typically based. When they were faced with restrictions, Zionist leaders often pointed to 'the
central position which immigration occupies in our programme of work for the development
of Palestine' .16 There was a considerable basis for this belief, as contacts between local Arab
peasants and existing Jewish agricultural 'colonies', which were established during the first
and second aliyah, were said to have encouraged the development of nearby Arab agriculture.
After Samuel's first visit to Palestine in February 1920, he concluded that
The most hopeful feature in the situation lies in the fact that there is no antipathy, and
remarkably little friction [between them] ... their relations, as a rule, are excellent. The
Arab villagers know that they have been able to improve their methods of cultivation
owing to the object-lessons furnished by the Jewish colonies. They know that there is
more employment in the districts where these colonies have been founded, and that
they themselves are in better circumstances than the Arabs in other districts that have
been left undeveloped. 17
The British government clearly hoped that the presence of Jewish immigration would provide
a natural stimulus to Oriental 'ignorance' and cause them to 'modernise' their ways of
15Mossek, Palestine Immigration Policy, p42-3; Atran, 'The Surrogate Colonisation of Palestine', pp.no-I.
16 Zionist Organisation to Churchill, 10 May 1921, FO 371/6382
17 Samuel to Curzon, 2 April1920, MECA, GBI65-02S2.
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cultivation, which would in turn promote a more economic use of land and encourage greater
prosperity. In this light, Samuel could also take encouragement from the fact that Jewish
Colonists have numerous connections with the Arab world, especially among the
fellaheen who always come to them for advice and guidance. It is the duty of the
Zionists in Palestine to take the Arab movement seriously and to try and establish
friendly relations with the Arab community on the basis of honest co-operation. This
is possible and a great service would be thus rendered to the cause of civilisation in
the Near East.18
This illustrates how the developmental aspect of trusteeship permeated early considerations
of immigration. The justification for facilitating Jewish immigration was never solely about
establishing a Jewish national home. The influx of immigrants and capital was expected to
drive economic development and help the 'static' Oriental population lift itself into the
'modem' world.
In these terms, the commitment to facilitate immigration was a 'positive' aspect of
mandatory rule. Yet such changes did have the potential to undermine the economic position
of the 'non-Jewish' communities in Palestine. In April 1934, the Colonial Office elaborated
on the developmental and protective aspects of trusteeship in relation to immigration by
suggesting that the key premise was to not place 'greater obstacles in the way of Jewish
immigration than are absolutely necessary for the purpose in view':
Our policy hitherto has been to leave the development of the Jewish National Home
(which is the main factor in the development of Palestine) to the Jewish people
themselves; the part of the Government being, in the words of the Mandate, "to place
the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will
secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home", and to apply the brake when
necessary in the interests of the other inhabitants of Palestine."
From the very beginning of the civil administration, the decision on when to 'apply the brake'
was conceived in economic terms. The Colonial Office and the mandatory administration
were particularly keen to avoid using political considerations to regulate immigration except
in times of major crisis, such as during outbreaks of rioting when immigration was typically
suspended. A political method of regulating immigration was avoided because it was clearly
more complicated and liable to become entangled in various protestations by the Arab and
Jewish communities. Moreover, the economic basis for immigration connected to the core
assumptions that sustained trusteeship: that the Palestinian Arabs did not require political
18 Samuel to Curzon, 2 February 1920, MECA, GB 165-0252.
19 Downie, 'Memorandum on Immigration into Palestine', April 1934, CO 733/255/3.
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rights of national self-determination but that their economic position in Palestine needed to be
protected, and that Zionist settlement would drive economic growth and mitigate any tensions
regarding the establishment of the Jewish national home. The capacity of Palestine for
immigration was linked to the limits imposed by the economic ability of the country to
absorb new immigrants. The economic considerations that went in to regulating immigration
have been described as 'political tools' designed to provide a facade of legitimacy to the
system, but this chapter will emphasise that those considerations were a fundamental part of
the immigration process that provided colonial officials with both legitimacy and a method of
regulation."
Developing an Immigration System: 1920-21
The transition to a civil administration in July 1920 required the question of a general
immigration policy to be considered for the first time. The principles of trusteeship ran
strongly through the very first proposals made by Samuel, which were influenced by the fact
that Palestine was suffering from an acute shortage of labour following the privations of the
First World War. Any capital investment by the mandatory administration or the Zionist
Organisation was likely to see the demand for labour increase considerably; Samuel warned
the Foreign Office that 'if immigration is not permitted the economic development of the
country will be retarded' .21 Albert Hyamson, who became director of immigration, explained
in his account of the mandate that, as Palestine was 'under-populated', immigration 'would
bring only benefit and no harm to the country'. 22 This connection between immigration and
economic development was established early by colonial officials as it was understood that
Palestine would not attract significant British investment.P At the first meeting of his
advisory council in October 1920, Samuel explained that
Immigrants, mostly Jews, are now arriving at the ports, and they are finding
employment in the building of roads and in the redemption of land previously derelict.
Their presence is thus not only no detriment to the interests of the existing population
but of direct advantage to them, by increasing the resources and prosperity of the
country. It is an illustration of the fact that the process of the establishment of the
Jewish national home will benefit and not injure the non-Jewish population/"
20 Smith, The Roots of Separatism, p.68.
21 Samuel to Foreign Office, 16 June 1920, FO 37115183.
22 Albert Hyamson, Palestine under the Mandate, (London, Methuen & Co., 1950), p.52.
23 Smith, The Roots of Separatism in Palestine, pp.19-36.
24 Speech made by Samuel at the First Meeting of the Advisory Council, 6 October 1920, FO 406/44.
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Early immigration was therefore justified through the perceived 'dereliction' of Palestine, but
Samuel's remarks also demonstrate the prominence of the link between economic growth and
immigration. Whilst the initial system through which immigrants began to arrive in Palestine
was relatively simple compared to later iterations, the idea that carefully managed
immigration would be of significant economic benefit to Palestine's 'non-Jewish' population
remained a constant feature of British attempts to facilitate Jewish immigration under
trusteeship between 1920 and 1936.
The immigration system in operation under the military administration was primarily
restrictive: general immigration was prohibited under the principle of maintaining the status
quo. Temporary permits were, however, issued to three classes of immigrants: 'expert
advisers' for the military administration or the Zionist Commission; representatives of
prominent commercial firms; or those who needed to visit Palestine for political, financial, or
journalistic reasons." After the San Remo Conference in April 1920, where it become clear
that Britain would maintain some form of control over Palestine, the Foreign Office, which
administered Palestine until it was transferred to the Colonial Office after the Cairo
Conference in March 1921, decided that a limited number of skilled Jewish workers should
be given visas in anticipation of a more general immigration policy. From Cairo, General
Allenby explained that Palestine could only absorb around one hundred immigrants a month
due to political and economic considerations, but this approximation went unheeded by
British consuls, who were also giving visas to unskilled workers.i" A Foreign Office estimate
put the number of Jewish immigrants that entered Palestine between December 1919 and
September 1920 at 6,500 - significantly higher than Allenby's recommendations - but
suggested that only 1,290 had found employment." The incoming civil administration sought
to regulate 'undesirable' entry as soon as possible by establishing a new system of
regulations.
An Immigration Ordinance came into effect on 1 September 1920. It authorised entry
to Palestine under four categories: immigrants whose livelihood was guaranteed by the
Zionist Organisation; persons of independent means; persons of religious occupations who
were self-supporting; and dependants of those already resident in Palestine.28 Two key
principles underpinned this system: the first was a need to attract immigrants with capital to
25 'Military Regulations Governing Admission of Civilians into Palestine', 1 June 1920, FO 37115183.
26 Allenby to Curzon, 20 April 1920, FO 37115183.
27 Foreign Office Minute, 9 November 1920, FO 37115185.
28 Storrs to Curzon, 11 August 1920, FO 37115184.
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accelerate economic growth; if sufficient evidence could be provided, the mandatory
administration would issue unlimited certificates under the independent means category.i"
The second principle allowed the Zionist Organisation to choose the immigrants that it would
'sponsor' for a year whilst they found employment in Palestine, although British consuls
were able to declare the proposed immigrant to be 'undesirable'. 30 Co-operation with the
Zionist Organisation was regarded as the most efficient way of facilitating Jewish
immigration outside of the independent means category: the British hoped that the vested
interests of the Zionist Organisation would ensure that only the 'best' immigrants were
selected to form the nucleus of the national home. This grant of autonomy connected to the
indirect approach that Britain took towards the yishuv and its obligations to facilitate Jewish
immigration. However, it also formed a crucial part of the wider thinking on trusteeship for
Palestine, where the corollary effect of this 'superior' quality immigration would be its
contribution to economic growth through 'advanced' agricultural enterprises and the import
of capital to increase development.
Labour immigration was to be facilitated by a quota system. On a bi-annual basis,
certificates would be given to the Zionist Organisation for distribution amongst European
Zionist Offices. This gave it significant control over shaping the nature of Jewish
immigration into Palestine, but it only held an advisory role in determining the number of
certificates to be issued." The initial regulations reflected the early hopes of the Zionist
movement that significant resources would be put at its disposal from world Jewry and that
mass immigration would be a viable strategy from the very beginning of the mandate. In
1919, for example, Chaim Weizmann spoke of Palestine eventually absorbing four or five
million Jews, with an annual rate of immigration rapidly rising to at least 70,000.32 Such an
influx would have required substantial finance. Weizmann's initial estimate of the capital that
would be made available to the Zionist project was around £2 million, but this was
confidently revised in 1921 to £5 million over a three-year period." In accordance with these
optimistic aspirations, the mandatory administration fixed the first annual quota for Jewish
immigrants at 16,500 heads offamilies.34 However, Weizmann's estimates of Zionist
finances were reliant on large donations from American Jews who, in tum, were shocked by
29 Spencer, 'Memorandum on Visas for Palestine', 3 August 1920, FO 37115184.
30 Ibid.
31 Samuel, 'Memorandum on Immigration into Palestine', and Foreign Office Minutes, 5 July 1920, FO
371/5183.
32 Smith, TheRoots of Separatism in Palestine, p.64.
33 Weizmann 'Memorandum on the New Phases of Jewish Activity in Palestine', 17 August 1921, CO 733/15.
34 Minute by Parkin, 22 October, 1920, FO 37115185.
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the 'astronomical figure' Weizmann was assuming would be made available. In the end-
much to the chagrin of Weizmann, as he believed that American Jews were amassing
'considerable wealth' - they could not guarantee any more than £100,000.35 This
disappointment overshadowed Zionist efforts throughout the early 1920s, as it meant that
financial responsibility could only be assumed for a fraction of the immigrants proposed in
the initial schedule.
In an admission to the Foreign Office in October 1920, a defiant Leonard Stein, the
acting political secretary of the Zionist Organisation, revealed the financial difficulties that it
was experiencing. He accused British consuls in Europe of allocating too many immigration
certificates, which had excessively consumed Zionist resources, and suggested that a lack of
public works undertaken by the mandatory government meant that the Zionist Organisation
preferred to 'proceed by gradual stages' in establishing the national home. He requested that
the annual quota of Zionist-sponsored immigrants be reduced to 1,000 individuals, excluding
their families, and that no additional certificates be issued until further notice. Finally, he
explained that financial responsibility could not be accepted for immigrants who had not been
vouched for by authorised Zionist representatives." It soon became apparent that attempts to
restrict immigration by adapting a system that was designed to facilitate large scale
immigration would fail. In December 1920 alone, 1,135 immigrants arrived in Palestine
carrying certificates with Zionist sponsorship, demonstrating that the Zionist Organisation
could not exercise enough control over its local offices which continued to encourage
immigration by any means possible.V
The failure of the Zionist Organisation to raise sufficient funds for the economic
integration of new immigrants created a need to make restrictive changes to the immigration
system, particularly as the majority of new immigrants who arrived in Palestine were from
Eastern Europe and without independent means of supporting themselves." The catalyst for
an overhaul came with the outbreak of the Jaffa riots in May 1921.39 The Jewish groups
involved in the initial demonstrations that caused the disturbances were composed of new
33 Chaim Weizmann, Trial and Error: the autobiography of Chaim Weizmann, (New York, Schocken Books,
1966), p.262.
36 Stein to Foreign Office, 18 October 1920, FO 37115185.
37 Samuel to Foreign Office, January 1921, FO 371/6382.
38 Jews from Eastern Europe constituted the vast majority of immigrants into Palestine. Over the 1922-29
period, 78% of immigrants were from Eastern Europe, see Chancellor to Passfield, 15 February 1930, CO
733/188/2.
39 'Reports of the Commission ofInquiry into the Disturbances in May, 1921', Cmd. 1540, (London, HMSO,
1921), pp.22-6.
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immigrants and Arab anger in Jaffa was symbolically focused toward the Immigrant Hostel.
The high commissioner temporarily suspended immigration on 13 May in an attempt to
defuse tensions and prevent any further outbreaks of violence, which left hundreds of
immigrants stranded en route." Whatever immediate provocation there may have been from
Jewish demonstrations, it is certain that Churchill's flying visit to Palestine in March 1921
had increased tensions. In Cairo, he refused to receive a delegation of Palestinian Arabs but
assented to an unofficial meeting in Jerusalem. The Arabs asked for the abrogation of the
Balfour Declaration and the establishment of full self-government in Palestine, but Churchill
replied that 'it is not in my power to do so, nor if it were in my power would it be my wish',
citing the need for a long-term British presence in Palestine in order to carry out the
obligations of trusteeship. 41
The riots were a particular setback for the mandatory administration, especially as the
festival ofNebi Musa in April, which was viewed as far more likely to culminate in an
outbreak of disorder, had passed by peacefully.f The disorder highlighted the prevailing need
to make changes to the immigration system, but the British interpretation of the May Day
riots did not conceive of Jewish immigration as a major cause in itself. Instead, attention was
directed to the regulations that governed immigration and how, in practice, they had not
excluded political 'undesirables'. In his assessment of the riots, Samuel explained to the
Colonial Office that a small percentage - 'probably about two per cent' - of the 9,500
immigrants that entered Palestine between September 1920 and April 1921 were
'Bolshevists' and had formed themselves into groups for the purpose of causing public
agitation. The main problem, in Samuel's view, was that 'the Arab population does not
distinguish between this group and the bulk of the immigrants, and is inclined to the
conclusion that Zionism must necessarily mean the importation into their country of the least
desirable elements of Eastern Europe' . However, Samuel was keen to stress that opposition to
immigration on grounds of political principle was a view 'held by comparatively few
persons'; he resorted to a stock explanation for colonial disorder by suggesting that the
trouble was 'fostered by agitators from outside the country, whose activities are difficult to
40 Samuel to Churchill, 13 May 1921, FO 371/6382.
41 Churchill to Arab Delegation, 28 March 1921, CO 733/2.
42 'Report on Political Situation in Palestine, ApriI1921', 9 May 1921, CO 733/3.
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detect, but who are believed to be at work stimulating whatever causes of trouble may
exist' .43
These perceptions formed the context for Samuel's ideas in re-shaping the
immigration system. The riots did not diminish British support for immigration or the place
that it held under trusteeship as a key measure for development. Arab hostility to Jewish
immigration was primarily explained in terms of fears surrounding increased competition for
jobs which had been exacerbated by a radical minority of 'un-absorbed' immigrants, which
was a more reassuring conclusion for colonial officials to reach." British officials perceived
opposition to immigration in economic, not political terms. Samuel's immediate action was to
deport the 'undesirable' persons that had infiltrated the country and maintain the suspension
of immigration whilst enacting some interim changes to the system. He had two conditions
that needed to be met before he would countenance resuming immigration. Firstly, the
employment with which immigrants were to be engaged should be ready before their arrival,
reducing economic fears; and, secondly, much stricter control needed to be exercised over the
selection of immigrants at their point of departure to ensure the exclusion of those who might
cause public agitation. A parallel measure at this point, which was discussed in the previous
chapter, was the proposal to establish a measure of self-government." These changes
reflected the failings of the Zionist Organisation to gain sufficient resources to support the
integration of all new immigrants.
Following the May Day riots, Samuel used the King's birthday speech, which had in
the previous year been full of optimism, to re-iterate the basic ideas on which British rule in
Palestine was based:
Let me, in the first instance, refer once more to the unhappy misunderstanding that
has existed with reference to the phrase in the Balfour Declaration, "the establishment
in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people". I hear it said in many quarters
that the Arab population will never agree to a Jewish Government being set up to rule
over the Moslem and Christian majority. People say that they cannot understand how
it is that the British Government, which is famous throughout the world for its justice
above all things, could ever have consented to such a policy. I answer that the British
Government, which does indeed care for justice above all things, has never consented
and never will consent to such a policy. This is not the meaning of the Balfour
Declaration."
43 Samuel to Churchill, 8 May 1921, CO 733/3.
44 See 'Reports of the Commission ofInquiry into the Disturbances in May, 1921 " p.52.
45 Samuel to Churchill, 8 May 1921, CO 733/3.
46 Speech made by Samuel on the King's Birthday, 3 June 1921, CO 733/3.
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Here Samuel offered an important clarification of the Balfour Declaration in the hope of
allaying 'misplaced' Arab fears over the nature of Jewish immigration. This connected to one
of the main assumptions which sustained trusteeship; namely that Zionist settlement would
not be detrimental to British notions of Arab interest ifit was properly managed. Samuel
continued by re-affirming the central place of immigration in the future of Palestine:
Itmay be that the translation of the English words into Arabic does not convey their
real sense. They mean that the Jews, a people that are scattered throughout the world
but whose hearts are always turned to Palestine, should be enabled to found here their
home, and that some among them, within the limits that are fixed by the numbers and
interest of the present population, should come to Palestine in order to help by their
resources and efforts to develop the country, to the advantage of all the inhabitants.
Trusteeship formed an underlying theme throughout the speech. Samuel continued by
suggesting that 'the British Government, the trustee under the Mandate for the happiness of
the people of Palestine would never impose upon them a policy which the people had reason
to think was contrary to their religious, their political, and their economic interests'. 41 This
highlighted the strong belief that British colonial officials held in their own sense of justice
and impartiality. These principles extensively informed the ethos of trusteeship and were
instrumental in allowing colonial officials to justify their position in Palestine.
The protective aspect of trusteeship was especially prominent in Samuel's speech. His
proposal that immigration would be 'fixed by the numbers and interest of the present
population' implied a more rigorous assessment of how it would be facilitated in the future
by a closer examination of the conditions in Palestine. Any future British commitment to
immigration could only come with stricter controls to ensure that immigrants would easily
integrate into existing economic structures without causing agitation, and this meant
elaborating on the simplistic categories through which immigrants had been able to enter the
country. Samuel transmitted his proposed set of new interim regulations to the Colonial
Office in July 1921, which increased the visa categories from four to seven:
(a) Travellers, i.e. people who do not intend to settle in Palestine and whose stay will not
exceed three months.
(b) Persons of independent means.
(c) Members of professions who intend to follow their calling in Palestine.
(d) Wives, children and other persons wholly dependent on residents of Palestine.




(f) Persons of religious occupations, including the class of Jews who have come to
Palestine in recent years from religious motives and who can show that they have
means of maintenance here.
(g) Returning residents.P
The most significant change was the removal of the category through which immigrants had
previously entered the country under the sponsorship of the Zionist Organisation, which was
instead replaced with the new category 'E' of persons who had a 'definite prospect of
employment' .
Samuel also drafted new instructions to be issued to British Passport Officers abroad.
He accused them of'laxity' in carrying out the old instructions by issuing certificates to
immigrants 'recommended' by local Zionist offices who had not actually been guaranteed by
the Zionist Organisation or not carrying out sufficient investigation into those with
independent means, as many had arrived in Palestine with 'little or no means' and without
any prospect of employment awaiting them." Oversights by British consuls abroad would
become a recurring problem for the mandatory administration, particularly when changes
were made to Palestine's immigration regulations. Samuel's complaints reflected British
concerns over the fact that a large number of immigrants had failed to find employment and
'integrate' into the Palestinian economy. The new regulations significantly increased the
supervisory role played by the Department of Immigration and Travel in Jerusalem as
immigrants would require prior approval from it. For those with independent means, a
minimum figure was established with passport officers to ensure that applicants had an
assured annual income of at least £80 or capital of £500.
The 1922 White Paper and Economic Absorptive Capacity
Following Samuel's speech on the 3 June, the centre of decision-making on immigration
policy for Palestine moved from Jerusalem to London for the next year until the White Paper
of June 1922 was issued. The shift of focus meant that the Zionist Organisation, which had
maintained good relations with the Colonial Office throughout the May Day riots, could exert
its influence on the formation of policy. The Colonial Office was particularly keen to ensure
Zionist goodwill after the sudden suspension of immigration had left hundreds stranded at
European ports. so In an effort to counter the access that the Zionist Organisation had to the
policymaking process, in June 1921 the Fourth Palestine Arab Congress elected to send a
48 Samuel to Churchill, 16 July 1921, CO 733/4.
49 Ibid.
so Zionist Organisation to Colonial Office, 16 May 1921, FO 371/6382.
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delegation, headed by Musa Kazim Pasha, a prominent member of the al-Husseini family, to
London to present the Palestinian Arab view to the British government. From the volume of
diplomatic contact with the Zionist Organisation, principally through Weizmann who had
returned to London early from a fundraising trip in the United States, it is evident that British
officials wanted to fashion some form of agreement on Samuel's proposals before the Arab
delegation arrived in London during August. Weizmann approved of the new scheme, but he
expressed reservations over having to refer all category 'E' applications to Jerusalem, which
he believed would significantly hamper the immigration process." The Colonial Office
agreed that the volume of anticipated applications would make the system impractical and
unwieldy. S2 After some objection, Samuel finally acquiesced to pressure from the Colonial
Office to restore the Zionist Organisation to its role in selecting 'guaranteed' immigrants for
Palestine without reference to the mandatory administration. S3
The restoration of this role was a significant success for the Zionist Organisation.
However, the Colonial Office stated that it was only willing to countenance it if the Zionist
Organisation could demonstrate that previous oversights would not be repeated. It
emphasised that future immigrants would have to be politically and socially 'suitable' as
settlers with the necessary physical and technical skills to successfully integrate into the
Palestinian economy. S4 These prerequisites caused an apprehensive Zionist Organisation to
prepare a substantial memorandum reviewing its immigration policy in a bid to strengthen
British confidence in its ability to regulate responsible immigration. ss Not for the first time,
the diplomatic skill ofWeizmann was a significant advantage for the Zionist Organisation
and during a conference at the Colonial Office in November 1921, he seemed to restore
British confidence by suggesting that, whilst it would be impossible to exclude all
'undesirables' from Palestine, the Zionist Organisation would be able to perform this duty
more efficiently than any government and even offered the mandatory administration
assistance in vetting 'non-guaranteed' Jewish immigrants. S6
After reaching a significant degree of consensus with the Zionist Organisation, the
Colonial Office sought to reach a similar accord with the Arab delegation that had arrived in
SI Churchill to Samuel, 30 August 1921, CO 733/4.
S2 Colonial Office Minute, S September 1921, CO 733/6.
S3 Samuel to Churchill, 21 September 1921, CO 733/6.
S4 Colonial Office Minute, 20 October 1921, CO 733/6.
ssWeizmann, Memorandum on Jewish Immigration into Palestine, 22 November 1921, CO 733/16.
S6 Minutes from conference held at Colonial Office on Jewish immigration into Palestine, 2S November 1921,
CO 733/16.
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London during August. The delegation, consisting of six Muslim and three Christian
members elected by the Palestine Arab Congress, had not been invited to come to London.
The congress was based on a network of Muslim-Christian Associations and enjoyed a broad
degree of popular support, yet the Colonial Office consistently refused to accept its
legitimacy, suggesting that as representative institutions had not been established in Palestine,
it could not speak for the Muslim and Christian communities of Palestine and that because of
that the colonial secretary could only meet with the Arab delegation in an unofficial
capacity. 57 British officials proposed to hold a series of informal meetings to obtain a
'working agreement' over immigration. 58 Such a stance corroborated the opinion of the Arab
community that it did not enjoy the same level of political access to the British government as
the Zionist Organisation. British hopes for pragmatic negotiations were soon quashed when
the delegation refused to meet with any member of the Zionist Organisation, stating that they
did not recognise it, and issued their own set of national demands based on the McMahon-
Hussein correspondence and the Anglo-French Declaration of 1918.59
After two unsuccessful meetings, during which the Arab delegation refused to
abandon their initial position, Sir John Shuckburgh composed a scathing memorandum on
British relations with the Arab delegation. He wrote that 'all endeavours to bring them down
from the region of high policy, (which, as they have been told over and over again is chose
jugee) and to induce them to discuss practical details have been attended with very little
success'; his language throughout seemed to suggest that he was dealing with a petulant
child, rather than a delegation on a political mission. He continued by describing the
delegation as 'a hopeless body to deal with' and that its members were 'very slow of
understanding, and probably rather suspicious of one another. At any rate they will never
commit themselves to anything in the course of conversation'. The refusal to discuss
'practical details' seemed a particular affront to Shuckburgh, and provided further evidence
of the political immaturity of Arabs. Convinced of the necessity for British trusteeship over
Palestine, he suggested that what the Arabs needed was the 'advice of a helping power' for a
substantial period of time, not full self-government. Despite the Arab delegation's
intransigence, Shuckburgh concluded that 'being Orientals, they will understand an order;
57 Shuckburgh, Memorandum on Palestine, 7 November 1921, CO 733/15. See also Khalidi, The Iron Cage,
£.42.
8 Report of conversation between Churchill and Arab delegation, 12 August 1921, CO 733/17.
59 See, for example, Palestine Arab Delegation to Churchill, 12 August 1921, CO 733/14.
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and if once they realise that we mean business, may be expected to acquiesce', echoing the
Orientalist stereotype that Arabs responded well to a 'firm hand,.60
Instead of terminating the talks, the Colonial Office decided to make a final attempt to
bring all the parties together for an informal meeting. On the 29 November 1921, the Zionist
Organisation and Arab delegation met under Shuckburgh's chairmanship, but the encounter
quickly dissolved into an unproductive argument. Weizmann called for co-operation for the
purpose of developing Palestine, whilst Musa Kazim Pasha rejected any form of discussion
that had Arab acceptance of the Balfour Declaration as its starting point. 61This failure
reinforced Shuckburgh's belief that a 'working agreement' could not be reached on the basis
of the Balfour Declaration as it was currently understood by both Jews and Arabs. He
explained that 'the policy which we are pursuing is not inconsistent with the claims and
interests of both sides; but our inability to convince either party handicaps our action at every
time,.62 This demonstrated the British belief that trusteeship could advance both sides'
interests simultaneously by ensuring that Jewish immigration was not detrimental to the
economic position of the Arab population. Their political claims of national self-
determination, on the other hand, could be dismissed, which meant that Britain resorted to
making its own statement of policy on the matter.
The decision to make a unilateral policy announcement would have inevitably
brought the negotiations in London to an end, but the Colonial Office thought it best to keep
the Arab delegation 'in play' for as long as possible to avoid disturbances in Palestine over
the turbulent Easter period when disorder from religious demonstrations was deemed most
likely to occur.63 The statement of policy was a collection of correspondence and statements
from the negotiations of the past year collected together to form the basis of a white paper
that defined future policy in Palestine. It built on the principles laid down by Samuel's speech
on 3 June 1921, but its most important part was a statement made by Churchill to the Zionist
Organisation. This began by repeating Samuel's clarification of the Balfour Declaration by
suggesting that Arab apprehensions were based on an 'exaggerated' interpretation of its
meaning and, instead, explained that the 'terms of the Declaration referred to do not
contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but
60 Shuckburgh, Memorandum on Palestine, 7 November 1921, CO 733/15.
61 Note on a meeting between Arab Delegation and Zionist Organisation by Mills, CO 537/855.
62 Shuckburgh, Memorandum on Palestine, 7 November 1921, CO 733/15.
63 Colonial Office Minute, 5 April 1922, CO 733/36.
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that such a Home should be founded in Palestine' .64This was a specific attempt to mitigate
some of the provocative and 'unauthorised' claims made by Zionist leaders that Palestine was
to become as 'Jewish as England is English', and amounted to an acknowledgment of the
need to allay Arab concerns and strengthen the foundations of British colonial rule after the
May Day riots.6S Churchill went on to say that Britain would remain committed to the
national home, but that further development of it was not to be understood as
The imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole,
but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of
Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the
Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a
pride.66
Colonial officials in Palestine also endorsed the clarification that the Churchill White Paper
offered; for example, Edward Keith-Roach, who served in the government secretariat and as
district commissioner of Jerusalem, wrote in his memoir that, as Britain had been 'entrusted
with the protection of Arab as well as Jewish interests ... [the Balfour Declaration] did not
mean that the purpose in view was to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. It did not contemplate
the subordination of the Arab population, language, or culture,.67 Keith-Roach was, of
course, careful to avoid mentioning Arab political rights but his sentiments reflected the
general British assumption that a Jewish settler movement in Palestine, installed through the
practices of colonisation, would, through its 'modern' and 'advanced' nature, promote the
economic development of Palestine.
For this development to take place further migration was judged necessary but the
protective aspect of trusteeship placed an obligation on British officials to facilitate
immigration more carefully:
For the fulfilment of this policy it is necessary that the Jewish community in Palestine
should be able to increase its numbers by immigration. This immigration cannot be so
great in volume as to exceed whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at
the time to absorb new arrivals. It is essential to ensure that the immigrants should not
be a burden upon the people of Palestine as a whole, and that they should not deprive
any section of the present population of their employment. 68
64 'Palestine. Correspondence with the Palestine Arab Delegation and the Zionist Organisation', June 1922,
Cmd. 1700, (London, HMSO, 1922), p.18.
65 See Edward Keith-Roach, Pasha of Jerusalem: Memoirs of a District Commissioner under the British
Mandate, (London, Radcliffe Press, 1994), pp.95-6.
66 'Palestine. Correspondence with the Palestine Arab Delegation and the Zionist Organisation', p.19.
67 Keith-Roach, Pasha of Jerusalem. pp.95-6.
68 'Palestine. Correspondence with the Palestine Arab Delegation and the Zionist Organisation', p.19.
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Trusteeship entailed an obligation to consider the economic interests of Palestine as a whole,
which is why the link to capacity was made so explicit. Itwas believed that unemployed
Jewish migrants held the most potential for causing economic problems for both Arabs and
Jews, and would also undermine the development of the national home. This principle
formed the starting point for all future policy on immigration from 1922 to 1936, but it was
not a sudden departure from established practice. Churchill's statement, which was most
likely drafted by Shuckburgh, was an articulation of the practice of British rule in Palestine
that had developed over the previous two years, which had already established economic
criteria as the main form of regulation for immigration.
The two principles that formed the basis of the initial system - to allow immigrants
with sufficient capital to enter freely and the decision to give the Zionist Organisation a
significant level of authority over the immigration process - were carried over in Samuel's
interim measures but the White Paper stipulated a greater recognition of the need for
regulation. Attracting Jewish immigrants with capital was deemed to be self-sustaining
because they could use their financial means to establish themselves in industry, agriculture,
or commerce, and then create jobs for others and contribute to economic growth. After the
1922 White Paper, it was decided to establish a minimum requirement of capital: £500 for
those who wished to follow commercial or agricultural enterprises or £250 for industrial
activities.f" The restoration of the role that the Zionist Organisation had previously played in
a new 'rationing' system was, in the end, deemed the most efficient way 'of introducing into
the country immigrants of real utility'. 70 After hesitation over whether the organisation
should regain this role, the British rationale behind this move was pragmatic; it was decided
that the Zionist Organisation was best placed to ensure that 'each immigrant should be
socially, morally and physically qualified to take his part eventually in the citizen life of
Palestine' .71
Both of these principles were tied to the concept of economic capacity. However, the
concept held most relevance for those immigrants that the Zionist Organisation would
sponsor under the 'rationing' scheme, known as the labour schedule. In the inter-war period,
nearly half of the Jewish immigrants who entered Palestine did so through this system, which
~9 See, for example, 'Control ofImmigration into Palestine', 21 February 1923, CO 733/54.
o Churchill to Samuel, 21 March 1922, CO 733/36.
71 Churchill to Samuel, 7 September 1922, CO 733/31.
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underscored the importance of British regulation ofit.72 The half-yearly schedules were
prepared by the immigration department after a period of consultation with various
mandatory government departments and Zionist bodies to ascertain the economic state of the
country and the number of labour immigrants that the Zionist Organisation believed it could
afford to settle under those circumstances. The chief immigration officer would then
recommend the number of certificates he felt it was appropriate to issue and the high
commissioner would make his decision.F Yet the calculations were often short-sighted: the
main considerations that went into working out the size of the labour schedule were the rate
of unemployment in the yishuv and the prospects of short-term economic growth. Longer-
term trends and forecasts were ignored, as was Arab unemployment, and any consideration of
the political effect that immigration might have.74
Inher account of British economic policy under the mandate, Barbara Smith
suggested that 'the concept of economic absorptive capacity was essentially a political tool; a
useful slogan purporting to show HMG' s concern for the protection of Arab interests'. 75
However, rather than simply being a 'useful slogan' to make a gesture towards the protection
of Arab interests, economic capacity was seen as the best measure available to facilitate
future immigration under the imperatives of trusteeship. Smith's suggestion was predicated
on the fact that when calculating the economic capacity of Palestine, only the rate of
employment and unemployment for the Jewish community were taken into consideration,
suggesting that Britain pursued a pro-Zionist policy to the detriment of the Arab community.
Yet it is better to see the importance attached to Jewish unemployment in terms of the relative
unimportance given to Arab unemployment. This disparity was fuelled not only by general
cultural images of 'advanced' Jews and 'backward' Arabs and their asymmetric places within
the dual economy, but was also actively promoted by the Zionist movement. Inhis account of
the mandate, Hyamson noted that 'Arab employment or unemployment was not taken into
consideration since the Zionist contention, which was accepted, was that Jewish workers only
could be expected to be employed on Jewish undertakings."
When assessing unemployment in Palestine during difficult worldwide economic
conditions in August 1923, Hyamson explained that, although 3,000 men were unemployed it
72 Metzer, The Divided Economy of Mandatory Palestine, p.75.
73 Note by Mills on the labour schedule, undated, CO 733/31.
74 Morris, Memorandum on Unemployment, 17 August 1923, CO 733/48.
75 Smith, Roots of Separatism, p.68.
76 Hyamson, Palestine Under the Mandate, p.55.
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was imperative to differentiate between the two communities. As colonial officials saw it, the
'traditional' structure of Arab society meant that Arab unemployment or underemployment
could reasonably be overlooked when calculating the economic capacity of the country. The
vast majority of the Arab population consisted of the rural peasantry engaged in subsistence
agriculture (fellahin) with a minority of urban landowners or merchants (e!fendis).77 Because
of this, Hyamson could comment that 'men in the Arab villages always seem to find means of
support', suggesting that Arab employment was rooted in the 'traditional' patterns of
seasonal employment and the vagaries of the agricultural cycle.78 On the other hand, Jewish
unemployment was given far more emphasis. Despite stressing that he took a 'purely
economic view' of unemployment, Keith-Roach suggested that the' Jews are essentially a
town dwelling people and do not generally take kindly to an agricultural life' and, despite
Zionist ideals to the contrary, concluded that 'environment cannot change national
characteristics! ,79 The view that Jews were an urban people was a pervasive one among
colonial officials; it followed that the tendency for Jewish immigrants to concentrate in towns
meant that seasonal changes had far less impact than wider economic forces, which made the
Jewish community far more vulnerable to unemployment. Hyamson added that as all Jews
were 'townsmen', when they were unemployed they were in 'dire need' and would struggle
to survive.f" Looking back to the causes of the May Day Riots and the pre-occupation that
unemployed immigrants inspired unrest, Keith-Roach ruminated that 'I will not have to dwell
on the undesirability ... of having immigrants wandering about without proper means of
sustenance' .81
These images were a prominent part of a British mentality that gave far greater weight
to Jewish unemployment when calculating the economic capacity of Palestine. The differing
views of the two peoples also provide a useful illustration of how cultural stereotypes could
override specific instances that provided potential counter-examples. For example, the view
that Jewish unemployment had to be taken more seriously was predicated on a belief that the
'urban' nature of Jews meant that they would suffer the consequences of unemployment more
acutely. This was in spite of the fact that Jewish immigration to Palestine was composed of
immigrants from a variety of different nations, classes, and occupations; many of whom did
77 In 1880, the proportion of rural peasants peaked at 79 percent. In the mandate period, it never fell below 64
~ercent. See Metzer, The Divided Economy of Mandatory Palestine, pp.8-9.
8 Hyamson, 'Memorandum on Unemployment', 9 August 1923, CO 733/48.
79 Edward Keith-Roach, 'Memorandum on Unemployment in Palestine', August 1923, CO 733/48.
80 Hyamson, 'Memorandum on Unemployment', 9 August 1923, CO 733/48.
81 Edward Keith-Roach, 'Memorandum on Unemployment in Palestine', August 1923, CO 733/48.
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establish themselves on the land in agricultural colonies that mandatory officials even
suggested were 'a great advance on the Arabs'. 82 Keith-Roach's remark on changes to
environment not being able to change national characteristics demonstrates how general
cultural images overrode the particular in colonial officials' thinking. In a similar fashion, the
lack of importance attached to Arab unemployment was derived from the view that the
'traditional' nature of Arab society separated it from the vagaries of the 'modem' world.
Such a narrow perspective found it difficult to accommodate the extent to which economic
changes wrought under mandatory rule, such as dramatic rises in the price of land through
Jewish purchases, affected these cyclical patterns of work when, for example, indebted rural
Arabs sold their land to payoff debts and then migrated to the towns in search of other work.
The result of this perspective was that the negative effects of economic growth within the
yishuv were divorced from their impact on the Arab community. This was acceptable during
the early years of the mandate when the yishuv was comparatively small and its economic
influence on the Arab community was minimal, but as it grew in size and its economy began
to have a larger effect on the Arab community, the mandatory administration was forced to
re-evaluate the workings of the immigration system.
Boom and Bust: Jewish Immigration during the 1920s
The British emphasis on economic capacity meant that the rate of labour absorption within
the Jewish economy was a paramount concern for the Zionist movement. The structure of the
Jewish element of Palestine's dual economy was particularly important for the Zionist
Organisation, which sought to promote industries that had the best potential for higher levels
of employment. Typically, agricultural settlement was seen as the most efficient means of
absorbing immigration as it required smaller investments in capital and training, and less time
to start up than manufacturing. The major form this took was labour-intensive citrus
cultivation, which formed around 30 per cent of Jewish cultivated land and accounted for just
over a third of Jewish agricultural output in the early 1920s; it rose to three quarters in the
mid-1930s, and provided nearly half of all Jewish agricultural employment." The emphasis
on agriculture had a further dimension in Zionist thinking that was typified by the colonies of
the kibbutz and moshav movements. They would establish the territorial basis of the national
home, but also complete a 'return' to the land that would forge a 'new' type of Jew.
82 Ibid.
83 Metzer, The Divided Economy of Mandatory Palestine, pp.146-9.
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Despite the prime position that agriculture held in Zionist ideology, the 'modernised'
nature of the yishuv' s economy meant that during the 1920s it supplied just over a quarter of
all Jewish employment. The service industry was by far the largest sector providing nearly
half of all jobs, whilst manufacturing represented around 17 per cent and construction about
14 per cent. 84 The predominance of the service sector emerged through three factors: the
import of capital, which produced a surplus of imported over exported goods and allowed for
a substitution of services and goods in the makeup of domestic production; the Zionist
objective of developing public services like education and health through its quasi-state
institutions; and the general occupational composition of Jewish immigration that channelled
labour to service industries.f The inflow of capital was therefore crucial to the Jewish
economy, particularly in the construction sector which was reliant on new immigrants
arriving to provide demand for houses that in tum provided jobs for Jews entering Palestine
under the labour schedule.
After Weizmann's initial optimism about an annual immigration rate of70,000, the
response from middle-class Jewish communities abroad during the third aliyah of 1920-23
had been comparatively unenthusiastic. Many preferred to emigrate to the United States
which, in the inter-war period, remained the destination of choice for most Jewish
immigrants." After 1923, two events combined to make Palestine a more attractive
destination: a worsening of economic conditions for Jews in Poland, where restrictions were
made on employment opportunities, and the establishment of a quota system in the United
States that placed heavy limitations on immigrants from Eastern Europe.87 Potential
immigrants with sufficient capital or an assured source of income could easily enter Palestine
under the independent means category, which provided the catalyst for the beginning of the
fourth aliyah of 1924-29, during which Palestine witnessed a short but intensive period of
economic prosperity. In 1924, recorded immigration jumped from an annual rate of around
7,000 to 12,856, then to 33,801 in 1925, before falling back to 13,081 in 1926. In 1925,
immigrants with capital outnumbered those who came to Palestine seeking employment
under the labour schedule.88 Unlike the third aliyah, the fourth consisted of a significant
84 Metzer, The Divided Economy of Mandatory Palestine, p.142.
85 Ibid, p.l43.
86 Ibid, p.66.
87 Smith, The Roots of Separatism, p.76.
88 11,794 compared with 10,723. See Sir John Hope-Simpson, 'Palestine, Report on Immigration, Land
Settlement and Development', October 1930, Cmd. 3686, (London, HMSO, 1930), p.183.
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number of immigrants who came to Palestine because of domestic anti-Semitic and economic
pressures.
The marked rise of immigration had a corresponding effect on the flow of Jewish
capital into Palestine. Between 1920 and 1923, around £11 million was imported to Palestine,
but between 1924 and 1926, this figure rose to over £17 million. With hindsight, Albert
Hyamson referred to this wave of immigration as 'top heavy': he explained that 'there was an
undue proportion of the smaller middle class - small shopkeepers and even pedlars with an
average capital of less instead of more than £500', which again indicated that immigration
officials abroad were still not complying fully with the regulations.V The 'top heavy'
composition of the fourth aliyah meant that new immigrants tended to concentrate in the
major urban areas of Palestine - Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem." The increased flow of
capital and the pattern of urban settlement created a property 'boom' and Jewish labour was
directed to the construction sector of the yishuv's economy to provide for the building
demands of the new immigrants. It was estimated that during this period construction and its
related industries engaged around 80 per cent of the yishuv's labour force, which
demonstrated how the surge in new immigrants altered the composition of the Jewish
economy." Generally, the Colonial Office saw the increase of revenue through tax and
customs receipts as a sign of progress, but following a visit to Palestine in the spring of 1925,
Shuckburgh expressed a cautious note over the imbalanced growth as a threat to the
permanent development of the country:
Immigrants come with their £500 or more, buy a plot of land, build a house and then
apparently wait for the next lot of immigrants with capital to provide them with
employment... Everything appears to depend upon the continuous influx of new
immigrants bringing capital with them. Can this be relied upon? Ifnot, I am afraid
that sooner or later there may be a bad crash ...92
Shuckburgh's warnings illustrate the extent to which trusteeship promoted a concern for the
stable development of the yishuv so that it would have a positive effect on the dual economy.
Other Colonial Office staff shared Shuckburgh's concern at the 'hand to mouth' existence in
Tel Aviv and feared a 'dismal slump' if immigration or the import of capital faltered.93
However, British caution did not translate into any effective preventive measures. The labour
89 Hyamson, Palestine Under the Mandate, p.62.
90 Joachim Schlor, Tel Aviv: From Dream to City, (London, Reaktion Books, 1999), pp.62-6.
91 'Report of the Commission on the Palestine Disturbances of August, 1929', p.l05.
92 Shuckburgh, 'Memorandum on Jewish immigration', 25 May 1925, CO 733/110.
93 Minutes by Lloyd and Clauson, 24 February 1926 and 2 March 1926, CO 733/124.
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schedule, which the mandatory administration held the most direct influence over, was
determined by the level of Jewish unemployment, which was virtually non-existent during
1925. Unless the Palestine government decided to change the mechanism for calculating the
labour schedule, immigration would continue to increase as more immigrants with
independent means created short-term work in the form of building activity.
InOctober 1925, an Immigration Ordinance finally came into effect that consolidated
the various changes made to the immigration regulations since the outbreak of the May Day
riots. InMarch 1926, the colonial secretary wrote to Lord Plumer expressing concern at the
current situation and emphasised the need to restrict immigration to prevent an economic
crisis that would affect the whole of Palestine." Yet the construction 'boom' had already set
the conditions for a deep economic crisis if the rate of immigrants with capital declined.
During 1926, the volume of immigration to Palestine contracted to 13,081, a steep reduction
from the levels of 1925, and in 1927 the phase of economic prosperity was followed by a
slump in the Jewish economy. Perhaps the most significant figure was that immigration
through independent means fell from 11,794 to just 1,613, which had direct consequences for
the labour schedule as unemployment increased." The Zionist Organisation blamed the
reduction of migrants on restrictive British policy and argued that their economic indicators
pointed to continued growth." However, the major reason was a deterioration in external
conditions, particularly in Poland, where the worsening position of Polish Jewry, currency
restrictions, and a steep fall in the value of the zloty had a significant effect on the standing of
Jewish immigrants with the necessary capital to emigrate"
The depression in Poland curtailed the essential flow of new immigrants, leading to an
unemployment crisis for the urban Jewish areas of Palestine. The conditions were so stark
that, in 1927, Palestine witnessed a net emigration of2,358 as many fled back to Poland to
salvage what remained of their interests there." This emigration was demonstrative of the
fact that for many immigrants of the fourth aliyah, economic opportunity was a major
motivation guiding them to Palestine, rather than Zionist ideology. Those who did not have
the means to leave once economic conditions deteriorated found themselves facing severe
94 Amery to Plumer, 17 March 1926, CO 733/124.
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unemployment that the Zionist Organisation was unable to alleviate. In 1927, unemployment
peaked at 7,300 persons in a total labour force of 41,000.99 The mandatory administration
was forced into a rare act of economic intervention to protect Jewish interests with relief
works in Tel Aviv, which caused its own budget to go into deficit.'?" Hyamson later argued
that if the mandatory government's immigration regulations had not been stricter, more
immigrants would have entered Palestine in the preceding years, which would have
significantly worsened the extent of both unemployment and emigration through 1927.101
Whilst it was probably the case that higher numbers of 'un-absorbed' immigrants would have
worsened the crisis, the fact the crisis happened in the first place demonstrated that the short-
term nature of the forecasts to determine the economic capacity of Palestine and the size of
the labour schedule were not adequate.
Britain drew two main lessons for immigration policy from this episode of 'boom and
bust'. First, it was decided that the minimum capital threshold of £500 was too low. The
Colonial Office view was that too many urban shopkeepers had been attracted to Palestine
who had fuelled the property market rather than investing in agriculture or manufacturing.
The commission of inquiry into the 1929 riots recorded that many immigrants spent all of
their capital on the construction of their home, after which they had no resources left to
provide further employment. 102 The second and perhaps more significant lesson was that the
high level of immigration - 33,801 in 1925, more than the years 1920-3 combined - had not
resulted in any outbreaks of public disorder or a demonstrable rise in communal tensions. The
unemployment situation was regarded as a crisis, but it was largely confined to the Jewish
community engaged in building activity around Tel Aviv and did not significantly impact the
Arab population.l'" The absence of public disorder meant that the mandatory administration
believed that, whilst the practical application of the regulations needed adapting, the principle
of using an economically based set of criteria to direct immigration was still viable.
Modification of the practical aspects of the regulations was designed to prevent a
crisis from re-occurring. Plumer wrote to the Colonial Office suggesting that immigration had
to be drastically restricted so that 'all capital and energy [can be] devoted to what may be
99 Nadav Halevi, 'The Political Economy of Absorptive Capacity: Growth and Cycles in Jewish Palestine under
the British Mandate', Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 19, No.4, (October 1983), p.458.
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described as consolidating the position attained'. I 04 The implication was that the national
home had been allowed to expand too quickly to allow for all of the immigrants to be
properly 'absorbed'. The labour schedule was gradually reduced and, as unemployment
worsened, was completely suspended between October 1927 and September 1928. Given its
link to economic capacity, this measure was inevitable. The high commissioner also decided
to increase the capital requirement for those with independent means and the threshold was
doubled to £ 1,000. The underlying aim was still to attract immigrants with capital, but under
trusteeship it was deemed necessary to increase the minimum capital so that they could settle
in Palestine and successfully establish commercial or agricultural enterprises which would
promote economic growth for the benefit of all. 105
The Shaw Commission, the Hope-Simpson Report, the Passfield White Paper, and the
'Black' Letter: Immigration Policy between 1929 and 1931
During the period of 1929-31, immigration policy was subjected to a sustained period of
examination after a major outbreak of rioting spread across Palestine in the summer of 1929
following tensions about the status of the Western Wall in Jerusalem. Those debates,
however, did not lead to a dramatic change in policy or British intent towards Palestine.
Instead, they provided another layer of interpretation on the nature of British trusteeship in
Palestine. InMarch 1930, Sir Walter Shaw delivered his commission of inquiry's report into
the causes of the disturbances. It suggested that the enlargement of the Jewish Agency at the
16th Zionist Congress during July and August of 1929, and its rhetoric towards the adoption
of a more 'progressive' immigration policy, had created an expectation amongst the Arab
community of mass Jewish immigration and a resurgence of the economic problems that
occurred in 1927 and 1928. The commission reported that the Arab population's primary
understanding of Jewish immigration was one of a phenomenon that created unemployment
and potential displacement from their land. However, the report determined that the role
played by immigration in the immediate outbreak was not a proximate one:
To say that apprehension or alarm due to fear of the effects of Jewish immigration
were immediate causes of the outbreak in August last is perhaps to go too far; but it is
our view that, among a large section of the Arab people of Palestine, there is a feeling
of opposition to Jewish immigration, that this feeling is well founded in that it has its
origin in the known results of excessive immigration in the past and that, given other
104
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and more immediate causes for disturbance, that feeling would undoubtedly be a
factor which would contribute to an outbreak.l'"
This was an important conclusion for the Shaw Commission to reach as it meant the general
issue of immigration became a key subject for further investigation. It explained that 'it
appears to us obvious that the Arab attitude, the result of a dangerous combination of anger
and fear, is a potential cause of future disturbance unless the fears which many undoubtedly
entertain can be shown to be greatly exaggerated or can be proved to be groundless' .107 The
implication of this statement was that the Arab 'attitude' was misplaced, but that Britain
needed to reassure them of the obligations that trusteeship imposed on the mandatory power.
As such, the report did not undermine the fundamental assumption of trusteeship that Jewish
immigration was beneficial to Palestine. On the contrary, it remarked that 'Jewish enterprise
and Jewish immigration, when not in excess of the absorptive capacity of the country, have
conferred material benefits upon Palestine in which the Arab people share' .108 Henry Snell, a
Labour MP on the committee, delivered a minority report that went further, suggesting that
too much attention was paid to 'the excited protests of Arab leaders' and 'the impatient
criticisms and demands of Zionist leaders on the other':
On any long view of the situation the Arab people stand to gain rather than lose from
Jewish enterprise. There is no doubt in my mind that, in spite of errors of judgment
which may have resulted in hardship to individual Arabs, Jewish activities have
increased the prosperity of Palestine, have raised the standard of life of the Arab
worker and have laid the foundations on which may be based the future progress of
the two communities and their development into one State.109
Here, Snell demonstrated one of the core assumptions that trusteeship relied on: that
economic development would ultimately lead to political co-operation. The Shaw
Commission wanted to prevent a repetition of the mass immigration of 1925 and 1926 that
was beyond the absorptive power of the Palestinian economy and recommended that the
mandatory administration should have more supervision over the selection of immigrants
under the labour schedule.
To address the concerns about immigration, it was decided that a dedicated report on
immigration, land settlement, and development was required to evaluate the economic
capacity of Palestine. This investigation was headed by Sir John Hope-Simpson, an ex-





colonial administrator from India who had been working on the settlement of Greek refugees
following the Graeco-Turkish War of 1920-22.110 His main conclusion supplemented the
findings of the Shaw Commission by suggesting that the continued establishment of the
Jewish national home would require the development of existing land and resources because
the economic capacity of the country was reaching the point where further Zionist settlement
would start to seriously exacerbate the problem of 'landless' Arabs, which had been steadily
building during the 1920s. This conclusion had significant ramifications for the facilitation of
immigration under the ideal of trusteeship: further immigration was regarded as having the
potential to aggravate existing problems in a manner that was detrimental to Arab economic
interests. This meant that the mandatory administration would need to take a more proactive
stance to protect those interests. One of the most significant aspects of the Hope-Simpson
report was its assessment of the relative importance of Arab unemployment. It indicated that
the cessation of conscription, which had traditionally consumed surplus labour under the
Ottoman government, meant the Arab population was rapidly increasing but with diminishing
prospects for employment as Jewish immigrants took positions that Arabs could otherwise
have filled. High levels of Arab unemployment had, in some instances, caused wages to fall
by around halfleading Hope-Simpson to conclude that 'available information on the subject
supports the belief that such unemployment not only exists but is serious and widespread'. III
His report advised that in relation to the labour schedule,
It is the duty of the Government to look upon the country as one unit. The solution of
the question facing the Government, in determining the number of Jewish labourers to
be admitted, must depend, not on the amount of Jewish unemployment in reference to
anticipated employment in the half-year for which the schedule is framed, but
unemployment generally in Palestine.112
Like the Shaw Commission, Hope-Simpson was not completely opposed to further
immigration; he acknowledged that carefully regulated immigration was a valuable source of
economic growth, particularly through the 'derived' demand that accompanied Zionist
settlement. Both the Shaw Commission and the Hope-Simpson report left intact the
assumption that immigration could be a positive phenomenon that promoted economic
growth, although they questioned the practical working of the regulatory mechanisms.
110 See Roger T. Steam, 'Simpson, Sir John Hope (1868-1961)', Oxford Dictionary of National Biography,
http://www.oxforddnb.comlview/articleI77017. accessed 19 Apri12011.




After the British government had received Hope-Simpson's report it decided to make
a full statement of policy on the findings and, inOctober 1930, a white paper was issued.113 It
confirmed that the statement of policy contained in the 1922 White Paper, which enshrined
the concept of economic capacity as the primary regulator for Jewish immigration, still
provided the foundation for British immigration policy in Palestine. However, it also
suggested more consideration of the practical aspects of how this principle should be
implemented was required. This is where the findings of the Shaw commission and Hope-
Simpson report had most impact, as they promoted wider considerations for future
immigration policy.
The Passfield White Paper, named after the colonial secretary, reiterated Hope-
Simpson's concern that the Histadrut= the General Federation of Jewish Labour- exerted
considerable influence over new immigrants, especially in promoting the Zionist principle of
'self-labour'. The Histadrut advocated the segregation of Jewish and Arab workers to further
the development of the national home. When it lent money or leased land for agricultural
enterprises, it often inserted clauses that bound the colonies to hire Jewish labour only.114The
rationale behind this strategy was clearly understood by British officials, whose economic
liberalism stipulated that whilst they could facilitate Jewish immigration to Palestine, they
could not become involved in directing settlement or instructing the Jewish Agency to utilise
its resources for the direct benefit of the Arab community. As the Jewish community grew
larger, however, there was a gradual appreciation that once the yishuv had reached a certain
size the principle of self-labour would begin to have a detrimental effect on the Arab
economy as employment opportunities were denied to them and that this had a divisive effect
on Arab-Jewish relations. The protective element of trusteeship thus became more
pronounced as the perception ofthe Jewish community growing in size and beginning to
pressure Arab interests gained wider circulation. This is not to suggest that colonial officials
began to adopt pro-Arab or anti-Zionist stances regarding immigration policy, but that the
balance by which they believed they were guarding the interests of both communities under
the ethos of trusteeship had changed in a way that required an adaption to the mechanism of
regulation. The White Paper echoed Hope-Simpson's statement about the duty of the
mandatory administration to consider a broader notion of the economic capacity of the
country:
113 'Palestine. Statement of Policy by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom', October 1930, Cmd.
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Clearly, if immigration of Jews results in preventing the Arab population from
obtaining the work necessary for its maintenance, or if Jewish unemployment
unfavourablyaffects the general labour position, it is the duty of the Mandatory
Power under the Mandate to reduce, or, if necessary, to suspend, such immigration
until the unemployed portion of the "other sections" is in a position to obtain work. IIS
This statement was one of the reasons for the contentious reception of the White Paper.
Zionists interpreted it as a betrayal of the mandate, whilst Arab leaders believed it envisaged
a permanent suspension of immigration. Itwas understood to imply that immigration would
be suspended if it prevented any Arab from obtaining employment.i'" The furore that
surrounded its publication led Ramsay MacDonald, the British prime minister, to issue a
letter to Weizmann in February 1931 designed to remove 'certain misconceptions and
misunderstandings' that surrounded the Passfield White Paper.117
The 'Black Letter', as it has come to be known, has been interpreted as a significant
reversal of policy by a minority Labour government following the mobilisation of Zionist
influence in London. I IS However, if scrutinised closely, it can be seen that the clarifications
given in the letter remain consistent with the themes of trusteeship that had been expressed in
the White Paper. MacDonald stressed that the White Paper in no way meant the suspension of
immigration that the Zionists feared, but that the mandatory administration had a duty to
consider a wider interpretation of economic capacity:
The effect of the policy of immigration and settlement on the economic position of the
non-Jewish community cannot be excluded from consideration. But the words are not
to be read as implying that existing economic conditions in Palestine should be
crystallised. On the contrary, the obligation to facilitate Jewish immigration and to
encourage close settlement by Jews on the land, remains a positive obligation of the
Mandate, and it can be fulfilled without prejudice to the rights and position of other
sections of the population of Palestine.!"
Whilst it is certain that significant political momentum had built up behind continued British
sponsorship of the Jewish national home in London, the description of Jewish immigration as
a 'positive obligation' is a useful one because it demonstrates the position that immigration
continued to hold in the overall context of British trusteeship for Palestine. However, a
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growing awareness that Jewish actions held consequences for the economic position of the
Arab community was also acknowledged:
The principle of preferential and, indeed, exclusive employment of Jewish labour by
Jewish organisations is a principle which the Jewish Agency are entitled to affirm.
But it must be pointed out that if in consequence of this policy Arab labour is
displaced or existing unemployment becomes aggravated, that is a factor in the
situation to which the Mandatory is bound to have regard.120
The succession of policy announcements that resulted from the 1929 riots did not result in
sudden or restrictive changes to Palestine's immigration system, but they did provide
significant clarifications about the evolving nature of British trusteeship in Palestine that re-
affirmed the historic basis of immigration policy and this would have a distinct impact on
British thinking about immigration during the 1930s.
Wauchope's 'Longer View' and Jewish Immigration between 1931 and 1936
The policy announcements between 1929 and 1931 formed the basis for a new approach to
admitting immigration to Palestine under the labour schedule. In November 1931, Major-
General Sir Arthur Wauchope was installed as high commissioner in the hope that his
military experience would promote stability in Palestine.!" The wider interpretation of
economic capacity formed a core part ofWauchope's attempt to facilitate immigration. His
guiding principle was to consider Palestine's ability to permanently absorb new immigrants,
as opposed to only considering immediate labour demands in what he referred to as a 'longer
view' on economic outlookl22 One of the primary reasons for this was that the 1931 census
recorded that 42 per cent of the Arab Muslim population was below the age of 15 (about
150,000 males), which suggested that there would be a large number of Arabs becoming
economically active in the near future. Wauchope explained to the Colonial Office that if all
opportunities for employment were taken by Jewish immigrants, then 'there may indeed be
'displacement' of Arabs without actual discharge of Arab workmen employed by Jews,.123
InMacDonald's letter to Weizmann, one of the clarifications given was that
'consideration will be given to anticipated labour requirements for works which, being
dependent on Jewish or mainly Jewish capital, would not be or would not have been
120 Ibid.
121 Martin Bunton, 'Wauchope, Sir Arthur Grenfell (1874-1947)', Oxford Dictionary of National Biography,
http;//www.oxforddnb.com!view/article/36786. accessed 20 April 2011.
122 Cabinet Paper on Immigration Policy in Palestine, 20 August 1934, CO 733/25417.
~.123 Wauchope to Parkinson, 14 February 1934, CO 733/254/9.
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undertaken unless Jewish labour was made available' .124 This recognised the Zionist principle
of self-labour, yet Wauchope's 'longer view', which he interpreted as entirely consistent with
the Black Letter, meant that in practice he was bound to take Arab unemployment into
consideration. He argued that when certificates were given to immigrants to be employed
exclusively on new or enlarged Jewish enterprises, there was not an adequate method of
ascertaining whether these immigrants had become permanently employed. Many immigrants
often moved on from their initial engagements to find other employment on public or
municipal works, or other activities not primarily dependent on Jewish capital, which,
Wauchope explained, 'means ifnot direct displacement of Arab labour, at any rate fewer
openings for Arab unemployed, and thus aggravation of existing Arab unemployment'. 125
The wider interpretation of economic capacity still did not allow for political
considerations to affect the numbers of immigrants. However, British officials were unable to
ignore the development of European politics and the deteriorating position of European Jewry
during the 1930s. The rise of Nazism in Germany in 1933 became a significant dimension in
the question of British immigration policy towards Palestine as the Third Reich began to
persecute and displace its Jewish population, causing many to flee Germany in search of
refuge. After the United States and Britain placed heavy restrictions on immigration,
Palestine became one of the only viable options left for emigration. Under trusteeship, the
primary obligation that colonial officials held was toward the inhabitants of Palestine; any
concern for assisting German Jews was secondary to those needs and interests. During a
House of Commons debate on 3 April 1933, where it was asked if immigration restrictions
would be relaxed, the colonial secretary, Sir Phillip Cunliffe-Lister, responded that 'there can
be no question of departing from the principle, which has been consistently followed, that
immigration into Palestine must be governed by the economic absorptive capacity of the
country' .126 Whilst the Colonial Office was desperate to avoid departing from established
principles, it believed that some measures could be taken within the existing system. For
example, Wauchope authorised an advance of 1,000 labour certificates to German Zionist
offices and gave the passport control officer in Berlin permission to grant certificates to
124 MacDonald to Weizmann, 13 February 1931, MECA, GB165-0058.
I2S Wauchope to Parkinson, 6 January 1934, CO 733/254/8.
126 Hansard HC Deb, 3 Apri11933, Vol. 276, c1420-1. See also Colonial Office Memorandum on Jewish
Immigration into Palestine, 12 April 1933, CO 733/264/5.
105
immigrants with independent means without reference to the mandatory administration in
Jerusalem.127
The Jewish Agency petitioned the high commissioner to allow for 'exceptional
facilities for Jewish immigration' in light of the 'catastrophic situation' Jews were facing in
Germany.f" Yet in his memoir, Albert Hyamson was keen to debunk the Zionist assertion
that Palestine could have taken more German Jewish immigrants before the outbreak of war,
suggesting that many certificates were made available to German Jews but that the Jewish
Agency preferred to distribute them throughout Eastern Europe instead, where over three-
quarters went. 129Outside of the labour schedule, there was still the possibility for those with
capital of £1,000 to enter Palestine but as the situation for Jews in Germany deteriorated,
Jewish assets were frozen by the Third Reich and emigration with independent means to
Palestine became more difficult. Germany had imposed capital exporting restrictions as early
as 1931 to protect its economy during the depression, but the Third Reich was particularly
reluctant to allow wealth to be exported as its own foreign reserves had begun to dwindle and
the sterling it held was assigned for purchasing military items. However, the interests of the
German authorities and Jews who wanted to leave Germany coalesced in the creation of the
'Haavara' transfer agreement, which became the only viable method for Jews migrating to
Palestine to export part of their blocked capital. Under the agreement, two clearing houses
were established: one in Germany, which would collect the assets of Jewish emigrants be'fore
they left Germany; and one in Palestine, which would provide immigrants in Palestine with a
portion of their capital in Palestinian currency, imported German goods, or property
elsewhere in Palestine, allowing them to meet the £1,000 capital threshold. Blocked Jewish
assets, up to a maximum of 50,000 Reich marks (equivalent to £4,000), would be deposited
in a special Haavara account at the Reichsbank. Importers in Palestine who wished to
purchase goods in Germany deposited the cost in Palestine pounds in the Palestine clearing
house; the goods would then be paid for using a mixture of those Palestine pounds and the
capital deposited in the Haavara account, earning Germany some foreign currency whilst
preventing the substantial export of capital.130British officials were wary of harming their
own interests by 'fostering German trade in the Near East', but acknowledged that this was
the only system whereby immigrants could gather the necessary capital to qualify for .
127 Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 12 April 1933, CO 733/236/4.
128 Sokolow to Wauchope, 19 April 1933, CO 733/236/4.
129 Hyamson, Palestine Under the Mandate, pp.68-9.
130 Francis Nicosia, The Third Reich and the Palestine Question, (New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers,
2000), pp.46-9.
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immigration and could be justified on the grounds that it would contribute to economic
growth.l3l
InPalestine, the influx of immigration and capital began to drive economic
development. Like the boom in the 1920s, the dramatic growth of the 1930s was fuelled by
immigrants investing in property and construction.132 As the economy expanded, questions of
unemployment became less important as Palestine began to suffer from periodic labour
shortages.133 Economic growth saw a huge rise in the volume of immigration that Palestine
could absorb, and Jewish immigration rose steadily from 4,075 in 1930 to a high of61,854 in
1935.134Nevertheless, Wauchope maintained a cautious view. For example, the Jewish
Agency argued that at least 20,000 certificates needed to be issued under the labour schedule
of April-September 1934 to compensate for 'the acute shortage of Jewish labour which
prevailed throughout the last schedule period,.135 After considering the evidence, the high
commissioner came to the conclusion that Palestine could absorb 6,400 labour immigrants.l'"
Wauchope believed that the labour shortage was exacerbated by the Jewish Agency's
tendency to select 'inappropriate' immigrants under the labour schedule: in 1933 over 2,000
immigrants that entered Palestine under the labour schedule were described as either relatives
or 'middle-class' persons with capital who refused to enter the market for manual labour.l"
Whilst it posed some difficulty for Wauchope and the Colonial Office to maintain a 'longer
view' on the economic outlook in the face of these labour shortages, the experiences of
growth and slump in the building industry during the 1920s had not been forgotten by
colonial officials and demonstrates how trusteeship required that the immigration regulations
facilitated stable economic growth.138
Indealing with the labour shortages, Wauchope believed that admitting too many
immigrants in a short space of time would undermine Palestine's ability to permanently
absorb new immigrants in the future. He emphasised that the quality of immigration was
more important than quantity, and that the correct ratio between 'immigrant workers' and
131 Hathorn-Hall to Williams, 27 November 1935, CO 7331277/2; Mills to Hathorn-Hall, 12 November 1935,
CO 733/277/2.
132 Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 12 April 1934, CO 733/255/3.
133 Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 25 December 1933, CO 733/254/8.
134 'Palestine. Royal Commission Report', p.279.
135 Shertok to Department of Immigration, 10 April 1934, CO 733/254/10.
136 Hathorn-Hall to Jewish Agency, 30 April 1934, CO 733/254/140.
137 Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 31 January 1934, CO 733/254/8.
138 Mills to Hathorn-Hall, 20 September 1934, CO 733/254/11.
107
'capitalists' had to be achieved for economic absorption to remain permanent.P" The high
commissioner suggested that a side effect of excessive immigration would be an increase in
land speculation and consequent rises in rent, which would be detrimental to wide sections of
the population in both the Arab and Jewish communities.t'" Although Wauchope was willing
to approve some supplementary schedules to alleviate acute problems, as happened in July
1934, from the British point of view, labour shortages and restrictions on the schedule held
the advantage of forcing Jews to employ Arab labour when necessary. Whilst the yishuv
'detested' this situation as they thought it would lower their standard of living, Wauchope
suggested to the Colonial Office that 'the more Arab and Jew work together the more hope
there is for the solution of our difficulties'. This cautious view should not be seen as hostility
to Zionism. Wauchope explained his rationale by using a building analogy: 'The National
Home will be built on more secure foundations if the mortar is given time to dry before the
superstructures are erected' .141
The effect of labour shortages on the dual economy was important as it drove
migration to towns where building work achieved higher wages. This had a consequential
effect on wage inflation that Wauchope was anxious to contain, but only within the
constraints of his approach to labour immigration.U' The building activity that took place in
the towns meant that citrus cultivation, which had experienced considerable growth in
previous years, was left without sufficient manual workers. The dynamic combination of
intensive development of existing agricultural land and the trend of migration to towns
allowed immigration to reach a high volume that would have been difficult to predict
following Hope-Simpson's conclusions on economic capacity. The other effect of the labour
shortages and restriction on immigration was the proliferation of illegal immigration and the
mandatory administration's attempts to combat it, which became a key feature of
immigration during the 1930s.
Concerns over illegal settlement were justified in terms of trusteeship. It was believed
that it had significant potential to compromise the economic position of both Jews and Arabs
that were settled in Palestine. Wauchope explained that 'the entry of unauthorised and
unselected immigrants is detrimental to the interests of all sections of the population'!" One
139 Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 19 July 1934, CO 733/254/10.
140 Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 8 May 1934, CO 733/254/10.
141 Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 21 July 1934, CO 733/254/10.
142 Cabinet Paper on Immigration Policy on 20 August 1934, CO 733/25417.
143 Ibid.
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of the main problems was that illegal immigration was difficult to accurately record.
Wauchope estimated that it was around 10,000 persons in 1932 and 12,000 in 1933. It also
undermined all efforts to accurately calculate the absorptive capacity of the country and the
high commissioner informed the Colonial Office that 'the entry of the additional 12,000
unauthorised immigrants in 1933 might have led to grave distress had 1933 not proved to be a
year of unusual economic prosperity' .144
Attempts to combat illegal immigration were hampered by a range of difficulties. One
of the main options was deportation, yet colonial officials appreciated the futility of
attempting to send Jews back to Germany or other countries in Europe where they would not
be welcome. This forced the mandatory administration to accept various instances of illegal
settlement; prevention therefore became the priority, but this also had its problems.v" The
Jewish Agency argued that the fact these settlers had actually integrated into the economy
demonstrated that the mandatory administration was underestimating the absorptive capacity
of the country.v" This argument was not accepted by the Palestine government, who began to
deduct certificates from the labour schedule to account for the number of illegal immigrants
that had settled in Palestine in an effort to compel the Jewish Agency to curb the practice. In
November 1934, for example, over 2,000 certificates were deducted from the schedule in this
manner and legislation was also introduced that attempted to restrict the ability of illegal
immigrants to acquire immovable property.l'" Wauchope also established a special police
force to patrol the coast and land frontiers in a bid to close the routes that illegal immigrants
took, but it lacked sufficient resources to police Palestine's wide borders successfully.!"
The rise in illegal immigration, Wauchope' s wider interpretation of economic
capacity, and the complications caused by the Jewish Agency selecting 'unsuitable'
immigrants under the labour schedule, which exacerbated the labour shortages, created the
need for a new system of immigration regulations.!" After a trip through Europe, Eric Mills,
who succeeded Hyamson as director of immigration, submitted his proposals for a new
system in April 1934. The system that he proposed, which drew on the legislation in force in
the self-governing dominion of Canada, centred on giving all Jews a legal right to enter
144 Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 31 January 1934, CO 733/254/8.
145Colonial Office Minute, 31 May 1934, CO 733/255/3.
146 Colonial Office Note on Jewish Agency Memorandum, undated, CO 733/254/12.
147 Mills to Jewish Agency, 9 November 1934, CO 733/254/12; Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 13 December
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Palestine whilst the mandatory administration would hold the power to check up on
immigrants and deport them if they had not been properly absorbed into the local
economy.ISOThe system was regarded as unworkable in Palestine and quickly rejected.
The debate over a new system of regulations did not encompass concerns for the
deteriorating position of German Jewry. InNovember 1935, Mills submitted a report to the
chief secretary following a visit to Berlin that was particularly revealing of British attitudes.
After describing the emergence of a totalitarian society in Germany, Mills went on to discuss
the position of Jews under the Nuremberg Laws. Where the state had legally segregated the
Jews, he explained that the Third Reich had enforced their social and economic isolation in
order to eliminate the Jews from Germany by 'complete impoverishment' .151 He suggested
that 'for the Jews ... there is no rule oflaw'; his solution was the 'planned emigration' of the
younger Jews, yet he did not view this is a sole British responsibility: 'His Majesty's
Government are not and ought not to be the 'protectors of Jews".IS2 For Mills, the problem
was an international one that needed to be carefully managed as large scale migration to
European countries had the potential to exacerbate anti-Semitic feelings. He discussed his
report with Wauchope and they arrived at the conclusion that the Jewish Agency needed to
give 'favourable treatment to German Jews' in the selection of immigrants, which reflected
the earlier belief that the immigration system as it stood could give some latitude to the
Zionist movement without compromising the principle of economic capacity. His suggestion
that Britain should not be the 'protectors of Jews' confirmed the view that its primary
obligations were to the established Arab and Jewish communities in Palestine.
The growth of the Palestinian economy allowed for a high level of immigration
during the mid-1930s. The Peel Commission estimated in 1937 that an annual rate of60,000
Jewish immigrants to Palestine would have seen the Arab and Jewish communities reach
parity in about 1947, which clearly accentuated the Zionist threat for Palestinian Arabs. The
political implications of the fifth aliyah became clear when the Arab rebellion began in April
1936. Immigration was not the sole reason for its outbreak: a change in the dynamic of land
sales, where more smallholders were being dispossessed of their land, and a radicalisation of
Arab politics after a new generation exhibited dissatisfaction with the methods of the
'traditional' leadership were also responsible for leading the Arab community to the belief
ISO Mills, 'Memorandum on Immigration into Palestine', 12 April 1934, CO 733/255/3.
151 Mills to Hathorn-Hall, 12 November 1935, CO 733/277/2.
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that armed resistance offered the only effective method of challenging British rule in
Palestine.
Conclusion
Throughout the mandatory period, British immigration policy was conducted in a highly
politicised environment yet economic capacity remained the primary consideration in British
efforts to facilitate Jewish immigration. The Zionist plan was to gain a majority in Palestine,
whilst the Arab leadership wanted to block all Jewish immigration. Between those political
objectives, there was little room for either community to be persuaded by the rationale of
British trusteeship. The various policy announcements made by the British government - the
1922 White Paper, the 1930 White Paper, the 'Black Letter' - were all designed to clarify
those aims without alienating either community, but they were received by the Arab and
Jewish communities in exaggerated fashions in order to reinforce their own political
arguments. When looked at closely, those policy announcements actually kept intact one of
the core assumptions of trusteeship that carefully regulated immigration would be beneficial
to all of the inhabitants of Palestine by promoting economic growth. The major British
complaint was that the local population did not properly understand how seriously Britain
took the 'dual' obligation that the 'sacred' trust of the mandate imposed. Of course, that dual
obligation did not include any scope for the recognition of a Palestinian Arab national
movement. The mechanism for regulating immigration required considerable adaptation to
try and discharge that obligation, but by harnessing it solely to notions of economic capacity,
the mandatory administration actually divested itself of a significant lever by which it could
have influenced the development of Arab-Jewish tensions.
Jewish immigration to Palestine was one of the chief methods of realising the British
ambition that Zionist settlement would help to drive economic development. This was not a
false assumption: new immigrants brought significant amounts of capital with them that
increased prosperity. But if the Palestinian economy is viewed through the 'dual' model, the
consequences of immigration were unequal and asymmetric. This was because of Zionist
policies designed to further the establishment of the national home by channelling that impact
towards the yishuv through policies like the segregation of labour and a disinclination to
invest in Arab enterprises. It is clear that there were significant contacts between the two
elements of the dual economy, but the Zionist movement intended that the direct benefits of
immigration should be reserved for the Jewish community. Ultimately, the mandatory
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administration respected this prerogative in line with its liberal ideas on economic
development, although there was a considerable level of indirect benefit for the Arab
community because increasing customs and taxation created revenue for the government that
could be used to provide general public services and improve infrastructure.
The other aspect of the assumption about economic development - that rising
prosperity would mitigate tensions arising from the presence of a Jewish national home -
proved false. Outbreaks of disorder in 1921 and 1929 provided a catalyst to alter the
immigration regulations. However, Arab political concerns were not conceived as the root of
British problem. Instead, it was believed that changing socio-economic realities in Palestine
were the fundamental causes of violence and the changes made to the immigration
regulations reflected this. The mandatory administration was forced to confront the fact that
as the yishuv grew in size it began to have a larger impact on the economic position of the
Arab community and therefore a wider notion of economic capacity was required. This
illustrated one aspect of trusteeship, but the form of protection offered was narrowly focused
on economic interests and so the principle of using economic capacity remained the primary
method of regulating immigration from the beginning of the civil administration in July 1920




The acquisition of land was a central aspect of Zionist efforts to establish a national home in
Palestine. On a practical level, the control of territory allowed the yishuv to build towns and
agricultural settlements in which to settle new immigrants and provide them with
employment. In Zionist ideology, a 'return' to the land through agriculture was also seen in
cultural terms as a key element of nation-building that would bring about a radical break with
Jewish life in the Diaspora and create a 'new' type of Jew who concentrated on the
production of goods rather than the provision of services. However, Palestine was a relatively
small territory, with limited natural resources, and, despite some contemporary European
preconceptions of an 'empty' country, an existing Arab population that owned or occupied
the vast majority of the good, cultivable land. As Sir Herbert Samuel remarked at the end of
his tenure as high commissioner, 'in the excitement of the moment difficulties and obstacles
were ignored. The presence of more than half a million Arabs, owning most of the soil, was
forgotten'. I This left two broad methods for the establishment of a national home: the use of
state land for 'close settlement' by the Zionist movement, which became an obligation for
Britain under Article Six of the mandate, and the purchase of Arab land by either private
individuals or Jewish land buying organisations, such as the Jewish National Fund or the
Palestine Jewish Colonisation Association. The exchange ofland from Arabs to Jews was
usually an irreversible process, as land purchased by the Zionist movement became a publicly
owned 'national' asset that could not be resold; a trend that was generally regarded by the
Arab community as dispossessing it of its national patrimony, despite the prevalence of Arab
notables privately selling land to Jews.2 Land policy and Zionist settlement, alongside
immigration, became one of the most politicised aspects of British rule in Palestine, and
provided a focal point for tensions between both communities, particularly in land disputes
that threatened Arab cultivators with eviction.i
A central theme in the historiography on land has been the acquisition of territory by
the Zionist movement through these two processes. The yishuv went from controlling a
1 Samuel to Amery, April 1925, CO 733/110.
2 Metzer, The Divided Economy of Mandatory Palestine, p.5.
3 See, for example, Raya Adler, 'The Tenants of Wadi Hawarith: Another View of the Land Question in
Palestine', International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 20, No.2, (May 1988), pp.197-220.
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relatively insignificant area of Palestine at the beginning of the mandate to the situation at the
end of it, where the territory it controlled influenced plans for the partition of Palestine and
formed the strategic nucleus for gains made during the first Arab-Israeli war." The key issues
have been the extent to which Britain assisted the Zionist movement by facilitating land
transfers and the dynamic of sales by land-owning Arab notables and the Arab peasantry to
Jewish immigrants and Zionist land purchasing organisations. As will be demonstrated in this
chapter, the search for 'vacant' state land - and the process ofland reform as a whole - was
complicated by the absence of comprehensive land registers and the legacy of what colonial
officials regarded as 'backward' and 'archaic' Ottoman legislation regarding its use.s
Nevertheless, the granting ofland to the Zionist movement, such as the concession to develop
the land surrounding Athlit, Caesarea, and Kabara, and the forced partition of customary
forms ofland tenure have been held up as examples of British attempts at aiding Jewish
settlement in Palestine." The motivation for land sales depended on who was selling, but a
common denominator was the significant rise in the price of land because of Zionist demand.
By 1936, the average price ofland had quadrupled since the beginning of the mandate.'
Many landowners who became 'absent' after the post-war division of Ottoman territories sold
out of convenience; some local Arab notables sold to raise capital for investment; whilst the
chronically indebted Arab peasantry often sold after agricultural crises motivated them to
take advantage of rising land prices to meet their financial obligations. Regardless of motive,
a general feature of this historiography has been criticism of the Palestinian Arab national
leadership who in public denounced Zionist settlement, but in private engaged in selling large
tracts ofland to Jews.8
4 See Kenneth Stein, The Land Question in Palestine. 1917-39, (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina,
1984).
5 Martin Bunton, 'Inventing the Status Quo: Ottoman Land-Law during the Palestine Mandate, 1917-36', The
International History Review, Vol. 21, No. I, (March, 1999), pp.28-56; and Warwick Tyler, State Lands and
Rural Development in Mandatory Palestine. 1920-1948, (Brighton, Sussex Academic Press, 2001), pp.IS-I8.
6 See, for example, Smith, The Roots of Separatism in Palestine, Ch. 5: 'The Search for Vacant Land'; Kenneth
Stein, The Land Question in Palestine. Ch. 2: 'The Land Question'; and Roza El-Eini, Mandated Landscape:
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Rebellion. pp.80-4.
114
The two processes of land acquisition illustrate how British rule in Palestine provided
the necessary framework for the legal possession of territory by the Zionist movement,"
However, a strong focus on the political motivation and consequences ofland transfers has
the potential to obscure the overall record of British land policy in Palestine by presenting it
solely in negative terms. As Martin Bunton has suggested, in this context the history of land
policy becomes reduced to a 'narrative of loss' with Zionism the determinant force in British
attempts at developing a new land system in Palestine." By 1948, the amount ofland
acquired by the Zionist movement stood at a relatively modest 1,588,365 dunams, or eight
and a half per cent of the total of Palestine, with over half of that land vested in the Jewish
National Fund in undeveloped and unpopulated areas. I I Whilst the political context cannot be
ignored, it should not be overstated and a theme in the more recent historiography on land has
been on British initiatives for development in Palestine. These works have attempted to
explore the improvement of Arab agriculture during the mandate, and how British efforts at
reforming land tenure were aimed at raising economic prosperity through creating a system
based around private property and clearly defined individual rights in a market economy.F
British officials believed these changes were necessary for their own sake; and not
simply to expedite the establishment of the Jewish national home. As Sir Ernest Dowson, the
mandatory administration's pre-eminent adviser on land reform during the 1920s, remarked
The establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people accentuated
the urgency of the reform and imposed a higher standard of performance than might
otherwise have been necessary; but basically the measures that were adopted were
evoked by the economic needs of the land and the inhabitants, irrespective of creed or
race, and would have been intrinsically just as necessary if the Balfour Declaration
had never been conceived."
9 See, for example, Adler, 'The Tenants of Wadi Hawarith', pp.197-220; and Geremy Forman and Alexandre
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From this perspective, changes to the land system were derived from the British desire to
transmit the 'civilising' values of its colonial traditions, such as liberalism, rationalism, and
utilitarianism, rather than the singular aim of building a Jewish national home. The aim of
this chapter is to explore how trusteeship informed the British approach to land reform in
Palestine. To do so, this chapter will examine five aspects of the land system in Palestine:
firstly, it will explore the British attempt at creating a liberal, unencumbered market in land
during the 1920s; secondly, it will chart the mandatory administration's preferences for
delineating and utilising state land in Palestine; thirdly, it will re-visit the policymaking
period of 1929-31 to review Sir John Chancellor's efforts to increase the protection offered to
Arab cultivators from eviction; fourthly, it will detail the attempt to carry out a policy of
'active development' in Palestine after the Western Wall riots of August 1929; and finally, it
will address British attempts to reduce problems of Arab poverty and indebtedness by
analysing changes made to credit and taxation under the mandate.
British proposals for the reform of Palestine's land system were informed by
trusteeship in two main ways. The first was the emphasis on development, which was
intended to help improve the economic position of the indigenous Arab population. The
Palestinian economy, under the Ottoman empire, became progressively more connected to
the world economy from the 1870s onward but the mandate period saw a dramatic
intensification of such processes as the 'colonial' status of Palestine created new
opportunities for imports and exports and the expansion of capitalist-style practices in the
Jewish sector of the dual economy provided a foundation for rapid economic growth."
Amidst these changes, land became converted into an increasingly valuable commodity. Land
had, however, always been an important resource to the predominantly agrarian Palestinian
economy, in which the vast majority of the Arab population existed as rural cultivators who
typically engaged in pre-capitalist subsistence agriculture and were heavily indebted. British
officials believed this impoverishment was exacerbated by a number of problems, such as
fragmented landholdings, insecurity of tenure, poor soil because of a lack of capital
investment, insufficient water resources for irrigation, and a punitive tax system. IS The
overriding aim of British reform was to create a liberal and rational land system through a
comprehensive programme ofland settlement that would systematically define individual
14 See Metzer, The Divided Economy of Mandatory Palestine, pp.1-27; and Sarah Graham-Brown, 'The Political
Economy of the Jabal Nablus, 1920-48', in Owen, Studies in the Economic and Social History of Palestine in
the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, pp.92-105.
IS Tyler, State Lands and Rural Development, pp.160-1.
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rights, which would allow for the identification and disposal of state lands; establish a land
market which would ensure that vacant land was made productive; and the reform of taxation
and credit structures. Such measures would help to shift agriculture from extensive to
intensive methods that were more appropriate for a 'modem' economy that was becoming
linked to new markets. Many of these land reforms were derived from Orientalist
understandings of the Arab 'character' that colonial officials believed needed 'improving',
which formed an underlying justification for many of the changes that the mandatory
administration tried to introduce in Palestine.
These proposals, however, contained significant potential to undermine the
'traditional' structure of Palestinian Arab society, particularly through facilitating a market in
land that could allow cultivators to be dispossessed from their land. The second way in which
British land policy connected to trusteeship was in the paternal stance which informed efforts
to mitigate any negative effects that reform might have on the indigenous population. Barbara
Smith has suggested that British administrators 'tended to overlook the rights of the Arab
population' because they 'better understood the more familiar European style of organisation
displayed by the Zionists'. 16 Whilst it is certain that colonial officials had more affinity with
the 'modem' methods of the Zionist movement, they were also conscious of their position as
'trustees' of both communities' interests and were eager to protect Arab peasants from
displacement. This was particularly the case when it came to disposing of state lands, but the
mandatory administration also tried to introduce various forms of legislation to ensure that
tenant cultivators were not unfairly displaced from their land. In acknowledging the
established Arab position on the land, the chief concern that colonial officials expressed was
linked, as in the case of immigration, to the question of permanent Arab economic alienation
rather than physical overcrowding of the land.!" The major aim was to prevent the creation of
a discontented class of permanently landless Arab peasants that could pose a danger to the
stability of the colonial state. Related to this was a reluctance to undermine the power base of
the landowning and moneylending notables who constituted the leadership of Arab society.
Britain looked to these notables as a basis for collaboration in expediting colonial rule and
did not want to dramatically alter the social structure of Arab society.l'' The inherent
paternalism of British trusteeship therefore aimed to keep Arab peasants on the land whilst
introducing evolutionary changes to their methods of cultivation within the overarching
16 Smith, The Roots of Separatism, p.87.
17 Ibid, p.86.
18
Tyler, State Lands and Rural Development, pp.12-3.
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traditions of colonial rule that promoted liberalism, rationalism, and utilitarianism as a means
to increase economic productivity.
British Reform and the Creation of a Land Market in the 19205
The First World War devastated the Palestinian economy. InNovember 1918, the military
administration took the decision to close the Land Registries to prevent further transactions
amidst concerns that a general eviction of tenant cultivators would follow landowners'
attempts to offset their deteriorating financial position by selling land." The civil
administration wanted the registries re-opened as soon as possible. Samuel quickly realised
that 'the resumption of land transfers is the first condition of economic revival' .20 The
closures had proved deeply unpopular with both Arab landowners, who wanted to capitalise
on the value of their land, and Jewish land purchasing bodies, who wanted to begin the
process of acquiring land for the national home." InAugust 1920, a Land Commission was
established to make recommendations on how to achieve greater productivity in Palestine. It
concluded that, even to a 'casual observer', much of the land owned by individuals, villages,
and even some Jewish agricultural settlements, was left uncultivated. This was taken to mean
that 'generally speaking the fellah has as much land as he can cultivate' and, therefore, that
'every encouragement should be given to landowners to sell their excess areas' to allow for
'the free flow of'money'."
A Land Transfer Ordinance (LTD) was enacted in October 1920 to re-open the
registries. It stipulated that all future transactions would have to be registered so that a
comprehensive record could be created which would confirm individual rights and make
future transactions more expedient. 23 Of course, this process of 'rationalising' and recording
individual rights was a form of power through which the apparatus ofthe colonial state could
start to exercise control over a subject population. The aims of the LTO were threefold, and
connected to both the developmental and paternalist aspects of trusteeship: to prevent
speculation on land prices so that land would be developed rather than hoarded; to offer the
small owner and tenant security against eviction; and to provide access to much needed
capital. One of the main principles embodied in the legislation was that all dispositions of
immovable property over a lease of three years required the consent of the mandatory
19 Shepherd, Ploughing Sand, pp.27-8
20 Samuel to Foreign Office, 23 August 1920, FO 37115139.
21 Clayton to Foreign Office, 27 June 1919, FO 371/4171.
22 'Report of Land Commission', 31 May 1921, pI9-20, CO 733/18.
23 Chief Secretary, 'Note on the Land Transfer Ordinance', 21 September 1920, FO 1411686.
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administration. This was primarily a means to prevent land speculation, but it was also to
guard against the unfair eviction of tenants or sales that left cultivators with an insufficient
area of'land.i"
The desire to prevent dispossession illustrated how Orientalist notions about Arab
'character' informed British thinking. J.F. Spry, director of the land registry, later wrote that
'the Ordinance [was] prepared at a time when Palestine was a very backward country' that
required a 'paternal government' to oversee land transactions.f The experiences of colonial
rule elsewhere had shown the mandatory government that it would have to 'protect the Arab
in spite of himself in matters where he is perhaps none too well fitted by nature to protect
himself .26 In the Sudan, for example, a 'five feddan law' had been introduced to create
minimum subsistence areas, which had in tum been modelled on legislation from India.27
Trusteeship imposed a clear obligation on the mandatory administration to raise Palestine
from its 'very backward' state; the facilitation of a land market was a key part of the wider
effort to promote economic development. Yet Orientalist projections, such as the Arab being
'none too well fitted' for change, stipulated that colonial officials must exercise a paternal
form of control to mitigate any negative impact on the local population. As Bunton has
suggested in his exploration of how British officials thought about the role of private property
in Palestine, this 'reflected the weight of colonial experience with peasant dispossession' .28 It
is also demonstrative of the self-justifying nature of colonial rule and the need for British
trusteeship: it suggested that Palestine required new methods of administration to embark on
the path to modernity, yet at the same time posited that the Arab community needed British
guidance and tutelage to adapt to the reforms that were required.
The Land Transfer Ordinance drew criticism from both the Jewish and Arab
communities almost immediately after it was promulgated.f" Zionist leaders found the
protection offered to tenants inhibited the growth of the national home because it complicated
the purchase of large tracts of land. 30 However, Arab opposition was largely unexpected. In
the Colonial Office, Mills minuted that 'it has always been a matter of amazement to me that
24 Chief Secretary, 'Note on the Land Transfer Ordinance', 21 September 1920, FO 141/686.
2S J.F. Spry, 'Memorandum on the History, Law and Practice of Land Registration in Palestine', October 1948,
MECA, GBI65-0315.
26 Colonial Office Minute by S.M.C, 24 November 1921, CO 733/7.
27 Ibid.
28 Bunton, Colonial Land Policies in Palestine, p.60.
29 'Report of the Land Commission', pp.20-1.
30 Stein, The Land Question in Palestine, pp.46-7.
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the Arabs never appreciated the benefits of these restrictions towards themselves'. 31 The need
for consent was seen by Arab notables as an attempt by the mandatory administration to keep
down the price ofland in order to assist Jewish land purchases. After the May 1921 riots, the
Haycraft commission noted that
The Arabs have regarded with suspicion measures taken by the Government with the
best intentions [and have viewed] the Transfer of Land Ordinance, 1920 ... as having
been introduced to keep down the price of land, and to throw land which is in the
market into the hands of the Jews at a low price."
An amending LTO therefore came into effect in December 1921. It stripped away the
protective aspects of the 1920 ordinance by removing the minimum allocations for
subsistence and the requirement for the high commissioner to approve sales. Instead, it
allowed the director of the land registry to intervene in cases where insufficient land would
be retained after a transfer to sustain the seller or any tenants that lived on the land. However ,
as Sir John Hope-Simpson noted in 1930, this could be easily circumvented by either the
landlord ejecting any tenants beforehand and selling the land with vacant possession or
inducing the tenant to withdraw through the payment of compensation, so the legislation
could only afford limited protection."
The desire to facilitate land transactions led to the ascendancy ofthe developmental
aspects of trusteeship rather than its protective imperatives. This was acceptable during the
1920s because, for the mandatory administration, these sales lacked the politically sensitive
context of state lands where colonial officials did not want to be seen evicting Arab tenants.
Kenneth Stein has suggested the land question was politically 'unobtrusive' at this time
because Arab landowners' interests were served by the amendment of the LTO, and that
tenant cultivators were willing to take high levels of compensation to vacate land prior to
transfer." Absentee landlords saw land as an investment; sales through an intermediary often
allowed a commercial transaction to be divorced from its political ramifications. In private,
Dowson linked these motivations to Oriental greed, commenting that he knew 'the inability
of the Arab temperament to refuse a handsome profit'." As long as the political climate
31 Minute by Mills, November 1921, CO 733/7.
32 'Reports of the Commission ofInquiry into the Disturbances in May, 1921', Cmd. 1540, (London, HMSO,
1921), p.51.
33 Sir John Hope-Simpson, 'Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development', Cmd. 3686, (London,
HMSO, 1930), p.35.
34 Stein, The Land Question in Palestine, p.59.
35 Personal letter from Sir Ernest Dowson, 25 September 1937, MECA, GBI65-0092.
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remained favourable, the mandatory administration was content to focus on the prospects for
development.
These legislative measures did not lead to an immediate transformation of the land
market. The process of defining individual titles to land was hindered by the lack of a
comprehensive land survey, the incomplete state of the inherited land registers, and the
prevalence of a customary form of land ownership known as musha. British efforts at reform
were undermined by the gap between legal doctrine and local practice. When the Ottoman
army retreated from Palestine, many of the land records were either confiscated or destroyed,
but there was also a prevalent tendency amongst the Arab peasantry to shun formal land
registration, which was expensive, and rely on informal arrangements that avoided liability
for taxation or conscription." To compound the incomplete state of registration, Palestine
also lacked a comprehensive cadastral survey against which individual rights could be
defined. The land settlement process - the surveying of land and registration of its ownership
- was the foundation on which most land reforms rested, yet the mandatory administration
could not wait until it was fully completed before it re-opened the land registries because of
the importance of stimulating economic growth. The creation of a land market and the
process of surveying land and recording ownership were therefore forced to run concurrently.
The land settlement process was a crucial part of the struggle against customary forms
of land tenure, which had created a gap between law and practice, and, in the eyes of colonial
officials, had done much to impede development. There was near unanimous agreement that
the primary reason for the 'backward' state of Arab agriculture was the perpetuation of land
owned in musha, which for the mandatory administration represented the antithesis of their
attempts to introduce liberal and rational land reforms that ensured the free working of
'natural' economic laws. The basis of the system was collective ownership through which
village land was divided into parcels of similar quality and then periodically redistributed
amongst those who held shares in the system. The failure to break out of these communal
arrangements was taken as a sign of Oriental 'irrationality'. As Amos Nadan has suggested,
British actions were motivated by an Orientalist perspective that assumed that Arab 'culture
or mental habits were the source of a conservative inability to make economic-related
judgments and adapt to change; in less politically correct language, the fellahin were too
36 Dowson, 'Report on the Land System in Palestine', pp.S-12.
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ignorant to manage their own farms wisely' .37 Dowson stated that 'there is no doubt that the
system is a most, probably the most, serious handicap on the economic development of the
country and the improvement of the position of the peasantry' .38 This was considered a
serious problem because, at the beginning of the mandate, it was estimated that over half of
all the cultivable land in Palestine was held in musha." Various government reports endorsed
the Land Commission's recommendation that the best solution was to enforce the compulsory
partition of musha lands, with each villager who owned a share in the communal land
receiving an individual plot of miri land that would encourage investment." The key
criticism made by British officials was that the periodic rotation of land promoted a 'hand to
mouth' existence that precluded development. Dowson explained that the Arab cultivator
'will aim at extracting all he can from the land and will put nothing in it. He will exploit and
impoverish it but will not develop it'. This verdict was reached without a thoughtful
investigation of the perceived benefits of the system - such as stimulation of local co-
operation and the non-alienation of village land, which gained new meaning in the context of
Arab-Jewish relations - that were quickly dismissed as 'illusory' .41
The general and widespread condemnation of the musha system removed any context
from its role as a cultural connection to the land. Neither did it take into consideration the
extent to which it had actually evolved in response to market conditions, producing
significant variation in the overall system where numerous smaller plots increased the ratio of
labour to land in a land-scarce economy, facilitated Islamic inheritance laws, allowed
peasants to spread risk, and cultivate both summer and winter crops." More recently, it has
also been emphasised that as an institution musha did not preclude investment: both
communal and individual development was possible, but was constrained by a lack of capital
in the Palestinian economy." A number of economic historians have reached the conclusion
37 Amos Nadan, 'Failing to Aid: British Administrators and the Palestinian Peasants, 1922-1947', in Zach Levey
and Elie Podeh (eds.), Britain and the Middle East: From Imperial Power to Junior Partner, (Sussex, Sussex
Academic Press, 2007), p.77.
38 Dowson, 'Preliminary Study of Land Tenure in Palestine', p.35.
39 Sir Ernest Dowson, 'Report on the Progress in Land Reforms, 1923-30', November 1930, CO 733/22114.
40 See, for example, 'Report of the Land Commission', pp.22-7; 'Report of the Tithes Commission, 1922', CO
733/20, pp.120-1; Dowson, 'Preliminary Study of Land Tenure in Palestine', pp.33-41; Lewis French, 'First
Report on Agricultural Development and Land Settlement in Palestine', 23 December 1931, CO 733/214/5,
ft25-32.
Dowson, 'Preliminary Study of Land Tenure in Palestine', p.37.
42 See, for example, Amos Nadan, 'Colonial Misunderstanding of an Efficient Peasant Institution: Land
Settlement and Musha Tenure in Mandate Palestine, 1921-47', Journal of the Economic and Social History of
the Orient, Vol. 46, No.3, (2003), pp.320-54; or Scott Atran, 'Hamula Organisation and Masha'a Tenure in
Palestine, Man, Vol. 21, No.2, (June 1986), pp.271-95.
43 Nadan, 'Failing to Aid', pp.78-83.
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that the indebted state of the Arab peasantry reflected a lack of opportunities rather than non-
rational behaviour.t" The denunciation of mush a can be seen as another example of the
pervasive, yet self-justifying nature of colonial rule: the assertion that the system was
'backward' and that reform was urgently needed constituted a powerful rationale that
justified British intervention against musha and, on a much wider scale, the existence of the
mandatory administration.
, The forced partition of musha land represented a significant intervention in
Palestine's land regime. In the end, however, it was a slow process and British rhetoric that
the case for reform was 'rarely so clear and compelling' was not matched by any particular
urgency on the ground." By 1930, for example, the amount of cultivable land held in musha
had only been reduced to 46 per cent." The disappointing progress was representative of
wider delays in the land settlement process because of an uncoordinated use of government
resources. The Survey Department, a new institution with limited funds, was purely
concerned with mapping, whilst the Land Registry had to deal with competing goals: to
continue to operate the registry and to attempt to introduce reforms into the incomplete
system." This led the Colonial Office to hire Sir Ernest Dowson, an expert on colonial land
reform, to advise the mandatory administration on where it was going wrong. Dowson had
made his reputation in Egypt, where he had been appointed as director-general of the land
survey in 1909. He retired from the Egyptian colonial service in 1923, but continued to
advise the Colonial Office on land issues in Palestine, Transjordan, Mesopotamia, and
Zanzibar.
Dowson's expertise allowed him a much broader view of the land system in
Palestine." He agreed with the mandatory administration that agriculture was the 'only
reliable basis for the establishment of healthy national economy', explaining that Palestine
lacked any significant mineral wealth or industry.49 Land reform was therefore one of the
primary British duties in Palestine and Dowson's aim was to transform the 'native'
agricultural economy for the good of the population. This would not only produce economic
44 See Metzer, The Divided Economy of Mandatory Palestine, p.96; Kamen, Little Common Ground; Bunton,
Colonial Land Policies in Palestine.
45 Dowson, 'Preliminary Study of Land Tenure in Palestine', pAO.
46 'Palestine. Royal Commission Report', p.219.
47 Dov Gavish, A Survey of Palestine under the British Mandate, 1920-48, (London, Routledge, 2005), p.1OS.
48 See Sir Ernest Dowson, 'Preliminary Study of Land Tenure in Palestine', 'Covering Memorandum to the
Report on the Land System in Palestine', and 'Report on the Land System in Palestine', CO 733/109.
49 S' Eir rnest Dowon, 'Notes on Land Tax, Cadastral Survey, and Land Settlement', MECA, GB16S-01S1, p.3.
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benefits but also offer stability for the colonial state by increasing prosperity, which
illustrated one of the core assumptions of trusteeship that economic development would
mitigate political tension. Dowson provided a diagnosis of the 'sickness afflicting agriculture'
that demonstrated how Orientalist tropes underpinned his thinking on the nature of Arab
society. He argued that the problems in Palestine were the same as those in Egypt before
British rule had transformed it from 'a semi-derelict, over-burdened, ex-Ottoman vilayet to a
State with a well-founded self-sufficing economy': they were both characterised by a
conglomeration of archaic land tenures, taxation of the 'medieval Moslem type', and
'starveling peasants' who lacked the initiative to improve the land and held fatalist ideas
about their position on it.50
Dowson advocated the removal of what he identified as the two main barriers to
agricultural efficiency: an uneconomic system of land tenure and a prohibitive taxation
regime. His ideas were informed by overarching sentiments of liberalism, rationalism, and
utilitarianism which characterised the British approach to land reform.I' Only a
comprehensive settlement process, which resulted in the definition of individual rights over
land, could give the Arab peasantry the impetus to improve their position by investing in the
land, whilst a fairer system of taxation and credit would alleviate long-term problems of
indebtedness and provide the small cultivator with the means to improve his piece of land. It
is arguable that the mandatory administration had already reached these conclusions by the
time of Dow son's first visit to Palestine in 1923, but his reports provided a significant degree
of coherence to the overall programme of British reform. 52
A firm conviction in the 'civilising' aspects of European-style land reforms was
reflective of Dowson's wider, Orientalist beliefs in the superiority of West em culture. The
aim of providing individual security of title was illustrative of his belief that communal
arrangements for land cultivation, which were based on land use rights rather than absolute
ownership, were inherently backward and had contributed to the dismal economic state of the
country, as witnessed in his remarks about musha." Yet he was a firm believer in the
precepts of trusteeship and explained that it was 'the intention of the British Government and
people, having set their hand to the plough as mandatories of the civilised world, to establish
SO Ibid, pp.2-3.
SI Ibid, pp.lO-14 and pp.lS-21.
52 See, for example, 'Report of the Land Commission, 1920', pp.19-28, CO 733/18 and 'Report of the Tithes
Commission, 1922', pp.l22-S, CO 733/20.
S3 Dowson, 'Preliminary Study of Land Tenure in Palestine', p.1l.
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'The Land of Three Faiths' as a stable and self-sufficing political entity'. 54 Later, he stated
that 'the mandate implies the tutelage of an irresponsible people ... the mandatory
administration [stand] in loco parentis to the mass of the indigenous population' and that it
was therefore necessary to exercise a 'beneficent control' over the land system, which
demonstrated how a significant degree ofpatemalism was also present in Dowson's approach
to land reform. 55 Acknowledging the 'conservative' nature of the Arab population, Dowson
supported an evolutionary approach to make change more palatable. His reforms were clearly
directed towards the developmental aspects of trusteeship, but they were to be implemented
'considerately, even gradually' to ensure the local population was not alienated, which was
consonant with the protective element of trusteeship. At base these comments were related to
Orientalist understandings of the Arab 'mind', which Dowson explained needed
'stimulating' :
The master key to economic success in Palestine is to be found, not in the
development of material resources (e.g. harbours and communications although these
aids are needed), not in the adoption of more scientific methods of cultivation,
although these will establish and accentuate success as they are locally tested and
assimilated, not even in the better conservation and use of the rainfall, which is
probably the most important physical problem; but, as it was in Egypt and as it is
everywhere else [in the Orient] in stimulating the individual enterprise of the mass of
the population. 56
Dowson explained that land reform would mitigate the 'incurably listless and idle' nature of
the Arab peasant, which means that changes to the land system can be seen as part of a
broader attempt to transform the 'character' of Palestine's native inhabitants.V
Dowson was critical of the slow pace of reform achieved by the mandatory
administration and pointed to the disjointed attempts at surveying land and registering rights
over it, as being chiefly responsible. As early as 1921, he had remarked that the mandatory
government had not grasped the basic point that accurate land survey was the prerequisite for
efficient land registration, and that, crucially, the two processes were inter-related. 58 In 1924,
writing to the Colonial Office, he explained that the separate 'efforts to resolve the tangle of
real rights in Palestine. has pursued an independent path with the very natural result that after
some six years occupation a systematic investigation and settlement of real rights has still to
54 Dowson, 'Notes on Land Tax, Cadastral Survey, and Land Settlement in Palestine', p.52.
ss Personal letter from Sir Ernest Dowson, 25 September 1937, Middle East Centre Archive, GBI65-0092;
Dowson, 'Report on the Land System in Palestine, 1925', p.8.
56 Dowson, 'Report on the Land System in Palestine', p.4.
S7 Ibid, p.5.
S8 L.B. Weldon to Dowson, 3 February 1921, FO 141/686/9.
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be planned,.59 When he delivered his report on the land system in 1925, he stressed that the
term 'land settlement' encapsulated the
Compound process of (i) definition of property rights, (ii) survey of properties and
(iii) joint record, [all] of which is required. The strongest emphasis must be laid on the
complementary nature of the two parts of the operation (i. and ii.) and that their united
objective is the creation of an intelligible and reliable record, (iii) for subsequent
use."
To expedite the reform process, Dowson recommended adopting the 'Torrens' system, which
was named after its creator Sir Robert Torrens. First used in Australia in 1857, the system,
Dowson explained, was 'now so widely and successfully applied, [that] when brought down
to bedrock is simply an authoritative record of rights over land systematically based upon
permanent cadastral or property survey'. He went on to explain that its advantage in
'primitive' countries was that its reliance on cadastral survey provided the only feasible way
of intelligibly recording rights as the local population could not be relied upon in the
registration process." The Torrens system called for an exhaustive record of rights within an
area, including not only major rights of ownership or use but all minor rights such as lease,
servitudes, charges, easements, and tax rates, through an investigation by land settlement
officers who held judicial powers to decide claims on the SpOt.62Dowson's ideas were finally
brought together in the Land Settlement Ordinance of 1928. The process of land settlement
was driven by the need to establish accurate land registers that would facilitate a liberal
market in land but, as will be seen in the next section, it was also necessary so that the
mandatory administration could delineate and utilise vacant 'state land' for the purpose of
promoting economic development.
The Search and Disposal of 'Vacant' State Lands
The major aim of the Land Commission, which was established in August 1920, was to
ascertain the extent of state land in Palestine and explore how it could be used to achieve
greater productivity. At the same time, it had to ensure that the rights and interests of the
existing Arab occupants were adequately safeguarded." These aims reflected how both the
developmental and protective aspects of trusteeship featured prominently in British plans to
identify and dispose of 'vacant' state land. Yet if the objective of defining individual rights
59 Dowson to Colonial Office, 21 August 1924, CO 733/85.
60 Dowson, 'Report on the Land System in Palestine', p.19.
61 Ibid, p.24.
62 Dowson, 'Notes on Land Tax, Cadastral Survey, and Land Survey', p.35.
63 Bentwich to Abramson, 19 August 1920, CO 733/18.
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and creating an efficient market for land transactions was weighted towards addressing the
developmental obligations imposed by trusteeship, the approach to state land was heavily
influenced by the need to protect Arab interests. This was mainly because of the political
context that surrounded the mandatory administration's position as a type of state 'landlord'.
Colonial officials were very reluctant to be seen to be driving Arab cultivators from state land
to make way for Jewish settlers.
In the covering memorandum to his first major report, Dowson remarked that the
Palestine government possessed 'a dual capacity as custodian of public utility land of various
kinds and as a steward of exploitable public domain'. 64 These twin roles produced a form of
ambiguity because the priorities of the mandatory administration were caught between
delineating and protecting its rights over state land and, on the other hand, encouraging close
settlement and development on it. For budget-conscious colonial officials, who tended to
view land in the public domain as a national asset, it was quickly decided that the role of
'custodian' was more important than that of 'steward', especially given the importance of the
public domain to Palestine's inherited system of Ottoman land tenure.6S The protection of
government rights over state land also found justification through trusteeship in that it was
preserving a legacy for any future administration of Palestine.
An effective bid at securing the rights of the mandatory administration to state land
was inextricably linked to reform of Ottoman land law. Bunton has argued that the law
regarding land was far less codified than is commonly perceived in the secondary literature,
which is important because it means that British perceptions of the extant system are
especially significant as officials sought to identify faults and correct them through legislative
changes to land tenure. 66 The lack of a comprehensive surveyor land registers meant that one
of the primary duties of the Land Commission was to determine the nature and extent of
unoccupied state land in Palestine. In its findings, the commission raised a major concern
that, since the end of the First World War, significant areas of unoccupied state domain were
being 'encroached' upon by Arab cultivators. However, not all of this was strictly illegal as
under Ottoman law certain types of uncultivated land could be reclaimed and a title deed
granted if a payment for the unimproved value of the land was made to the state.
64 Sir Ernest Dowson, 'Covering Memorandum to the Report on the Land System in Palestine', 5 December
1925, CO 733/109.
6S Bunton, Colonial Land Policies, p.30.
66 Ibid, pAl.
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Nevertheless, colonial officials feared that state land that they did not know even existed was
being 'stolen' from them.
In its position as 'custodian', it was clear that the mandatory administration had to act
to prevent what Dowson later termed 'illicit drains' on Palestine's resources." In 1920, a
Mahlul Lands Ordinance was passed and then, in 1921, a second ordinance, the Mewat Lands
Ordinance, was introduced. The former required those who had encroached to inform the
authorities and, in certain circumstances, it allowed for the possibility of a lease to be granted
over the land, whilst the latter stipulated that consent would need to be sought before mewat
land was reclaimed and that those who did so without consent could be prosecuted for
trespass.68 These measures had significant potential to disrupt the lives of Arab
agriculturalists. A.L. Tibawi, an Arab official in the Palestine government, later wrote that the
legislation deprived 'the poorest Arab cultivators of rights long enjoyed under the Turks', yet
it seems this was not a major consideration for a mandatory administration that was dedicated
to guarding 'its' rights over state land.69 It is probable that part of the rationale was to ensure
that there was at least some unoccupied state land to facilitate Jewish settlement, and
therefore help to drive economic growth, but the overriding concern was that the mandatory
administration was missing opportunities to take advantage of the rising value of land,"
This legislative activity represented a fundamental misreading of the situation by
British officials as reclaimed land did not pass permanently out of the public domain. In
Palestine, there were two fundamental categories of land tenure: mulk, which was absolute
land ownership that tended to relate to urban property, and land in the public domain,
comprising the miri, mewat, mahlul, and matruke forms of tenure. This meant that the public
domain constituted a significant element in the overall land system, but the key marker of
property relations was not legal ownership of the land in itself - the raqaba - but ownership
of the tasara/, which was the right to use the land. The most prevalent form of land in the
public domain was miri, where the tasarafwss permanently granted to the titleholder as a
heritable right on the basis that the land was made productive and an annual tithe paid on it.
As the legal ownership of this land remained vested in the state, if it was left uncultivated for
three years the tasaraf could escheat to the state and it would become mahlul- or waste -
67 Dowson, 'Preliminary Study of Land Tenure in Palestine', p.63.
68 'Report of the Land Commission', pp.2-3 and pp.15-6.
69 A.L. Tibawi, Anglo-Arab Relations and the Question of Palestine, (London, Luzac & Co., 1977), p.469.
70 Minute by Clauson, 18 July 1925, CO 733/107; see also Bunton, Colonial Land Policies in Palestine, p.30.
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land." Instead of passing out of the public domain, reclaimed land was simply transformed
into miri and made subject to the normal stipulations. The overarching principle of the power
to reclaim land was to ensure that the total cultivated land area was maintained and expanded
whilst a stream of taxation revenue was guaranteed for the state.72
The confusion over reclamation was indicative of a wider British misunderstanding of
the success that legislative intervention could have in achieving their goals of liberalising and
rationalising the land system. As Bunton has suggested, colonial officials were forced to
acknowledge early on in their attempt to make unoccupied state land available for Jewish
settlement that a significant gap existed between 'local arrangements and legal doctrines' in
Palestine.P The extent of the public domain and the mandatory obligation to promote 'close
settlement' on it created an expectation amongst Zionist leaders that the Jewish national
home would benefit from extensive grants of relatively 'cheap' land from the mandatory
administration. However, these hopes were never substantially realised as British recognition
of 'local arrangements' and the political context of its position as state 'landlord' ensured that
colonial officials were especially reluctant to be seen evicting Arabs from state land to make
way for Jewish settlers, even if those Arabs were 'illegally' cultivating the land. The principal
result of this acknowledgment was that Samuel introduced a concept of 'moral' rights to
protect the interests of Arabs who cultivated land in the public domain but lacked legal or
prescriptive rights to do SO.74 Warwick Tyler has suggested that the recognition of 'moral'
rights constituted a 'generous approach' by the mandatory administration, yet, in terms of
trusteeship, it was difficult to construe evicting Arabs from state land as protecting their
economic interests. Instead, the mandatory administration sought to establish security of
tenure for them as the precursor to the development of their land.7s
The aim of conserving government rights over state land led Samuel to conclude that
it should generally not be sold but made available on long-term leases." State land that was
available for settlement fell broadly into three main categories: jiftilik, a customary form of
tenure created when land owned by the Ottoman sultan passed to the Ottoman government
following the revolution in 1908, which in tum passed to the British administration as
71 Dowson, 'Preliminary Study of Land Tenure', pp.l3-6.
72 Roger Owen, 'Introduction', in Roger Owen (ed.), New Perspectives on Property and Land in the Middle
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mandatory power; mewat, which was estimated to consist of roughly 60 per cent of the total
country but was considered 'dead' land in that most of it was virtually unusable for pastoral
agriculture; and mahlutl! During the 1920s, the mandatory administration had to make
decisions over two areas of land that, although requiring significant development, had good
access to water resources and were sparsely populated by their Arab occupants who were not
utilising all ofit.78 The areas were a large tract ofjiftilik land in the Beisan valley in the
north-east, and an area of mewat land consisting of swamps and sand dunes in Athlit,
Kabbara, and Caesarea along the central coastal strip of Palestine.
In September 1920, the Land Commission put forward its recommendation that the
Athlit, Kabbara, and Caesarea (AKC) concession should be granted to the Palestine Jewish
Colonisation Association, and the mandatory administration endorsed the agreement a year
later in November 1921. Under the terms of the concession, the Association was to drain and
desalinate the swamps in the Athlit and Kabbara regions to prepare it for intensive
cultivation, and fix and afforest the shifting sand dunes of the Caesarea. Many aspects of the
concession were seen to be in the public interest: the eradication of malaria, increased
productivity, closer settlement and intensive cultivation of the land, improved government
revenue through rents paid by the Association and agricultural taxation, and the fixing of the
shifting dunes which threatened the railways and existing arable land.79 This ensured that the
Palestine government was keen to grant the concession to the Association, especially as the
cost of afforestation was high and because the works were considered 'far beyond' the
capabilities of the Arab occupants. This is an important point to note, as it illustrated how the
mandatory government believed that Zionist settlement could be utilised for the overall
benefit of Palestine by giving the yishuv projects that it believed local Arabs were unable to
execute.
It was not long before difficulties with the agreement emerged. The major problem
was that the government did not have vacant possession of the land it was trying to lease. It
was occupied by about 800 semi-nomadic Arabs, who lived by extensively cultivating the
land and grazing their animals on it, whilst supplementing their income through basket
making from the reeds provided by the swamps. Much of the land was held in matruke, the
chief characteristic of which was that ownership was inalienably invested in the state for
77 Sir Ernest Dowon, 'Preliminary Study of Land Tenure in Palestine', 3 November 1925, CO 733/109; 'Report
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public or communal intcrests.t" Samuel considered it essential that any decision had to
protect not just the legal rights of the occupiers but their moral rights as well. He suggested
that the inhabitants of the land should not have to move unless proper provision for their
settlement was made in some other part of the concession or elsewhere in Palestine. Three
options were put forward by the high commissioner: a free title to land as near as possible to
their present locality to ensure the same level of income, a sum of money equivalent to the
capitalised value of their income, or employment by the association during the drainage
operations and the grant of a free title to some of the drained land for intensive cultivation."
The Colonial Office concurred with Samuel's ideas, suggesting that the safeguards 'should be
framed in a generous spirit and afford real security for their future interests' .82 The Kabbara
Arabs accepted the first option and, by 1930, had re-settled on 'better' land to allow for
partial drainage of the swamps and settlement by the Jewish Colonisation Association.
However, the Caesarea Arabs rejected all offers of settlement and the project became mired
in delays and negotiations, some of which were still unresolved at the end of the mandate."
The concern for political expediency and for the mandatory administration to be seen
as protecting the interests of Arab cultivators on state land was also demonstrated in its
settlement project in the Beisan valley. The area was regarded by the Zionist movement as
one of the most desirable tracts of state land in Palestine. The land covered about 240 square
kilometres, was sparsely populated by its Arab occupants, and had excellent access to water
resources.f" Under the Ottoman empire, 'underhanded' tactics by the sultan had resulted in
ownership of the land being transferred to him from the local Arabs, and so the mandatory
administration inherited the lands under the customary jiftilik tenure. The Land Commission
recommended that the tenants should be given the opportunity of gaining a tenancy in
perpetuity for the land sufficient for their maintenance. In a rare departure from the principle
of non-alienation of state land, the Beisan Agreement allowed Arab cultivators to purchase
land through 15 annual payments in the hope that this would promote greater productivity by
turning the semi-nomadic Arabs into a class of small landowners. The purchase price was
'somewhat less than the market value', but this was justified as addressing the moral rights of
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the Arabs who were already cultivating the land.8s Samuel re-iterated that generous treatment
of the cultivators would demonstrate that the mandatory administration was seriously
interested in protecting their interests, and that this would consequently have' great benefit
for the future colonisation of the District,.86 This again illustrated the predominance of the
protective aspect of trusteeship regarding state lands, but it is also significant that the
possibility for development was not ruled out. The hope was that after the Arabs' claims had
been settled, there would be large areas of uncultivated land available for Jewish settlement."
By the time the Demarcation Commission had finished its work in 1932, it had
already become apparent that there would no good, cultivable land left in the Beisan valley
for close Jewish settlement and intensive cultivation.t'' Two-thirds of the land had gone to the
Beisan Arabs who, under the purchase agreement, had been able to agglomerate large estates,
whilst the remaining third was deemed uncultivable. The fragmented nature of the land
system and the lack of a comprehensive survey meant that it was easy for the Arab cultivators
to put forward claims to the land. Bunton has suggested that one of the major difficulties
faced in trying to reformulate the system of public domain was a dependence on the specific
knowledge oflocal cultivators, who were increasingly keen to assert what they viewed as
their rights.89 The Zionist movement itself was not opposed to the principle of providing the
Arabs with a long-term settlement, but they argued that too much land was being allocated
under the purchase agreement for the Arabs to effectively cultivate.i" The Beisan Agreement
was subject to later criticism from various government reports, which also held the view that
too much land had been given away and that a significant opportunity for development had
been IOSt.91
British efforts to protect the interests of the existing cultivators therefore prevented
the mandatory administration from leasing any land in the Beisan Valley to the Zionist
movement. Instead, they had to purchase excess areas from the Beisan Arabs at the market
rate, which was nearly double the original price paid. By 1926, for example, ten per cent of
the allotted land had already been sold, which partly vindicated the argument that too much
8S Samuel to Churchill, 24 November 1921, CO 733/6.
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land had been given away in the first place.92 The contraction in the yishuv's economy
between 1926 and 1928 caused large-scale interest in acquiring land in the Beisan valley to
fade." The disposal of state lands thus demonstrated some of the overarching precepts of
trusteeship: trying to promote development through creating opportunities for Zionist
settlement, whilst mitigating that impact by safeguarding the economic rights and interests -
both legal and 'moral' - of the existing cultivators on the land. When it came to state land,
colonial officials were particularly sensitive to the political ramifications that evicting Arab
tenants to make way for Jewish settlement would have, and so they tended to make
'generous' offers of settlement that in effect significantly impeded Zionist hopes for close
settlement on state land. However, these offers were not just seen in protective terms: it was
believed that providing security of tenure to Arab cultivators would create an incentive for
investment in the land, which would help to drive development within the Arab economy.
Efforts to protect Arab cultivators incumbent on the land became an increasing preoccupation
of the mandatory administration after the outbreak of the Western Wall riots in August 1929.
Sir John Chancellor and the Protection of Cultivators
Through most of the 1920s, a focus on development had been the predominant factor in the
British policy toward land transactions outside of state lands. This was demonstrated by the
lack of concern expressed towards the failure of the land transfer ordinances passed in 1920
and 1921 to achieve their secondary purpose of offering protection to tenant cultivators.
Palestine's third high commissioner, Sir John Chancellor, observed that 'in practice, the Land
Transfer Ordinance ... did not, save possibly one individual case, secure, either for "tenants in
occupation" or for persons "exercising customary rights" sufficient land for the maintenance
of their families' .94In recognition of these realities, Chancellor decided to enact new
legislation to bring the law into line with common practice, explaining that not only could the
current law be evaded by landlords forcing tenants off the land before a sale took place, but
that to require landlords to procure land in a different area for evicted tenants was a severe
impediment of the right to dispose of their land. The high commissioner argued that offering
a tenant monetary compensation instead of relocating him offered a better option as he could
select the land that was the most appropriate for him.9s The 1929 Protection of Cultivators
Ordinance thus required that tenants would have to be provided with a year's notice and
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granted compensation for the disturbance and any improvements that had been carried out on
the land."
The occurrence of the Western Wall riots, however, presented a significant challenge
to the primacy of development and the facilitation of a liberalised land market. After the
violence, the problem of 'landless' Arabs was accentuated in the minds of colonial officials.
An examination of the political decision-making between 1929 and 1931 through the prism
of land provides another opportunity to revise some of the historiography about this period.
As with immigration policy, Zionist fears and Arab hopes that Britain would introduce
stringent restrictions on land transfers, in a bid to confine Jewish settlement and abandon the
national home project, seem to have distorted the historiographic record of the decision-
making process by suggesting that British policy shifted from a pro-Zionist bias to a pro-Arab
one, before Zionists in London managed to lobby the fragile minority government of Ramsay
MacDonald to restore the status quo. Instead, it will be argued here that what Britain
attempted was a re-balancing of its priorities between development and protection. The core
assumptions of trusteeship remained intact and there was actually far less variation in the
policy-making process than is commonly assumed."
The need to strengthen cultivators' protection against dispossession, which was
advocated by the Shaw Commission, the Hope-Simpson Report, and the Pass field White
Paper, has been described by Kenneth Stein as a 'frontal attack against the physical growth of
the Jewish national home' that emanated from a high commissioner who held a 'personally
strong anti-Zionist disposition'v'" Whilst it is true that Chancellor had little sympathy for
Zionism, this did not automatically equate to an ideologically motivated, anti-Zionist policy.
Instead, his attitude to Palestine was probably more strongly informed by his paternal
approach to its Arab inhabitants, after having served as a colonial administrator in Mauritius,
Trinidad and Tobago, and Southern Rhodesia.99 The interpretation that Chancellor was
attempting to enforce a major change in British policy towards Palestine following the 1929
riots stems from a memorandum he submitted to the Colonial Office in January 1930. In it, he
suggested that, on the basis of estimates about the total area of cultivable land and the
minimum amount required to support the average Arab family, Palestine could not support a
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larger population unless intensive methods of cultivation were widely adopted. The
consequence of this was that ifmore Arab land was sold for Jewish settlement, then problems
oflandlessness would be seriously exacerbated. To guard against this, Chancellor
controversially advocated a re-formulation of certain articles of the mandate to include a
'positive' expression of Arab rights so that, although continuing to offer broad support to the
establishment of the national home, the mandate did not grant 'preferential treatment' to
either the Arab or Jewish communities.Y'
Chancellor's memorandum advocated some important changes to the way Britain
should administer Palestine. However, he accepted the legitimacy of the Balfour Declaration
and, if the document is assessed against the overarching themes of trusteeship, it can be seen
not as a radical departure from previous policy by an 'anti-Zionist' high commissioner but a
distinct attempt to give equal weight to the 'dual obligation' that was first enunciated in the
1922 White Paper. The high commissioner justified this on the grounds of
Showing the Arabs that Great Britain is no less mindful of her obligations to them
than of her obligations to the Jews, and that she is equally solicitous for their interests
and welfare ... Taking long views as to the future welfare of Palestine, that policy
would be no less to the interest of the Jewish inhabitants of the country than to the
interest of the Arabs. Many of the wiser Jews have already expressed the view that the
national home in Palestine cannot be permanently established under the protection of
British bayonets.'?'
This statement can therefore be viewed as part of a broader attempt at re-balancing the
developmental and protective aspects of trusteeship, and not as a policy to prevent all future
Zionist settlement, which remained a fundamental method of driving economic growth.
Chancellor explained that whilst Arab agriculture was being moved over to intensive
cultivation, the Zionist movement would still be able to expand the national home on the
large tracts of undeveloped land that it already possessed, which is a key point that is often
overlooked in favour of the interpretation that the high commissioner wished to 'deal a blow
to Zionism' .I 02
The Colonial Office decided to keep Chancellor's proposals secret, as they did not
..
want to influence the Shaw Commission while it was still in Palestine investigating the
causes of the riots. However, in London, any suggestion of 'throwing up' the mandate for its
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amendment was simply' out of the question' .103 The Colonial Office was reluctant to sanction
a course of action that had the potential to undermine the overriding British justification for
being in Palestine, which could have had ramifications for imperial strategy in the region. It
was concluded by the Colonial Office that any changes could be made under the existing
constitutional framework of the mandate and the 1922 White Paper, which demonstrates that
both of these documents contained scope for varying interpretations depending on
contemporary needs.104 The Shaw Commission's report, which was received in March 1930,
echoed the central thrust of Chancellor's memorandum. It explained that structural economic
changes and a fast-growing Arab population meant that unless methods of intensive
cultivation were widely adopted, Palestine would be unable to support a larger population
without further displacement of Arab cultivators. Having decided that 'the outbreak of
August last neither was nor intended to be a revolt against British authority', the commission
concluded that there could 'be no doubt that racial animosity on the part of the Arabs,
consequent upon the disappointment of their political and national aspirations and fear for
their economic future, was the fundamental cause of the outbreak' .IOS The report advised that
If it be accepted that the conversion of large sections of those who are now cultivators
of the soil into a landless class be, as we think, not only undesirable in itself, but also
a potential source of disturbance, it is clear that further protection of the position of
the present cultivators and some restriction on the alienation ofland are inevitable.l'"
The publication of the report caused 'a furore' amongst the Zionist movement, but its
findings reinforced colonial officials' understanding of the need to try and re-balance their
priorities under trusteeship; not least because they evoked anxieties about the proliferation of
a discontented class of landless Arabs that could further threaten the stability of British
rule.107
At this point, the prime minister, Ramsay MacDonald, became involved in the
decision-making process to try and minimise the impact on his minority government. After
the colonial secretary met the prime minister, Passfield wrote to Chancellor explaining that,
whilst they could not contemplate changing the mandate, they were ready 'to consider
practical reforms in such matters as protection of agriculturalists' .108 Itwas proposed that
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some temporary legislation be enacted to strengthen the Protection of Cultivators Ordinance
to allow the mandatory administration to prohibit land sales that would dispossess Arab
cultivators while Sir John Hope-Simpson was carrying out his 'scientific' investigation into
the findings of the Shaw Commission.l'" Chancellor prepared a Transfer of Agricultural Land
Bill, which would replace the practice of paying monetary compensation by restoring the
concept of minimum subsistence areas. Itwould also make all land transactions over 1,000
dunams conditional upon the high commissioner's consent, and give tenants the ability to
challenge unfair increases in rent designed to force them to vacate land. These reforms were
not particularly radical- they were actually just reviving aspects of the previous Land
Transfer Ordinances - but the bill was never promulgated. Ito The Colonial Office explained
that it was caught between 'local requirements' and the prospect of further 'bitter
controversy' with the Zionist movement in London, which was sensitive to any legislative
change after the publication of the Shaw Commission report. Ramsay MacDonald was
reluctant to force the matter with the House of Commons because he feared it might bring
down his minority government. I II In the end, domestic political considerations influenced
short-term action and prevented any temporary laws from being passed, but the Colonial
Office acknowledged that 'on the merits it is difficult to see what valid objections the Jews
could raise to legislation of the kind proposed. ' 112 In the longer-term, though, it is important
to note that the core ideas contained in Chancellor's bill were neither discredited nor
abandoned, and they formed the basis of future legislation in 1933.
Hope-Simpson's report, delivered in October 1930, built on the conclusions reached
by the Shaw Commission. He stated that the mandatory administration had a clear duty in
relation to the problem of dispossession: 'an active policy of agricultural development,
having as its object close settlement on the land and its intensive cultivation by both Arabs
and Jews,.113 This 'active policy' addressed both the developmental and protective
obligations of trusteeship, but its three central elements were designed to promote a more
even alignment between the two: the establishment of a development commission, an
investigation into the landless problem to discover how many Arabs had been displaced and
where they might be settled, and the introduction of legislation to create occupancy rights that
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would prevent tenants from becoming ejected. 114Whilst this policy was being implemented,
it was envisaged - to the consternation of the Zionist movement - that transfers of land would
only be permitted if they did not interfere with the plans of the authority responsible for
development.
In private, Hope-Simpson wrote to Passfield to explain that he felt Britain was in
serious danger of failing to carry out the terms of the mandate if it did not do more to protect
the native population in Palestine. The absence of a sustained plan for land improvement by
the mandatory administration had now 'produced a serious state of affairs among the
fellahin', which had been made acute by the pressures of Zionist settlement. These remarks
constituted another call to strengthen the protective aspect of trusteeship in order to preserve
the British conception of Arab interests. I IS Hope-Simpson explained that this was because
Palestine, at the moment, is a land with two main sections of the population. On the
one hand, the Arab, in a large majority, chiefly an agricultural population, primitive in
cultural practice, intelligent enough and most desirous to learn, but ignorant and
devoid of the capital which is necessary for agricultural development. On the other
hand, we have the Jew, intelligent, educated, forceful, with every advantage of ample
capital and expert advice, and who, whatever his leaders may say for public
consumption, is entirely unmoved by any consideration of what suffering may be
inflicted on the Arab by the Jewish determination to create a Jewish State in
Palestine.!"
These binary images were, of course, crucial in shaping colonial attitudes in Palestine. The
cultural 'primitiveness' of the Arab population tended to evoke paternalism; Hope-Simpson
explained that 'the helplessness of the fellah appeals to the British official with whom he
comes in touch'. Yet the 'intelligent, educated, and forceful' Jew produced a feeling of
ambivalence in British-Zionist relations, which was atypical of most colonial situations.
Indeed, Hope-Simpson suggested that 'the offensive self-assertion of the Jewish immigrant
is, on the other hand, repellent' ,117 It is important to note how categorical thinking like this,
which was derived from Orientalism, provided the underlying context for Hope-Simpson's
recommendations: the 'ignorance' of the Arab population meant that colonial officials' duty
to 'instruct' it in universal values, such as liberalism, rationalism, and utilitarianism,
remained intact; but it was now necessary for the mandatory administration to 'protect' the
114 Ibid, pp.143-9.




Arabs from the Jews who were using their 'ample capital and expert advice' to exploit the
transmission of these values for their own ends: the creation of a Jewish state.
Regardless of the domestic political context, the British government could not, in the
long-term, ignore the findings of both the Shaw Commission and Sir John Hope-Simpson on
the extent of land available for cultivation. The Passfield White Paper was published shortly
after the Hope-Simpson report and stated that previous estimates that Palestine contained a
total cultivable area of between 10 and 11 million dunams were too optimistic: the total was
actually nearer to 6.5 million dunams. It was thought that for an Arab cultivator to maintain
his family to a decent standard on unirrigated land about 8 million dunams of cultivable land
would be required, which reinforced the assertion that for future Zionist settlement to take
place a policy of intensive development would be needed. 118 It also estimated that of the
86,980 rural Arab families nearly 30 per cent were 'landless', although it was not known how
many of those had been dispossessed as a consequence of Zionist land purchases. As will be
seen in the next section, this would be an important point for the investigation into Arab
landlessness, as the mandatory administration decided to help only those that had been
directly displaced by Zionist settlement. Inview of this, it was suggested that any state land
that was unoccupied would have to be held back for the purpose of resettlement.
The White Paper endorsed the 'active' policy that Hope-Simpson had called for and
explained that
It will be the endeavour of His Majesty's Government, not only by the present
statement of policy but by the administrative actions which will result from it, to
convince both Jews and Arabs of their firm intention to promote the essential interests
of both races to the utmost of their power, and to work consistently for the
development, in Palestine, of a prosperous community, living in peace under an
impartial and progressive Administration.li''
This was far from advocating the termination of Jewish growth in Palestine or the withdrawal
of British support for Zionism. The White Paper referred to the benefits that Jewish
settlement brought to Palestine, stating that
It would be unjust to accept the contention, which has been advanced in the course of
the controversy regarding relations between Jews and Arabs in Palestine, that the
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effect of Jewish settlement ugon the Arab population has in all cases been detrimental
to the interests of the Arabs. 20
It continued:
It is for this reason fortunate that the Jewish organisations are in possession of a large
reserve of land not yet settled or developed. Their operations can continue without
break, while more general steps of development, in the benefits of which Jews and
Arabs can both share, are being worked OUt.121
In September 1930, the Cabinet Committee on Palestine reported that Zionist reserves of land
in Palestine constituted about 125,000 acres, which it estimated would be enough to meet
Jewish settlement requirements for the next five years without displacing any Arab
cultivators.122 Whilst these measures may have implied some potential restriction on Zionist
growth in the future, they should not be seen as a radical departure from established policy
that completely prevented further Jewish settlement in Palestine.
The letter sent from MacDonald to Weizmann in February 1931 has traditionally been
viewed as a document that 'cancelled' the Passfield White Paper and restored British policy
to the status quo ante.123 This interpretation relies on a belief that the Passfield White Paper
sought to fundamentally remove British support for Zionism in Palestine, which, as has been
shown, it did not. It was a conciliatory document, so it is unsurprising that its tone sought to
allay some of the Zionist movement's concerns. The letter recognised that 'the constructive
work done by the Jewish people in Palestine has had beneficial effects on the development
and well-being of the country as a whole'. Furthermore, it stated that the obligation to settle
landless Arabs on state land 'in no way detracts from the larger purposes of development,
which His Majesty's Government regards as the most effectual means of furthering the
establishment of a National Home for the Jews' and that the White Paper 'did not imply a
prohibition of acquisition of additional land by Jews' .124 These remarks were seen as political
victories by the Zionist movement, but closer scrutiny demonstrates that the letter confirmed
that the substance of Hope-Simpson's recommendations would be carried forward. It
explained that 'in framing a policy ofland settlement, it is essential that His Majesty's
Government should take into consideration every circumstance that is relevant to the main
purposes of the Mandate', which was an oblique acknowledgment of the need to re-align the
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balance between the developmental and protective aspects of trusteeship by giving more
protection against dispossession to Arab cultivators. It confirmed that a development plan
was needed to bring new areas into cultivation that would secure a better standard of living
for Arab peasants; that there would be an inquiry into landless Arabs; that the authority
responsible for carrying out that development would be given 'regulative' controls over land
transactions; and that the high commissioner would have 'full powers to take all steps
necessary to protect the tenancy and occupancy rights ... throughout Palestine'. These
measures represented the culmination ofa process that began in the aftermath of the 1929
riots after which Britain gave a significant degree of thought to how it could ensure that it
was discharging its obligations under trusteeship to protect both Arab and Jewish interests.
The Development Department, the Landless Arab Inquiry, and the Protection of
Cultivators, 1931-1933
InJuly 1931, the British government elaborated on the 'active' policy of development it had
in mind for Palestine. To oversee its implementation, it confirmed that Hope-Simpson's
recommendation for the creation of a development department within the mandatory
administration that was to report directly to the high commissioner and assume responsibility
for all land survey, settlement, and development operations in Palestine would be carried out.
The development of agricultural land and the re-settlement of displaced Arabs were to be
complementary operations. The director ofthe new department, Lewis French, delivered his
first report in December 1931. It focused predominantly on long-term solutions to the
problems of Arab dispossession, stating that five preconditions were necessary before a
concerted scheme for development could be carried out: the acceleration of survey
operations; the continued partition of musha; the establishment of a land administration
agency; government control of land intended for development; and government control of
water supplies in those areas.125 Once these conditions were in place, the mandatory
administration could start to acquire land from Arab cultivators, develop it for intensive
agriculture, and then hand back smaller, more productive parcels so that landless Arabs could
be re-settled on the surplus areas. French's preconditions were designed to create 'durability'
in land tenure and prevent further landlessness, as well as address existing problems.126
125 Lewis French, 'First Report on Agricultural Development and Land Settlement in Palestine', 23 December
1931, CO 733/214/5, pp.1-19.
126 Stein, The Land Question in Palestine, p.164.
141
The proposals for agricultural development were centred on the extension of irrigation
throughout Palestine to transform the 'traditional' dry farming methods of the Arab
peasantry.127 Such development would be costly: the Cabinet Committee in September 1930
considered one scheme for £7 million and another for £3.1 million, before deciding on Hope-
Simpson's plan for £2.5 million.128 This was designed to settle 10,000 dispossessed Arab
families over a period of ten years. The funding for the development department was to be
made available via a loan from the British government. However, in the summer of 1931 the
allocation of this money was 'postponed' amidst concerns over the stability of the pound,
which had fallen in value by more than a quarter after it had been taken off the gold standard
in September.P" Instead, French was to be handed an initial budget of £50,000 to formulate
his plan, and begin development operations and the re-settlement of landless Arabs. Given
the ambitious nature of the development plans, this was a meagre amount of money with
which to achieve its aims. Financial constraints, therefore, had a significant effect in limiting
the development department's activities and were ultimately responsible for the mandatory
administration's failure to successfully re-align the 'laissez-faire' aspect of trusteeship that
promoted development with the paternal element that obliged colonial officials to protect the
standing of native Arab cultivators.
The reduction of the department's budget meant that French's long-term proposals
were unwelcome in the Colonial Office. The colonial secretary epitomised the position taken
in London:
Taking a long view and given time and money French's prerequisites may be
desirable ideals at which to aim with a view to the attainment of a maximum of
prosperity and of efficiency in administration ... At the moment what is wanted is
concrete proposals for (a) the resettlement of displaced Arabs and (b) development
with a view to Jewish colonisation both to be on the smallest scale compatible with
the attainment of useful results as an immediate palliative of grievances, and must be
had regard to the probability that the funds which in the near future can be made
available will be greatly reduced.P''
The worldwide deterioration of economic conditions during the early 1930s provide a clear
example of how financial constraints imposed from the exchequer in London could take
priority over the needs derived from British trusteeship over Palestine. The long-term nature
of French's proposals was not the only unwelcome aspect of his first report, which had
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claimed that Zionist settlement in Palestine had been 'nationalising' land contrary to Article
Six of the mandate. He expressed fears that the Zionist movement was planning to divert
water resources in the Beisan district, in an attempt to displace the Arab cultivators settled
there. French was also critical of Arab landowners, suggesting that 'capitalist' effendis had
been responsible for evicting Arabs in the hill districts of Palestine to speculate on land and
sell it for Jewish settlement.
French's reports examined the main causes of Arab displacement with great precision:
Jewish demand for land had continuously driven up prices over the decade, which had made
sales increasingly profitable for Arab landlords who procured further land from the Arab
peasantry, evicted whoever was cultivating it, and then sold it on for a profit to the Zionist
land purchasing agencies. However, whilst such conclusions had formed the underlying
context of the Shaw Commission, the Hope-Simpson Report and the Passfield White Paper,
French's report was deemed too inflammatory and explicit in its denunciation of both Arabs
and Jews. Cunliffe-Lister, the colonial secretary, advised Wauchope that he should ask
French to resubmit his first report, omitting or modifying the passages 'which might give
offence'. )3) French's proposals would have constituted a significant intervention against the
liberalising approach to land transactions. It is clear that French was more heavily influenced
by obligations to protect Arab cultivators from dispossession. Yet this approach, with the
development department assuming control of all land transactions, came up against the vested
interests of the both the Jewish Agency and Arab notables who had been able to take
advantage of a relatively unencumbered land market.' 32 The Colonial Office was reluctant to
engage in further political controversies after the experiences of 1929-31, particularly as the
idea conflicted with its developmental strand of thinking.
The lack of enthusiasm for an expensive, long-term development project was not only
justified on the basis of concerns about the instability of the world economy. The underlying
constraints of the financial context served to structure the investigation into landlessness in a
manner that removed the urgency that had surrounded the problem after the Western Wall
riots. Given the fact that there was a very limited amount of unoccupied state land that might
be used, it was mooted that the project would inevitably involve land purchases and might
even require the expropriation of uncultivated land. This created a fear amongst the Zionist
movement that its undeveloped land would be targeted for this purpose and so it set about
131 Ibid.
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confining the scope of the landless problem. British and Zionist interests therefore converged
in ensuring that very few Arabs found themselves officially classified as 'landless'. The
wording of the Black Letter constituted the framework for the investigation: it explained that
a 'landless' Arab would be defined as
Such Arabs as can be shown to have been displaced from the lands which they
occupied in consequence of the lands passing into Jewish hands, and who have not
obtained other holdings on which they can establish themselves or other equally
satisfactory occupation.V''
This wording was important for two reasons: firstly, Arab cultivators were usually evicted
from the land before it was sold, which meant the land passed vacant into Jewish hands and
therefore was not covered by the definition; and secondly, many Arabs who were displaced
moved to urban centres for employment, which provided a growing source of jobs as Jewish
immigration increased during the 1930s, meaning they could be described as having found a
'satisfactory occupation'.
Once its budget had been reduced, the Jewish Agency decided that it had nothing to
gain from co-operating with the development department. In political terms, it only stood to
lose if the landless investigation concluded that Jewish settlement was the sole factor driving
dispossession. The Jewish Agency pressured the mandatory administration to make sure that
whoever was appointed as the legal assessor to the development department would adhere to
the narrow definition embodied in the MacDonald letter. However, because of its record-
keeping on land purchases, the Jewish Agency was also able to playa direct role in the
assessment of claims. The mandatory administration was forced into this position because of
the incomplete state of land registration and its belief that verbal evidence submitted by Arab
claimants would be unreliable. The extent to which this influence was used in a malign way
is unknown. The process for deciding a claim involved initial scrutiny by the legal assessor,
who would then decide whether it warranted checking against the records of the Jewish
Agency.134 Initially, the Cabinet Committee on Palestine had postulated that 10,000 Arab
families would be re-settled but, in the end, only 899 were added to the landless register; by
the outbreak of the Arab rebellion in 1936,just 74 had been re-settled on land provided by the
development department.
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With the scheme for intensive development 'postponed' and the investigation into
landless Arabs completed in a politically expedient manner, all that remained for the
development department to do was to propose legislative measures to protect Arab cultivators
from further dispossession. The intention had been to give the development department
centralised control of all land transactions but, without the development scheme in place,
there was little justification for introducing such sweeping controls. After being asked to
resubmit his report, French's supplementary report was delivered in April 1932. It followed
the Colonial Office's guidance to concentrate on measures that were inexpensive and could
be introduced at short notice. French suggested that 'for the future the truth that prevention is
better than cure should be held up as the guiding principle', which would preclude the need
for 'heavy expenditure' in the long_term.135 The draft proposals for legislation encompassed
two measures: a Homestead Protection Ordinance and an Occupancy Tenants Ordinance.i"
The first was designed to prevent small owner-occupiers from selling minimum subsistence
areas. French justified this principle of 'inalienability' by contrasting it against the practice of
the Jewish National Fund when it 'nationalised' the land it purchased and the legal provisions
that existed for waqfreligious endowments. Yet the Colonial Office - ever mindful of the
economic benefits that it thought a liberal and efficient land market could create - was
apprehensive of restricting the individual right to dispose of land. Cunliffe-Lister explained
that 'no legislation should at present be passed preventing the owner-occupier from disposing
of his land ... [as it] would be difficult to justify such an interference with the right of
landowners to dispose of their property' .137 Bunton described such meddling as 'the Rubicon
that the Colonial Office ... was desperately trying to avoid crossing', which meant that British
efforts became directed at permanently bolstering the position of tenant cultivators.!"
Despite the limited number of Arab families placed on the landless register, the
Colonial Office was still cautious about exacerbating the problems of dispossession and the
effect on public order that it might have. In his second legislative proposal, French suggested
that tenants should be given occupancy rights that built on the recommendations made by
Chancellor in January 1930. However, French was removed from his position in May 1932
after leaking a summary of his two reports to a New York Times correspondent. The British
government had been hoping to keep French's reports unpublished, but after learning of this
13S Lewis French, 'Supplementary Report on Agricultural Development and Land Settlement in Palestine', 20
April 1932, CO 733/214/8, pAS.
13 Ibid, p.49.
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'leak', Wauchope was forced to relieve him of his duties.139 It took until November to
appoint a successor to French, but the major points of his second proposal were brought
forward in the 1933 Protection of Cultivators Ordinance. This law stipulated that a tenant
could gain occupancy rights through the cultivation of land, which lessened the need for a
formal agreement, and that as long as tenants were making the land productive, a landlord
would have to relocate any tenants before he wished to sell or give them substantial notice
and compensation at a rate fixed by the mandatory administration.l'"
The promulgation of the 1933 Protection of Cultivators Ordinance marked the final
British attempt at trying to re-align the balance between encouraging economic development
through the facilitation of a land market and protecting the standing of the native population.
By 1933, the economic situation in Palestine had begun to change as a consequence of the
increasing rate of Jewish immigration. On the one hand, the mandatory administration was
reluctant to impede any potential growth by unnecessarily preventing land transfers; but, on
the other, there were also expanding opportunities for urban employment that could help to
provide jobs to landless Arabs. However, much of the rural Arab peasantry remained in a
state of indebtedness. Those that managed to hold on to their land witnessed the economic
output of agriculture fall dramatically during the early 1930s as bad harvests decimated yields
and cheaper imports served to drive down prices. The alleviation of problems like these, as
will be demonstrated in the next section, was a fundamental purpose of British land reform in
Palestine.
Credit, Taxation, and Rural Indebtedness
Despite the failed plan for intensive agricultural development, the mandatory administration
was not indifferent to the problems of Arab poverty. The Palestine government tried to
address the causes of Arab indebtedness by reforming the systems of credit and taxation, but
only within its overarching liberal, rational, and utilitarian views on how to create economic
growth. The other elements of land reform, such as land settlement, the efficient use of state
land, and the facilitation of property transactions, were all aimed at stimulating a general
economic revival so that credit could be made cheaper and more accessible and that taxes
139 Stein, The Land Question in Palestine, p.I70.
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would become less punitive and encourage individual endeavour.!" These changes would
gradually allow the Arab cultivator to 'escape' from his chronic state ofindebteciness, and
give him the means with which to invest in his own land.142In 1930, Hope-Simpson
estimated that the average debt per Arab family was £27, close to its annual income, with
interest being charged at a staggering rate of around 30 per cent per annum.143Effective
reform was hindered by colonial priorities. For example, taxation was an important source of
revenue for the mandatory administration and as Palestine was expected to 'pay its own way',
the government was reluctant to alter 'traditional' practices that made tax collection more
expedient yet were often viewed as standing in the way of development. The mandatory
administration was also disinclined to sponsor an agricultural loans bank as it believed that its
position as creditor could lead to unfortunate political consequences if it had to enforce
collection on defaulted loans. In the end, conflicting priorities like this meant that British rule
did little to alleviate the poverty of many Arab cultivators before the outbreak of rebellion in
1936.
The importance of agriculture to Palestine's economy has already been stated.
Dowson explained in his first report of November 1925 that it was 'by universal admission in
a very unhealthy state,.144 His diagnosis was that the whole industry was heavily overtaxed
by an archaic and complex system: a fundamental legacy of Ottoman misrule that the
mandatory administration needed to transform under the obligations imposed on it by
trusteeship. The main form of agricultural tax was the tithe, which consisted of a percentage
of the crop given to the state in the form of a cash payment. One of Samuel's final acts was to
request permission from the Colonial Office to reduce the tithe from 12.5 per cent to 10 per
cent, which it reluctantly accepted as a sign of goodwill. 145The major problems of the tithe
were that the incomplete land registers meant that valuations varied from place to place; that
around eight per cent of the revenue collected had to be spent on assessment; and, perhaps
most importantly, that by assessing the tithe on the village's threshing floor, it taxed not only
the actual product but ignored the costs of production as the crop still had to be transported to
141 See, for example, E. Sawer, 'Review of the Agricultural Situation in Palestine'. 16 March 1922, CO 733/46,
pp.l-12; 'Report of the Tithes Commission', 27 February 1922, CO 733/20, p.119; Dowson, 'Progress in Land
Reforms, 1923-30', November 1930, CO 733/221/4, pp.4-6.
142 Dowson, 'Covering Memorandum', pp.4-5; C.F. Strickland, 'Report on the Possibility ofIntroducing a
~ystem of ~gricultural Co-Operation in Palestine', 21 August 1930, CO 323/1071114, pp.1-2.
1 3 Hope-SImpson, 'Report on Immigration, Land Settlement, and Development', pp.67-8.1:Dowson, 'Notes on Land-Tax, Cadastral Survey and Land Settlement in Palestine', p.4.
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market and sold.146 Other taxes on agriculture included the aghnam, a tax on livestock, and
the werku, a 'house-and-land tax', which was notoriously inaccurate because there was no
reliable record of its distribution and little re-assessment had been carried out by the Ottoman
government.l'"
These forms of taxation were far too complex and unwieldy for colonial officials who
favoured a rational system based upon a reliable record of tax liabilities. As Bunton has
explained, it was often the case that a colony'S main source of taxable wealth was the land
itself. Usual practice was to base a colony'S revenue capacity on an efficient system ofland
registration.l'" This was aimed at making the tax burden more manageable for the local
population, but another dimension of this preference for 'rationalisation' was to facilitate
colonial rule. The more 'knowledge' that the colonial state could gather, the easier it was to
exert power on a subject population; in this case by increasing its ability to tax the local
population. The overriding aim of British reform was to replace the various taxes it inherited
with a single tax for agricultural land. However, until a comprehensive programme ofland
settlement had been carried out, the mandatory administration was forced to perpetuate the
Ottoman taxes to ensure a steady stream of revenue, regardless of their deficiencies.P"
In the interim, the Palestine government attempted to lessen the burden imposed by
the existing system. In 1927, the tithe was commuted so that the assessment was fixed on a
four year basis. ISO This would provide the cultivator with a reason to try and improve his
land; it encouraged higher yields that would not be subject to tax. lSI The idea of creating a
financial incentive can be seen as a prime example of Dowson's policy of 'stimulating' the
population to help improve the agricultural economy. However, it was acknowledged that
fixing the tithe formed 'an untrustworthy character' as the basis of village taxation because it
failed to accommodate changes in the value of agricultural production. IS2 When agricultural
prices crashed in the wake of the 1929 world depression, cultivators in Palestine were
particularly badly hit with prices declining in some instances by a half. This forced the
146 Colonial Office Minute, 23 May 1924, CO 733/68; Bunton, Colonial Land Policies in Palestine, p.143.
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mandatory administration to remit significant proportions of the tithe to help Arab cultivators
survive.P!
The commuted tithe was only ever regarded as a provisional measure until something
else could be put into place. In the short-term, it was 'justified by its success in removing the
grosser evils of tithe collection'v'<' Dowson was instrumental in making amendments to the
commuted tithe that resulted in the creation of a rural property tax that came into force in
1936. Itwas heavily influenced by his general preferences for land reform: rational and
utilitarian to ease the plight of indebted cultivators by creating a consistent tax that would
allow for long-term planning. Dowson suggested that the principle of taxation should be
based on gross agricultural production; not on the possession ofland.lss His solution was the
creation of a single 'block land tax' where land was classified in blocks of approximately
uniform quality, graded on a scale according to productivity, and then taxed accordingly. This
would create a consistent approach to help improve agricultural yields, but was also fairer
because it ensured that tax liabilities were governed by an ability to pay.IS6 These dual
aspects provide another example of how the developmental and protective elements of
trusteeship informed the mandatory administration's approach to land reform.
An important aspect of the rural property tax was its reliance on 'traditional'
structures and practices. Despite the fact that colonial officials held the institution of musha
in universal disregard as an obstacle to agricultural and economic progress, the block
assessment of land was compatible with this communal system where Arab cultivators were
constantly grading the quality of land for the purposes of re-distribution. The widespread
prevalence of musha faciliated a swift fiscal survey for the purposes of implementing the new
tax, and in villages where land was no longer held as musha it was thought the practice would
be largely familiar to the inhabitants. The reliance on musha for the purposes of rural taxation
can therefore be seen as indicative of a wider trend in taxation policy. As Bunton has
suggested, 'the desired expediency in the collection of as much tax as possible, in such a way
moreover that did not unduly disrupt the stability of social structures ... outweighed the stated
ideals regarding property rights,.157 Despite colonial rhetoric about the need to reform native
Structures, when these structures could be used to help increase the efficiency and expediency
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of taxation they were widely seen as useful, which is a good example of the competing
priorities between advancing trusteeship and maintaining the colonial power base.
If the burdensome and uneven state of taxation in mandatory Palestine could be
regarded as offering little scope to escape from indebtedness across the period, then the lack
of credit facilities exacerbated the problem, especially after the general fall in agricultural
prices after the First World War as Palestine became increasingly sensitive to fluctuations in
the world economy.P" As credit facilities dried up during the course of the 1920s, Arab
cultivators were increasingly forced to tum to moneylenders who charged high rates of
interest. The subsequent rise in land prices made it tempting to sell off land to payoff debts
or taxes, which exacerbated political problems of dispossession and landlessness.
Despite the recognised need for credit facilities, the military administration decided to
liquidate the main institution through which agricultural credit was delivered under the
Ottoman regime, the Ottoman Agricultural Bank, as its funds were removed and records
disrupted during the war.IS9 The administration continued to collect the portion of the tithe _
around £76,500 - that funded the agricultural bank, but chose to pay it into the general
revenues of the administration. Following the disruption of the war, the military
administration arranged a deal with the Anglo-Egyptian Bank to advance small loans to it
which could then be distributed to cultivators in desperate need of seed, live-stock, and
essential agricultural implements. The civil administration, whilst recognising a 'moral
obligation' to advance some means of agricultural credit, continued this temporary measure
only until 1923.160At the time it was argued that such loans were only to be suspended whilst
the government investigated setting up an agricultural mortgage bank.161The proposed bank
did not materialise in the 1920s due to lack of funding, which provides another example of
how financial constraints could limit the scope of activities called for under the obligations of
trusteeship.162
Regardless of funding, a cautious Colonial Office envisaged that any bank would
need government sponsorship and that this would leave it in a difficult position. One official
minuted that:
1S8 Smith, TheRoots of Separatism in Palestine, pp.14-S.
1S9 See, for example, 'Report of the Land Commission', p.29; or Dowson, 'Report on the Land System in
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Political pressure on Government to increase advances and be lenient about security
and repayment is always brought to bear eventually. At times of agricultural crisis
when Government would be most in need of funds it might be impossible to recover
principal or interest. Foreclosure on mortgages would lead to further slump in values.
Colony would then be left to meet debt charges from general revenue.l'"
There was, however, slightly more to this reasoning than not wanting to assume
responsibility for the debt charges. It was also influenced by the precepts of trusteeship in that
a government-sponsored bank might sacrifice long-term economic efficiency for short-term
political expediency. Itwas acknowledged that the incomplete process of land settlement
would hamper the issue of loans, as security of title was regarded as a vital pre-requisite and
the incomplete process of settlement would mean credit would be available to some but not
all.164
After the riots of 1929, the question of credit was once again raised and linked to the
overall problem of dispossession that had gained much political attention. In his report,
Hope-Simpson proposed the creation of co-operative credit societies as an essential
preliminary to the development of Arab cultivation.l'" C.F. Strickland, an expert from the
Indian Civil Service, was engaged to advise the mandatory administration on this possibility.
His report echoed Colonial Office sentiments about the undesirability of an agricultural bank
and advanced the further argument that a private financial institution would be unsuitable as a
board of commercial directors could not 'exercise that continuous supervision or possess that
detailed knowledge, which the temperament of the Arab borrower renders desirable' .166
Strickland's recommendations on how to improve the indebted state of the Arab cultivators
were clearly in line with ideas of trusteeship, but they were also predicated heavily on
Orientalist notions of the Arab' character': particularly its 'weakness', 'instability', and
'fatality':
The difficulty will be the character of the Arab peasant. So long as his outlook on life
is hopeless and his attitude towards his fellow villagers is one of suspicion, he will
seldom be loyal to a marketing association ... Stability of character is a plant of slow
growth, but without it there is no hope of freeing the peasant permanently from the
debt which he has learned to regard as inevitable.l'"
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Paternal ideas of 'forming' the Arab character to develop this 'stability' were to be one of the
main benefits of the co-operative society:
The first essential therefore for the organisation of the Arab fellah is to provide him
with current resources through a cooperative credit society, leaving the clearance of
his major debt to a later time, to form his character slowly in such a society during a
term of years, train him to watch his expenditure and submit it to the criticism of his
fellow members, to be punctual in payment, and to be loyal to his society rather than
to those creditors who are the cause of his afflictions.168
Alongside the more visible transmission of 'universal' property values, the modification of
'character' along these lines can be seen as an integral part of the British tutelage under the
ethos of trusteeship.
There were other benefits to co-operative credit societies than addressing the flaws in
the Arab 'character' that particularly appealed to the Colonial Office. They would not be
particularly expensive to establish as they would deal in short-term credit raised through the
societies themselves, with a minimal initial injection of capital from the mandatory
administration. They would also have the advantage of not requiring security of title as the
basis of an agreement would be on local knowledge of 'character' within the societies
themselves. Strickland argued that co-operative societies were one of the primary methods by
which an 'Asiatic country' could successfully absorb the 'European influences' of the
mandatory administration.l'" As an institution, he argued, it had been tested in parts of Africa
and India; its success in those places was reflected in the eventual ordinance of 1933, which
contained provisions from the legal systems of Madras, Bombay, Tanganyika, and Burma.170
Where Palestine differed was that the native population required 'direction' in the institution
by a registrar who would promote and organise the societies; another instance of trusteeship
being exercised through the tutelage of British colonial officials. Itwas also acknowledged
that several successful Jewish co-operative societies were in existence that were 'vigorous
and very creditable', demonstrating that the Jewish community enjoyed far more substantial
access to agricultural credit, and its advantages, than the Arab community. In line with
cultural perceptions of the Zionist community as well-versed in European traditions and
168 Ibid.
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consequently more advanced, their societies were held to be sufficiently proficient as to
require no guidance from the mandatory administration.!"
Despite a belief in the necessity of co-operative credit societies - Strickland described
them as 'the only chance of getting a more contented and peaceful atmosphere amongst the
Arabs,I72 - the initial reaction to them was tentative at best. The Registrar reported in 1933
that fourteen societies had been organised, but that he required more manpower, stressing
'the necessity for constant and prolonged education, inspiration and control in the initial
period of the co-operative movement among backward and largely illiterate Arabs' .173 By
1935 it was reported that 60 societies had been established that had been useful in mitigating
debt, but the limited take up must be seen as an indicator of the continued limited nature of
credit facilities under the mandate and the wider British failure to alleviate problems of Arab
poverty.
Conclusion
The overarching aim of British land reform in Palestine was to introduce liberal and rational
changes in pursuit of the utilitarian goal of increasing economic productivity and raising
prosperity. Yet British reform between 1920 and 1936 had limited success in achieving these
goals. The most significant impact of British land policy was that it created the framework in
which the Zionist movement could legally acquire land for the national home. However, this
was never the primary aim of the mandatory administration, nor did it provide the
justification for the changes Britain made to the land system. One of the key measures was
the creation of an efficient land market to facilitate transactions that put uncultivated land into
more productive hands. In his study on colonial land policy, Bunton explained that this was
part of a wider attempt to increase the importance of private property. This approach was
predicated on the belief that a comprehensive register of accurately recorded individual rights
would create security of tenure, which would not only make land transactions more expedient
but also serve as the precursor to investment in the land.
The consequence of this was that it made property easier to sell and therefore
contributed to the growing problem of Arab displacement. The mandatory administration was
able to ignore the fact that its legislation designed to offer protection to tenants had failed
:~~Strickland, 'Memorandum on the Co-Operative Societies Ordinance', 15 March 1933, CO 733/23317.
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because vested interests on all sides were largely in favour of a less regulated land market:
Arab landowners could take advantage of rising prices; tenant cultivators were offered, in
their eyes, large amounts of compensation to vacate land; and the Zionist movement needed
an agricultural base to establish the national home. By contrast, the approach to state land
was more weighted in favour of protecting Arab interests. The political context was the
overriding issue here as colonial officials did not want to be seen to be driving Arabs from
state land to make way for Jewish settlers. The original intention had been that the Zionist
movement would be given surplus state land that required development where this was
beyond the capability of the local population, although the Arab community proved itself able
to exploit the fragmented system and British concerns to stake their claim to the majority of
the 'good' state land.
The dramatic outbreak of violence at the Wailing Wall in August 1929 forced
officials to confront the reality that the Jewish national home had grown to such an extent that
further expansion would have a deleterious effect in the form of further Arab displacement.
This became a major concern for Britain as it feared the creation of a sizable class of
discontented Arabs who might rebel against the colonial state. This drove the Colonial Office
to re-align the balance between the developmental aspect of trusteeship, which sought to
promote economic growth through liberal and rational land reforms, and the protective
element, which attempted to mitigate any negative impact of those reforms on the position of
the native population. This in itself was not a radical departure from previous policy. The
1922 White Paper had explained that Britain held a dual obligation towards Palestine and that
the expansion of the national home could not come at the expense of the Arab population.
At the time, Lord Passfield argued that 'there has been a good deal of propaganda
hostile to His Majesty's Government tending to misrepresent their actions' .174 This
misrepresentation has been carried forward into the historiography of this short period, which
is reflective of the fact that it has been difficult to analyse British policy outside of the
confining, binary forms of either pro-Zionist, anti-Arab or anti-Zionist, pro-Arab
perspectives. The domestic political context certainly influenced the timing and the method in
which these policy announcements were made, yet there was a fairly linear and logical
progression from one to the next. British policymakers remained committed to the national
home, but at the same time they acknowledged that under the obligations imposed by
174 Passfield, Memorandum on Future Policy in Palestine, 10 August 1930, PREM 1/102.
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trusteeship they needed to take greater action to protect the interests of the Arab population
from further dispossession.
The development department that emerged as a result of the attempt to re-align the
two aspects of trusteeship has to be regarded as a failure. This was predominantly because the
British government did not want to commit to such a project at a time when world-wide
financial instability was having an impact on the British economy. Yet this occurred during a
period when Arab agriculture in Palestine was experiencing its own problems; bad harvests
combined with falling prices to make the position of the Arab cultivator even more
precarious. British changes to taxation and credit had little effect in alleviating these
problems and the obligations imposed by trusteeship were constrained by colonial priorities
like maintaining a healthy tax base so the colony could 'pay its own way'. This was a major
reason for the changing dynamic of land sales that saw more small owner-occupiers forced
into selling their land to meet their financial obligations, which, along with rising levels of




During the mandate, control over education was an asset prized by all of the communities in
Palestine. The British preference, derived from their own experiences of the private school
and Oxbridge system, was to uphold an ideal of education that was both politically and
ideologically neutral yet could provide for the development of 'character' and the growth of
civic responsibility. Clearly, these ideals contained a political and ideological consistency of
their own, but they supplied both a method and an underlying case for the transformation of
local structures. For both Jews and Arabs, however, education was always placed in its
political context as a powerful tool for developing national consciousness. In the Zionist case,
the aim was to shape a cohesive 'Hebrew' nation from diverse Jewish immigrants. From the
Palestinian Arab perspective, the schoolroom was a key place to disseminate the values of a
national movement that contested mandatory rule and Zionist settlement in Palestine. The
issue of control was a contentious and highly politicised aspect of mandatory rule. In the
British view, the question was connected to the wider debate about self-government, which
meant that the debate was crucially structured by British cultural preconceptions about the
capability of the Arab and Jewish communities to run their own affairs. The result of this was
that responsibility for the majority of Arab education became vested in the mandatory
administration, which was limited in both content and capacity by British concerns and
priorities, whilst the yishuv was given the scope to construct its own system along political
and national lines with minimal interference from the Palestine government.
Education policy has not featured prominently in the historiography on British rule in
Palestine, in spite of the fact that contemporaneously it was regarded as one of the most
important public services. Given the political significance attributed to it, and the fact that the
ostensible basis of at least half of the mandate was to provide tutelage to an 'immature
people', the comparative lack of attention paid towards what was viewed as a vital issue is
surprising. Apart from the memoirs and studies of those who worked in the Department of
Education 1, the main analyses of education during the mandate have come through short
articles or chapter excerpts but these have not offered a particularly thorough or critical
I See, for examples, Humphrey Bowman, Middle East Window, (London, Longmans, 1942); and A.L. Tibawi,
Arab Education in Mandatory Palestine, (London Luzac and Co., 1956).
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analysis of British education policy.i Major exceptions to this are a chapter by Ylana Miller'
that examines both the cultural and political underpinnings of British views on education in
the rural Arab context and an unpublished PhD thesis by John Harte that explores the role of
history teaching under the mandate."
British officials promoted a narrowly utilitarian view of education. The basic aim of
the government system was to expand access to basic forms of education in order to improve
rates ofliteracy amongst the Arab population and develop agricultural technical and
vocational practices. The mandatory administration was keen to avoid advanced forms of
'literary' education, which meant that the focus on elementary schooling came at the expense
of secondary or higher forms of education as it was believed that the transmission of a
'literary' education would exacerbate trends of migration from the village to the town. Yet
British concerns over security were also a prevalent factor because officials thought that the
proliferation of an educated class would be more likely to become discontented with
mandatory rule and engage in anti-colonial politics. British priorities for education were also
influenced by financial constraints. The major concern for the mandatory administration was
to devote its resources to improving Arab Muslim education. As the Zionist authorities were
deemed capable of controlling and developing their own system of schools, the Palestine
government consistently tried to limit its financial liability for Zionist education so that it
could attempt to meet the growing Arab demand for schooling.
Education connected to the precepts of trusteeship in a fundamentally important
manner. Jerome Farrell, who became deputy director of education in 1927, even went as far
as suggesting that that the provision of education formed the underlying rationale of the entire
mandatory system:
Itmay be argued that a mandatory function is in the broadest sense an educative
function; that the education of an immature people is not merely the training of its
officials in the details of administrative routine but rather the general development of
character, sense of duty and social unity. S
2 For examples, see Shepherd, Ploughing Sand, Ch. 4: 'Patching up Palestine'; Segev, One Palestine, Complete,
pp.258-9, pp.354-8, and pp.389-2; or Rachel Elboim-Dror, 'British Educational Policies in Palestine', Middle
Eastern Studies, Vol. 36, No.2, (ApriI2000), pp.28-47.
: Miller, Government and Society in Rural Palestine, ch. 6.
John Harte, Contesting the Past in Mandate Palestine: History Teaching Jor Palestinian Arabs under British
Rule, 1917-1948, (unpublished PhD thesis; School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London;
2009). .
5
Farrell, Memorandum on the Reports of the Local Government Commission, 21 April 1925, ISA 2/0111273.
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Both the developmental and protective aspects of trusteeship were relevant for the
government education system. Colonial officials held a firm belief in the transformative
power of education, particularly when it came to ideas of 'reshaping' the Arab character. This
would help to prepare the next generation to participate more responsibly in self-government
through the growth of, in Farrell's words, 'a sense of duty and social unity'. Yet British
officials were also keenly aware of the potential that education had for social dislocation. The
popular belief in the Arab community was that education conferred sufficient power to
achieve political aspirations and social mobility but this type of thinking was anathema to
colonial officials who sought to strictly regulate access to and content of it in order to
promote stability and protect the structure of Arab society." The aim of this chapter is to
explore how these priorities combined with trusteeship to shape British thinking on education
in Palestine. To do so, this chapter is divided into three sections: the first will explore the
emergence and development of the government education system; the second will examine
the effect of British control on Arab education; and the third section will chart the
relationship between the mandatory administration and the Zionist education system.
The Development of the Government Education System
Early British efforts at developing a government education system were influenced by the
legacy of Ottoman education, the re-working of the millet system, and the financial
constraints that were placed on the Department of Education. Prior to the British occupation,
there were various types of school in Palestine, including Ottoman state schools, private
Muslim kuttabs that specialised in teaching the Qur'an, Zionist and non-Zionist Jewish
schools, and Christian missionary schools. During the mandate, schools were categorised as
either public or private but there were further sub-divisions along communal lines and the
politicisation of education did much to ensure that schools were fragmented both religiously
and linguistically. The government system catered for the majority Arab Muslim population
by taking over the Ottoman state schools and a large number of the private Muslim schools.
In time, however, the distinction between public and private became increasingly blurred as
the Zionist schools of the 'Hebrew' system became recognised as public in return for a
greater share of government funding. Through the early years of the mandate, these
educational arrangements developed on an ad hoc basis until a bill to formalise the situation
6 Miller, Government and Society in Rural Palestine, p.97. See also Farrell to Bowman, 21 Apri1192S, ISA
2/0/1/273; Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 9 April 1932, CO 733/224/11; Bowman, Middle East Window, pp.2S1-
4.
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was put forward in late 1927. This section will chart the emergence of this communal system
of education and explore the contentious issue of control in the government school system.
The modem Ottoman system of education emerged in 1869 during the Tanzimat
reform period. Itwas based on the French model of elementary, secondary, and higher stages
but, apart from provincial centres like Jerusalem, it made slow progress into the remote,
outlying parts of the empire. The few state run schools that existed were concentrated in
major towns and taught through the medium of Turkish, which made them undesirable to
many who sought to use the Arabic language as a cornerstone of identity. 7 The education
department of the mandatory administration found these Ottoman schools to be 'ill-
organised' with 'unsatisfactory' methods of teaching that made the schools ineffective and
unpopular with the local population." Of course, as Harte has suggested, the idea of an
educational 'dark age' under the Ottomans was convenient for colonial officials who were
keen to legitimise their own vision." Nevertheless, this idea contributed to a substantive belief
that a 'complete reorganisation' of the inherited Ottoman system was necessary."
The influence of foreign intervention in the holy land, which had been instrumental in
the creation of the millet system, created a significant disparity in the educational
opportunities offered by the Ottoman state and the private schools that existed in Palestine.
After the first and second aliyah, there was a growing network of Zionist and non- Zionist
Jewish schools, like those of the Anglo-Jewish Association and the French Alliance Israelite,
whose aim was to educate the children of the extant yishuv and the newly settled immigrants.
Like Jewish children, most Christians were also provided with some form of instruction by
either their own religious authorities or missionary bodies, both of which had tended to have
links with European powers, which protected them against British interference. This pattern
of inclusion continued well into the mandate: in 1929, for example, there were 191 Christian
schools (nearly half were of the missionary type) that educated 11,917 Christian Arab
pupils. I I In the same year, the government system provided schooling to 18,411 Muslim
Arabs, but the Christian element accounted for just an eighth of the total Arab population.V
Of interest is the fact that nearly 2,000 Muslim Arab pupils attended Christian institutions,
which was probably a reflection of the relative sophistication of the Christian schools and the
7 Khalidi, Palestinian Identity. p.50.
: Department of Education Note on Education in Palestine, 1920-1929, CO 733/168/12, p.4.
Harte, Contesting the Past in Mandate Palestine, p.61.
10 Bowman, Middle East Window, pp.253-4.
:~Depar~ent of Education Note on Education in Palestine, 1920-1929, CO 733/168/12, p.20
Hope-Simpson, 'Report on Immigration, Land Settlement, and Development', pp.24-5.
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limited nature of the government system but could also be taken as an illustration of Muslim-
Christian solidarity in the face of British attempts to use a communal paradigm to control
Arab society.
The need for a comprehensive overhaul of the inherited Ottoman system was
constrained by the finite resources of the mandatory administration. Bowman explained in his
memoir that the first responsibility of his department was to assume control over its 'heritage'
of 'Turkish state schools' and adapt them to 'modem conditions'v ' In theory, these
government schools were open to all communities in Palestine but the fact that instruction
was changed to Arabic and that the syllabus included the teaching of the Qur 'an meant that,
in practice, Jews and Christians rarely entered the government system.i" Itmight be thought
that the education system was an ideal arena in which to nurture some form of Arab-Jewish
co-operation, yet this idea was never seriously considered on a wide scale. William Ormsby-
Gore, as assistant under-secretary of state for the colonies, minuted that whilst an 'avowed
aim was to get Jew and Moslem to work together and develop a Palestinian consciousness',
he understood that 'there would always be duality in Palestine' between them. IS The
difficulties of trying to establish a single joint school highlighted the futility of the exercise
when both communities recognised that education was connected to their national futures. In
the early 1920s, for example, the Colonial Office was bequeathed £100,000 in the will of a
wealthy British Jew of Iraqi origin, Sir Ellis Kadoorie, for the opening of schools in Iraq or
Palestine. Both Samuel and Bowman saw this as an opportunity to establish an institution 'of
fundamental importance in advancing the welfare of the country': a secondary school run on
British-lines, open to Jews and Arabs, where English would be the main language of
instruction.l'' However, they were forced to bow to pressure from Zionist leaders who wanted
separate institutions so that the Hebrew language could unite the Jewish community.!" This
was hardly a surprise, but Sir John Shuckburgh still concluded that the Jewish attitude was
'narrow and unreasonable' .18 Instead, the mandatory government decided to set up two
13 Bowman, Middle East Window, p.254.
14 In 1929, for example, the government system had 72 Jewish and 2,325 Christian pupils. See Department of
Education, 'Note on Education in Palestine, 1920-1929', CO 733/168/12, p.20
IS Minute by Ormsby-Gore, 18 September 1926, CO 733/115.
16 Samuel to Devonshire, 20 April 1923, CO 733/44.
17 Samuel to Devonshire, 21 January 1924, CO 733/63.
18 Shuckburgh to Samuel, 20 February 1924, CO 733/63.
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specialist agricultural schools, one Arab and one Jewish, although officials lamented the
missed opportunity.l"
The establishment of a communal paradigm for education was confirmed when the
mandatory administration decided not to bring the Jewish or Christian schools under the
direct control of the Department of Education. Itwanted to avoid a confrontation with the
various foreign powers and missionary bodies that operated schools in Palestine, whose rights
were later enshrined in Article 15 of the mandate. Financial exigencies were also a significant
aspect of this decision. Bowman explained that 'the Jewish community were jealous of their
rights; and did not readily brook advice, still less administrative interference'. Without giving
the schools 'heavy financial aid', the mandatory administration was 'not in a position to
resist' their independent status. The disparity between what colonial officials viewed as
Muslim education on the one hand and Christian and Jewish education on the other led them
to believe that under the obligations imposed by trusteeship their primary responsibility was
to improve Arab Muslim schooling. The director of education stated that 'it was clearly our
duty to spend where it was most urgently needed. The Jews had considerable funds at their
disposal' .20The mandatory administration therefore opted to perpetuate the autonomy of
'non-government' schools and offer them limited support through an annual grant-in-aid
rather than taking on complete administrative and financial responsibility.
These decisions were underpinned by the cultural preconceptions of British officials.
Bowman, who had experienced the problems of colonial education policy in the Sudan and
Iraq, explained in his memoirs that 'in Palestine, we had the far greater problem of a dual
race; one old-fashioned, conservative and largely illiterate; the other educated, socialistic, and
burning with enthusiasm for all things new.,21 This binary image formed the underlying
premise for most British policy in Palestine, but its effect on education was to centralise
control over the majority of Arab schooling in British hands on the grounds that the Arabs
were not capable of administering their own system. By contrast, the' superiority' of the
yishuv allowed the mandatory administration to give it significant autonomy: Bowman
. explained that it had 'the advantage of an almost wholly literate population; brought up for
~: Bowman, Middle East Window, pp.263-S. See also 'The Kadoorie Bequest', CO 733/129/2.
Bowman, Middle East Window, p.254.
21 Ibid, p.251.
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the most part in Europe or under European traditions, and capable of evolving their own
system of education' .22
The difficulties of handing control to Arabs was highlighting by the distribution of
positions within the Department of Education itself. When discussing a proposed re-
organisation of the office in August 1922, Samuel recognised the desirability of giving one or
two 'high grade posts' to Arab Muslims as part of his general strategy to conciliate local
opinion but insisted that for the foundations of education 'to be well and truly laid' it was
essential that the director and deputy director were' Englishmen' .23 British control over Arab
education was therefore justified through trusteeship as in the Arab interest. This type of
attitude served to hold back the promotion of George Antonius. A Christian Arab who had
held the post of assistant director since 1924, he was educated at Victoria College, Alexandria
and then at King's College, Cambridge; had close connections to various Arab notables; and
believed himself to be Bowman's natural successor. However, in 1927 Jerome Farrell was
promoted over him to the position of deputy director and Antonius was surreptitiously
transferred to the Secretariat whilst he was engaged on diplomatic duties in Egypt and the
Hejaz. Unsurprisingly, he was bitter at this treatment and repeatedly requested to return to his
old department. He was eventually granted his request in October 1929, only to be given a
post that was tantamount to a demotion. Frustrated at the discrimination against him, he
resigned from the mandatory administration in May 1930 and went on to write one of the
classic texts on Arab nationalism, The Arab Awakening, which was published in 1938.24
Throughout the mandate, the main executive positions that controlled the government system,
including director, deputy director, senior education officer, supervisor of technical
education, and senior inspector were always held by British officials.f
Despite a clear delineation between the British controlled government system and
private schools that could exercise autonomy, there was no formal instrument that regulated
this position or the powers of the Department of Education. After the failure of Samuel's
constitutional proposals, a commission was created in December 1923 to consider how local
forms of autonomy could be used to advance self-government. Whilst given a broad remit,
the Local Government Commission focused mainly on education and pushed the question of
22 Ibid, p.254.
23 Samuel to Churchill, 6 August 1922, CO 733/24.
24 The story of George Antonius is told in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, see
http://www.oxforddnb.com/vicw/artic)cI75899. accessed on 31108/2010.
25 See, for example, Department of Education Annual Reports for 1929-30 and 1934-35, CO 814/1 and CO
814/4.
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control to the forefront of the agenda for education policy.26 The commission, under the
chairmanship of Sir Ronald Storrs, was plagued by delays as its members found it hard to
meet regularly and some had to be replacedr" It submitted an interim report in June 1924 that
contained some tentative proposals on health and public works, but devoted most of its
attention to examining how education could be used to meet the demand for local self-
government. Its main idea was to create two groups of separate but identical machinery to
administer both Arab Muslim and Jewish education. It proposed that functions carried out by
the Department of Education, including control over the budget, curriculum, and employment
of teachers, could be devolved to a central education council. Beneath this controlling body
there would be a number of district education councils that would collect local taxes for
education, maintain and provide new school buildings, and carry out regulations passed by
the central council. 28The Department of Education would undertake an advisory role. These
proposals represented the most significant attempt to change the pattern of control over
education into a more equal, unified method of administration for Jews and Arab Muslims,
although significantly the commission did not advocate changing the communal structure on
which the existing system was based.
The idea of establishing a central council to oversee education produced many of the
same dilemmas that had attended the creation of a legislative council, such as the number of
official members, the powers it would have, the safeguards that would be needed, and the
question of whether to elect or nominate the non-official component. The interim report
offered some suggestions on these points: it recommended a nominated, non-official majority
with supervisory powers invested in the high commissioner and director of education.
However, unlike the proposals to establish a legislative council, the report did not offer a
comprehensive evaluation of the benefits and disadvantages involved other than to suggest
that the influence of the official members would be 'very real' and would help to ensure it
was a compliant body that would not embark on a 'settled policy of opposition to the
Government'. The lack of detailed consideration given to the financial aspect of the proposals
was indicative of the hurried nature of the report. It suggested that devolving responsibility
for education could result in a decrease in government expenditure as local bodies could
generate revenue through their own taxation. Without considering the capacity for a heavier
26 Clayton to Thomas, 18 July 1924, CO 733171.
~: Interim Report of the Local Government Commission, 2 June 1924, p.4, CO 733171.
Ibid, pp.23-7.
163
tax burden, the report suggested that the extra strain would be borne 'less grudgingly' by the
population if they knew it was going towards education. 29
The proposals contained in the interim report quickly provoked opposition. As
director of education, it was not surprising that Bowman was against a scheme that would
diminish the position of his own department by devolving its most important functions to a
central council that did not even have an official majority. He argued that, as interest in
schools was heavily localised, the district education councils would constitute an irrelevant
layer of bureaucracy and would require a set of sub-district councils to ensure that the local
population remained interested in the scheme for devolution. He also expressed considerable
doubt as to the local authorities' ability to raise enough money to meet the teachers' wage
bill. Bowman's reservations over a central education council were even stronger: he
questioned whether it would serve 'any good purpose' and doubted that it would be possible
to find suitably qualified members with 'technical' expertise of education - again
demonstrating British beliefs about Arab administrative incapacity. If an elected council for
education had to be created, Bowman recommended that the official members should hold a
majority, and that 'complex' issues like setting the curriculum and the management of
secondary schools should be left in the hands of his department.
The director of education was not, however, completely opposed to some delegation
of responsibility. Itwas simply far less than that envisaged by the Local Government
Commission. Bowman's ideas about the lack of Arab capability and the difficulties of raising
sufficient local taxes to make the commission's proposals feasible led him to suggest an
alternative proposal of creating some local authorities but only devolving 'material services'
to them, which would entail raising local funds for the construction and repair of buildings,
provision offumiture, and the supply of books and equipment for schools in their area.30 In
the Colonial Office, Edward Keith-Roach, who was on secondment from the mandatory
administration, concurred with Bowman's suggestions but framed the view from London in
more explicit and pragmatic terms: the proposals would create a 'cumbrous machine' that
would 'crush' the education department, produce more work for the secretariat by having it
adjudicate the inevitable disputes between the central council and education department, and
29 Ibid, p.27.
30 Bowman to Storrs, 19 May 1924, CO 733/90.
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place a bigger financial burden on the already overtaxed population in return for a nominal
say in the running oflocal schools."
InFebruary 1925, the Local Government Commission submitted a second report that
elaborated on its initial proposals for devolution, particularly the financial aspects of the
scheme. They maintained that local bodies needed to be endowed 'with the substance, and
not only the shadow, of authority and responsibility' so that trusteeship could be advanced
and the population gain valuable experience in self-government. The second report explained
that its proposals for devolution had the advantage of 'general equality of treatment' towards
Arab and Jewish education in advocating identical forms of administrative machinery. The
plans had also evolved in response to the initial criticism that was directed at them. Palestine
would be divided into eight 'education areas' centred on the major population areas (Gaza,
Hebron, Jerusalem, Jaffa, Nablus, Tulkarm, Haifa, and Safad), each with its own district
council, which would have the authority to set up town or village commissions responsible
for the 'material services' that Bowman suggested. It was also acknowledged that the district
education councils would need to receive a subvention from the mandatory administration to
supplement their income. This undermined assertions that the scheme would result in a
reduction of central government expenditure. An argument that was made still less plausible
by the fact that the Department of Education would also need to hire new inspectors to cope
with the added workload from the Jewish schools that would come under the purview of full
government inspection.
The proposals appeared excessively bureaucratic when compared against the existing
system. The report envisaged that there would need to be an Arab and Jewish central council,
eight Arab and four Jewish district councils, and numerous village commissions to make the
parallel machinery acceptable to both communities. The councils would also have official
members in addition to a government officer presiding over them. This was deemed 'essential
to the success of the scheme', but again illustrates how the delegation of authority was always
circumscribed by some form of supervisory oversight. Speaking of the 'broader aspects' of
the scheme, the report noted that it might 'entail an increase in cost and, possibly, a falling off
in efficiency' yet, in the commission's view, this was acceptable because devolution would
meet 'a real and widespread demand' and would 'give the people an effective share in the
management of the public services', which it claimed was in keeping with the spirit and letter
31 Minute by Keith-Roach, 4 August 1924, CO 733/71.
165
of the mandate.32 In terms of trusteeship, the commission argued that the development of self-
government displaced concerns about the loss of administrative efficiency.
A wider array of officials commented on the more detailed proposals contained in the
second report, including officials from the treasury and the district administrations. Their near
unanimous opposition ultimately led to the plans being abandoned, but the debates were
particularly illuminating in demonstrating British attitudes to both education and trusteeship,
and, indeed, the purpose of the mandate more generally. The major criticism was that the
proposals were an 'unnecessary complexity' and unsuitable for both communities.P The
Zionist Executive, which already had an organisational structure for its schools, would resent
the interference from the mandatory administration and, given the consensus they could
already manage their own system, the proposals were redundant. Eric Mills, a district official,
suggested that the 'complete dichotomy' between Jews and Arabs meant that the new system
of organisation would leave the Arabs in a 'hopeless' situation because they could not be
expected to cope with managing their own education to the same level as the Jewish
community.l" Even one of the commission's members, Sidney Moody, agreed with this
assertion and submitted a minority report that questioned the desirability of altering the
existing system. Moody explained that as the Arabs were 'not on the same cultural level as
the Jewish community', it was imperative 'that the Government should take especial care of
Arab education' .35 His statements carried with them the implication that, even with
safeguards, the Arabs would not be sufficiently capable of controlling their own education
system. Perceived Arab incompetence had, of course, long become the standard argument to
justify British control in Palestine. Moody was also concerned that the extra layers of
bureaucracy would render the work of district officers less effective, which demonstrated his
paternal understanding of the British role in Palestine. He explained that 'it is generally
recognised that nothing can be done in a village, and very little in a town, without the
persuasive personality of the District Officer' and that the mentality of the Arab population
was that 'the Government is our father, we are its children, and we must be compelled to do
what is for our own good' .36 Like Bowman, Moody supported the idea that some 'material
services' could be devolved to the local councils that had already been established under the
32 Second Report of the Local Government Commission, 24 February 1925, CO 733/90.
33 Symes to Chief Secretary, 27 March 1925, ISA 2/0/1/273; Minute by Secretariat, 4 April, 1925, ISA
2/0/1/273.
34 Note by Mills, 23 March 1925, ISA 2/0/1/273.
35 Note by Moody, 24 February 1925, CO 733/90.
36 Moody to Storrs, 25 February 1925, ISA 2/0/1/273.
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Local Councils Ordinance of 1921. The treasury was, unsurprisingly, concerned with the
financial aspects of the scheme but agreed that it was unnecessarily complicated, commenting
that the creation of new layers of bureaucracy were 'impracticable and financially and
economically unsound' .37
The most disparaging criticism came from the deputy director of education, Jerome
Farrell, who expanded on the earlier criticisms and attacked the Local Government
Commission's ideas on the basis that they had casually disregarded concerns about efficiency
on the grounds of submitting 'to a popular demand which it believes to exist'." Farrell's
argument had two strands: firstly, mandatory obligations meant that control of the
government system should remain centralised in British hands and, secondly, that the
'popular' Arab demand for control over education was not genuine or widespread. As has
already been suggested, Farrell regarded the 'educative function' as one of the most
important aspects of mandatory rule and stressed its link to self-government: 'education is in
fact ultimately the most important of all public services; this is especially true of the
education of character upon which alone real ability for self-government must be based' .39
The steady development of 'character' as a platform for achieving self-government was
integral to British notions of trusteeship. In these terms, devolving control over education
could not be justified as promoting Arab interests. Farrell stated that 'a people incapable of
self-education, as the Palestinian people by the definition of a mandated territory must be,
needs control in no public department more than in education,.4o He argued that devolving
responsibility for education to advance self-government before the growth of civic
consciousness among Arabs was a premature measure and described it as 'a blind alley'.
The other strand of Farrell's argument was that the Local Government Commission's
understanding of Arab demands to control the government education system was flawed. He
argued that there was 'practical unanimity' against popular control amongst the teaching staff
in the Department of Education and that parents were generally 'satisfied with the present
situation' of centralised government control. The demand for popular control in the 'national
interest' was actually 'not very widespread'. Instead, Farrell explained that 'in fact the
demand for Arab control narrows down to the desire to teach a form of negative patriotism
better described as racial hatred' that was espoused by a small number of journalists and
:7 Minute by Davis, 14 April 1925, ISA 2/0/1/273.




politicians." The idea of Arab 'national interest' was therefore downgraded to a version of
'negative patriotism' that was contrary to British ideas of education. Farrell suggested that the
desire to teach this type of 'patriotism' stemmed from Arab leaders' own narrowness of view
and conservatism, which was derived from their own inadequate education. InBritish terms,
there was a clear desire to avoid the propagation of 'racial hatred' that could threaten public
order. Additionally, Farrell attributed part of the demand to 'a desire for power and for the
control of a large field of patronage' , which, in his eyes, further undermined its validity.
Education should remain a service in British hands, he argued, but some delegation of
material responsibility, like that envisaged in Moody's minority report, could be made
without an 'undue' loss of efficiency.
Inhis own response to the second report, Bowman suggested that 'in fundamentals'
he agreed with his deputy's remarks and said that 'the dangers of going too far or too fast in
the matter of educational devolution can hardly be exaggerated'. 42 The main Arab criticism,
Bowman thought, was that Jewish schools were free to follow 'the dictates of a Zionist
conscience', whilst Arab schools were 'fettered in the expression of so-called patriotism'.
The continued, derogatory references to 'negative' or 'so-called' patriotism are a useful
indicator of the general distrust that Britain held towards Arab assertions of nationality. For
Bowman, the solution to this problem did not lie in creating identical machinery and
decreasing control over Arab education but in increasing control over Jewish education,
particularly with regard to the appointment and dismissal of teachers, and possibly devolving
some of the material aspects of elementary education to the Arab community. In the face of
such resounding opposition, Storrs, the chairman of the commission, attempted to respond to
some of the objections but he was unable to address the fundamental issues raised by the
various criticisms.f The final parts of the debate over these plans had occurred against the
backdrop of Samuel's departure from office, so it was decided that the attempt to modify the
extant system should be postponed until the incoming high commissioner, Lord Plumer, had
been able to give his opinion on the matter."
Plumer stated that his priorities for education were to extend the system of Arab
Muslim schools controlled by the government and to exercise a greater measure of control
41 Ibid.
42 Bowman to Secretariat, 28 September 1925, ISA 2/0/1/273.
43 Note by Sir Ronald Storrs, 11 June 1924, ISA 2/0/1/273.
44 Bowman to Secretariat, 28 September 1925, ISA 2/0/1/273.
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over Jewish schools, in return for a greater share of the education budget.4s In June 1926, the
high commissioner laid down the basis of his plan to achieve these objectives and advised
that he would submit a draft bill for education after further consultation. As the financial
constraints on the mandatory administration meant that it was unlikely that the education
budget would be 'materially increased for some years to come', Plumer recognised that he
would need to find other methods to fund the expansion of the government system. The high
commissioner carried forw~rd some of the key suggestions that were made by Moody and
Bowman in their criticism of the Local Government Commission's proposals. He confirmed
that future policy would be based on the communal structure that was already in place, but
stated that education would have to 'be treated as a quasi-local service' where some tasks
could be devolved to local authorities." Plumer recommended that local and municipal
councils could take on the material responsibility for maintaining and opening new schools
through local forms of taxation, which would allow towns and villages that lacked a school to
establish one on their own initiative. Yet Plumer also stressed that
Itmust be recognised that by devolving Arab education upon local authorities even to
a limited extent, a certain loss of efficiency must be anticipated, though it is intended
to combat this to some extent by maintaining and improving the quality of the
teaching staff. On the other hand, some sacrifice of efficiency can be contemplated
without undue concern if it is compensated by a sufficient increase in the extent of
elementary education and the standard of teaching and education does not fall below a
national minimum."
The potential loss of efficiency was acceptable because the priority for Plumer was to expand
access to elementary schooling rather than to improve the quality of it. Even then, the high
commissioner acknowledged that, whilst universal education was an admirable aim, it would
only be possible 'to spread education by degrees, especially among the Moslem Arabs'
because of the costs involved. The mandatory administration would still have to supply and
pay for a new school's teacher, which made it unlikely that it would faciliate a rapid
expansion of the government system. Unlike the Local Government Commission, Plumer's
ideas for policy were not made in the context of advancing self-government so purely
educational considerations were allowed to shape policy. Devolving power for material
services to local and municipal councils had the advantages of providing a method of
transferring some of the costs of the government education system to the local population
45
Plumer to Amery, 19 February 1926, CO 733/112.
46
Plumer to Amery, 24 June 1926, CO 733/155.
47 Ibid.
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through the use of existing bureaucratic structures, whilst the central education department
could retain its control over the more contentious aspects of the system.
These proposals were welcomed in the Colonial Office as 'quite sound': officials
were particularly pleased that the new high commissioner realised that compulsory
elementary schooling would be impracticable 'for many years to come' due to the financial
cost involved." The need for an ordinance to formalise British control over education in
Palestine was well understood by colonial officials in London who were particularly keen to
ensure that it was not used for 'subversive' purposes. Sir John Shuckburgh wrote that 'in our
Tropical African dependencies ... insufficient Government control of educational
developments was said to be the root of all evil'. Given the importance of education in
Palestine, he explained it would 'be necessary to proceed with the greatest tact if the
Ordinance is to have the desired effect of promoting good education with the help of efficient
Government control' .49 The Colonial Office insisted that provisions drawn from the Nigerian
education laws must be included in any ordinance so that school inspectors would have the
power to close schools down if they were 'being conducted in a manner contrary to good
order and morals', which again demonstrated the preoccupation with ensuring that the
mandatory administration had sufficient power to ensure education was carried out according
to British ideals of political and ideological neutrality. 50
A draft ordinance was finally put forward in late 1927 with the aim of consolidating
administrative practice towards education as it had evolved since the British occupation of
Palestine. S IThe bill confirmed the wide powers that the director of education held in all
matters connected to secular instruction in government schools, including control over the
curriculum; the appointment and dismissal of teachers, and their emoluments and pensions;
the rate of school-fees and the provision of free places; and, of course, the power to close
schools. It also contained provisions that allowed for the devolution of 'material' services to
local education authorities, yet the powers that remained centralised in the education
department provided an effective safeguard to ensure that standards did not fall too far, which
would run contrary to the obligations of trusteeship. This was the more positive justification
for maintaining centralised British control; the undercurrent to this thinking was the political
48 Minute by Lloyd, 10 July 1926, CO 733/155.
49 Minute by Shuckburgh, 22 March 1928, CO 733/146/7.
50 Colonial Office Minute, 27 January 1928, CO 733/14617.
51 Luke to Amery, 8 November 1928, CO 733/146/8. See also Palestine Gazette, 16 October 1927, CO
733/146/7.
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concern that uncontrolled schools would espouse 'patriotism' or 'racial hatred' and
undermine British rule. The mandatory administration therefore retained significant influence
over the content of education in government schools by supervising both the curriculum and
teachers within the system.
The wording of the ordinance made it seem that these measures would apply to all
schools that accepted some form of government funding, which provoked a series of
objections from the Zionist movement and the foreign powers who sponsored schools in
Palestine, and this delayed enactment of the ordinance untilI933. The legislation can be seen
as a move to maximise the legal control that the mandatory administration could exercise
over the schools that it assisted. The Zionist movement's response to the ordinance and the
general relationship between the mandatory administration and the Jewish education system
will be examined in more detail later in this chapter, but the foreign powers involved -
principally France, Italy, and the Vatican - argued that the proposed legislation violated
Articles 15 and 16 of the mandate that guaranteed their right to maintain schools free from
interference by the mandatory government. These articles did also stipulate that those schools
would have to conform to 'educational requirements of a general nature as the administration
may impose', but the Colonial Office took foreign allegations that it was breaking the
mandate seriously. The main points of contention concerned the definition of schools that
were 'assisted' by the mandatory government and the 'penal appearance' of the ordinance
toward foreign schools. 52 This caused a prolonged period of diplomatic correspondence
between the Foreign Office and the other powers as various clauses concerning the definition
of different types of school were amended to bring them into line with foreign opinion. 53 The
1933 ordinance marked an end to the ad hoc nature of British control over education and
formalised the various systems of government and non-government schooling, which re-
affirmed the British ability to shape and direct Arab education under the mandate.
Arab Education in Government Schools
The previous section explored how Orientalist ideas about Arab capability helped to justify
British control over the government system; this section will examine how those ideas also
had a corresponding influence in framing the character and priorities of that system. The
centralisation of British control over the government school system had a major influence on
52 Plumer to Amery, 12 January 1928, CO 733/14617.
53 The relevant files are contained in CO 733/146/8 and CO 733/165/5. See also Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister,
27 August 1932, CO 733/222/1.
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the nature of local education. The views of the Department of Education were profoundly
shaped by Bowman, its director, and Farrell, his deputy, who became director when Bowman
retired in 1937. Bowman claimed he had 'sympathy and understanding' for the Arabs,
believing them to be a 'lazy and un-enterprising people' who needed the type of discipline
that British values could provider" Like most colonial officials, Bowman believed that Arab
aspirations could be met within a framework of colonial rule that encouraged development
whilst preserving the 'traditional' structure of Arab society. Farrell, who was educated at
Jesus College, Cambridge, before serving as an assistant master at Rugby and in the
Department of Education in Iraq, held similar beliefs about the capacity of the Arab mind for
education, explaining that 'a high standard of achievement is very small.; [it is] fixed by
nature and cannot be increased by education'. 55 In 1923, the Department of Education
conducted' group intelligence tests' on Arab boys aged between 11 and 16 which found that
'the mental development of the Palestinian child is somewhat behind that of the average
English child' and concluded that the effect of the Arab social environment 'upon actual
attainment of pupils must inevitably be prejudicial'. 56 These ideas were products of an
upbringing that reinforced Orientalist stereotypes about the native inhabitants of Palestine.
Cultural preconceptions were fundamentally important in guiding British administration of
the government school system. It was assumed that very few Arab schoolchildren merited the
benefits of secondary or higher education, with those that did marked down primarily for
teaching careers in government schools; that the Arab character required 'shaping' through
public school ideas like team spirit; and that appropriate rural education was essential to
prevent Arabfellahin from becoming disillusioned with village life and 'drifting' to the
towns.
Education was seen as having the potential to raise prosperity amongst the Arab
population, particularly by helping to spread more advanced agricultural methods, yet it had
to be carefully regulated to manage its social effects. The main British aim under trusteeship,
therefore, Was to achieve basic literacy on a mass scale by expanding access to elementary
schooling, rather than the quality of it. This goal was significantly constrained by financial
considerations. The mandatory government decided to continue a scheme started by the
military administration to re-open schools that had been forced to close during the First
World War as part of a 'comprehensive programme' that Samuel explained would see the
S4 Shepherd, Ploughing Sand, p.157.
ss Quoted in Ibid, p.158.
S6 Department of Education Annual Report for 1923, CO 814/1, p.9.
172
country 'covered with elementary schools,.57 Initially, the majority of these were small
village kuttabs - private schools that primarily offered rote religious learning based on the
Qur'an - but by offering a grant-in-aid, the mandatory administration was able to quickly
absorb and expand these schools into a state-run government system. By July 1920, the
military education service had opened 171 schools and by 1923 this number had reached 311,
,
but such rapid expansion had to be abandoned to make savings in the education budget,
which had fallen from £114,217 in 1922 to £97,279 in 1923 in order to reduce general
expenditure and alleviate the financial burden of Palestine on the British taxpayer. 58A.L.
Tibawi, an Arab official in the Department of Education, suggested that any concern for
education was subordinated to public security, which, with nearly a third of the mandatory
administration's budget devoted towards it, formed a 'crushing priority,.59 Between 1920 and
1936, the overall level of investment in education remained fairly consistent at about six per
cent of the total budget, Despite the importance that was placed on schooling under
trusteeship, this was regarded as inadequate and offers yet another illustration of how
financial retrenchment could take precedence over the goals of trusteeship. 60
Universal education was an admirable, yet distant goal for colonial officials. Under-
investment in education translated into a failure of the mandatory administration to meet the
Arab demand for school places in the government system. In 1937, Farrell remarked that 'it
would be difficult to exaggerate the cumulative seriousness of the situation ... created by the
inadequacy of the educational provision made by Government since the Occupation'i'" The
cancellation of the school building programme in 1923 meant that during the 1920s the
mandatory administration was only able to accept around half of those who applied for a
government school place. In 1929, when the figures were first included in the education
department's annual report, there were 4,732 Arab children in towns who applied to enter
elementary education, but only 2,422 could be admitted.62 The earlier reports simply noted
that 'the demand for elementary education remains as great as ever'. 63 This problem was
compounded by a progressive deterioration in the rate of pupils who completed the full
S7 Samuel to Churchill, 15 December 1921, CO 733/8.
S8 'Department of Education Annual Report for 1923', CO 814/1; 'Note on Education in Palestine, 1920-1929',
~.6.
9 Tibawi, Arab Education in Mandatory Palestine, p 159. For the defence budgets, see 'Palestine. Royal
~ommission Report', pp.188-192.
6 Department of Education Annual Report for 1934-35, p3, CO 733/291/4.
6~ Farrell, 'Note on draft education estimates, 1937-38', 10 April 1937, CO 733/329/13.
63 Department of Education Annual Report for 1929-30, CO 81414.
See, for example, Department of Education Annual Report for 1923, CO 814/1.
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elementary course. In rural schools, only 11 per cent completed the four year course, whilst in
towns the number completing the six year course was 38 per cent." The growing Arab
population eventually forced the mandatory administration to begin a new programme of
school expansion, particularly in the towns, that began in 1933.65 The Department of
Education estimated that the number of Arab children at school age increased by 36 per cent
to 127,000 over the course of the 1920s because of an 'abnormal birth rate'; in the towns, this
meant a 49 per cent increase in the demand for school places. The new scheme could only
keep pace with the growing Arab population: in 1933, 63 per cent of applications were
accepted; in 1934 and 1935, that figure dropped to 59 per cent, signalling that despite the
expansion scheme, the mandatory administration could not radically change the structural
deficit of places for schooling."
The concern for teaching only basic literacy was grounded in wider fears about the
disruptive power of education in the colonial context. Major Young in the Colonial Office
wrote of the 'horrid examples of the dangers of literary education turning out large numbers
of unemployable clerks' in places like India and Egypt, who often became disaffected and
engaged in anti-colonial politics.f" A Department of Education pamphlet explained that
The danger of giving too literary a bias to village education has been one to which the
authorities are keenly alive. The consequent ill effects seen of recent years in other
countries of the Near and Middle East, due in large measure to the provision of an
unsuitable type of education, of tempting the village boy to the town where he may
become unemployed and unemployable, have resulted in the directing by the
authorities of efforts to provide him with an education alike attractive and suited to his
own and his country's needs.68
The connection between literary education and the growth of dissent had important
consequences for British priorities in government schools. Bowman was conscious of the
view that schools were the 'bane of the East' and 'little else than nurseries for agitators', but
he countered this by explaining that an incorrect type of education had been provided to those
in the 'East'. He suggested that 'purely literary education is oflittle use' and connected his
ideas to trusteeship by explaining that 'what is required is an education that will at once
enlighten the peasant, make him a contented citizen, and keep him on the land'. 69 Education
64 Department of Education Annual Report for 1929-30, p.23, CO 814/4.
65 Bowman, 'Memorandum on Expansion of Education in Towns', 3 January 1934, CO 733/250/13; Hathom-
Hall to Cunliffe-Lister, 23 March 1934, CO 733/250/13.
66 Department of Education Annual Report for 1934-35, p22-3, CO 733/291/4.
67 Minute by Young, 18 July 1926, CO 733/155.
68 Note on Education in Palestine, 1920-29, p.7.
69 Bowman, Middle East Window, p.279.
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was geared towards these basic aims. As Ilan Pappe has suggested, the idea was 'limited
modernisation' where improvement in rural life was achieved with local traditions left intact,
so that the 'dangerous leap forward' to anti-British nationalism could be avoided." The same
rationale that underpinned land policy was also prevalent in education: when the Arab
peasant had 'drifted' to the town, it was feared he would become vulnerable to agitation and
pose a risk to public security.
Apprehensions over social dislocation converged with the view that education should
be politically neutral to produce a curriculum that was widely criticised by Arab leaders for
being 'de-nationalised' in an attempt to make the local population acquiesce in the
establishment of the Jewish national home. Khalil Totah, headmaster ofa boys' school in
Ramallah, explained to the Peel Commission in 1937 that 'it would seem that Arab education
is either designed to reconcile Arab people to this policy or to make the education so
colourless as to make it harmless' .71 The exclusion of Arabs from the drafting of the school
syllabus, which overlapped with educational trends elsewhere in the empire, only reinforced
this feeling. The idea that Britain sought to 'immunise' the Arab population against
nationalist feelings has been pervasive in the historiography. Majid al-Haj, for example,
explained that 'traditional norms and values ... [were] emphasised vigorously in order to
undermine national education'." Miller has also suggested that in neglecting Arab history,
British officials could not provide an 'adequate national history'. 73 However, these
interpretations seem to stem more from contemporary Arab complaints that were directed
against education, rather than an assessment of the curriculum itself, which, given the paucity
of source material regarding the syllabus, is understandable.i" A recent study by John Harte
has suggested that traditional views that a straightforward and de-nationalised curriculum was
imposed by a colonial hegemon on to a passive subaltern population require a more nuanced
understanding of how education was actually used by teachers to help shape Arab
consciousness, rather than simply holding on to the idea that it completely suppressed
identity."
~~Pappe, ~ His!ory of Modern Palestine, p.74.
72 Qu~~edm ~Iller, Government and Society in Rural Palestine, p.96.
Majid aI-HaJ, Education, Empowerment and Control: The Case of the Arabs in Israel, (Albany, State
~ni~ersity of New York Press, 1995), p.4S.
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The subject of history, which is crucial to the development or construction of national
identity, is a particularly useful prism to explore this question and the relationship it had to
trusteeship. Examining the elementary syllabus, Harte explained that 'it was always
envisaged that some kind of "national" awareness -linked to an understanding of the rights
and responsibilities of Palestinian citizenship - would be nurtured by the government
curriculum' ,76 The key word here is 'awareness'; although colonial officials did not want to
teach a radical Palestinian Arab nationalism, which was outside the scope of their
understanding of the Arab national movement in Palestine, they did at least strive to provide a
layer of identity, based mainly on ideas of Islamic heritage and pan-Arabism, in order to
provide some cultural coherence to the 'traditional' structure of Arab society, This was
demonstrative of the assumption which sustained trusteeship that the Palestinian Arabs did
not constitute a nation.
The 1925 syllabus for elementary schools offered four years of Arab history, taught
through 'stories' of 'heroic' individuals, whilst the final two years offered some general
European history and a year of 'History and Civics' ,77 Interestingly, the final two years were
only offered in town schools. Presumably, it was too 'literary' for children in rural areas and
undermined the focus on vocational, agriculturalleaming. The final year is particularly
interesting because it suggests that the values for civic consciousness in the 'modem' world ,
which colonial officials were trying to inculcate as part of trusteeship, could not be drawn
from Arab history. Reflecting a Euro-centric, almost Hegelian view of modernity, History
and Civics began by tracing the development of civilisation from 'primitive man and the
family', which included the role of the tribe in the Arab system and the development of the
caste system in India, to the Greek and Roman city states. It continued with classes on the
Middle Ages, the growth of autocracy, before finishing on constitutional forms of European
government, including concepts such as limited government; the franchise; the basis of
representation; the separation of powers into legislative, judicial, and executive functions;
and modem republican ideas." The Arab contribution to the development of human society,
it seemed, was minimal and confined to the times of 'primitive' man. The aim of history
teaching was to develop a general sense of identity amongst all Arabs, before using the
lessons of European forms of history as a vehicle for disseminating civic consciousness
among urban pupils where there was less concern for social dislocation and migration. This
76 Ibid, p.124.
77 Ibid, pp.116-7.
78 Tibawi, Arab Education in Mandatory Palestine, pp.86-7.
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connected to the wider aims of trusteeship in using quasi-European reform to achieve
development in Palestine. In that sense the development of the curriculum mirrored the
liberal, rational, and utilitarian approach to land reform.
The suggestion that the curriculum was completely de-nationalised is therefore not
entirely accurate. It also does not take into account the potential agency of Arab teachers and
the possibility ofre-formulating what British officials were trying to express through the
syllabus. Harte has used post-colonial notions of 'hybridity' and 'slippage' to argue that
teachers could re-interpret the curriculum, particularly when it was transmitted from English
to Arabic. Thus, in the 1921 syllabus, the aim of history to impart' a sense of the
responsibility of citizenship and his duty to his country and his fellow men' becomes 'the
spirit of awareness of responsibility and duty towards his people and his homeland, and
towards humanity' (my emphasis)." The subtle, yet definitive shift towards a more
nationalist tone is a good example of this form of 'slippage' and demonstrates the potential
agency of teachers to subvert the colonial context in which the curriculum was forged.
Despite its principled opposition to 'national' trends, there may have been some tacit
recognition of these 'slippages' by the Department of Education or at the very least a
reluctance to invoke political opposition by challenging minor infractions. A thorough system
of reporting on Arab teachers in government schools was in place, where bi-annual reports
were furnished by the headmaster of a school and passed up through the district inspector,
then the administrative inspector in Jerusalem, before finally finding their way to the director
of education, yet it was rare for the Department of Education to take disciplinary action
against teachers on grounds of inappropriate lesson content. Most dismissals were for poor
teaching methods, lack of discipline in the classroom, or 'moral' infractions, like excessive
corporal punishment. Action was usually taken when opposition to the mandatory
administration became visible. For example, in the early 1920s the headmaster of the Shafa-
'Amra Boys' School was dismissed after anti-government strikes broke out amongst the
student body.80 It is entirely possible that, because British involvement was infrequent at the
bottom of this chain, minor incidents did not get passed up or were concealed along the way.
All of this should not, however, be taken to mean that the curriculum was a comparable
equivalent to the overtly nationalist type of education provided in Zionist schools. Indeed,
when set against the aims of Zionist education to develop strong connections between
79 Harte, Contesting the Past in the Mandate Palestine, p.l47.
80 Ibid, p.204.
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disparate Jewish immigrants and foster an active Zionist political consciousness the limited
'national' history in government schools was described by Harte as 'hopelessly inadequate'. 81
There were other ways in which Arab education in government schools was inferior
to the Zionist system. The idea that 'literary' education would lead to social disruption placed
a narrow but utilitarian focus on elementary education with a technical or vocational bias
over more academic forms of learning, which was detrimental to the development of
secondary or higher education. In theory, the Palestine Matriculation Examination could open
the way to study at the American universities in Beirut or Cairo, or even in England at
Oxford, Cambridge, or London. However, in 1929, there were only 11 government secondary
schools in Palestine; nine of them could only provide the first two years of the four year
secondary course, whilst only one, the Government Arab College in Jerusalem, could provide
the full course.82 The number of students who could take the matriculation exam was
therefore very low: in 1934-35, when there were 35,868 pupils in the government elementary
system, only 28 students attempted it and, of those, only 18 passed. Other than the few who
managed to obtain a government-sponsored university scholarship - three from the 1934-35
class - the main function of secondary education was to provide elementary school teachers
for the government school system.83 The teaching course offered by the Government Arab
College as a fifth year was the highest class available in Palestine but, as the Department of
Education noted, 'the course of pedagogy is practical rather than theoretical. Some attention
is paid to psychology but a greater part of the lesson time is given to practical training in
methods of teaching and class management'; even prospective teachers, it seemed, had to be
kept away from the dangers of a literary education.i" Designating - and limiting - the
purpose of secondary education as training 'practical' teachers was a natural consequence of
the mandatory administration's aim of providing basic literacy to as many pupils as possible.
This contrasted against the Zionist system of education where nearly all pupils were able to
access some form of secondary education that catered for a variety of purposes. 85
The problems of access also translated to higher education, but here the most
contentious issue was over the teaching of English. The standard practice in British colonial
education was for English to be the medium of instruction at secondary level, but in Palestine
81 Ibid, p.l44.
82 Department of Education Note on Education in Palestine, p.ll, 1920-29.
83 Department of Education Annual Report for 1934-35, pp.22-9, CO 733/291/4.
84 Department of Education Note on Education in Palestine, p.ll, 1920-29.
85 Segev, One Palestine, Complete, pp.389-92.
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Arabic was used to mirror the use of Hebrew in the Zionist school system. Despite the lack of
an overtly 'nationalised' syllabus, the use of Arabic throughout elementary and secondary
education must have provided some form of continuity to the development of a national
identity for those fortunate enough to progress through the system. Shepherd has criticised
the lack of English teaching as restricting access to colleges and universities in the region,
particularly for rural Arabs, because most required at least a working knowledge of English. 86
Yet, as Harte has demonstrated, the results of the English paper in the matriculation exam
show that government students did just as well as their non-government counterparts,
suggesting that it was not the medium of instruction that was the cause of
'underdevelopment' but the paucity of places in the secondary system.87 In 1935, the
mandatory administration finally bowed to Arab pressure and decided to introduce limited
teaching of English in village schools, although the main aim was to provide a cadre who
might be trained as agricultural teachers. Again, British fears were related to social
consequences with the chief secretary explaining that the process would be 'carried out so as
not to encourage the indiscriminate migration of village pupils to towns,.88
Despite the dearth of secondary education, and a strong focus on elementary
education, the mandatory administration and Colonial Office were prepared to consider the
idea of establishing a British university in Jerusalem.t" This had first been proposed by Storrs
in 1922 as a way of getting Arabs and Jews 'to work together', but Zionist leaders had
opposed the idea as it was perceived as a threat to the proposed Hebrew University. In 1927
the issue was raised again after a report, commissioned by Rennie MacInnes, the bishop of
Jerusalem, to comment on the education activities of the Anglican Missionary Societies,
suggested that an institution of university status should be established in Palestine. James
Headlam-Morey, the historian who authored the report, explained that mandatory rule had
opened Palestine up to 'Western' influences: 'the country will no longer be, as it formerly
was, primitive, secluded and under the sole influence of inherited tradition; whether we like it
or not, the inhabitants will come more and more under the influence of Western thought and
Western life,.9o The priority for Headlam-Morey was that British officials provide
supervision during this process, arguing that 'it is above all essential that the inevitable
:~ Shepherd, Ploughing Sand, p.158.
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revolution in habits and in thought should be carried out under wise, sober, and disinterested
guidance' .91 These remarks demonstrate how Orientalism informed British ideas about the
path to modernity. Alongside the notion that only European history offered the requisite
knowledge for the development of a civic consciousness, it was also the case that only with
European tutelage could the Oriental traverse the path out of his 'backward' state.
Headlam-Morey recommended merging some of the missionary institutions in
Jerusalem that were carrying out 'advanced' education to form the British-sponsored
university in Palestine. Under the obligations of trusteeship, there was a clear case for
establishing such an institution. Headlam-Morey explained that it could help to train the
future leaders of the country and
Enable them to move freely in the world of modem thought, to be able to understand,
appraise and criticise the ideas by which, whether we like it or not, we must recognise
that the modem world is governed. This means of course what we may call the
'Westernisation' of their minds.92
Yet the report also raised some important doubts about higher education. Rennie MacInnes
acknowledged that technical education to drive economic development was a greater priority
than higher education. Perhaps more fundamentally, he questioned whether this process of
'Westernisation' was 'in the best interests of oriental peoples or conducive to their real
happiness'i'" For the bishop of Jerusalem, the main attractions were prestige - a British
university could rival the American ones in Beirut and Cairo, and could serve Palestine,
Transjordan, Cyprus, Iraq, and the Sudan - and control. MacInnes explained that Arab
students at the American universities were 'subjected during their most impressionable years
to an influence which is the reverse of'pro-British'." However, the idea for a university did
not get past the planning stage. Despite a fairly detailed proposal on the' Jerusalem Institute',
as the proposed university was called, which included an administrative structure, a projected
budget and capital outlay, a teaching specialisation (history, political science, European
thought, and philosophy), and an estimated class size, the doubts surrounding the scheme
were enough to curtail it. 95 The exact reasons for abandoning the scheme are unknown" but it
seems likely that the doubts over the scheme, such as whether there was wide enough demand
91 Ibid, pp.3-4.
92 Ibid, p.35.
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in Palestine, whether higher education was suited to Arabs, if the necessary funds could be
raised, and whether the proposed institution could compete successfully with the American
University at Beirut, which were expressed vocally by the Colonial Office, combined with
the deteriorating situation in Palestine in 1929 to shift the mandatory government's priorities
elsewhere."
Instead of higher education, the mandatory administration was much more concerned
with vocational training. Village schools were given a practical, agricultural focus. The
village curriculum was two years shorter than for urban schools, and lacked geometry,
science, and English. Even with the focus on vocational education, the provision of useful
agricultural training was circumscribed by the lack of financial resources. The basic idea was
that every school should develop a garden which was provided by the villagers, but few
schools routinely maintained their plots and, of those that did, less than half were supervised
by teachers with the appropriate training." Technical education also remained narrowly
wedded to utilitarian notions of agricultural activity. In 1929, the high commissioner invited
W.A. Stewart, the former director of the Central School of Arts and Crafts in Cairo, to submit
a report on the state of technical education in Palestine. He observed that there was 'an
almost complete lack of qualified technical training' in government schools, which meant
that craftsmanship was never 'likely to be raised to any higher standard than that of the
bazaars' .99 But Stewart's plans for technical education were derived from his own Orientalist
beliefs that Arabs should only engage in traditional Oriental arts and crafts, like silk
production, cloth-weaving, carpet-making, pottery, and glass-blowing. For him, 'industrial
training' for Arabs meant enabling them to manufacture their own ploughs, hoes, locks,
window frames, and household utensils between seasons of sowing and harvesting; the
development of industry, he concluded, 'should be related through the development of its
crafts to the country's primal activity, agriculture,.loo Chancellor appointed Stewart as a
specialist supervisor of technical education without considering a single Arab for the
position, explaining that his 'sympathy with Oriental character' and 'taste for Oriental
craftsmanship' made him the ideal choice for the job.IOI In 1935, a Government Trade School
was established in Haifa, Palestine's industrial centre, yet the courses on offer, which
97
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included fitting and turning, blacksmithing, and woodworking were confined to the
traditional arts and crafts format and were intended to help 'young men who have the
legitimate and honourable aspiration to acquire a sound elementary training in manual
work' .102 The predominance of this ethos meant that technical education was prevented from
providing more advanced forms of vocational qualification. This was in distinct contrast to
the Zionist education system that included, for example, the Technion in Haifa, which offered
civil engineering and architectural courses. As will be seen in the next section, British ideas,
whilst having a key influence on various aspects of the government education system, did not
exert anywhere near the same level of influence on Zionist education.
British Relations with Zionist Education
British attitudes towards Zionist education were markedly different from the assumptions that
underpinned the mandatory administration's control over Arab Muslim education through the
government school system. It defied colonial precedent from the beginning of the mandate;
the key manifestation being the overtly political and nationalist nature of its organisation and
curriculum. Structured along three political lines to represent dominant ideologies and trends
within Zionism - 'general' or political, Mizrachi, and labour - the system was a vital tool for
nation-building in the mandatory period by acting as a 'melting pot' through which disparate
Jewish immigrants could be forged into a cohesive national body. 103 Despite the
heterogeneous trends within this system, all schools were geared towards the achievement of
Zionism and worked to shape a 'new' kind of Jew who was free from the characteristics
attributed to life in the Diaspora. For many Jewish parents in Palestine, education was
regarded as a national enterprise and most schools made great efforts to imbue their pupils
with a deep attachment and sense of belonging to the land of Israel. These efforts were
spearheaded by the revival of Hebrew as an everyday language, which became the medium of
instruction in all Zionist schools. The curriculum fostered Jewish culture, with the bulk of
teaching devoted to history, geography, and literature.l'" In contrast to the government
system, a highly developed network of elementary and post-elementary institutions offered a
diverse range of courses and various specialisms. These were crowned by the Hebrew
University in Jerusalem: inaugurated in 1925 at a ceremony attended by Arthur Balfour, it
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had long been a central element to the cultural development of the Zionist project as a
whole.!"
The national orientation of Zionist education would obviously clash with British
thinking on the subject. Bowman explained it was 'faulty' and 'in many of its aspects it did
not conform with British ideals'.106 Farrell was more explicit: he disapproved of its 'racial
and national exaltation' and called for the mandatory administration to enforce 'ideas based
on British ideas of education and conduct' in Zionist schools.l'" National 'exaltation' was not
the only criticism and the Department of Education felt there was a distinct lack of
'discipline' in the Zionist system: children addressed their teachers by first name; parents
regularly intervened in school affairs; and the politically organised schools competed against
each other for new pupils and additional funding. 108Yet the mandatory administration had
little power to curb these tendencies because it had granted the Zionist Executive significant
autonomy over education in the early years of British rule. The Palestine government spent
much of the mandate attempting to improve its position of influence towards Zionist
education, whilst simultaneously trying to avoid acquiring excessive financial responsibility
for it. This section will explore the relationship between the mandatory administration and the
Zionist school system by examining the issues of government control and funding, and how
this related to trusteeship.
In granting autonomy to the Zionist education system, the mandatory authorities
acknowledged that their primary duty under trusteeship was to focus on the development of
Arab education. This decision was profoundly shaped by the preconception that the yishuv
was culturally sophisticated enough to be capable of running its own school system, but there
was also a more practical basis to this belief. An independent network of Jewish schools had
been developing under Ottoman rule to meet the needs of the immigrants that arrived in
Palestine during the first and second aliyah. In 1914, a Zionist Board of Education had been
created to administer 12 schools where Hebrew was the main language of instruction. By
1918, it controlled 40 schools and formed the nucleus of the Zionist education system during
the mandate period.l'" The benefit for the mandatory administration of providing autonomy
was mainly financial; instead of completely funding the more expensive Jewish system, it
lOS Harte, Contesting the Past in Mandate Palestine, p.46.
106 Bowman, Middle East Window, p.254.
107 Farrell, 'Memorandum on the Kadoorie Bequest on the Institution of an Arab and Hebrew Agricultural
School', 1927, CO 733/142/4
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could pay small grants-in-aid to individual schools that requested them in return for some
limited powers of inspection.
An important calculation in this delegation of authority was the confidence that
Jewish education would be able to support itself primarily from international funding and
contributions from the yishuv. This was initially true, but rapid expansion and financial
mismanagement became a greater problem for British officials than the national focus of the
education system. The Zionist Board of Education had a tendency to treat international '
donations as a stable source of income and used them to fund a rapid expansion of its school
system during the 1920s. By 1928, the number of schools controlled by the board had
increased to 207 and it educated over 18,000 pupils. The government system also served
around 18,000 children, but this has to be set against the relative population figures at the
time when Arabs outnumbered Jews by around six to one.IIO The revenue of the Zionist
Executive experienced considerable fluctuations and this contributed to a chronically unstable
state of financial affairs for the Zionist movement generally. The problems manifested
themselves most visibly through the years 1925-32 when the non-payment of teachers'
salaries became a recurrent issue for the mandatory administration. The teachers suspected
that the fall in the education budget allocated by the Zionist Executive, which in 1920-21 was
£109,000 but in 1931-32 had fallen to £40,000, was because funds were being diverted to
non-educational objects such as unemployment relief and land-purchases. I I I The teachers,
who were organised in a strong trade union, engaged in frequent strikes that threatened to
paralyse Jewish education and forced the Palestine government to step in with emergency
grants.112
The mandatory administration had long recognised the need for reforms in Zionist
schools, but without formal powers it could do little to enforce them and the Zionist
education authorities were particularly keen to guard against government intervention. When
Lord Plumer began his tenure as high commissioner in 1925, he explained that as well as
expanding the government system, he wished to exercise more control over Zionist schools in
return for giving them a greater share of the education budget. 113 The issue was considered
between 1925 and 1926, and a block grant scheme was instigated. It was fixed for five years
at £9,740 and paid directly to the Zionist Executive, but this was an arbitrary figure and bore
110 Ibid, p.14; pp.20-1.
III Farrell, 'Relations between the Government of Palestine and the Jewish School System', pp.13-4.
112 Moody to the General Council of the Va'ad Leumi, 14 August 1933, CO 733/234/11.
113 Plumer to Amery, 19 February 1926, CO 733/112.
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no relation to need or relative population size. 114 The Zionist movement argued that it should
benefit from government expenditure 'commensurate with its size and importance'. In June
1927, the colonial secretary, Leo Amery, accepted this reasoning and doubled the size of the
grant to £19,190, which represented around a sixth of the education budget, to bring it more
into line with government spending on Arab education. I IS
Itwas hoped that the increased grant would cause the Zionist Board of Education to
pay more attention to the general 'directives' issued by the government and increase the
influence that the Department of Education had over the Zionist system.i'" Under the block
grant scheme, the mandatory administration would recognise the Zionist schools as a
'Hebrew public school system' in the forthcoming education ordinance. This was an attempt
to capitalise on the increased funding by defining the specific powers that the mandatory
administration would possess over Zionist education. The proposed ordinance would force
the Zionist Board of Education to register all of its teachers with the Department of
Education, including their qualifications to teach, and grant the director of education a formal
right of inspection in all Zionist schools that received government finance.
This move provoked apprehension in the Zionist Executive. Its opposition was one of
the reasons the enactment of the ordinance was delayed, although foreign objections to the
legislation were the most important cause. InAugust 1928, a delegation visited Farrell, who
was acting director of education whilst Bowman was on leave, to express their concerns that
the education ordinance failed to specifically mention the Zionist Board of Education as a
controlling body for Jewish education. Their main fear was that Britain's intention was to
'administer the Ordinance as to impair the unity and autonomy of the Jewish School
system' .117 The ostensible reason for the omission was that as the Zionist Executive was
beginning to transform into the Jewish Agency, the mandatory government did not want to
make its duties the subject of precise legal regulation when it was liable to change. Farrell
advised the delegation that future relations between the two departments would remain
'essentially unchanged' .118 The key question was economic: to fundamentally alter the
relationship would have required the mandatory administration to incur greater financial
responsibility for Jewish education. The promulgation of the ordinance, whilst marking an
::: Wauch~pe to Cunliffe-Lister, 9 April 1932, CO 733/224/11.
116Quoted In Farrell, 'Relations between the Government of Palestine and the Jewish School System', p.9.
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increase in the mandatory administration's formal power by granting the right to inspect
Zionist schools and gather information on those who taught in them, ultimately did not give it
the power to compel the Jewish Agency to introduce reforms. The main form ofleverage
remained the grant-in-aid.
Despite Farrell's reassurances, relations between the mandatory administration and
the Jewish Agency over the organisation of Zionist education grew increasingly fractious.
The increase of the block grant in 1927 did not inhibit the Zionist argument that they were
entitled to a greater share of government expenditure. The Jewish Agency argued that the per
capita spending of the mandatory administration was unfair: in 1929-30, for example, it
stated that the mandatory administration spent nearly £4.50 per head in government schools
whilst it gave less than £1 to the Hebrew school system. It hoped to take advantage of the
relatively higher proportion of pupils in its schools and claim that future divisions of the
education budget should be based on the absolute numbers of children attending school,
which would have resulted in about half of it being spent on educating around a sixth of the
population. The Jewish Agency suggested that it was entitled to greater funding than the Arab
community for two reasons: firstly, because the Jewish contribution to public revenue was
approximately twice as large as its percentage of the overall population, and, secondly, that,
because a higher proportion of Jews were in school than Arabs, the Jewish 'zeal' for
education was demonstrably greater than the Arabs. 119 Colonial officials understood the
Jewish desire for universal education on the grounds that most immigrants came from Europe
or America where the practice was already established at public expense, but they were more
concerned with limiting their financial liability.V" The education budget was already
inadequate to meet the Arab demand for government school places; any increase in the
funding of Jewish education would mean a corresponding decrease in the amount that could
be spent on Arab education, which assumed a greater priority under trusteeship. Farrell
explained that it would be 'unjust' to the Arab community if more Jewish than Arab children
were educated at the sole expense ofthe state given the relative sizes of the population and
the fact that the Zionist movement was opening schools without sufficient resources and then
. h d dmi . fi 121relying on t e man atory a mmistranon or emergency support.
119 Arlosoroffto Wauchope, 2 February 1932, CO 733/224/11.
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In recognising the Zionist system as a public one, however, the mandatory
administration had taken on a responsibility for funding at least a portion of it. The question
was whether an equitable and sustainable solution could be found that allowed it to continue
its primary focus on the government system. Leo Amery's increase to the block grant was not
initially based on a precise formula but on a loose calculation of population sizes. The
colonial secretary had not formally accepted the principle of using population size to
calculate the block grant for Zionist education 122, but British representations to the Permanent
Mandates Commission in late 1927 explained that the mandatory administration had in fact
allotted the grant on a population basis.123 When the block grant came up for reconsideration
in 1932, the Colonial Office felt that it was honour bound to use a formula based on relative
population sizes.124 In February 1932, following a three week closure of Zionist schools
because of financial difficulties, Chaim Arlosoroff, the political director of the Jewish
Agency, wrote to Wauchope requesting that the grant-in-aid be re-calculated on a 'multiple'
basis that took into account both the size of each community and a per capita grant on the
number of pupils in school, which would have resulted in an overall increase of £5,000 to the
subsidy. Arlosoroff insisted that the grant-in-aid needed to be immediately increased because
the 1931 census demonstrated that the Jewish population in Palestine had increased relative
to the Arab population.':" After deliberations on the subject, the mandatory administration
agreed to move away from using overall population statistics to use relative school age
population figures.126 This formula actually resulted in a similar increase to the Zionists'
grant-in-aid than the multiple basis, but the Colonial Office felt that omitting a per capita
element made the formula more manageable.V'
The mandatory administration attempted to make payment of the grant-in-aid
contingent on reforms being enacted to the organisation of the Hebrew school system. In
1927, for example, Plumer had requested that a budgetary committee with government
representation was established; that changes were made to the constitution of the Zionist
Board of Education; and that a reduction in pupils' weekly lesson time was enacted to
:~:Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 9 April 1932, CO 733/224/11.
See League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes of the Fifteenth Session, 24 October - 11
November 1927, accessed via http://unispal.un.orgfUNISPAL.NSF/O/E211 072996E780B9052565F00065 1656,
on 01110/2012.
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decrease costS.128 The budgetary committee was established, but the other reforms failed to
materialise as the Zionist Board of Education was reluctant to impose the changes on its
teachers which would provoke their union. The mandatory administration's position was
somewhat incongruous. Whilst the teachers' strikes in the face of non-payment of salaries
were described as 'neither unnatural nor very reprehensible', the vigorous rejection of
reforms that threatened their interests was deemed to show a complete lack of 'public
spirit' .129 In terms of trusteeship, the mandatory administration was seeking to ensure that the
expansion of Zionist education remained stable and self-sufficient. Farrell explained that the
reforms were not intended to mean 'retrenchment but reorganisation with a view to securing
more efficient or expanded services at lesser costs' - the nationalist tone to Zionist education
did not even feature in British discussions about reform.130 Wauchope was concerned that the
economic instability of the Hebrew system had caused a gradual deterioration of Jewish
teachers' efficiency and morale.!" He endorsed Bowman's calls that the Zionist education
budget should be balanced 'in practice and not only in theory' by alterations to the teachers'
terms of service and a strengthening of the administrative powers of the Zionist education
authorities.132 Somewhat optimistically, given the history of Zionist reform, Wauchope
agreed to the new formula and increased the grant by £6,064 to nearly £25,000 in December
1932 after he 'anticipated' that the necessary changes would be carried out 'in the near
future' .133
This did not, however, signal an end to the financial difficulties. In 1932, the Jewish
Agency handed over control of the Hebrew school system to the Va 'ad Leumi. It undertook to
provide a contribution of £40,000 to cover the 1932-33 school year, yet financial difficulties
in the United States created a shortfall in donations from the Keren Hayesod funds, and the
Jewish Agency was only able to provide £8,000 of the promised grant. It requested an
emergency grant of £20,000 from the mandatory administration to cover the deficit. 134 The
unsympathetic reaction from the Colonial Office was predictable given its concerns about
limiting the mandatory administration's financialliability for Zionist education. Downie
minuted that it was time for the mandatory administration to 'stand fast', even in the event of
school closures: he exclaimed 'we are bound under the Mandate to facilitate the
128 Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 9 April 1932, CO 733/224/11.
129 Farrell, 'Relations between the Government of Palestine and the Jewish School System' pl0-12.
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establishment of the Jewish National Home, but the Palestine Government is not bound to
pay for the establishment of the Jewish National Home' (emphasis in original).135 He
believed the existing formula offered a 'reasonable and defensible basis' for calculating the
grant-in-aid to Zionist education and argued that 'the Jews cannot have it both ways': they
had to either accept the public nature of their schools and listen to government calls for
reform and reductions in expenditure, or revert to a private system and accept much smaller
grants-in-aid to individual schools.v" The seriousness of this situation seems to have
compelled the Zionist education authorities to listen to British calls for retrenchment. The
high commissioner approved a small advance on the forthcoming grant to cover teachers'
salaries and keep schools open, whilst the mandatory administration recommended specific
savings through the budgetary committee and helped to arrange a loan with Barclays Bank to
cover the remaining arrears.137
Financial difficulties like these virtually disappeared between 1933 and 1936 because
Jewish immigration led to an influx of capital. The Zionist education budget was bolstered by
local sources of revenue, particularly the municipality of Tel Aviv that contributed over
£22,000 in 1933-34.138 During these years, annual updates to the block grant were relatively
uncontentious, although in May 1935 the Jewish Agency lobbied for the formula to be
reverted back to using overall population sizes after the dramatic growth of the yishuv.139
Wauchope rejected this idea on the grounds that there were 'many thousands of Arab children
for whom Government is still unable to provide educational facilities'; the Colonial Office
agreed, commenting that the Zionists 'appear to adopt whatever formula will give the biggest
grant irrespective of the merits of the case,.140
The issue of government funding and its relation to the respective development of
Arab and Jewish education was a question that underpinned most considerations of the grant-
in-aid to the Zionist school system. Farrell's evidence to the Peel Commission is particularly
interesting in this respect. He explained that as Jewish immigrants mainly came from
countries enjoying a 'Western civilisation', they were 'in general at a higher cultural level'
than the Arabs and that, because of the international dimension of Zionism, through which
the yishuv could develop its social services, 'the antecedent difference of culture tends to
135 M' b D .
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widen rather than diminish' .141 At the very least, he explained, this 'cultural gap' could not be
allowed to become any wider. Farrell suggested that the 'ideal expression' of this policy
would be to deny all support to Jewish education until the 'gap' had been closed, but he
acknowledged that this was not practical and, until the mandatory administration could
provide universal and compulsory education, it would have to provide educational expenses
in 'strict proportion to the number of educands in either community' .142 His comments seem
to reflect a belief that the major difference between the two systems was financial, but this
was not the case. To really put Arab and Jewish education onto a similar footing, colonial
officials would have had to embrace the 'literary' education they so feared and invest far
more in secondary and higher forms of learning, both of which they believed were unsuitable
for an 'Oriental' people. The Zionist system clearly benefited from this disparity. Taking into
account fees charged by schools, the Hebrew system's total expenditure was about £250,000
for around 34,000 pupils in 1934-35, against roughly £180,000 for nearly 36,000 students in
the government system, but the fundamental reason for the perseverance of the 'cultural gap'
was the culture of imperialism itself.143 It shaped British understandings and priorities for
education in Palestine and allowed the mandatory administration to hand autonomy to the
Zionist movement in matters wider than education.
Conclusion
Under the imperatives of trusteeship, it was clearly recognised that the Arab population,
particularly the Arab Muslim community, required more help in educational matters than the
Christian or Jewish communities. This recognition, combined with the underlying image that
Arabs would not be able to manage their own education system, led to a centralisation of
control of government schools in British hands. Its fundamental aim was to promote basic
literacy for Arab Muslims, but the tensions between the developmental and protective aspects
of trusteeship served to constrain meaningful development for the Arab population relative to
Zionist advances. Colonial officials realised the potential for education to lead to the growth
of civic consciousness and the development of 'character' but they also feared the social
effects that might accompany 'literary' education and so, thinking about the consequences for
public security, they adopted a cautious approach to education that fell far short of Arab
demands in terms of both its scope and its character.
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During mandatory rule, Palestine witnessed dramatic economic and social changes.
Despite British hopes to 'insulate' the Arab community against the negative effects of such
trends, the inadequacies of government education meant that the transformations within Arab
society and the Palestinian economy proceeded at a quicker pace than the ability to utilise
'modem' concepts and methods. This was in stark contrast to the Zionist movement that was
adept at exploiting the 'universal' values propagated by the British colonial state. As Miller
has suggested, 'in this context, British control over education came to seem particularly
manipulative, designed to deprive the Arab community of the intellectual tools it required to
control the process of change' .144 'Under-development' was never an aim of British policy;
yet, in the face of a burgeoning Zionist sector, the priorities set for the government system
and the chronic lack of investment in it produced this result. When the mandate drew to a
close, only three out of every ten Arab children had attended school. As Segev explained,
'they were a lost generation' .145
Almost perversely, British officials were determined that the mandatory
administration would not provide undue help to the yishuv to allow the 'cultural gap' between
Jews and Arabs to widen further. In 1932, Wauchope wrote to the Colonial Office fearing
that any increases to the grant-in-aid would exacerbate 'a growing and dangerous disparity'
between the educational standards of the Muslim population and the Jewish community.l'"
Yet in recognising the Zionist system as public in the Education Ordinance of 1933, colonial
officials took on a responsibility to provide at least some funding for it. This was intended to
make the Zionist education authorities respond to government calls for greater financial
responsibility, but after numerous contentious episodes it was obvious that British calls for
retrenchment were never welcomed and only usually taken when it entailed either an increase
in the regular grant or the approval of an emergency payment. The aims of reform were
twofold but inter-related: to limit the mandatory administration's fmancialliability for Jewish
education so it could focus on the government system and to allow the Zionist system's
expansion to occur in a stable and a sustainable manner.
Farrell believed that the Hebrew school system was over-ambitious and financially
impossible to maintain due to the wages paid to teachers, the longer period of elementary
schooling - eight years in total- and its universal nature, and the admission of large numbers
:: Miller, Government and Society in Rural Palestine, p.l 08.
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of children into higher grades of schooling. 147Whilst the Hebrew school system was more
expensive per pupil, its ambitious nature also made it a potent tool for nation-building. Segev
provided another useful summary: 'the Hebrew education system ... formed the Jews into a
national community, prepared them for their war of independence, and led them to
victory' ,148 That could not have happened without British help. Not just directly through the
grant-in-aid but, more importantly, through the autonomy it gave to the Zionist Executive in
the early years of the mandate that allowed it to foster a nationalist system of education.
147 Farrell, 'Note on the Principles upon which the Grant-In-Aid of the Jewish Public School System Should be
Estimated and Applied', p.3.




During his inaugural speech on the King's birthday in July 1920, Sir Herbert Samuel
explained to those present that the 'greatness of the British Empire' rested on order being
'maintained with a firm hand'.' The 'firm' maintenance of law and order was necessary to
safeguard British imperial priorities in the region yet it was also required to create the
stability needed to discharge mandatory obligations and fulfil the imperatives of trusteeship.
This rationale can easily be overlooked in favour of the overarching need to protect British
interests, but, at the end of his term in office, Samuel suggested that 'the first of all the
conditions necessary for the welfare of the country is public security'. British approaches to
policing could therefore be justified by reference to the 'welfare' of the local population. 2
Law and order was also a matter of prestige, because failure to successfully deal with
outbreaks of violence had the potential to undermine the wider image of British power. For
these reasons, the commitment to maintain public security could often take precedence over
other aspects of colonial governance and undermine policies that sought to promote
development in Palestine, but trusteeship also informed British objectives towards law and
order in a significant manner. As the Peel Commission noted in 1937, the overarching aim of
the Palestine government had been to train 'an efficient force of Police to preserve internal
order'.' A key British aim under trusteeship was to shift the burden of responsibility for
public security to local, self-sufficient forces by cultivating a sense of autonomy and reducing
their reliance on garrisoned British and Indian troops.
The security problems that Britain experienced in Palestine have been a prominent
feature of the historiography. The repeated outbreak of rioting and rebellion is one of the
most discussed aspects of British rule in Palestine." After the riots in 1920 and 1921,
significant episodes of disorder occurred again in 1929 and 1933, but between 1936-39 and
1944-48 the mandate was characterised by open rebellion and then civil war as Britain
withdrew from Palestine. These events have often been utilised as turning points in the
~Samuel to Curzon, 12 July 1920, FO 406/44.
3 Samuel to Amery, 'S Year Report', April 1925, CO 733/110.
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general histories of mandatory rule and used to illustrate deep tensions underlying Arab-
Jewish relations. To a large degree this cannot be disputed, although this thesis has
emphasised that 1929 was less of a turning point for British policy than is often assumed. The
broad subject of law and order has been mainly explored through these incidents, particularly
the Arab rebellion in the 1930s and the Jewish revolt in the 1940s, rather than an examination
of the British structures that were in place throughout mandatory rule. The historiography on
counter-insurgency has tended to focus on the causes of disorder and the British response
towards it, whilst emphasising that the mandatory administration was often unprepared,
reactive, and even indecisive in its approach. S However, in a pattern that seems to be gaining
momentum after literature on the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya demonstrated British atrocities
there, some recent studies have started to chart the repression and brutality used by British
soldiers in combating rebellion."
There has been a trend within the historiography on law and order that has looked
more specifically to the police force of Palestine. 7 The force became increasingly important
as a training ground for colonial officers, many of whom served in Palestine during the 1930s
before moving on to positions in other parts of the colonial empire. In tum, the difficulties of
policing in Palestine attracted some of the empire's specialists who attempted to introduce
reforms following outbreaks of major disorder. The two most prominent examples were Sir
Herbert Dowbiggin, inspector-general of the Ceylon Police, who restructured the force
following its inadequate handling of the Western Wall riots of August 1929, and Sir Charles
Tegart, commissioner of the Calcutta Police, who went to Palestine in 1937 to advise the
mandatory government on fighting the Arab rebellion. The impact of these experts has
garnered much debate, but often the analysis is removed from the broader context of the
5 For general analysis on British counter-insurgency in Palestine, see Charles Townshend, Britain's Civil Wars:
Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth Century, (London, Faber, 1986); Shepherd, Ploughing Sand, eh, 5; Thomas
Empires 0/ Intelligence, eh, 8. For analysis on the Arab rebellion, see Tom Bowden, The Breakdown of Public '
Security: the case of Ireland. 1916-21, and Palestine, 1936-39, (London, Sage, 1977); Michael Cohen, 'Sir
Arthur Wauchope, the Army, and the Rebellion in Palestine, 1936', Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 9, No.1,
(January 1973); Charles Townshend, 'The Defence of Palestine: Insurrection and Public Security, 1936-39',
English Historical Review, Vol. 103, No. 409, (October 1988).
6 See Jacob Norris, 'Repression and Rebellion: Britain's Response to the Arab Revolt in Palestine of 1936-39'
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 36, No.1, (2008), pp.22-45; and Matthew Hughes, 'The
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security situation. One important exception to this tendency is Martin Kolinsky's Law, Order,
and Riots in Mandatory Palestine, 1928-35, which explores both the reforms introduced by
Dowbiggin and their subsequent effect on the security situation.l
The maintenance of law and order was a necessity across all territories in the colonial
empire, but Palestine's particular circumstances elevated it above conventional problems.
Tensions that developed as a consequence of British policies relating to self-government,
land, immigration, and education, amongst others, meant that the effort to maintain public
order increasingly consumed the attention - and not to mention the budget" - of the Palestine
government during the mandate. During the 1920s, the main responsibility for upholding law
and order rested with two semi-militarised gendarmeries. Their approach to public security
was mainly reactive, hoping to promptly contain an outbreak of disorder rather than prevent it
from happening. The police force was neglected during this decade and an intelligence-led
approach to security was notably absent. The main intelligence gathering apparatus of the
mandatory administration were the district administrations, which relied heavily on local
opinion or newspaper reporting rather than rigorous investigative or human intelligence
practices. to As Martin Thomas has pointed out in Empires of Intelligence, a 'functioning
intelligence state' remained elusive during the mandate: as relations with the Arab
community deteriorated and resistance to British rule gained momentum, the possibility of
creating useful intelligence links diminished as well. II
These problems reflected the general context in which policing was carried out in
Palestine: two antagonistic, sometimes hostile, populations motivated by differing forms of
nationalism with tensions that manifested themselves in the political, economic, and religious
spheres, usually over disputes about immigration, land purchases, or claims to sacred urban
spaces. However, communal tensions were not unique in the colonial empire and had been
experienced in places like Ceylon or Ireland. Initially, the main threats to public security were
not conceived in racial terms and were concerned primarily with the elimination of
highwaymen and brigands, and the policing of new colonial borders to prevent tribal raiding.
The relative inattention paid to communal tensions derived from images of the 'docile' Arab
: Martin Kolinsky, Law. Order. and Riots in Mandatory Palestine. 1928-35, (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1993).
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who would be obedient to a colonial state that robustly exercised its authority. This idea was
soon undermined when tensions between the Jewish and Arab communities escalated into
violence: first in April 1920 during the Nebi Musa festival and again in May 1921 with the
Jaffa riots. After this, the assumption was that outbreaks of Arab disorder were driven by
spontaneous outbursts of religious or racial emotion, not political motivation directed towards
national goals. The inter-war years were a formative moment for Palestinian Arab
nationalism'", but the British refusal to acknowledge political disorder in such terms had a
profound influence on the way that Britain structured the security forces in Palestine. The
initial conception of security goals never fully faded, and there was a significant convergence
in the approach that British officials believed was required to effectively police Palestine in
the 1920s that led to the establishment of semi-militarised gendarmeries.
The aim of transferring responsibility for internal security to local forces was part of a
general process of 'civilianisation' under trusteeship that called for a clear delineation
between the functions of the police and the military and a more preventive approach to law
and order. The primary aim of this chapter is to examine the development of the security
forces in Palestine and explore these trends. Ultimately, the maintenance of law and order
assumed a higher priority than the devolution of responsibility, but the aim of 'civilianising'
the security forces remained a long-term objective of strategic planning. During the 1920s,
the expansion of the police force's responsibilities was inhibited by assumptions about the
Arab character which emphasised that it was very difficult to prevent an outbreak and that a
strong reactive force needed to be in place to contain violence. Samuel offered a typical
British verdict in this respect:
The majority of the people are illiterate; placid, and as a rule easily led by men in
whom they place confidence, they are prone to fierce personal and family quarrels,
and, like other oriental peoples, are occasionally liable to be swept by passion or panic
into excitement and unreasoning violence. Strangely credulous as they often are, the
most improbable and unfounded stories may find a ready acceptance, and give rise to
sudden riots.'?
Concerns over the reliability of Arab and Jewish officers to use robust policing tactics against
their own communities inhibited moves to devolve responsibility for security out of British
hands. The secondary aim of this chapter is to explore how cultural assumptions informed
general British thinking on law and order in Palestine. To carry out these aims, this chapter
12 See, for example, Weldon C. Matthews, Confronting an Emp_ire, Constructing a Nation: Arab Nationalists
and Popular Politics in Mandate Palestine, (London, LB. Tauns, 2006).
13 Samuel's 'S Year Report', Apri1192S, CO 733/110.
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will examine the early formation of the security forces between 1920 and 1926; the
legislative powers used to uphold law and order in the 1920s; the re-organisation of the
Palestine police after 1929; and finally the security situation between 1930 and 1936.
It must be noted, however, that the overarching need to transfer responsibility to local
forces and reduce their reliance on the garrison was not only driven by trusteeship but also
significantly by cost. In terms of perceived efficiency, the creation of an all-British police
force was the ideal although the high expense alone precluded this as a realistic proposition.
The contribution that the British taxpayer made to Palestine for security was already deemed
far too high: in 1921, it stood at a staggering £3.5 million.l" Concerns over expenditure
operated on two levels: the cost of the military garrison, primarily responsible for external
defence, which was shouldered directly by the British government, and the cost of local
forces for internal security, which were funded by a mixture of Palestinian revenues and a
grant-in-aid from Britain. The aim of the government in London was to reduce the garrison as
far as possible and transfer security functions to local forces whilst retaining a minimum
defence capability. This meant the financial burden of Palestine to the taxpayer decreased as
military forces were withdrawn, but the cost of public security to Palestine increased
significantly as local units were enlarged to close the gap. Itwas a difficult balancing act
when unrest could spread across Palestine very quickly; mistakes in paring down the garrison
too quickly were harshly exposed, for example, in the riots of August 1929 that claimed the
lives of 133 Jews and 116 Arabs. IS
The Formation of the Security Forces and the British Gendarmerie, 1920-26
Two of the major influences on the early development of the public security forces in
Palestine were the establishment of new colonial frontiers under the mandate system and the
outbreaks of disorder during the Nebi Musa riots in April 1920 and the Jaffa riots in May
1921. Both demonstrated the need for a semi-militarised police force that was mobile enough
to check banditry and brigandage along Palestine's borders, mainly with Transjordan, whilst
being able to respond quickly to internal disorder. The police force that the mandatory
administration inherited from the military administration was a disorganised body. After the
British occupation, military governors had created independent local forces to fill the gap
created by withdrawal of the Ottoman gendarmerie but there was no centralised command
:: Churchill to Samuel, 12 November 1921, CO 733/6; Samuel to Churchill, 16 November 1921, CO 733/6.
'Report of the Commission on the Palestine Disturbances of August, 1929', p65.
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structure and police officers were primarily used as messengers, guards, or tax collectors,
which meant that military assistance was repeatedly invoked to deal with unrest. The
precedent of using a militarised approach to civil disorder was set early under British rule and
was difficult to break given the weakness of the police. By the beginning of 1921, around 60
per cent of the force had resigned on grounds of poor pay and conditions.l'' As the long-term
aim under trusteeship was for a civilian police force to handle public security, one of the
early priorities for the civil administration was to enact legislation that regulated the police
force and created better conditions. The Police Ordinance of 1921 created a director of public
security whose job was to co-ordinate the police force and increase its efficiency. The
legislation drew heavily on the Indian model of colonial policing and emphasised that the key
duties of an officer were to contain outbreaks of public disorder rather than engage in the
prevention and detection of crime, which was highly revealing of the early priorities of the
British colonial state."
Those priorities were also shaped by the disorder of 1920 and 1921. The catalyst for
these outbreaks of violence was understood in terms of cultural preconceptions, which were
instrumental in shaping assumptions about the goals of public security, particularly that it
would be the Arab community who would attack the Jewish one, and that isolated Jewish
colonies would need to be protected from those attacks. The development of the public
security forces occurred with Orientalist judgments about the Arab character in mind. The
commission of enquiry set up to investigate the causes of the 1921 riots under Sir Thomas
Haycraft, Palestine's chief justice, commented that 'when Arab discontent with Zionist
manifestations and resentment against the new immigrants reached its climax ... a
demonstration of Bolshevik Jews became the occasion for a popular explosion' by the
'credulous and excitable' Arabs who readily formed together when 'any cause of excitement
arises' .18 The idea that Arab disorder would take the form of a spontaneous 'popular
explosion' created a preference for acting rapidly to contain violence, rather than establishing
an intelligence-led approach that emphasised prevention. The report continued:
The Arab population is ordinarily very obedient to authority, and it is only when some
religious or racial emotion is aroused that it becomes difficult to manage. The Jews
are less obedient to authority and more difficult to control; on the other hand, they are
16 Sir Herbert Dowbiggin, 'Report on the Palestine Police Force', 6 May 1930, CO 935/4, p.36.
17 Draft Police Ordinance, December 1920, HO 45/24727.
18 'Reports of the Commission ofInquiry into the Disturbances in May, 1921', pp.18-9.
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less prone to that sudden access of violence which characterises the Arab when
aroused to anger by some actual or supposed wrong or provocation.l"
This statement demonstrates a variety of the cultural preconceptions that existed throughout
the mandate. The resonant image here is the 'docile native', who is 'ordinarily very obedient
to authority', but who could be aroused into fits of violent passion through 'religious or racial
emotion' that demonstrated his irrationality. This was compounded by the suggestion that the
Arab found it difficult to discern an 'actual' wrong or provocation from a 'supposed' one and
that, in any case, aggravation could only be understood in terms of race or religion, not
political grievances - a crucial judgment for the colonial state as it created the underlying
context which allowed it to downgrade the need to engage in serious political discourse with
the native population. The statement is also important because it shows how perceptions of
the Jewish community differed from the traditional image of colonial subjects. They were
'difficult to control' and 'less obedient to authority' than colonial officials were used to
dealing with, which created a sense of ambivalence in British-Zionist relations.
These assumptions created difficulties for transferring the responsibility for public
security to local forces and encouraged the idea of using paramilitary forces. InApril 1921,
discussions had taken place about creating a Palestine 'Home Force' to supplement and then
replace the British garrison, which would consist of both Arabs and Jews but would draw its
senior officers from the British army.20 Inparallel with self-government, the tendency to
centralise command in the hands of British officers was a key theme in efforts at developing
public security forces. This reflected underlying concerns about the reliability of Arab-Jewish
forces when it came to emergencies. In the aftermath of the riots, Samuel asked that the funds
allocated for the defence force instead be allocated to the creation of a special Police Reserve
with a high proportion of British officers to assist the regular police during emergencies and
protect Palestine's border.f An inter-departmental committee in London concurred with this
plan, but it also suggested that responsibility for the defence of Palestine be transferred to the
Air Ministry and proposed that Jewish colonists should be armed so that they could protect
themselves.F The decision to use the Royal Air Force to structure Palestine's strategic
priorities was in line with the wider context of British imperial policing after World War I
19 Ibid, p.24.
~~Samuel to Churchill, 29 Apri11921, CO 733/1.
22 Samuel to Churchill, 13 May 1921, CO 733/1.
Churchill to Samuel, 20 May 1921, CO 733/1.
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across the Middle East23 but, as Thomas noted, it was a questionable move in Palestine where
the rapid escalation of communal urban violence was the main threat to internal order. The
aeroplane was a formidable symbol of colonial authority in rural areas, particularly Iraq and
Yemen, during the inter-war years but it was lethal and indiscriminate, which did not make it
an efficient instrument for bringing a disorderly urban situation under control or gathering
useful intelligence.i" The decision to place Palestine under Air Ministry control on grounds of
cost is understandable in terms of border security, but not internal security when the
mandatory administration would be forced to rely on uniformed men on the ground during
times of emergency.
In late 1921, a scheme to create a British gendarmerie was approved that would
facilitate the withdrawal of regular British troops from the garrison. The creation of an
auxiliary British unit, combined with a garrison of Indian troops, would produce a saving for
the British exchequer of around £1 million whilst providing the same number of 'bayonets
and sabres for keeping order'." In order to meet the obligations of trusteeship, a 566-strong
Palestinian gendarmerie was established as a local body to maintain law and order. The
creation of these units underscored the belief that the police would be unable to cope with
disorder. The British gendarmerie was regarded as the body that would take on most
responsibility until the Palestine gendarmerie was ready, which demonstrated that only an all-
British unit could, at that time, be considered completely reliable in times of crisis. The
British gendarmerie was recruited from the recently disbanded 'black and tans' of the Royal
Irish Constabulary who had earned notoriety for their treatment of the Irish civilian
population" This was a clear signal that order would be maintained with a firm hand and
that the British gendarmerie would be used punitively during outbreaks of disorder; an
initiative that, in the short term at least, reinforced the military character of the approach
taken to law and order.
This character was further affirmed when the Colonial Office insisted that as the
director of public security would be responsible for the gendarmeries, the position would
need to be held by someone who had significant military rather than policing experience. To
coincide with the establishment of the British gendarmerie in May 1922, Major-General H.H.
23 See, for example, David Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control: the Royal Air Force, 1919-1939,
(Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1990).
24 Thomas, Empires of Intelligence, pp.230-1.
25 Churchill to Samuel, 12 November 1921, CO 733/6.
26 See Keith-Roach to Devonshire, 20 November 1922, CO 733/27.
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Tudor was installed as both General Officer Commanding and director of public security.
After his service in Ireland, it was hoped that his expertise would inform policy and promote
stability. This move concentrated responsibility for the garrison, the two gendarmeries, and
the police in a single office_27Whilst this dual role was slightly ambiguous, as Tudor reported
to the high commissioner in both a civil and a military capacity", it was a demonstrative
highpoint of the militarised approach taken to public order that focused more on paramilitary
forces than on developing the local police force for 'regular' duties. The lack of importance
given to the police was shown in July 1923 when, on financial grounds, its training school in
Jaffa was closed, its strength reduced by 210 to 1,100 officers, and general pay lowered in
favour of conduct and proficiency bonuses."
Cost was also a divisive issue for the British gendarmerie. Churchill asked Samuel if
the money for it could be found out of Palestine revenues, even if that meant increasing
taxation or reducing expenditure on public health or education. The colonial secretary argued
that either of these were 'preferable to imposing further burden on [the] British exchequer',
which demonstrated both the importance of reducing British liabilities and how concerns for
public security took precedence over other goals.i" In the end, the British government in
London was forced to pay a grant-in-aid to cover some of the costs, but this had an important
effect on the constitution of the unit. The mandatory administration had wanted 500 of the
700 gendarmes to be mounted so that the unit would be a predominantly mobile one."
However, to reduce costs, the Colonial Office decided that the British gendarmerie would
have to arrive in Palestine as a dismounted unit and that the high commissioner could transfer
horses and equipment from the 'native' gendarmerie, as the Colonial Office called it, to the
'white' gendarmerie.V The use of such characterisation reflected the prevalence of race in
issues of security and reliability; a key question for the Palestinian gendarmerie was to be its
ethnic composition. In principle, recruitment was on the basis of a minimum of one-third
Jews and one-third Arabs, but the number of Jews who signed up was well below target.33
For the remainder a 'leavening' of non-Palestinians was sought to guarantee reliability.
27 Shuckburgh to Air Ministry, 9 March 1922, CO 733/19.
28 Colonial Office Memorandum undated CO 733/1929 ' , •
30 Dowbiggin, 'Report on the Palestine Police', p37.
3 Churchill to Samuel, 2S February 1922, CO 733/18.
3: Ch~chill to Samuel, 10 February 1922, CO 733/18.
33 Ml~ute by Young, 19 April 1922, CO 733/18.
KolInsky, Law, Order and Riots in Mandatory Palestine, p.2S.
201
Cypriots, Armenians, Assyrians, and Circassians were all considered, but only Assyrians and
Circassians were considered to be 'good material for recruitment' .34
InMarch 1923, Samuel wrote to the Colonial Office explaining that the 'black and
tans' stigma that had been attached to the British gendarmerie had 'vanished' and that the
'degree of control' and 'moral force' exhibited by the irregular body in its special duties more
than justified its existence.f The Palestine gendarmerie was also lauded for being free from
'racial and religious contentions' and possessing 'excellent discipline and morale', which had
allowed it to undertake more 'regular' policing activities in the frontier towns - although the
reduction of the police in July was probably the more acute reason." The effect of the two
bodies was seen in the reduction of highway robbery during 1922-5, with 180 instances
reported in 1922 falling to 71 by 1925.37 At the end of his tenure Samuel could report that 'a
rapid pacification of the country' had been carried out, in which 'the spirit of lawlessness
[had] ceased', although this may have been an optimistic valedictory statement as highway
robbery, for example, continued." Nevertheless, the apparent growth in stability, mirrored by
the absence of significant outbreaks of public disorder during this period, allowed the
mandatory administration and the Colonial Office to make significant changes to the structure
and size of the garrison and security forces.
Discussions over reducing the garrison had begun in July 1922 as the Colonial Office
sought to make economies in the British grant-in-aid to Palestine. Yet cost was not the only
factor in re-organisation, and the Iong-term goal of transferring the burden of security to local
forces was a prominent consideration. Tudor, for example, suggested that 'the establishment
of the Palestine Police and Gendarmerie on a proper footing is the first and most essential
step towards the ultimate goal of making Palestine self-supporting in the matter of internal
security', whilst both the Colonial Office and mandatory administration were agreed on the
desirability of creating a clear organisational divide between the police and military."
The growth of external stability in the region following the British suppression of the
revolt in Iraq and the French conquest of Syria during 1920 meant that calculations over the
34 Samuel to Churchill, 31 July 1921, CO 733/4; Churchill to Samuel, 11 August 1921, CO 733/4.
35 Samuel to Churchill, 7 March 1923, CO 733/43
36 Ibid; Report of the Committee on Public Security, 30 March 1923, CO 733/46; Dowbiggin, 'Report on the
Palestine Police', p.37.
37 'Palestine. Royal Commission Report', p.186.
38 Samuel '8 Five Year Report, April 1925, CO 733/110.
39 Major-General H.H. Tudor to Chief Secretary, 18 August 1923, CO 733/49; Samuel to Devonshire, 26 July
1923, CO 733/46.
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size of the garrison could be made primarily in reference to its role assisting the civil power."
From Tudor's point of view, it was more desirable to reduce the size of the garrison in order
to maintain an effective force of gendarmerie." This set in motion a steady withdrawal of the
garrison until, in 1924, only a cavalry regiment, RAF squadron, and a company of RAF
armoured cars remained, at a cost of around £1.5 million. The garrison of 1920 had consisted
of a British and an Indian cavalry regiment, a British and an Indian infantry battalion, units
from the RAF, and detachments from the Royal Engineers, Royal Artillery, and Royal Army
Service COrpS.42However, the pressure to reduce the British contribution to Palestine
remained and, in May 1924, the idea was put forward to reduce the size of both gendarmeries
and incorporate them into the police force, which was a clear signal that policing concerns
were beginning to.take priority over military considerations. Samuel was particularly hesitant
about these plans and believed they would undermine the security of Palestine's frontier with
Transjordan.Y A conference between the high commissioner, the colonial secretary, Leo
Amery, and the air secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, was arranged in April 1925 and, despite
Samuel's reluctance, it was proposed that the Palestine gendarmerie of 500 men become a
fully militarised force -later known as the Transjordan Frontier Force - and re-deployed
along the Transjordanian side of the border, whilst the British gendarmerie, which now
numbered 450, be further reduced to 200 and absorbed into the police force, which would
then stand at 1,500 men." Itwas decided to postpone the final decision on the re-organisation
to gain the views of the next high commissioner.
Lord Plumer recognised that there was a clear obligation to shift the responsibility for
public security to local forces and accepted the recommendations of the inter-departmental
conference in line with the imperatives of trusteeship. He affirmed the principle ofa creating
a clear distinction between forces employed in 'normal' policing duties and those required for
military operations. Plumer was an experienced soldier, having served in the Sudan, southern
Africa, Ireland, the Western Front at Ypres, and then as post-war governor of Malta in a
career that began in 1884.45After the First World War, he received a promotion to field
marshal, which meant that the Colonial Office regarded his advice on the question of public
~ Fieldhouse, Western Imperialism in the Middle East, pp.86-88; pp.253-4.
I Tudor to Chief Secretary, 23 February 1924, CO 733/66.
42 See Samuel to Churchill, 20 July 1922, CO 733/23; Samuel to Churchill, 7 December 1923, CO 733/51;
Powbiggin, 'Report on the Palestine Police Force', p.36.
~ Samuel to Thomas, 16 May 1924, CO 733/68; Colonial Office Minutes, 19 February 1925, CO 733/87.
45 Symes to Amery, 17 July 1925, CO 733/95.
See 'Herbert Charles Onslow Plumer', Oxford DNB,
http://www.oxforddnb.comlvicw/articlc/35545?docPos-l accessed on 25/10/2012.
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security very highly." His main concern was directed towards the border with Transjordan;
he thought that military forces in Palestine were largely unnecessary and that an Arab force in
Transjordan, supported by aircraft and armoured cars, would ensure public security for
Palestine.Y His recommendations included more ambitious proposals for the police, which
included a new training depot and a distinct role for the British component of the
gendarmerie, who were to deal with urban disorder and patrol main roads - the vital arteries
in times of disorder." Plumer has been criticised for reducing the garrison too quickly and, in
Kolinsky's words, for stretching the 'thin line' of Palestine's security to 'breaking point',"
However, this point is made with hindsight following the security forces' inadequate
response to the riots in 1929. The mandatory administration and the Colonial Office made
steady reductions to the garrison throughout the 1920s to minimise the cost to the British
taxpayer, whilst the primary responsibility for public security had been given to the semi-
militarised gendarmeries. This meant that the long-term development of the police was
neglected in favour of short-term stability, which was not solely attributable to Plumer's
endorsement of the recommendations of the inter-departmental committee of Apri11925.
Law and Order in the 1920s: Prevention of Crime, Collective Punishment, and
'Heinous' Crime Legislation
The major focus of the mandatory administration during the 1920s was on the cost and
structure of the security forces in Palestine. Considerations about preventing crime formed a
secondary priority in thinking about law and order. The connections between crime and
public order are not usually discussed in the secondary literature, yet the legislative actions of
the mandatory administration could often be put towards both ends. The aim of this section is
to examine how legislation enacted to fight crime could also be utilised to prevent and punish
outbreaks ofpubJic disorder. Despite the 'reactive' structuring of Palestine's security forces
in this decade, the legal powers that were handed to them did allow for something of a
preventive mode of action. The obstacles for that approach to be effective were, as Thomas
has suggested, the lack ofa 'functioning intelligence state' and the cultural assumption that
Arab disorder, driven by spontaneous 'religious or racial emotion', would be too difficult to
avert. In those terms, this section will also explore how such legislation was based on
46 Minute by Lloyd, 14 November 1925, CO 733/98.
47 Minute by Young,S August 1925, CO 733/95.
48 Plumer to Amery, 30 October 1925, CO 733/98.
49 See Kolinsky, Law. Order. and Riots in Mandatory Palestine, pp.24-30; and Thomas, Empires of Intelligence,
pp.232-4.
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Orientalist stereotypes of the Arab population. Indeed, when thinking about crime it was clear
that the mandatory administration's focus was mainly on the Arab community. For British
officials, the frequency of 'heinous' crime in Palestine, particularly murder, was rooted in the
Arab 'character'. Sir Gilbert Clayton, the chief secretary, for example, explained to the
Colonial Office in discussions about the Ottoman penal code that it was clear that the Arab
'sense of right and wrong is undeveloped'. so
In December 1921, the high commissioner forwarded copies of two ordinances that
had been passed in advisory council to the Colonial Office: a Collective Responsibility for
Crime Ordinance and a Prevention of Crime (Additional Powers) Ordinance. These
represented a major expansion oflegal powers to strengthen the hand of the mandatory
government against what was described as an 'epidemic of crime' in Palestine. They were
both viewed as emergency laws that could be repealed after an improvement in public
security, but remained in force for a substantial period of time before being consolidated into
standing pieces of legislation. 51 Both had utility in preventing crime generally and stopping or
punishing acts of public disorder.
The original Prevention of Crime Ordinance, which was enacted in 1920, allowed for
the 'binding over' of persons suspected of unlawful designs, including those inciting sedition,
'loitering in circumstances which suggest that they are about to commit an offence', or
'habitual thieves and bad characters who are a danger to the community'. District governors
or the president of a district court could order a person to execute a bond with a surety that
guaranteed 'good' behaviour for a period of one year. This was found to be effective in
controlling those who might provoke unrest, but had little effect on the other two categories
so the additional powers ordinance in 1921 allowed the police to place supervision orders in
these cases. 52 The key aim of the orders was to restrict the movement of any 'untrustworthy'
person. The penalties varied, but they included restricting where someone could live,
preventing the person from leaving the town or district without police consent, making the
person liable to present himself at the nearest police station when called upon to do so, or
imposing a curfew. Breaking the orders meant losing the security paid and the imposition of
50
51 Clayton to Thomas, 2 July 1924, CO 733/70.
52 ~amuel to Churchill, 9 December 1921, CO 733/8.
Explanatory Note. Prevention of Crime Ordinance', undated, CO 733/8.
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either a six-month prison sentence or a £50 fine.s3 Clearly, measures used to fight crime
could also in theory be used to prevent public disorder.
The mandatory administration also held wide powers under the Collective
Responsibility for Crime Ordinance. It acknowledged that collective punishment required
'thorough safeguards' to prevent its abuse but it offered a useful method of redressing
grievances when insufficient evidence was available to convict individuals for a particular
crime. A claimant could apply to the district commissioner through the village mukhtar and,
ifhe consented, the application would be heard in the district court who would decide
whether there were grounds for collective responsibility. If a collective punishment was
imposed, the court would draw up a list of all those liable to pay and the amount of
compensation due. Alternatively, the high commissioner had the power to bypass the courts
and order a district governor to impose his own punishments, which allowed the mandatory
administration to implement a penalty when it believed that prompt action was necessary.l"
Its main use during the 1920s was to check village feuding within the Arab community,
where common practice was to cut down a neighbouring village's trees causing long-term
economic damage. In 1924, the powers were extended to deal with lawlessness in the
Southern district of Palestine, which had a high concentration of Bedouin tribes, whose
'turbulent and lawless conduct', which included raiding, had become 'a danger to all law-
abiding people of whatever denomination'c'" Under the Prevention of Crime in Tribal Areas
Ordinance, the conditions under which collective punishments could be imposed were
widened to include anyone who conspired or abetted the commission of an offence, who
failed to render assistance to discover the offenders or help effect their arrest, who assisted in
the escape or harboured a person suspected of having committed an offence, or helped to
destroy the evidence of the commission of a crime. 56 Plumer wanted to extend the ordinance
to municipal areas, but the Colonial Office blocked this idea on the grounds that enforcing
collective punishment in the municipalities would have a negative effect on British prestige. 57
In 1925, a consolidating ordinance was enacted that turned the Collective Responsibility for
Crimes Ordinance 1921 and the Prevention of Crime in Tribal Areas Ordinance 1924 into
standing pieces of legislation.
53 See Prevention of Crime (Additional Powers) Ordinance 1921,7 December 1921, CO 733/8.
S4 'Explanatory Note. Collective Responsibility for Crime', undated, CO 733/8; Collective Responsibility for
Crime Ordinance 1921,8 December 1921, CO 733/8.
ssMinute by Shuckburgh, 30 January 1924, CO 733/51; Samuel to Devonshire, 30 November 1923, CO 733/51.
S6 See Draft Prevention of Crime in Tribal Areas Ordinance 1923, CO 733/51.
S7 Minute by T.K. Lloyd, 16 November 1925, CO 733190.
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The idea of holding villages collectively responsible can be seen as part of a general
attempt to impress a sense of civic responsibility upon the Arab character. Albert Abramson,
a district commissioner, suggested that it had enabled him to establish 'tranquillity' across his
territory. Hugh Foot, another district commissioner, reached a similar view and took
particular pride in putting a stop to the practice of tree cutting in his district during the
1930s.58 The use of collective punishment connected to the ethos of ruling with a 'firm hand',
but it was also something that British officials felt was a familiar and natural process of
justice for rural Arabs. Abramson, for example, explained that the Arabs were being
governed according to their own 'tribal customs' .59 When the legislation was consolidated,
the colonial secretary, Leo Amery, reiterated the point that using collective responsibility was
a punitive measure congruent with Arab customs." Collective punishment was often used in
the colonial empire and when the Colonial Office proposed that the legislation relating to
collective punishment be consolidated, they put forward the Nigerian ordinance as a model
for guidance. It became an important weapon in the mandatory administration's arsenal and
was used frequently during the Arab rebellion of 1936-39, but it had been primarily
developed as a response to crime within the Arab community during the 1920s.61
The exceptional powers granted in the Prevention of Crimes Ordinance and the
collective responsibility laws highlighted a general need to make changes to the underlying
system of criminal law in Palestine. A new criminal code was not implemented until 1936,
despite recognition that the Ottoman penal code was defective with the establishment of the
civil government in July 1920.62 It was decided that the issue should be left for the proposed
legislative council to consider, so discussions on the subject did not begin again until March
1924 when the high commissioner wrote to the Colonial Office with concerns about the
prevalence of 'heinous crime' and the police's failure to deal with it. Clayton, who was
administering the government, suggested in July 1924 that deficiencies in the detection of
crime and the preparation of prosecutions were 'an inevitable consequence' of the infancy of
the police and its lack of experience. 63 Part of the problem was again thought to reside with
the Arab character and its lack of civic responsibility. Clayton explained to the Colonial
Office that
58 H
59 ~gh Foot, A Start in Freedom, (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1964), p.4S.
60 Minute by E. Keith-Roach, 31 January 1925, CO 733/87.
61 Amery to Clayton, 4 August 1925, CO 733/87.
62 Shepherd, Ploughing Sand, pp.196-7.
63 Colonial Office Note on the Replacement of the Ottoman Penal Code, undated, CO 733170.
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There is no general appreciation of public duty or responsibility to help the
administration of justice, so that evidence against criminals is rarely volunteered, and
the inhabitants ... [never] allow themselves even indirectly to be instrumental in the
capture of offenders' .64
Criminals were also able to routinely evade justice through incomplete investigation or
technical irregularities in the prosecution, which led Clauson, an official in the Colonial
Office, to describe the Ottoman criminal code as 'unsuitable, incomplete, and ineffective' in
., f'cri 65preventmg senous acts 0 cnme.
The debate on how to remodel the Ottoman code, which entailed over 12 years of
delay, revolved around trying to create an 'ideal' criminal system and one that was relevant
for the 'Oriental' nature of Palestine. The 'ideal' system was based entirely on English
criminal law and was seen by British officials as the most equitable possible. In terms of
trusteeship, this was the most desirable solution for the future, but there was a pragmatic
element to the maintenance of law and order which emphasised that the criminal code must
work in the colonial context to which it would be applied. The more pragmatic proposals
were based on the Egyptian criminal code, because its 'Moslem character' would make it
suitable for the Arabs of Palestine." InJuly 1924, a draft based on the Egyptian code was put
forward by the mandatory administration, but the Colonial Office did not approve of a
'hotch-potch' derived partly from the previous Ottoman regime/" The codes of British
Guiana, the Gold Coast, Cyprus, and the Sudan were all considered as alternatives but none
were regarded as suitable.68
At the heart of the dispute was the classification of various offences; many of which
were held by the Colonial Office as 'contrary to the fundamental principles of English
, ,
justice' .69 These differences highlighted some inherent contradictions between trying to
devise an ideal solution, that was in line with trusteeship, and the need to reach a compromise
that supported British views of what 'suited' the native population, whilst helping to expedite
colonial rule. The draft based on the Egyptian model preserved a distinction between wilful
homicide and wilful premeditated homicide, which destabilized the differences between
murder and manslaughter within English law. Both wilful homicide and wilful premeditated
64 Clayton to Thomas, 2 July 1924, CO 733/70.
6S Minute by Clauson, 22 July 1924, CO 733/70.
66 Colonial Office Note on the Replacement of the Ottoman Penal Code, undated, CO 733/70.
67 Clayton to Thomas, 16 July 1924, CO 733/71.




homicide contained a less severe penalty than murder - to which the Colonial Office
remarked 'anyone who is content to live in this atmosphere of Arabian Nights will no doubt
be quite satisfied'. 70 A related predicament was over the status of diyet or 'blood money' paid
as a result of feuding. The practice was repugnant to British ideas of order and the Colonial
Office believed that 'a British administration ought not to tolerate the principle of these blood
feuds at all', suggesting that condoning the diyet effectively sanctioned murder." Yet the
mandatory administration was reluctant to interfere directly with this 'essential institution of
the Moslem religion', which, it argued, actually prevented feuds from spiralling out of
control.72 Debate also focused on the use of flogging as a criminal punishment. Plumer first
wanted it introduced in 1928 for sexual offences, robbery with violence, or robbery on the
highway, but district officials rebelled against its implementation, arguing that it was not
suitable for the local population.P The debate on whether to include flogging was primarily
responsible for holding up the enactment of a new criminal code in the 1930s after the
Howard League for Penal Reform lobbied the government against its incorporation into
Palestinian law. 74
The discussions about the rationale underpinning the various legislative changes to
criminal law were conducted primarily with the Arab community in mind. The yishuv was a
less obvious concern for crime and aspects of Jewish criminality were often overlooked
during the 1920s. The smuggling of arms into Palestine was a key example in this respect. In
January 1922, a consignment of arms, including 303 automatic pistols and 17,000 rounds of
ammunition, was discovered at the port of Haifa concealed in steel cylinders and beehives.
The shipment had left from the port of Trieste and was destined for the Jewish Co-Operative
Society of Haifa. 75 Despite a significant outcry from the Arab community, the only action the
Colonial Office took was to recommend that the Foreign Office inform the Italian
government that arms were being smuggled from Trieste.76 The smuggling of weapons was
crucial to the later development of the yishuv's underground defence force, the Haganah.
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The main concern held by the mandatory administration was Zionism's political
affiliation to the left and revolutionary socialism. British apprehension on this subject was
indicative of the wider understanding that thinking in the Jewish community was more
'advanced', and that Jewish actions were taken for ideological reasons and could not be
reduced to inherent character flaws. After the May Day riots, in which 'Bolshevik' elements
had playeda significant role, the mandatory administration held a particular concern for
subversive activities amongst socialist groups within the Zionist movement. Following the
riots in 1921 all known 'Bolsheviks' were deported, but that did not end the threat of
subversion inPalestine. The rise of communism within the Zionist movement can be
attributed to a general growth of socialism amongst Jewish workers in Europe, where the vast
majority of Jewish immigrants to Palestine originated.f InMay 1922, the chief secretary,
Wyndham Deedes, informed the Colonial Office that binding over orders, under the 1920
Prevention of Crimes Ordinance, had been issued to the leadership of the Socialist Workers
Party (Palestine) to prevent them from inciting sedition. The administration was concerned
that the group was being absorbed into the Poale Zion party, which was moving further to the
left and associating with the Haganah. A lack of clear evidence prevented the administration
from taking further action, but there was periodic surveillance on the development of
communism within the Zionist movement for the rest of the mandate."
Sir Herbert Dowbiggin and the Re-organisation of the Palestine Police, 1929-31
In August 1929, a wave of violence swept over Palestine after a dispute over the status of the
Western Wall in Jerusalem, which had steadily increased communal tensions during the
summer months.I" The mandatory government was unprepared for the outbreak of rioting. On
22 August, only a day before it occurred, the chief secretary, Harry Luke, believing that the
danger had passed, had written to the Colonial Office to offer his account of recent events,
praise his officers for restraint, and inform officials that he was proposing to hold
reconciliation meetings with the leaders of the Jewish and Arab communities. so The next day,
events quickly accelerated out of control and led to killings across the length and breadth of
Palestine. The police and garrison, having been gradually reduced during the 1920s,
contained no infantry and were unable to contain the violence. By the time reinforcements
77 For more on communism in Palestine, see Fred Halliday, 'Early Communism in Palestine', Journal of
Palestine Studies, Vol. 7, No.2, (Winter 1978), pp.162-9.
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79 For an account of the escalating tensions, see Townshend, 'Going to the Wall'.
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arrived from Malta and Egypt on 28 August, 133 Jews were killed and 339 wounded, whilst
116 Arabs were killed and 232 wounded/"
The 1929 riots were the most serious outbreak of colonial disorder yet experienced
under British rule in Palestine.f Public confidence in the police force was shaken. Its
response had been disjointed and disorganised as its senior leaders, the commandant, Arthur
Mavrogordato, and the district superintendent of Jerusalem, Major W.F. Wainwright, had
been on leave when the riots broke out, which disrupted communication and co-ordination
between district and town police commands. The killing of over 100 Arabs by a hastily
enrolled special constabulary, Jewish auxiliary volunteers, and soldiers rushed in from Egypt
in a desperate attempt to restore order represented a significant departure from the minimum
force-style policing of the civilian approach and exposed the inadequacy of the security
arrangements in Palestine.V Interim measures were taken to strengthen the police, including
an expansion of the British section by 200, bringing it to nearly 600 officers (out of a total
strength of almost 2,000), and the deployment of two infantry battalions which could give aid
to the civil power in times of emergency.l" Questions of cost - usually so important - were
largely irrelevant as this was viewed as essential for the future maintenance of law and order.
The inevitable effect was a dramatic rise in expenditure on public security, which jumped
from nearly £380,000 in 1927, after the gendarmeries had been disbanded, to over £900,000
in 1930; a figure which did not take into account contributions from the British government
in London.85
The police's failure to contain the violence had considerable potential to undermine
the long-term aim of trusteeship, which was to place responsibility for public security into its
hands. A return to a more militarised approach would have certainly presented less risk for
the colonial state in the fulfilment of its most basic objective. There was, however, a
surprising degree of agreement that, whilst the police needed some form of restructuring, they
would continue to play the main role in the maintenance of public order. The Colonial Office
accepted that it was inevitable that some of the reinforcements sent to Palestine during the
riots would need to be retained, but did not think they would displace the police's role.
Officials in London were generally inclined to wait for the commission of enquiry to deliver
:~ 'Report of the Commission on the Palestine Disturbances of August, 1929', p.65.
83 Chancellor to ~assfield, 31 December 1929, CO 733/180/1.
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its verdict. 86 The riots had demonstrated the limitations of air policing and Sir Hugh
Trenchard, the chief of the air staff, was forced to mount a vigorous defence ofthe RAF's
position in Palestine. His solution was to increase the size of the police, spread their resources
more evenly across Palestine, and provide back up through air power. As Thomas has
suggested, Trenchard's 'stubborn reluctance' to acknowledge the urban nature of disorder in
Palestine and that fundamental change was required, indicated that he had a 'limited grasp' of
the situarion." Perhaps the most important conclusion was reached by the Committee of
Imperial Defence, which suggested that, whilst a garrison of infantry should be kept
permanently in Palestine, an efficient police organisation offered the most effective method
of preventing future disturbances.f"
Mavrogordato was asked to submit his own proposals for the reorganisation of the
police. He advocated an increase in numbers and the payment of special allowances to
encourage more Jews, who were significantly under-represented, to join the force. However,
Chancellor decided that these recommendations did not get to the 'root of the matter', rectify
any structural defects in the force, or offer any guarantees of improved efficiency in dealing
with disturbances or in the detection and prosecution of criminals. 89 When the commission of
enquiry into the riots under Sir Walter Shaw submitted its report in March 1930, it passed a
series of damning verdicts which, in the aftermath of the violence, were not particularly
surprising. It suggested the policy of reducing the garrison had been taken too far, that the
non-British elements of the police could not be relied upon when faced by 'racial
disturbance', and that the intelligence system was inadequate and focused too heavily on the
threat of communist subversion.Y The committee recommended that no reductions should be
made to the two battalions of infantry that had been sent to Palestine during the riots and that
an independent enquiry on improving the efficiency of the police force should be carried out
by an experienced officer.91 Given Mavrogordato's narrow proposals, Chancellor readily
accepted the Shaw commission's recommendation that a review of the force be carried out by
an independent expert."
86 See Minutes by O.G.R. Williams and Sir 1. Shuckburgh, 16 September 1929, CO 733/176/5.
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The experienced officer selected was Sir Herbert Dowbiggin, the former inspector-
general of the Ceylon police. His success in Ceylon, which, with its Sinhalese, Tamil, Malay,
Moor, and Burgher population, had significant communal tensions of its own, meant that he
was viewed as an expert on preserving law and order between groups that had divergent
religious and political commitments." The main question confronting Dowbiggin was
whether to continue the civilian approach to public order or return to a semi-militarised
footing. He arrived in Palestine with finn ideas on colonial policing, and his overarching goal
was to create a fully effective civilian police force that focused on the prevention of disorder
rather than its containment. Dowbiggin's approach could be summarised by his maxim 'a
notebook is to the policeman what a rifle is to the soldier'." The Colonial Office had a
number of questions that they wanted Dowbiggin to consider, including the role that British
and Jewish officers should play within the force, and the wider issue of how the functions of
the police should be demarcated from the military. The long-term aim of Dowbiggin's
investigation was to make recommendations that would develop the efficiency of the police
in such a way as to reduce its dependence on British troops garrisoned in Palestine.95 The
focus on increasing the effectiveness of the police to make it a self-sufficient body, in the
context of a scheme that provided overall security for Palestine, underlined the fact that the
attempt to reorganise the security forces after the 1929 riots was congruent with the aims of
trusteeship.
The report that Dowbiggin produced ran to 274 pages and covered every aspect of
policing in Palestine. His approach was sympathetic; he acknowledged that the inexperience
of the force and the vicissitudes of the 1920s, when significant uncertainty had existed
between the functions of the various security forces, had placed a considerable obstacle in the
way of its development. 96 He also explained that communal tensions had undermined the
confidence of the police, suggesting that 'the only condition under which police work can
successfully be done is when no partiality is shown in dealing with different races and the
different classes of the population'." The complete removal of racial prejudice was deemed a
long-term objective and Dowbiggin appreciated that to expect the Palestine police to prevent
and impartially deal with racial disturbances in the short-term was 'asking the impossible of
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them' .98 He cited various reasons for this, including a lack of training, adequate barrack
housing, and recreation facilities, but perhaps most important was the dearth of British
supervision. These deficiencies illustrated the general neglect shown towards the police under
the semi-militarised approach to law and order that dominated the 1920s.
Dowbiggin held a strong belief in the impartiality of the British section of police - he
applauded their 'good qualities of impartiality, courage, tact, courtesy, and good nature'. 99
This was an instructive example of the general confidence of British officials in Palestine that
they could deal with both communities equally, yet Dowbiggin's position was informed by
Orientalist stereotypes of the Arab community that echoed earlier British views about the
nature of public disorder in the 'East'. He explained that
Serious premeditation and organisation for months in advance is almost impossible ...
[however, if] the cry is raised that a certain religion, temple, or place of worship is in
danger or has been attacked, or that co-religionists have been killed, a state of
religious frenzy is at once aroused, and in five minutes a riot of the most serious
nature is in progress, in the course of which the people whose religious feelings have
been worked upon will gladly lose their lives in attacking a community alleged to
have imposed upon their religious rights, ceremonies, or property. 100
This was similar to the Haycraft commission's verdict that unrest in the Arab community
could primarily be attributed to religious or racial incitement, rather than as part of a political
objective to demonstrate opposition to the policies of the colonial state. This perspective
continued to have a significant influence by perpetuating a reactionary stance to the
maintenance of public order. Despite his emphasis on prevention, Dowbiggin stressed that it
was 'a question of minutes and not of hours or days between peace and an emergency' .
. The palpable increase in tensions over the status of the Western Wall prior to August
1929 should have given the mandatory administration sufficient opportunity to prepare for an
outbreak of disorder, but the fact it did not suggests how pervasive these stereotypes were in
producing a reductive appreciation of events. In diminishing the capacity for Arab agency,
the mandatory administration effectively rejected any intelligence-led approach which would
require them to anticipate the scale of violence or prepare accordingly for it. Once a
disturbance was under way, Dowbiggin explained that
98 Ibid, p.l O.
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The only hope of prevention is for adequate force to be on the spot. The only
possibility of preventing a riot once started from spreading is to deal with the first
outbreak with utmost promptitude. Firm handling of the first outbreak will, in the long
run, prove to have been the most merciful and humane course.'?'
The reference to 'firm handling' reflected the Orientalist view that Arabs responded more
readily to a strong, authoritarian approach, and it helped to shape British planning for
maintaining public order across the mandate. Dowbiggin's assertion that the only method of
containing disorder was through having adequate force 'on the spot' was consonant with
earlier British analyses that stressed a reactive approach to containing disturbances. The
departure that Dowbiggin made was to suggest that the functions of the police and military
needed to be properly demarcated in times of emergency, and to express the hope that the
police could use their authority in a more preventative fashion.
Dowbiggin's plans for managing disorder rested on an assumption that military forces
would remain in the country for at least the next 20 years to provide stability for the
improvement of the police.l'" He envisaged a three-phase system for the deployment of the
garrison during times of unrest: it would move from a 'peacetime' disposition to a
'precautionary' stage that would see the garrison dispersed throughout the country, before an
'emergency' phase during which extra troops would be sent to Palestine from Egypt and
naval reinforcements from Malta.103 In the precautionary phase, the police would be
responsible for dealing with demonstrations, minor riots, and attacks on Jewish colonies, but
would also take preventive action by dispersing assemblies that were at risk of becoming
unlawful or escalating into a riot. 104 The police within each district would be able to utilise
the dispersed garrison to provide aid to the civil power if the disturbances became more
serious, but overall responsibility for order would rest with the mandatory administration.
This was important because it maintained police control in the most likely instances of unrest.
The emergency phase would be initiated in event of a general rebellion against the mandatory
power, in which case the Palestine government would have to consider a declaration of






defence plan of its type and, as Martin Kolinsky suggested, helped to provide stability and
purpose to the mandatory administration after the tumultuous events of August 1929.106
The duties assigned to the police under Dowbiggin's proposals were not only reliant
on a clear separation of police and military functions, but also on the role of the British
section of the Palestine police. Mavrogordato's earlier recommendations had simply called
for a larger British section so that there would be more reliable officers during emergencies,
but Dowbiggin envisaged a significantly different use of the British section. After the
reorganisation of 1926 that disbanded the two gendarmeries and created the Transjordan
Frontier Force, the British section of the police had been concentrated as a 'strike force' to
protect urban centres and patrol major roads, but this had created an overlap with the military
that essentially made the policing function of the British section redundant. The key question
for Dowbiggin was how to impart the 'good qualities' he had identified in the British section
to the entire force - the clear inference being that they did not possess those characteristics.P"
In terms of trusteeship, Dowbiggin's ideas of trying to make the police force more 'British'
can be viewed as an attempt to shape character to what colonial officials regarded as the
'correct' standard.
Despite his detailed planning for disorder, in Dowbiggin's view the main priority for
the police was to prevent and detect crime through the collection of intelligence. 108 This was
a key departure from the model of policing that underpinned the 1921 Police Ordinance,
where the primary duty of the force was to contain outbreaks of disorder. The most
significant feature of Dowbiggin's proposals was that the British section should be dispersed
throughout Palestine and engaged in more routine police work, with the aim of providing an
overall boost to the efficiency of the force. British police officers would be spread out across
32 permanent stations from which they would engage in regular patrols. Dowbiggin believed
that the visible presence of British officers would have significant benefits in maintaining
public order, which again demonstrated his faith in the 'superiority' of British personnel.
They were to patrol with Palestinian officers as much as possible to help instil 'a high sense
of duty' and provide an example of reliable and impartial policing.'?" Crucially, they were not
meant to take the place of the Palestinians but to 'supplement' them and offer the benefits of
greater exposure to the admirable qualities associated with the British section. The reason for
106 Kolinsky, Law, Order, and Riots in Mandatory Palestine, p.l21.




this was in line with the thinking of trusteeship and Dowbiggin's overarching goal of
promoting a self-sufficient Palestinian police force. If British officers formed the core of the
force, then there would be substantial problems if their numbers were reduced, which was not
unlikely at some point given the overarching trend of trying to reduce expenditure. In the
interim period, it guaranteed an element of reliability as the British police officers could
provide supervision during times of heightened tension.
The distribution of the British section amongst the permanent stations was particularly
significant as they were an integral part of the plan to provide for the defence of Jewish
colonists. Each station would be responsible for protecting a group of outlying colonies
during times of unrest, in tandem with sealed armouries that would be used for defence until
the security forces arrived. This was a highly controversial issue which originated at the
beginning of the mandate when, after the Jaffa riots in 1921, a scheme that placed rifles in
Jewish colonies was expanded so that they could be used to defend themselves until military
forces arrived.l'" The policy was gradually phased out during the 1920s but, even then,
Samuel explained it was essential 'to avoid giving substance to [the] absurd but nonetheless
firm belief of Arabs that Government is arming Jews against them'. III Dowbiggin advocated
using 'Greener guns', short-range defensive weapons, in the armouries to prevent such
criticism. The proposal is particularly revealing of British attitudes that the Jewish
community could be trusted with arms whilst the Arab community could not. Although arms
were widespread in Palestine following the First World War, the mandatory administration
sought to confiscate Arab weapons whenever possible. I 12 The scheme for the defence of
Jewish colonies was demonstrative of the assumption that it was the Arab community who
would initiate disorder and the yishuv that would need protecting. This was one of the more
tangible ways in which the mandatory administration sought to protect the development of
the Jewish national home in Palestine.
The other key element of police re-organisation was the restructuring of the Criminal
Investigation Department (CID). The CID was the subject of various criticisms after the riots
because it had been unable to supply intelligence that helped to prevent or contain the spread
1
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of violence.I" Dowbiggin stated it was the weakest part of the police force and was
particularly critical of its commanding officer, J.F. Broadhurst, suggesting that he was
incompetent and that 'one wonders how Mr. Broadhurst spent his day' .114 An efficient CID
was central to Dowbiggin's efforts at putting the police onto a more proactive footing, but he
also emphasised that the collection and communication of intelligence was a responsibility
that all police officers carried and should be instilled in new recruits from the very beginning
of their training. His report explained that a 'Police officer who, by getting information in
advance, prevents a riot or prevents a crime is a better man then the Police officer who quells
a disturbance by force' .IIS Dowbiggin advocated a general overhaul of the CID, including
new leadership, increased funding and staff, and a new administrative structure, so that it
could carry out its responsibilities of detecting crime and collecting and communicating
intelligence to the government on political movements, the press, and seditious activity.i'" He
suggested that intelligence liaison between police districts, divisional headquarters, and
district administrations be improved through a daily assessment that would also be sent to the
government secretariat, the commandant, and the general officer commanding, and a
quarterly analysis of crime in the various districts so that rank-and-file police officers and
district officials could understand their medium-term priorities. He further advised that the
CID's commanding officer should, like the police commandant, have the ability to
communicate directly with the high commissioner and the general officer commanding.
These changes were all designed to create an apparatus that could quickly process
incoming information about potential unrest and react to it, but such a system relied on the
raw intelligence that was fed into it and the reforms could do little to improve relations with
the Arab population, particularly as organised resistance to British rule gained momentum
during the 1930s.117 Kolinsky has suggested that the most important of Dowbiggin' s changes
to the police was the transformation of the CID. 118 Whilst the reforms were significant,
Kolinsky's conclusion does not pay enough consideration to the dispersal of the British
section of the Palestine police amongst the rest of the force as a wider move that would
transform its character. As long as the assumption that 'serious premeditation' from the Arabs
113 See, for examples, Committee of Imperial Defence Report, 30 December 1929, CAB 517; Note by Sir John
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would be impossible prevailed, it was difficult for the colonial state to gauge the scale and
depth of disorder. The CID, despite being re-organised, was unable to give the mandatory
administration accurate intelligence on the outbreak of the Arab rebellion. Yet the dispersal
of the British section seems to have provided the police with greater resilience which, as will
be explored in the next section, was demonstrated in its handling of the 1933 riots.
Law and Order between 1929 and 1936
The maintenance oflaw and order until the outbreak of the Arab rebellion in April 1936 was
carried out in the shadow of the August 1929 riots and the policy debates that followed with
the Shaw Commission, the Hope-Simpson Report, the Pass field White Paper, and the
MacDonald Letter. As has been suggested earlier, these political deliberations did not
fundamentally undermine British adherence to the principles of trusteeship in administering
the mandate and the civilian approach to policing was retained. The 1929 riots also posed
some fundamental questions for the Jewish community in Palestine. The long-running
assumption that the national home could be achieved through an 'evolutionary' approach, by
settling the land before the growth of Arab nationalism, lost much of its credibility. However,
the yishuv remained committed to what Anita Shapira described as its 'defensive ethos' - the
development of Jewish power for use in self-defence only. This ethos was an integral part of
the evolutionary approach; it exemplified mainstream Jewish attitudes towards the use of
force, but on a wider level it also served as an 'emotional, psychological and rational
foundation' that helped to justify Zionist goals in Palestine. Much like trusteeship, the
evolutionary approach postulated that disputes between the two peoples were connected to
the 'backwardness' of Arab society; any problems would therefore gradually disappear with
further economic 'progress and societal development. Despite the traumatic events of August
1929, the focus on these questions subsided as concerns intensified over Adolf Hitler's rise to
state power and the need to absorb the fifth aliyah.119
The events of 1929-31 preceded an intensification of the Palestinian Arab national
movement. During the 1930s, Islam became a more prominent symbol in the struggle against
Zionism and Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the grand mufti and president of the Supreme Muslim
Council, began to assume a more dominant role as leader of the Arab community. Moreover,
a new generation of better-educated and more radical politicians emerged that proved more
willing to confront the mandatory power than the traditional leadership represented by the
1J9 Sh . Lapira, and and Power, p.l2l; p.l73.
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Arab Executive (AE). However, factional struggles continued to prevent any attempt at
forging a unified opposition to the colonial state and Zionist settlement. The 1930s saw the
rise of youth organisations like the Arab Young Men's Muslim Association (established in
the late 1920s), the Patriotic Arab Association (July 1931), and the Committee of the Nablus
Congress (August 1931); political parties such as the Independence Party (August 1932), the
National Defence Party (December 1934), the Palestine Arab Party (May 1935), the Reform
Party (June 1935), and the National Bloc (October 1935); and clandestine resistance
organisations like Sheikh Izz ad-Din al-Qassam's Black Hand (1930).120 The policy
statements made by the British government in the aftermath of the 1929 riots persuaded some
Arab leaders that they had finally achieved a limitation of Zionist colonisation through co-
operation with the mandatory power. After the Black Letter, such hopes were frustrated and
the impetus of the national movement shifted away from the AE towards these various
groups. The Arab political process became more radicalised in order to mobilise popular
opposition to the mandate, and violent resistance to colonial rule was increasingly seen as the
only remaining method to protect Arab society in Palestine, particularly as Jewish
immigration and land purchases dramatically increased after 1933.121
Against this backdrop, it could be seen as paradoxical that the mandatory
administration actually managed to uphold an increasing standard of public security until
April 1936 and, from its point of view, successfully deal with an outbreak of disorder in
October 1933. Dowbiggin's proposals for police re-organisation represented a more proactive
approach to law and order, but the priority given to public security also provided the
justification for utilising the legal systems of the colonial state in a more authoritarian
fashion. After the disturbances in August 1929, the key question in this respect was over the
amount of control the mandatory administration should exercise over the press in Palestine to
thwart its ability to exacerbate unrest. The Shaw Commission drew particular attention to the
issue of press incitement in the build-up of tensions by suggesting that 'too great a liberty of
expression has been allowed to the Press in Palestine' .122Inhis own appreciation, Chancellor
reflected that Arab newspapers had come close to being 'actively seditious' and that certain
articles were an 'incitement to disorder'. He viewed these tendencies as the natural product of
a less 'civilised' or 'responsible' society, explaining that
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Such violence of language is common in the vernacular presses of the Middle East
and it is only to be expected among races which are undisciplined in a social sense
and highly passionate when under the influence of a religious idea or labouring under
a sense of injustice. 123
This statement was based on general images provided by Orientalism, but it also reflected
prevailing British views on the nature of Arab disorder by emphasising the influence that
religion had in aggravating 'passions'. Such characterisation was significant as it reinforced
the idea that disturbances were spontaneous and unorganised, with the corresponding
knowledge that a sustained campaign of politically motivated disorder against the mandatory
power was unlikely to occur.
The need to curb the press's potential to incite disorder necessitated a change in the
administration's approach to it. Press censorship had been introduced after the Jaffa riots in
1921 and district governors had been given permission by the colonial secretary to act 'on the
side of severity' in censoring opinions. Churchill recognised that this was' obviously required
for the safeguarding of national interests' but also advocated that it should be 'done away
with at the earliest possible moment'. He explained to Samuel that he was facing opposition
in parliamentary circles and wished to give 'the fullest assurance' that the civil rights
accorded under the mandate would be respected.V" Itwas clear that censorship sat
uncomfortably with many British officials as it clashed with the liberalising tendencies within
the British philosophy of colonial rule. Press supervision was handed to the Criminal
Intelligence Department, but there was no consistent policy and minimal contact took place
between the press and government. In 1928, the responsibility for press scrutiny was
transferred from the CID to a dedicated bureau that had been set up in the government
secretariat. A junior assistant secretary was given the task of directing the bureau, but this
was not his primary responsibility and the importance of the press bureau quickly
diminished.125 The Shaw Commission recommended that inflammatory articles should be
brought to the attention of the senior officers in the mandatory administration more often and
that the old Ottoman press laws should be amended to ensure that newspapers who published
articles that were conducive to breaches of the peace were more routinely prosecuted in
COurt.
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Furness, to restructure the press bureau so that it could adopt a more thorough supervisory
role.
The changes proposed after 1929 continued to reflect British ambivalence over
censorship and led to a debate between the Colonial Office and mandatory administration on
how far the legal system of the mandate should be harnessed to repression. The first of the
Shaw Commission's recommendations was fairly uncontroversial and Furness set about
reorganising the bureau and finding an official to train as a dedicated press officer. His report
explained that a lack of independence and understaffing had led to the inefficiency of the
press bureau. After the riots, it had exercised 'almost exclusively inspective and repressive'
control over the press with 'hardly any guidance' given to it.127 The emphasis on guidance
was indicative of how Furness's general approach to the press was informed by a significant
degree of paternalism, which in itself relied on Orientalist judgments about the Arab
character. They underpinned the sweeping observation that
The press in Palestine indisputably has a great influence on public opinion, and
ultimately on public security. The public is an ignorant one, and therefore credulous,
particularly of what they read, and the newspapers are their favourite reading. They
are largely illiterate, but that is no bar to acquaintance with the content of newspapers,
which are habitually read aloud to them all over the country and do not lose force in
the process. They are both excitable, and, so far as I can observe, serious.128
This potent mix of credulity and excitability, from the administration's point of view,
underlined the need for a more rigorous supervisory regime. Furness suggested that a more
constructive approach to press relations was needed, so that there was an equal division of
responsibility between supervising the press, collating information from newspapers and
scrutinising content, and acting as a liaison to journalists by providing information and
issuing communiques on matters of public importance.F' In the long-term, this approach
connected to trusteeship through the creation of a fairly regulated, more responsible press;
Furness envisaged that attention paid to the latter would help to improve journalistic
standards and prevent distorted or inaccurate reporting of government actions and reduce the
need for a repressive stance towards the newspapers.P"
The second recommendation, legislative change, was more divisive. Ultimately, the
need to guarantee security dictated policy but British officials tried to conform to liberal





principles as far as possible. In the aftermath of the riots, a number of prosecutions were
attempted against newspapers but the 'cumbrous and obscure' nature of the Ottoman press
laws!3! meant they failed and the administration relied on the autocratic powers that the high
commissioner could exercise in council to suspend newspapers.!32 This was not viewed as a
satisfactory long-term solution and the Palestine government wanted executive powers for
district officials to enable them to seize publications, levy sanctions, and close down
newspapers they regarded as seditious, without recourse to the courtS.133The Colonial Office
legal advisers were particularly concerned at the removal of judicial sanction from the issue
of press offences.P" Instead, they proposed a system based on the model of supervision in
Cyprus, where the high commissioner could more easily suspend the press in the short-term
and seize newspapers containing seditious material, whilst the courts could take longer-term
decisions on sanctions and closures. 135Wauchope used the expertise of Furness, who was
training the press bureau, to draft a new ordinance in April 1932 that was approved by the
Colonial Office.136
The new approach to the press was soon tested when the Arab community discovered
in July 1931 that sealed armouries had been re-introduced into Jewish colonies on
Dowbiggin's recommendations. There was a significant public outcry, and the mandatory
administration feared that a sustained press campaign would trigger a repeat of the agitation
that led to the riots in August 1929. After an Arab congress took place at the end of July
1931, during which younger politicians made inflammatory speeches - a sign of the
radicalising national movement amongst the Arab youth - the administration acted firmly by
summoning leading Arab editors to inform them that presenting the sealed armouries as a
threat to law-abiding citizens would result in the suspension of their newspapers. In concert
with binding over various Arab leaders under the Prevention of Crimes Ordinance, this
warning seemed to bring an end to the agitation.l " The actions taken were illustrative of the
limits of Furness's constructive approach in Palestine in the face of the need to maintain
public security. Shuckburgh, for example, had already expressed his scepticism about
attempting to 'nurse' the press in Palestine but deferred to the high commissioner's
131 Colonial Office Note on 'Press Law in Palestine', 12 April 1932, CO 733/24017.
::~ Furness, 'Report on the Control of the Press in Palestine', p.3.
OAG to Passfield, 9 July 1930, CO 733/190/3.
134 S M' bI3S ee .mutes y N.L. Mayle, 21 July 1930 and 2 December 1930, CO 733/190/3.
Colonial Office Note on 'Press Law in Palestine', 12 April 1932. CO 733/24017.
136 Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 9 April 1932, CO 733/221/3.
137 K l' ko ms y, Law, Order, and Riots in Mandatory Palestine, pp.l13-S.
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judgement on the matter.138 When confronted with a potentially divisive issue, it was deemed
safer to operate a more repressive and heavy handed stance towards newspaper editors and
threaten them with closure.
Itwas not long before the possibility of unrest within the Arab community manifested
itself again. The changing dynamic within the Arab national movement, as the importance of
the Arab Executive declined, forced the 'traditional' leadership to adopt a more militant
stance to prevent its position from being further undermined. In March 1933, the AE declared
a boycott of Jewish trade and a policy of non-cooperation with the mandatory government.P?
During 1933, the Arab press reported with growing concern on the increase of Jewish
immigration and the resolution of the eighteenth Zionist Congress calling for unrestricted
immigration into Palestine. This again highlighted both the difficulties of controlling the
press and British reluctance to engage in censorship. Since the 1929 riots, demonstrations had
been banned but, in protest against Jewish immigration, the AE called for a general strike on
13 October and decided to hold a protest in Jerusalem against the British policy on Jewish
immigration. Despite warnings that demonstrations were illegal and would carry penalties,
the protest went ahead as planned. A minor skirmish broke out between the fifty-strong
detachment of unarmed police and the demonstrators, but the police managed to disperse the
crowd through baton charges and there was no loss of life which, after the 1929 riots, was
viewed as a significant success.
The Arab Executive also considered the protest a success and organised another strike
and demonstration two weeks later in Jaffa. This time, the procession turned into a riot after
diverting from its original route. The police opened fire to disperse the crowds, killing 14 and
wounding 38. As news of this disorder spread, disturbances broke out in Haifa and Nablus
but were eventually contained without fatalities. Wauchope was especially keen to limit any
political fallout from the disturbances. The high commissioner wrote to the Colonial Office
suggesting that a commission of inquiry should be established, but with a narrow frame of
reference to prevent it from commenting on policy. Wauchope believed that policy
recommendations of major importance should not stem from an investigation into a
138 Minute by Shuckburgh, 13 March 1930, CO 733/190/3.
139 Kolinsky. Law, Order, and Riots in Mandatory Palestine, pp.l64-8.
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disturbance and feared that a wide frame of reference would 'arouse racial feelings' leading
to a further increase in communal tensions.l'"
The commission, headed by the former Chief Justice of the Straits Settlements, Sir
William Murison, commended the police for their restraint and forbearance despite the
'mercurial and excitable and when excited, dangerous Arab crowd,.141 Under the defence
scheme, the garrison in Palestine had dispersed to the precautionary stage but the police had
not needed to call on it and, in marked contrast to 1929, the entire force had been reliable,
which was seen as a testament to Dowbiggin's proposals and the re-organisation carried out
by Roy Spicer, who had replaced Mavrogordato as inspector-general.i'f Whilst
acknowledging 'a general feeling of apprehension' amongst the Arabs engendered by Jewish
immigration and land purchases, the commission concluded that the disturbances 'were
chiefly due to a desire to retaliate generally against the police on account of the action which
they had been forced to take, the accounts of which were doubtless greatly exaggerated'. The
spread of disturbances to Haifa and Nablus were consonant with this verdict of 'criminal'
retaliation against the police, which removed any political motivation from the riotS.143
In hindsight, the 1933 riots can be seen as an expression of increased Palestinian Arab
opposition to the colonial state. Yet despite the various signs that resistance was growing, the
general standard of public security in Palestine was actually increasing. After the police were
re-organised in 1931 and the British section assigned more 'routine' policing duties, levels of
crime fell dramatically. In 1931, the first year that the police filed an annual report with the
secretariat, there had been 4,815 indictable and 28,008 non-indictable offences committed in
Palestine, but a steady drop each year meant that by 1935 crime had more than halved with
1,753 indictable and 10,525 non-indictable offences committed. There was also a significant
increase in the rate of convictions, which went from around 50 to nearly 80 per cent as the
police utilised new techniques of collecting evidence. 144Falling levels of crime and the
police's ability to contain the riots in 1933 contributed to a general sense of complacency
about the security situation. The limited nature of the inquiry into the 1933 disturbances
140 Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 6 November 1933, CO 733/239/6; Cunliffe-Lister to Wauchope, 7 November
1933, CO 733/239/6.
::~Report of the Murison Committee on the 1933 disturbances, 4 January 1933, CO 733/239/6.
143 Wauchope to Spicer, 12 January 1934, CO 733/258/2.
Ibid.
144 Palestine Police Force, 'Annual Administrative Report, 1931', CO 814/5; Palestine Police Force, 'Annual
Administrative Report, 1935', CO 814/10.
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allowed the prevailing British view about Arab disorder to continue until the outbreak of the
Arab rebellion in 1936.
Conclusion
The maintenance of law and order was a primary responsibility for the Palestine government.
When the civil administration of Palestine began in July 1920, the territory had a substantial
garrison of troops that cost the British taxpayer over £3.5 million a year but little in the way
of effective local forces. The need to reduce Britain's financial liability for Palestine was a
pressing one, but discussions on restructuring the security forces were also related to
trusteeship because they explored how responsibility for public order could be transferred to
a local, self-sufficient police force. The composition of the forces used to preserve internal
security went through some key phases: initially, the military garrison was paramount, then
the gendarmeries were created, before, finally, the main responsibility for public order was
vested in the police force. The overarching logic of these changes was a reduction of costs
but there was also a corresponding increase in the level of responsibility taken on by local
forces in Palestine which was consonant with notions of trusteeship. The 1929 riots were a
bloody demonstration that the garrison had been reduced too quickly and that the police could
not cope with disorder in its current form. Dowbiggin's restructuring of the force, which.
included dispersing the British section, and his defence scheme ensured that the police
continued to play the primary role in times of disorder. By the mid-1930s, it can be argued
that the goals of trusteeship had largely been achieved; there was an efficient police force in
place that was responsible for public security and a clear delineation between its
responsibilities and those of the military garrison.
The secondary aim of this chapter was to explore how cultural assumptions influenced
the British approach to law and order. Dowbiggin had also tried to establish a more
preventive method of maintaining order through overhauling the Palestine CID. Various
pieces of criminal legislation could have also been harnessed to this approach but ultimately
an intelligence-led system was difficult to implement. Not only did deteriorating relations
with the Arab community hinder such an approach but cultural preconceptions about the
spontaneous nature of Arab disorder pushed British priorities in a different direction. In his
work on the Arab rebellion, Charles Townshend noted that 'by 1936 the British had become
accustomed to thinking that the Arabs of Palestine were incapable of organising a unified
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national movement' .145 Indeed, to colonial officials there had been no evolution between the
preceding outbreaks of disorder in 1920, 1921, 1929, and 1933 - all had been expressions of
Arab irrationality and an inability to control a 'murderous temper' when labouring under a
religious or racial grievance. This image had considerable force. The mandatory
administration consistently feared an outbreak of disturbances, but it was never considered
that they would emerge out of a politically organised Palestinian Arab national movement.
This view extended into an initial confusion over whether the Arab resistance that began with
a general strike in April 1936 actually constituted a revolt. As it progressed, however, the
scale of the Arab rebellion fundamentally and irrevocably undermined many of the
assumptions that the British position in Palestine had been built on.




The outbreak of the Arab rebellion marked the failure of trusteeship in Palestine. In scale and
intensity, the rebellion completely eclipsed previous outbreaks of disorder and the routine of
civil administration became impossible as the British authorities lost control of wide swathes
of the Palestinian countryside. I In contrast to previous episodes of rioting, the rebellion was
specifically directed at the mandate government and rebels targetted both the political and
economic apparatus of the colonial state in Palestine.i The causes were multi-faceted: the
dramatic rise in immigration during the 1930s was accompanied by a change in the dynamic
of land sales, which prompted an influx of rural Arabs migrating to the towns in search of
work and exacerbated Arab grievances about being dispossessed of their land. Yet Arab
motivations for supporting the rebellion were not simply because of a reaction to heightened
Jewish immigration and land purchases. During the 1930s, the Palestinian Arab national
movement went through a process of political radicalisation which stemmed from the
inability of its traditional leadership to effectively oppose British support for Zionism. In
mobilising widely held opposition to the mandate, the rebellion had a significant popular base
that combined an urban Arab nationalism with peasant economic grievances. This compelled
Arab notables to confront the rivalries that had previously undermined the national movement
and caused the political parties that emerged during the early 1930s to band together and
establish the Arab Higher Committee in order to direct the rebellion.'
The rebellion began on 15 April1936 with the murder of two Jews on the Tulkarm,
Nablus road. This was quickly followed by the retaliatory murder of two Arabs near Petah
Tiqva. Rioting and anti-Jewish demonstrations then occurred in Jaffa, but the unrest
continued and a general strike was declared on 21 April and the newly formed Arab Higher
Committee vowed to continue the strike until the British government in London met their
demands for a ban on Jewish immigration and land acquisition, and the establishment of a
ISegev, One Palestine, Complete, p.414.
2 Thomas, Empires of Intelligence, p.244.
3 Martin Kolinsky, 'The Collapse and Restoration of Public Security', in Martin Kolinsky and Michael Cohen,
Britain and the Middle East in the 1930s: Security Problems, 1935-39, (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1992),
p.147.
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representative government.' By the summer of 1936, the rebellion had intensified into an
irregular war and policymakers in London decided to send a royal commission, headed by
Lord Peel, to investigate the disturbances 'on the spot'. Before the committee could depart for
Palestine, however, Britain was forced into the unprecedented step of asking Arab leaders
from outside Palestine to intervene and persuade the Arab Higher Committee to stop the
violence so that the commission had a stable environment in which to work. The Peel
Commission's report was wide-ranging and astutely addressed nearly every facet of British
rule in Palestine but its most contentious recommendation was that Palestine should be
partitioned into Jewish and Arab states.
The British government's endorsement of this principle caused public security to
deteriorate even further than in the initial phase of the rebellion. Wauchope asked for early
retirement after his conciliatory approach had failed. He was succeeded by Sir Harold
MacMichael, a colonial administrator who had been governor of the Sudan and was an
Orientalist scholar.' Unlike Wauchope, he had no qualms about declaring military law and
sanctioned repressive methods to combat the insurgency. Even so, during the summer of
1938, he had no choice but to inform the Colonial Office that the rebellion had reached a
point where the 'rebel leaders are more feared and respected than we are' ,and speak of 'the
essential unity' of the Palestinian Arab movement, which, although 'not fully co-ordinated' ,
was being constantly improved and was 'definitely a national one,.6 After the Munich
Agreement postponed the possibility of war in Europe, the British government felt able to
commit substantial military forces to Palestine and suppress the rebellion, but the magnitude
of the disorder obliged policymakers to rethink the fundamental assumptions that
underpinned their position in Palestine and it was clearly recognised that a political solution
was required to stabilise the wider British position in the region.
The new political approach emerged during 1938 and it involved a significant turn
away from some of the core assumptions that underpinned trusteeship. In January 1938, the
government appointed the Woodhead Commission to work out the technical details of
partition, but when it presented its findings to Parliament in November, it had long been
known in London and Jerusalem that partition would be abandoned," Speaking to the House
of Commons in November 1938, Malcolm MacDonald, the colonial secretary, lauded Zionist
: Sherman, Mandate Days, pp.94-5.
6 See Ox~ord DNB, accessed via http://www.oxforddnb.com/vlcw/articlc/34797?docPos=1. on 29 Apri12013.
Quoted m Townshend, 'The Defence of Palestine', p.934.
7 Report of inter-departmental meeting in London, 10 October 1938, CO 733/386/13.
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achievements in Palestine and explained that 'it is not only the Jews who have benefited from
the Balfour Declaration' . However, he also acknowledged that 'it is useless to press that
argument on the Arabs. They are deafto the argument, they are blind to the spectacle of a
gradually improving standard of life for their people, because they are thinking of something
else. They are thinking of their freedom'. 8 At an inter-departmental conference in the same
month, Downie, an assistant secretary in the Middle East Department, explained that 'all
experience, and the Royal Commission's opinion, shows that (whatever Jews may say or
think) nothing can persuade the Arabs that economic progress and Jewish infiltration are
better than poverty and national independence'." His remarks were somewhat misleading as
British policymakers had long held the same assumption that economic growth would
mitigate political tensions but they demonstrate how colonial officials were beginning to
distance themselves from previous policy.
These verdicts, and others such as MacMichael's, which acknowledged the 'essential
unity' of the Palestinian Arab national movement, established a political foundation for the
White Paper of May 1939. Described as an instrument of appeasement in the Middle East, it
provided for the establishment within ten years of an independent Palestinian state in treaty
relations with Britain; the immediate appointment of some Palestinians to head certain
Ministries, once order in Palestine was completely restored; the restriction in some areas, and
the complete prohibition in others, ofland purchases by Jews; and a quota of75,OOO Jewish
immigrants over the next five years, after which Arab consent would be sought for
subsequent entries." The White Paper recognised that the Palestinian Arabs would never
accept Zionism on the grounds that it brought economic benefits, but it also went much
further: it curtailed British support for Zionism, crystallised the size of the Jewish national
home, and acknowledged that the Palestinian Arabs had legitimate national aspirations of
their own, which effectively removed the core assumptions that sustained British trusteeship
in Palestine as it had existed between the establishment of the civil administration and
outbreak of the Arab rebellion. The White Paper policy clearly envisaged that Britain would
maintain an influential position in the proposed Palestinian state through treaty relations, as
had been the case in Iraq in 1932 and as would happen with Transjordan in 1946. However,
8 Speech made by MacDonald in the House of Commons, 24 November 1938, CO 733/386/13.
9 Report ofinter-dcpartmental meeting in London, 11 October 1938, CO 733/386/13.
10 'Palestine. Statement of Policy', May 1939, Cmd, 6019, (London, HMSO, 1939). See also Cohen,
'Appeasement in the Middle East', pp.592-3.
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the outbreak of the Second World War meant that the White Paper was never fully
implemented and after the war events unfolded in a different direction.
Those events, of course, are another story; but the nature of them has had a significant
influence on the subsequent development of the historiography on the inter-war period in
Palestine. This thesis has sought to add to that historiography by tracing the influence of
trusteeship in policy-making debates between the Colonial Office in London and the
mandatory administration in Jerusalem. To do this, it has tended to focus on the link between
the Middle East Department and the office of the high commissioner. Whilst other parts of
the mandatory administration have featured prominently, the nature of the sources and the
research undertaken has been conducive to this particular focus. It seems that the bombing of
the government wing of the King David Hotel in July 1946 destroyed many of the records
from the earlier years of the mandatory administration and so the main body of source
material is the correspondence that survives in the files of the Colonial Office. For the future
historiography on trusteeship, there remains significant scope for further examination of the
deeper context of mandatory rule in Palestine by focusing more explicitly on individual
departments within the mandatory administration or on other administrative areas, such as
health and public works. There is also the possibility of examining how conceptions of
trusteeship differed among the British mandates, both in the Middle East and Africa. Looking
further afield, it could also be possible to study French policy to assess how mandatory
obligations and the principles of trusteeship were interpreted in the Syrian and Lebanese
mandates.
Those mandates, established by the Covenant of the League of Nations, were
described as a 'sacred trust of civilisation'. In emphasising notions of trusteeship, the
mandate system was designed to confer legitimacy to the conquests made during the First
World War. For Britain, the issue of trusteeship had a long history that had been at the heart
of its imperial project since the acquisition of India in the eighteenth century and so British
philosophies of colonial rule promoted liberal, utilitarian, and rational approaches to
governance in Palestine. As has been suggested, the Balfour Declaration and the mandate
provided 'flawed foundations' for British rule 11; trusteeship was required as both a method of
achieving and as a way of reconciling the conflicting obligations that were contained in these
controversial documents. Against the backdrop of developing tensions between the Arab and
It Renton, 'Flawed Foundations', p.37.
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Jewish communities, it has been easy to overlook the influence that trusteeship had on British
policy-making in favour of the political ramifications that resulted from British support for
Zionism. By utilising notions of trusteeship, this thesis has sought to move away from
historiographical trends that focus solely on the primacy of Arab-Jewish conflict and instead
follow in the path of some recent historians, such as Martin Bunton, who promoted an
approach to the mandate that takes into account the wider influences of British imperialism in
Palestine.V
Trusteeship was a key feature in the British administration of the mandate between
1920 and 1936, and this thesis has explored its influence in five key administrative areas:
self-government, immigration, land, education, and law and order. The beginning of the civil
government in July 1920 allowed Britain to move away from the principle of maintaining the
status quo that had guided the military regime. The early priorities of the mandatory
administration included the creation of a system to regulate immigration and the
establishment of a Land Commission. These moves could be interpreted as paving the way
for Zionist colonisation by facilitating migration and 'rationalising' tenure in order to make it
easier to buy and sell land yet, whilst British officials were aware that such moves would
fulfil their mandatory obligations to Zionism, they were primarily justified in economic
terms. The import of capital and labour was deemed crucial to the Palestinian economy in the
aftermath of the First World War and, because it lacked significant resources of its own, land
reform was considered vital in order to increase agricultural productivity. These objectives
were deemed necessary irrespective of any British commitment to support Zionism.
The outbreak of rioting in 1920 and 1921 posed some early challenges to the
mandatory administration, but they did not undermine the basic precepts of trusteeship. The
colonial perspective that attributed the cause of violence to flaws within the Arab character,
and which refused to recognise the violence as having a political rationale, formed a
consistent theme in the British approach to Arab disorder. After the Jaffa riots, it was decided
to establish a legislative council to reinforce connections between the mandatory
administration and Arab notables. In London, the British government sought to reach an
agreement with the Arab delegation over plans for a constitution for Palestine but the
delegation's refusal to consider any proposal that effectively endorsed the Balfour
Declaration meant that Britain was left with little choice but to make a unilateral declaration
12 Bunton, Colonial Land Policies in Palestine, pp.1-30.
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of policy in the 1922 White Paper. This was one of the most important attempts to 'clarify'
exactly what the Balfour Declaration meant as it suggested that the Jewish national home
would be founded in Palestine, but would not encompass the whole of it. In the interests of
the 'non-Jewish population', the rate of immigration was formally tied to the economic
absorptive capacity of the country, which was an important expression of trusteeship. The
White Paper prepared the ground for elections to the legislative council, but the Arab
community boycotted all attempts at constitutional development because it did not want to
confer legitimacy to the mandate. In order to make progress in the field of self-government,
the British focus shifted to developing local forms of communal autonomy for the remainder
of the 1920s.
The outbreak of rioting in 1929 resulted in a prolonged period of reflection on the
future of British rule in Palestine. However, the policy implications were less drastic than is
assumed because Britain remained committed to trusteeship in Palestine. Rather than an
attempted move away from support for Zionism, the Shaw Commission, the Hope-Simpson
Report, the 1930 White Paper, and the Black Letter should all be viewed as a recalibration of
the developmental and protective aspects of trusteeship, which was necessary because the
yishuv had reached the point where its continued development was believed to have a greater
effect on the economic position of the Arab community. British policymakers continued to
recognise the importance of Zionism for economic development, but they also acknowledged
the limited quantity of land available for further Jewish settlement so they advocated an
'active' policy of development which prescribed more intensive cultivation of the land by
both Arabs and Jews to support a larger population. These more subtle changes did imply
some limitation on the potential growth of the national home. However, they did not envisage
a complete restriction on future settlement; the Cabinet Committee on Palestine estimated
that Zionist reserves of land would be sufficient for five years of continued settlement whilst
the proposed development was carried out. The Black Letter has traditionally been
interpreted as reversing the Pass field White Paper yet it actually affirmed many of its central
aspects, including the development plan; the creation of a body responsible for carrying it out
,
with powers over land transactions; an inquiry into Arab landlessness; and the introduction of
new legislation to protect the position of tenant cultivators. The failure of the policies
contained in the White Paper was not due to the Black Letter but because the British
government was reluctant to finance large-scale infrastructure projects during the depression
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of the 1930s. Whether a successful development policy could have averted the kind of
tensions that were instrumental in the outbreak of Arab rebellion is an open question.
This thesis has also sought to emphasise the importance of cultural preconceptions by
utilising Edward Said's concept of Orient ali sm. The binary images supplied by Orientalism
facilitated the discourses of progress and improvement that formed the core of trusteeship.
Beyond the image of superior Occidentals and inferior Orientals, a framework of cultural
stereotypes about the Arabs in Palestine was created. They were variously depicted and
described by British policymakers as a 'subject' people; that their farming and landholding
methods were archaic; that the rural fellahin were fatalistic about their position on the land
and lacked political consciousness; that they were usually obedient when faced with 'strong'
forms of authority, but were volatile and irrational when it came to religious and racial
grievances, which often caused rapid outbreaks of public disorder; that anti-British activity
was the work of criminals; that notables and effendis were parochial, divided, and motivated
by kinship or greed rather than political ideology; that they were unsuitable for 'literary' or
advanced forms of education; and that the Arab character lacked civic responsibility and
needed to be tutored in administration.i'' Cultural preconceptions also informed British
attitudes towards the Jewish community. The European origins of the Zionist movement
allowed the mandatory administration to give the yishuv a significant degree of autonomy.
The relationship between Britain and the Jewish and Arab communities has often been
conceived in terms of a triangle" but, contrary to much of the early historiography on the
mandate, the different communities did not begin on an even footing and the interactions
between them were in no sense equal. British cultural preconceptions skewed power relations
in Palestine because the colonial state in Palestine created and managed the environment in
which the interactions between the Arab and Jewish communities took place: it formed 'the
constitutive blueprint within which the other actors moved, acted, and thought'. IS Within this
environment, the Zionist movement was able to develop powerful quasi-state institutions for
which the Arabs had no parallel because they were directly subordinated to the British
dominated mandatory administration.l"
13 Ghandour, A Discourse on Domination in Mandate Palestine, p.2.
14 See, for example, Bethell, The Palestine Triangle.
15 Shamir, Colonies of Law, p.ll.
16 Bernard Wasserstein, 'The British Mandate in Palestine: Myths and Realities', Middle Eastern Lectures No.1,
(1995).
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The core assumptions that a coherent articulation of trusteeship relied on between
1920 and 1936 - that the Palestinian Arabs did not warrant national rights of self-
determination; that economic development, assisted by Zionist settlement, would mitigate
any tensions that derived from an increased Jewish presence in Palestine; and that Britain
would retain a long-term presence in Palestine to protect the interests of all communities, as
they were conceived by colonial officials - were gradually undermined as the mandate
progressed and finally abandoned during the Arab rebellion. By the time British priorities in
Palestine had shifted away from trusteeship, it was, at best, only partially fulfilled. In the field
of self-government, the mandatory administration developed various local forms of autonomy
as part of their efforts to carry out trusteeship but, ultimately, meaningful power remained
centralised in British hands. Immigration and land reform were supposed to achieve
economic development but, by 1936, it was clear that, whilst the Palestinian economy had
grown significantly, that prosperity had done little to improve the impoverished position of
the rural Arab fellahin. In education, the mandatory administration significantly expanded the
government school system, yet it fell far short of meeting the Arab demand for education.
The school-building programmes of the 1930s could barely keep pace with the rising demand
for school places, let alone address the deficit that had built up during a decade of parsimony.
Even then, the content of education was narrow and tied to British priorities. Arab leaders
often looked to private forms of education in order to develop values such as Palestinian Arab
nationalism, pan-Arabism, and pan-Islamism.l" In law and order, after Dowbiggin's reforms,
a detailed defence scheme was put in place; the efficiency of the police was significantly
improved; and its functions were clearly demarcated from those of the garrison but the
outbreak of the Arab rebellion and the British failure to contain it undoubtedly erased the
achievements of the early 1930s as the colonial state turned to repression to fight the
msurgency.
British rule in Palestine has often been judged for its failure to cultivate Arab-Jewish
relations. Under trusteeship, however, this was always a secondary priority; a question that
could only be properly considered when economic development had formed the foundation
for a stable polity that the various communities could engage in. How colonial officials
would judge when the economic climate was optimum, or what the demographic balance
would be like then, is unclear but British officials were forced to confront this question at
17 S
ee, for example, Ela Greenberg, 'Majal/at Rawdal al-ma 'arif: Constructing Identity within a Boys School
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various intervals - usually after an outbreak of violence. These episodes typically resulted in
partial answers and a rethinking of how the primary obligations of trusteeship would be
carried out, whilst difficult questions about the end of the mandate were 'postponed'. Yet the
communal approach that was adopted in the interim, which was a form of divide and rule,
clearly reinforced the separation of the Arab and Jewish peoples, and this made the objective
of creating some form of unified political community for the purpose of devolving self-
government ever more distant. Trusteeship does, however, allow for more nuanced
understandings of British relations wit~ the Arab and Jewish communities; rather than
prescribing mutually exclusive pro-Arab or pro-Jewish perspectives to mandatory rule, it is
more important to understand how British interests and obligations were conceived. In doing
that, I hope this thesis has offered some insight on how trusteeship enabled British officials to
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